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“The mantra of any good security engineer is: “Security is a not a product, but a 
process.” It's more than designing strong cryptography into a system; it's designing 




"Cryptography shifts the balance of power from those with a monopoly on violence to 




















Cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network 
access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources that can be rapidly 
provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider 
interaction. Over the last decade, cloud computing has gained popularity and wide 
acceptance, especially within the health sector  where it offers several advantages such 
as low costs, flexible processes, and access from anywhere.  
Although cloud computing is widely used in the health sector, numerous issues 
remain unresolved. Several studies have attempted to review the state of the art in 
eHealth cloud privacy and security however, some of these studies are outdated or do 
not cover certain vital features of cloud security and privacy such as access control, 
revocation and data recovery plans. This study targets some of these problems and 
proposes protocols, algorithms and approaches to enhance the security and privacy of 
cloud computing with particular reference to eHealth clouds.  
Chapter 2 presents an overview and evaluation of the state of the art in eHealth 
security and privacy. Chapter 3 introduces different research methods and describes 
the research design methodology and processes used to carry out the research 
objectives. Of particular importance are authenticated key exchange and block cipher 
modes. In Chapter 4, a three-party password-based authenticated key exchange 
(TPAKE) protocol is presented and its security analysed. The proposed TPAKE 
protocol shares no plaintext data; all data shared between the parties are either hashed 
or encrypted. Using the random oracle model (ROM), the security of the proposed 
TPAKE protocol is formally proven based on the computational Diffie-Hellman 
(CDH) assumption. Furthermore, the analysis included in this chapter shows that the 
proposed protocol can ensure perfect forward secrecy and resist many kinds of 
common attacks such as man-in-the-middle attacks, online and offline dictionary 
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attacks, replay attacks and known key attacks. Chapter 5 proposes a parallel block 
cipher (PBC) mode in which blocks of cipher are processed in parallel. The results of 
speed performance tests for this PBC mode in various settings are presented and 
compared with the standard CBC mode. Compared to the CBC mode, the PBC mode 
is shown to give execution time savings of 60%.  Furthermore, in addition to 
encryption based on AES 128, the hash value of the data file can be utilised to provide 
an integrity check. As a result, the PBC mode has a better speed performance while 
retaining the confidentiality and security provided by the CBC mode. 
Chapter 6 applies TPAKE and PBC to eHealth clouds. Related work on security, 
privacy preservation and disaster recovery are reviewed. Next, two approaches 
focusing on security preservation and privacy preservation, and a disaster recovery 
plan are proposed. The security preservation approach is a robust means of ensuring 
the security and integrity of electronic health records and is based on the PBC mode, 
while the privacy preservation approach is an efficient authentication method which 
protects the privacy of personal health records and is based on the TPAKE protocol.  
A discussion about how these integrated approaches and the disaster recovery plan can 
ensure the reliability and security of cloud projects follows. 
Distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks are the second most common 
cybercrime attacks after information theft. The timely detection and prevention of such 
attacks in cloud projects are therefore vital, especially for eHealth clouds. Chapter 7 
presents a new classification system for detecting and preventing DDoS TCP flood 
attacks (CS_DDoS) for public clouds, particularly in an eHealth cloud environment. 
The proposed CS_DDoS system offers a solution for securing stored records by 
classifying incoming packets and making a decision based on these classification 
results. During the detection phase, CS_DDOS identifies and determines whether a 
packet is normal or from an attacker.  During the prevention phase, packets classified 
as malicious are denied access to the cloud service, and the source IP is blacklisted. 
The performance of the CS_DDoS system is compared using four different classifiers: 
a least-squares support vector machine (LS-SVM), naïve Bayes, K-nearest-neighbour, 
and multilayer perceptron. The results show that CS_DDoS yields the best 
performance when the LS-SVM classifier is used. This combination can detect DDoS 
TCP flood attacks with an accuracy of approximately 97% and a Kappa coefficient of 
0.89 when under attack from a single source, and 94% accuracy and a Kappa 
coefficient of 0.9 when under attack from multiple attackers. These results are then 
v 
discussed in terms of the accuracy and time complexity, and are validated using a k-
fold cross-validation model. 
Finally, a method to mitigate DoS attacks in the cloud and reduce excessive energy 
consumption through managing and limiting certain flows of packets is proposed. 
Instead of a system shutdown, the proposed method ensures the availability of service. 
The proposed method manages the incoming packets more effectively by dropping 
packets from the most frequent requesting sources. This method can process 98.4% of 
the accepted packets during an attack.  
Practicality and effectiveness are essential requirements of methods for preserving 
the privacy and security of data in clouds. The proposed methods successfully secure 
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The unintentional and unexpected exposure of data in the eHealth sector is increasing 
at a disturbing rate. According to the Identity Theft Resource Centre (ITRC, 2015), in 
2015, health organisations in the United States were attacked 276 times, exposing 
177,866,236 health records and in 2016, they were attacked 376 times, compromising 
15,942,053 health records,. It is clear that the health industry remains a prime target 
for cybercriminals (Roberts, 2017). This motivates the researcher to study and propose 
a suite of solutions to handle the security and privacy of eHealth clouds using 
cryptography and other techniques, thus helping health industry stakeholders gain 
maximum benefits from eHealth cloud projects. 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Cloud computing is a model for the use of computer resources and other modern 
technological functionality in the information technology world, providing services 
such as storage and applications (Mell & Grance, 2011). Users can access and use 
cloud computing services without the need to acquire knowledge, expertise or even 
administrative rights for the infrastructure that supports these services. There are three 
main types of services offered by the cloud: software as a service, platform as a service 
and infrastructure as a service (Kushida et al., 2015; Sugumaran et al., 2014). In 
addition, four deployment models have been identified for cloud architecture 
solutions; namely private, community, public and hybrid clouds (Hsu & Cheng, 2015; 
Zissis & Lekkas, 2012).  
The technologies used in cloud computing serve to ensure simple and 
straightforward on-demand network access to a shared group of computing resources, 
1 
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which can be prepared quickly and put together with minimal effort (Meenakshi, 
2012). This has become an important direction for technology research, and many 
scientists and researchers claim that cloud computing has changed both computing 
processes and IT markets. Powered by cloud computing, users can adopt 
comprehensive sets of tools to access various applications, storage and platforms 
through the Internet (Vuyyuru et al., 2012). Since clouds share distributed resources 
through the Internet and intranets in environments that may not be secure, security is 
an important factor.  
Some have expressed concern over storing all of their data and files in the cloud 
(Chen & Zhao, 2012; Gonzales et al., 2012; Ma, 2012). If a successful attack can be 
launched on an exposed service, an attacker may be able to obtain all the users’ 
information. Furthermore, if an attacker were able to use or re-sell the stolen 
information, this would constitute a privacy and security problem. To overcome these 
issues, cloud service providers often use secure and reliable encryption techniques to 
secure their data. The provision of data privacy and security in cloud computing 
projects is therefore desirable.  
Cryptography is one of the most widely used and practical options for cloud 
computing developers seeking to ensure a high level of security (Li et al., 2013). 
Cryptography is the art of changing plain information into a cipher or hidden 
information, where only the intended user(s) or machines can gain access to the 
original information (Kapoor et al., 2011; Lek & Rajapakse, 2012). It is divided into 
two main categories based on the keys used: symmetric and asymmetric cryptosystems 
(Elminaam et al., 2010). Symmetric cryptography systems require the sender and the 
receiver (for example, Alice and Bob) to share an identical key for the encryption and 
decryption processes. This shared symmetric key must be changeable, for better 
protection, and must be strong enough to stop a third party (Eve) from getting the 
original information (Forouzan & Mukhopadlhyay, 2011). Asymmetric cryptography 
systems require Alice and Bob to each have a set of two different keys. The asymmetric 
cryptography systems process is slower than the symmetric one (Kumar et al., 2013). 
The safety of any symmetric cryptosystem relies heavily on the key exchange 
algorithm used, such as the Diffie-Hellman (DH) protocol. A key exchange algorithm 
is a technique for exchanging the keys in a secure way between the users (Forouzan & 
Mukhopadlhyay, 2011; Kumar et al., 2013). There are many algorithms for 
distributing the keys between Alice and Bob after Alice has physically chosen a key, 
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such as sending the key to Bob by mail, by phone or in person. Alice may also use a 
previous key shared with Bob to encrypt the new key and send it to Bob. Unfortunately, 
these techniques are currently insecure in wide network systems. In addition, a very 
strong encryption algorithm such as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 
algorithm may be used, but if Alice and Bob do not secure the keys, their systems can 
easily be compromised. 
Furthermore, cryptanalysis shows weaknesses in block ciphers, such as 
parallelisation for cipher block chaining (CBC) mode (Beeputh et al., 2010). In view 
of these issues, we need a faster block cipher mode, such as a method using a 
probabilistic encryption scheme. 
Hence, the development of a secure cloud system is vital to ensure the security, 
privacy, and availability of data in the cloud. This thesis focusses on key exchange 
protocols, block cipher modes of operation, security and privacy preserving methods, 
disaster recovery plans, and the detection and prevention of flood attacks. It reviews 
current research and existing solutions, and proposes protocols, algorithms and 
approaches that will benefit cloud users in many sectors, such as health, education, and 
government. The outcomes of this study will help to improve the security, privacy and 
availability of clouds such as eHealth clouds. 
 
1.2 Research Problems 
Cloud are used by millions of people around the world. Cloud services give users the 
opportunity to store data in the cloud for easy access, anytime and anywhere (Carroll 
et al., 2011). However, the use of a cloud poses many security and privacy problems. 
Both security and privacy are vital for data distribution in the cloud (Chen & Zhao, 
2012). In the cloud environment, a user’s data are controlled by the service providers 
rather than by users themselves. There is, therefore, a potential for data leaks, either 
intentional or accidental, which is unacceptable (Gonzales, et al., 2012; Ma, 2012). 
Furthermore, data in the cloud are stored in geographically diverse locations. Thus, 
confidentiality, authentication, and communication between parties become important 
concerns (Hussain & Ashraf, 2014). When users use cloud services, they may not 
know precisely where their information is held (Gampala et al., 2012). In this situation, 
it is better for cloud service providers to offer high levels of encryption to secure the 
confidentiality of data wherever they are stored, and an appropriate key exchange 
method should be adopted. 
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Confidentiality is not enough to guarantee cloud computing security. Users want to 
ensure that their data cannot be modified or compromised by a third party. Cloud 
service suppliers should also apply methods to guarantee data integrity (Sugumaran et 
al., 2014). In addition to integrity issues, the availability of services must be ensured. 
Flood attacks caused by distributed denial of service attacks (the second most common 
cybercrime attacks after information theft) must be detected and prevented, and 
excessive energy consumption reduced. Hence, the following research questions were 
identified: 
1. Has a researcher in this area reviewed the major and relevant literature on cloud 
security and privacy? 
2. How can the security of key exchange between parties be hardened, and different 
types of attacks prevented? 
3. How can the performance of the adopted encryption algorithm be improved on top 
of security assurance? 
4. How can security and privacy be preserved in eHealth clouds? How can a client be 
enabled to connect to the system at any time, even during a disaster? 
5. How can DDoS TCP flood attacks be detected and prevented? How can the energy 
consumption caused by DoS attacks be reduced?  
 
1.3 Research Hypotheses 
Having identified the research questions of this study, it is time to be more specific. 
Five tentative predictions (hypotheses) for the study are proposed:  
H 1. Investigation and review of the relevant literature on eHealth cloud security and 
privacy would facilitate the researcher’s decisions on research directions 
H 2. Developing a key exchange protocol based on the Computational Diffie-Hellman 
assumption should secure key distribution between parties and protect systems 
against multiple attacks 
H 3. A new parallel hash-based block cipher mode of operation would be able to 
improve the encryption process on top of security assurance 
H 4. Integration of potential key exchange protocol and block cipher mode would 
preserve privacy and security on eHealth clouds. A disaster recovery plan with 
heartbeat signals will result in 24/7 services availability 
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H 5. Classification techniques can detect DDoS attacks in eHealth clouds, and filtering 
techniques can reduce excessive energy consumption caused by DoS attacks. 
 
1.4 Contributions of the Thesis 
Data security and privacy are sensitive, critical, and play a vital role in the information 
technology world (Ritchey et al., 2013). Cryptography can be used effectively to 
support and enhance data security and users’ privacy in cloud computing (Jaber & 
Zalkipli, 2013). This study is focused on security, privacy, prevention and mitigation 
of attacks on clouds such as eHealth clouds, using encryption and other techniques. 
The expected outcomes of this research are as follows: 
1. For a fuller understanding of the research directions in security and privacy in 
eHealth clouds, it summarises and analyses the state of the art publications in 
eHealth cloud security and privacy. An extensive review is conducted, and over 100 
studies from several peer-reviewed databases such as IEEE Xplore are investigated. 
The selected studies are reviewed and summarised in terms of their benefits and 
risks. Details can be found in Chapter 2. The content of this chapter has been 
submitted to the journal Computer Science Review 
2. A TPAKE protocol based on the CDH is presented. It securely distributes keys 
among users and protects systems against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, 
amongst others. Details of this are given in Chapter 4. Part of the content of this 
chapter has been accepted by the International Journal of Communication 
Networks and Distributed Systems, and the remainder was published in the 
International Conference on Telecommunications (ICT), 2015 22nd: Proceedings 
of the IEEE 
3. A PBC mode of operation is introduced in which blocks of cipher are processed in 
parallel, ensuring both high performance and security. The details are presented in 
Chapter 5. Part of the content of this chapter was published in The 4th International 
Conference on Computer and Communication Systems (ICCCS2018), Japan, and 
the remainder was published in the 10th International Conference on Information 
Technology and Applications (ICITA), Sydney 
4. The PBC mode and TPAKE protocol are used to introduce both security 
preservation and privacy preservation approaches, thus ensuring both the privacy 
and the security of eHealth clouds. In addition, a disaster recovery plan that ensures 
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connectivity for users during a disaster is presented. The details are given in Chapter 
6. The content of this chapter has been published in the journal Computers in 
Biology and Medicine 
5. Finally, a classification-based security system that helps to detect and mitigate 
DDoS TCP flood attacks is proposed. A method to mitigate DoS attacks in the cloud 
by reducing excessive energy consumption via limitation of the number of packets 
is also presented. Rather than a system shutdown, the proposed method ensures 
continued availability of service. The details of these approaches are presented in 
Chapter 7. Part of the content of this chapter has been published in the journal IEEE 
Access, and the remainder was presented in the First MoHESR and HCED Iraqi 
Scholars Conference in Australasia, Melbourne.  
  
1.5 Connections Between Chapters 
This research focuses on the hardening of security for data in eHealth cloud projects. 
This study uses a TPAKE protocol to prevent multiple attacks in DH key exchange 
(Chapter 4), and introduces a new parallel encryption mode entitled PBC (Chapter 5). 
TPAKE and PBC are then brought together to preserve the security and privacy of 
eHealth clouds. In addition, a disaster recovery plan that ensures uninterrupted 
connectivity for users during a disaster is presented (Chapter 6). A system that detects 
and prevents DDoS attacks, and a method for reducing the excessive energy 
consumption caused by DoS attacks are introduced (Chapter 7). A diagrammatic 
representation of the relationships between chapters is given in Figure 1.1.  
 
1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis consists of eight chapters, each of which provides important information 
related to the research project. The rest of the thesis is structured as follows: 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of cloud computing, in terms of its security and 
privacy and some necessary background knowledge. It briefly introduces contextual 
information and knowledge related to the current research on eHealth cloud security, 
privacy and associated issues. The chapter then summarises and analyses state-of-the-
art security and privacy issues related to the cloud. An extensive review is conducted 
in this chapter, and over 100 studies from several peer-reviewed databases such as 
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IEEE Xplore were examined. The selected studies are reviewed and summarised in 
terms of their benefits and risks. 
Chapter 3 describes some research design methodologies and the methodology 
adopted in this research project. The Vaishnavi and Kuechler research design 
methodology, and its five phases (shown in Figure 1.1) are described to provide an 
overall picture of the process used in later chapters.  
 
Figure 1.1 Connections between chapters 
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Chapter 4 identifies a gap in the security of key exchange between parties, and 
presents a new TPAKE protocol that securely distributes keys between users and 
protects systems against MITM attacks, among others. 
To enhance the speed performance of encryption, the PBC mode is introduced in 
Chapter 5. In PBC, blocks of cipher can be processed in parallel to ensure both high 
performance and security.  
In Chapter 6, with the security and privacy of eHealth clouds in mind, the PBC mode 
and the TPAKE protocol are integrated to form a security-preserving approach and a 
privacy-preserving approach. In addition, this chapter presents a disaster recovery plan 
which ensures uninterrupted connectivity for users during disasters. 
Chapter 7 presents a classification-based security system that helps to detect and 
prevent DDoS TCP flood attacks. This chapter also introduces a method for 
mitigating DoS attacks in the cloud and reducing excessive energy consumption by 
limiting the number of packets. Instead of a system shutdown, the proposed method 
ensures the continued availability of service in the case of a DoS attack. The method 
was evaluated with more than 14,900 attacking packets per second and the server can 
still provide services (no missing packets). 
Chapter 8 presents a summary and the findings of this study. Possible directions for 
future work are also discussed in this chapter. 
The Appendices provide programming code for some of the proposed methods, code 
for the techniques described in Chapters 4, 5, and 7, and a copy of related publications. 










To fully understand the research directions of security and privacy in eHealth clouds, 
this chapter summarises and analyses the security and privacy issues and the state-of-
the-art solutions proposed for eHealth clouds. A review is conducted in this chapter, 
and over 100 studies from several peer-reviewed databases, such as IEEE Xplore were 
investigated. The selected studies have been reviewed and summarised in terms of 
their benefits and risks. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The official definition of cloud computing, according to the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology is as follows: “cloud computing is a model for enabling 
ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable 
computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications and services) that 
can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service 
provider interaction” (Mell & Grance, 2009). Over the past decade, cloud computing 
has gained popularity within the health sector as it offers several advantages such as 
low costs and flexible processes (Li et al., 2013). Cloud-based health services allow 
physicians, patients, and owners of health data to control and share their data easily. 
However, eHealth cloud computing poses a range of challenges, such as data security 
and privacy for clients and cloud service providers (CSPs) (Yu et al., 2017). Security 
and privacy issues threaten an open network and semi-trusted servers which may lose, 
leak or disclose data (Tang et al., 2016). This can breach users’ privacy. 
A great deal of research has explored the security and privacy issues in eHealth 
clouds, and many solutions have been suggested to resolve the identified issues. To 
2 
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obtain a clear picture of the security and privacy problems that can affect eHealth 
clouds, this literature review summarises and analyses the current state of the art in 
eHealth security and privacy. The aim of this study is to deliver a clear and complete 
picture of eHealth security and privacy issues, and to discuss recent research that 
targets these issues and the proposes solutions. As shown in Figure 2.1, the study is 
divided into five main categories: security and privacy, security controls, effective 
encryption, data security requirements, and disaster recovery plans. 
Although cloud computing is widely used in the health sector, numerous issues 
remain unresolved (Jing et al., 2013; Sahi et al., 2015). Several studies have attempted 
to review the state of the art in security and privacy in eHealth clouds (Abbas & Khan, 
2014; Fernandez-Aleman et al., 2013; Thilakanathan et al., 2014 (B); Gonzalez-
Martinez et al., 2015; Sajid & Abbas, 2016; Yuksel et al., 2017) however, some of 
these studies are now rather outdated, and others do not cover certain vital features of 
cloud security and privacy such as access control, revocation and data recovery plans.  
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      In addition, some of the existing review papers focus on either the privacy of the 
cloud or the security of the cloud, but not both. This chapter classifies and evaluates 
these review papers. The review covers most of the recent studies in this area, and can 
be considered a good literature base for researchers in the area of eHealth clouds. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows, using a structure similar to 
that of Figure 2.1. Section 2 describes the proposed schemes with regard to the security 
and privacy of eHealth clouds; Section 3 describes the proposed schemes with regard 
to security controls; Section 4 describes the effective encryption of eHealth clouds; 
Section 5 discusses the data security requirements of eHealth clouds; Section 6 
describes disaster recovery plans; and finally, Section 7 concludes the chapter.  
 
Figure 2.2 The inclusion/exclusion process 
Figure 2.3 Distribution of the selected articles by year 
Papers searched for in IEEE Xplore, 
Springer, Elsevier, Science Direct 
databases, and with Google Scholar  
Search results 
= 502 
Paper selection based on 
title, abstract, keywords, and 
conclusion  
Relevant papers 
 = 216 
Irrelevant papers   
= 286 
Included papers  
= 101 
Paper selection 
based on a full 
reading 
Excluded papers  
 = 115 
Earlier than 2011 
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2.1.1 Paper Selection 
Papers were selected according to their titles, abstracts, keywords, and conclusions to 
include the most relevant papers and to exclude irrelevant ones from the study. Figure 
2.2 shows the inclusion and exclusion processes, and Figure 2.3 shows the distribution 
of the selected articles over the years. 
The contributions of this study are as follows: Collection and evaluation of papers 
on the current state of the art in eHealth security and privacy schemes. The collected 
papers are classified into five categories, as shown in Figure 2.1.  
In the next section, the literature of security and privacy in the cloud will be 
reviewed. 
 
2.2 Security and Privacy in the Cloud 
Cloud computing is a model commonly used to save money and effort in many sectors, 
and particularly in the health sector. However, despite the benefits of eHealth clouds, 
there are still many unresolved issues regarding security and privacy which require a 
great deal of research to resolve.  
 
2.2.1 Identity Management  
An Identity Management System (IMS) is a comprehensive organisational system 
used to identify entities in a cloud project. Access to information and resources in the 
project is managed by linking client privileges and constraints with a proven identity. 
The main aim of an IMS is to determine what clients can do within a cloud project and 
under what conditions. In addition, an IMS is utilised to improve the security and 
privacy of a cloud system, and to reduce the running costs and effort. 
According to Bichsel et al., there is a high security risk of identity theft and 
impersonation of the user by the Cloud Service Providers (CSP) or an intruder who 
has gained access to the CSP resources (Bichsel et al., 2013; Bichsel et al., 2014). To 
manage access to data and resources, CSP use either their own IMS (such as CloudID 
(Haghighat et al., 2015)), or incorporate the client’s IMS into their infrastructure. Take, 
for example, the use of a biometric-based IMS to preserve the privacy of the cloud 
project’s information (Haghighat et al., 2015). A biometric-based IMS is used to 
connect the private data of the clients to their biometrics, which are saved as 
ciphertexts. To ensure that the CSP or any possible attackers cannot obtain any type 
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of access to this private information, the proposed biometric-based IMS is 
implemented in an encrypted domain using a searchable cryptographic system. 
Recently, Wang et al. proposed a computationally efficient secure eHealth cloud 
system using the Identity Based Encryption (IBE) method (Wang et al., 2017). In this 
system, there are four parties with different roles: the cloud, the health community, 
physicians, and patients. The system works as follows. First, the system sets up public 
and private keys for all parties according to their published identities (e.g. email 
addresses). These identities are considered to be public keys and are used to generate 
private keys using an IBE algorithm. Next, the Electronic Health Records (EHRs) are 
encrypted by the parties using a block cipher algorithm such as AES, and the keys are 
encrypted using the IBE and sent to the cloud. Following this, the parties can receive 
the encrypted EHRs from the cloud and decrypt them using their identity keys. 
According to a survey conducted by Khalil et al., (2014), more than 66% of users’ 
identities are stored in unsafe places. Khalil et al. (2014) therefore proposed a new 
IMS system called the Consolidated Identity Management (CIDM) system, which they 
claim is resistant to certain attacks, such as server compromise attacks, mobile device 
compromise attacks, and traffic interception attacks (Khalil et al., 2014). The CIDM 
mechanism splits permission identifications and spreads them between the parties at 
the IMS to prevent traffic interception attacks. To mitigate mobile device compromise 
attacks, a challenge-response approach is adopted. Finally, the security of the 
communication channels between the CIDM and the CSP is addressed to reduce the 
possibility of any effective compromise of that channel (Khalil et al., 2014). However, 
further investigation is required to resolve the problem of insufficient dynamic 
federated identities and privacy in most of the current IMS systems (Sanchez et al., 
2012). This is an architectural problem and must be considered at the design level. 
Also, a survey of 67 random mobile users is hardly a justification for the claim, as 66% 
means only 44 people. 
Haufe et al. proposed a new framework named the Information Security 
Management System (ISMS) (Haufe et al., 2014) consisting of many vital security 
procedures for eHealth clouds. The proposed security management framework was 
implemented based on the ISO 27000 family of standards. The ISMS was able to 
identify the most frequent cloud computing threats and the information that these 
attacks aimed to collect from the cloud system (Haufe et al., 2014). One drawback is 
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that the ISMS needs specific details from processes, such as input, output, and 
interfaces, to facilitate communication and interaction between processes.  
In another study, the concept of the Identity Management as a Service (IDaaS) was 
discussed (Nunez & Agudo, 2014). In this work, the authors proposed a new IMS 
called BlindIdM which preserved the privacy of data and delivered them as IDaaS. 
Specifically, the authors described how a system based on the Security Assertion 
Markup Language (SAML) was employed with proxy encryption to enhance the 
security of the cloud project with respect to the CSP (Nunez & Agudo, 2014). To 
improve the proposed system, extending the IDaaS from a single domain to a cross-
domain approach has been suggested, as in the System for Cross-domain Identity 
Management (SCIM) (Grizzle et al., 2015; SCIM, 2017).  
Xiong et al. proposed a scheme named Privacy pReserving Identity and Access 
Management (PRIAM) (Xiong et al., 2014), which has five components: registration, 
token withdrawal, tenant pre-authorisation, access control, and token spending. 
PRIAM is described as being able to fulfil all the requirements of cloud security. The 
proposed scheme uses a hash function, signature, and mutual authentication to ensure 
the privacy of clients. To deliver secure access control for clients and CSP, it utilises 
a service-level agreement. Finally, Burrows Abadi Needham (BAN) logic is used to 
confirm the correctness of the scheme (Burrows et al., 1989). 
 
2.2.2 Physical Security  
Physical security is the concept of securing and controlling hardware, software, 
networks and data from physical actions and events that could cause serious loss or 
damage to workstations. In other words, the aim of physical security is to prevent 
intruders from accessing a cloud’s physical facilities. Cloud hardware, such as servers, 
switches etc., is also physically secured by the CSP from any unusual activities such 
as attacks, threats, and floods (Regola & Chawla, 2013), and is provided with the 
necessary power supplies to reduce any potential interruptions.  
Mxoli et al. showed that in order to protect Personal Health Records (PHRs) from 
any physical intrusion, the system hardware must have a physical security border 
(Mxoli et al., 2014). For example, physical access control, offices and rooms must be 
secured, and resistance against disasters and other environmental situations must be 
available. All of these security borders must be in place to ensure that the cloud and 
network equipment is not readily accessible to the public. The equipment and 
Chapter 2 Literature Review   
15 
 
applications used by the CSP, which may contain PHRs, must not be moved out of the 
site or repositioned without the administrator’s authorisation (Mxoli et al., 2014). 
The IT equipment building, or the site where data centres and other cloud hardware 
are located, must be properly secured. Rodrigues et al. highlighted that these buildings 
must be secured by security staff members, video surveillance systems and Intrusion 
Detection Systems (IDS); in addition, only authorised people should be allowed to 
enter the building using authenticated access controls (Rodrigues et al., 2013). 
Carlson stated that CSPs should adopt Federal Information Security Management 
Act (FISMA) standards to ensure the physical security of their records. Since the 
physical entrances to the physical machines and storage devices are a possible route 
for data compromise, FISMA must be implemented at the client sites as well as at the 
server sites (Carlson, 2014). 
 
2.2.3 Privacy  
Credentials such as digitally signed IDs or other information used to authenticate or 
identify a client have not been designed to respect the clients’ privacy (Rannenberg et 
al., 2015). CSP uses encryption and other techniques to preserve the privacy of clients’ 
critical information, such as credit card numbers, and only authorised clients have the 
right to access this kind of information.  
Abbas and Khan reviewed the state of the art in eHealth cloud privacy in 2014 
(Abbas & Khan, 2014). This part of the review aims to cover, not only the issues 
regarding privacy, but also other security concerns such as storage security, access 
controls, and disaster recovery plans. This section will, therefore, first review some of 
the proposed approaches with regard to eHealth privacy. More details on privacy 
preservation approaches can be found in Abbas and Khan article (Abbas & Khan, 
2014). 
A three-factor authentication protocol based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) 
was proposed by Yeh et al. in 2013 (Yeh et al., 2013). The protocol has certain 
disadvantages, such as a vague procedure, impractical IDs, and no shared key (Wu et 
al., 2015). In addition, the protocol cannot prevent spoofing attacks (Wu et al., 2015). 
Another authentication protocol based on a fingerprint was proposed by Khan and 
Kumari (Khan & Kumari, 2013). However, this protocol cannot mitigate 
impersonation or desynchronisation attacks (Wu et al., 2015). To overcome the 
weaknesses of these protocols, Wu et al. proposed a new biometrics-based three-factor 
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authentication protocol that can overcome all of these drawbacks as well as ensuring 
the privacy of clients (Wu et al., 2015). This protocol uses the ECC and mobile devices, 
and adopts a fuzzy extractor to deal with inadequate biometric inputs. The protocol 
proposed by Wu et al. was formally proven using random oracles and Elliptic Curve 
Gap Diffie–Hellman (ECGDH) problem assumption to demonstrate the low 
probability of attack success. However, this protocol is vulnerable to other attacks, 
such as impersonation and offline password guessing attacks, if the mobile device falls 
into the wrong hands. In addition, the user revocation procedure is not included in the 
protocol (Jiang et al., 2016 (A)). Therefore, another three-factor authentication 
protocol that is able to resist these attacks and offers more security features was 
proposed by Jiang et al. in 2016 (Jiang et al., 2016 (A)). 
Yang et al. presented a privacy preservation approach for health records in eHealth 
clouds (Yang et al., 2015). This approach is based on the classification of health record 
attributes. It collects these attributes vertically from the health dataset to ensure that 
these are collected from all areas of the dataset with different privacy aspects. Their 
approach consists of four steps: (1) vertical data collection, (2) data merging, (3) 
integrity checks, and (4) plain and cipher text searches. Cryptography and statistical 
analysis are combined to create multiple approaches which can strike a balance 
between the use of health records and privacy preservation (Yang et al., 2015). This 
approach, however, does not consider the situation where several users are using the 
service at the same time. 
Many online services and applications need some authentication of users to start 
trust relations, either for only one endpoint of communication or for both. A password-
based authentication mechanism is widely used for this (Camenisch et al., 2012). 
Scheme proposed by Sahi et al. aims to preserve the privacy of the PHRs (Sahi et al., 
2016). This scheme adopts a three-party password-based authenticated key exchange 
protocol (3PAKE) based on the computational Diffie–Hellman assumption proposed 
by Khader and Lai (Khader & Lai, 2015). This scheme uses a different generator and 
primitive root in each session to ensure that only the specific client has complete access 
to his/her PHR, and clients are revoked at the end of the session. This ensures that old 
session keys cannot be used to access a client’s PHRs. A disaster recovery plan and a 
break-glass technique are also addressed in this scheme. 
Based on the HireSome-I method, an improved history record-based service 
optimisation method (HireSome-II) was proposed by Dou et al. in 2015 (Dou et al., 
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2015). HireSome-II was proposed in order to ensure the privacy of big data such as 
health records in cloud computing. The cloud rejects requests which reveal transaction 
information for privacy reasons, and the proposed method can efficiently support the 
cloud service structure to complete transactions securely (Dou et al., 2015). 
Another framework to ensure the privacy of patient data was proposed by Page et 
al. (Page et al., 2015). This framework combines monitoring and analytic methods to 
deliver secure and authenticated health records. This framework was based on fully 
homomorphic encryption (FHE). However, FHE is known as computationally-
intensive therefore, to measure the practicality of the proposed framework, the authors 
developed a proof of concept and a prototype system (Page et al., 2015). 
In the next section, the literature of cloud security controls will be reviewed. 
 
2.3 Cloud Security Controls 
Security approaches are effective in cloud environments when an excellent 
protection mechanism is adopted. This mechanism must identify the potential 
problems that may arise during the management process. These problems will be 
addressed and considered by the security controls, thus preserving the security of the 
system from its own weaknesses and reducing the number of attacks (Sajid & Abbas, 
2016). There are many cloud security controls, which can be categorised as follows. 
 
2.3.1 Deterrent Controls 
Deterrent controls aim to reduce the number of attacks on a cloud project. A “No 
Trespassing” sign can alert security personnel to watch out for intruders as well as 
highlighting the consequences of intrusion. Deterrent controls serve to warn attackers 
that there will be penalties and punishments if they proceed with attacks (Nedelcu et 
al., 2015; Rajamani et al., 2016).  
 
2.3.2 Preventive Controls 
Preventive controls aim to secure cloud projects by preventing or decreasing 
vulnerabilities. For example, an effective authentication protocol can ensure the 
security of the cloud’s clients and prevent any unauthorised access to that cloud. 
Preventive controls can therefore help the cloud system to confidently identify their 
clients (Nedelcu et al., 2015; Rajamani et al., 2016). 
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2.3.3 Detective Controls 
Detective controls aim to detect and respond appropriately to attacks which could 
threaten the cloud system. During an attack, the detective control will notify the 
preventive control or the corrective control to report the problem. An intrusion 
detection system (IDS) is typically used as a detective control (Li et al., 2013; Yu et 
al., 2017). 
2.3.4 Corrective Controls 
Corrective controls aim to reduce the damage of an attack. These controls are 
usually initiated during or after attacks. Restoring a cloud system from a backup to 
ensure the availability of services is an example of a corrective control (Nedelcu et al., 
2015; Rajamani et al., 2016). 
Generally, access controls are linked to security policies delivered to clients while 
accessing the service. A company typically has its own security controls which allow 
staff members access to a set of data rather than giving them full data access. This 
control limits the access of a staff member to a particular group of data. These kinds 
of security controls must be put in place in cloud projects to avoid unauthorised access. 
The Software as a Service (SaaS) model must be sufficiently elastic to combine the set 
of controls offered by the company (Subashini & Kavitha, 2011). 
Recently, much research has been done on cloud security controls. Some of these 
works are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
Many stakeholders might access PHRs without authorisation. Access control is 
therefore a major problem for the privacy of data when health records are stored and 
shared in the cloud. Thus, a dynamic access control is necessary to ensure the privacy 
of the stored health records. Son et al. proposed a new dynamic access control scheme 
for securing the privacy of the PHRs in cloud projects (Son et al., 2017). Their scheme 
can detect unauthorised access dynamically by altering the context information, 
meaning that even if the subject has the same role, access authorisation will not be 
defined in the same way, according to the conditions and the context information. The 
proposed scheme was tested using a real-life health system. 
Tong et al. proposed another access control architecture designed to ensure the 
privacy of data (Tong et al., 2014). To overcome the misuse of health records, the 
proposed architecture had several features including key exchange, storage data 
privacy, emergency retrieval, and auditability. A pseudorandom number generator was 
used as a key exchange to ensure unlinkability, and a redundancy-based secure 
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indexing feature was proposed to preserve the privacy of the data by hiding the search 
and access patterns. Finally, to mitigate any potential misbehaviour, an attribute-based 
encryption was integrated with threshold signing to be used in emergency and normal 
situations as an access control with auditability. 
Based on two-stage keyed access control and a zero-knowledge protocol, Kahani et 
al. proposed another security control method (Kahani et al., 2016). Their method aimed 
to facilitate access control and authentication in electronic health cloud systems. When 
a user requests access to a health record, a limited amount of access will be extracted 
based on the user’s rights. To connect two parties in the system securely, a two-stage 
key management is used. This two-stage key management is a combination of public 
key encryption and Derived Unique Key Per Transaction (DUKPT) 
Fernando et al. proposed a new approach which aimed to reduce leaks of patient 
information using unlinkability (Fernando et al., 2016). This approach provides the 
health data owner with the ability to make decisions in terms of access control. To 
fulfil the policies of the service provider, the proposed approach utilises a personal 
information management protocol which improves the privacy of the patients.  
This approach depends on a scenario in which patient EHRs are stored on a Health 
Information Exchange (HIE) cloud service. The approach demonstrates the 
communication techniques between EHR consumers, EHR owners, EHR creators, and 
the HIE service. The authors claimed that the privacy of the EHR was ensured by the 
unlinkability of consumers’ sessions with the HIE service. In addition, the HIE service 
cannot reach the consumer classes even when they have access policies. The proposed 
approach works as follows: a patient consults a doctor and the doctor prescribes a 
medical test. The patient goes to a laboratory with the doctor’s instructions, and the 
laboratory carries out the test. The results of the test are sent by the laboratory to the 
HIE. Finally, the patient provides access to the doctor and the HIE (Fernando et al., 
2016).  
In 2015, Wand et al. proposed a new scheme called Constant-Size Ciphertext Policy 
Comparative Attribute-Based Encryption (CCP-CABE). This method inserts similar 
characteristics from all attributes into a key and combines the restrictions of these 
attributes into a single chunk of a ciphertext. This procedure is carried out during the 
encryption process to apply elastic access control rules with a variety of relationships. 
The authors showed that the CCP-CABE scheme was efficient, as it produced keys 
and ciphertexts of the same size each time for any number of attributes, as well as 
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reducing the cost of the computation to a trivial size. To ensure access privacy, the 
authors extended CCP-CABE to numerous attribute domains (Wang et al., 2015 (C)). 
Younis et al. proposed a new model named Access Control for Cloud Computing 
(AC3) (Younis et al., 2014). This model utilises the role and task principles, as shown 
in Figure 2.4, and uses clients’ jobs as a categorising factor. Based on the clients’ jobs’ 
roles, security domains are created to restrict each client to a particular security 
domain. Each role within the AC3 is given a group of related and required tasks for 
performing those roles. For access to data and resources, security classification is done 
for each task, and an authentic permission is required to complete the task. The authors 
employed a risk engine to interact with unpredictable client behaviours. However, an 
authentication protocol that can deal with massive storage complexity and high 
performance is required. 
 
Figure 2.4 Access Control for Cloud Computing (AC3), adapted from (Younis et al., 
2014) 
In 2014, Yang and Jia proposed a new multi-authority access control scheme (Yang 
& Jia, 2014). In this scheme, the authors presented a Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-based 
Encryption (CP-ABE) scheme. This is an extension to a single-authority scheme 
proposed by Lewko and Waters in (Lewko & Waters, 2012). Yang and Jia adopted 
Chase’s multi-authority scheme (Chase, 2007) in which all generated secret keys for 
the same client are combined. CP-ABE also uses a revocable scheme and can mitigate 
collusion attacks. More specifically, the functionality of a single authority is divided 
into a certificate authority and multiple attribute authorities. The proposed multi-
authority access control scheme is shown in Figure 2.5. 




Figure 2.5 Multi-authority access control scheme, adapted from (Yang & Jia, 2014) 
Li et al. adopted Semantic-Based Access Control (SBAC) techniques to propose a 
new architecture called IntercroSsed Secure Big Multimedia Model (2SBM) for 
securing access between different cloud systems (Li et al., 2016 (B)). In addition to 
the architecture shown in Figure 2.6, the 2SBM architecture can be summarised in 
three steps: 
 To relate attributes to each other, the proposed architecture formats the data by 
linking the attributes in a matrix 
 Based on these relationships, the architecture creates interrelations between 
attributes in the matrix 
 The architecture builds a tree of attributes and sorts the attributes according to 
their frequency, thus improving the efficiency of access control. 
Figure 2.6 Architecture of 2SBM, adapted from (Li et al., 2016 (B)) 
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Choi et al proposed the ontology-based Access Control Model (Onto-ACM) in 2014 
(Choi et al., 2014). Onto-ACM is a model of analysis which recognises and presents 
the differences between providers and clients. Based on this analysis, the ontology 
cognitive and context-aware technologies, the proposed model can decide whether to 
allow data access or not. This model can be seen as a detailed access control, which 
can be used to establish cloud feature boundaries.  
Yu et al. proposed a new scheme which claimed to achieve secure, scalable, and 
fine-grained access policies for cloud projects (Yu et al., 2010). The proposed scheme 
uses attribute-based encryption (ABE), proxy re-encryption (PRE), and lazy re-
encryption. Specifically, it allows the data owner to pass the operations of computation 
to the servers without revealing the original data. In this scheme, the data owner is 
therefore responsible for the accessibility of the data, which is particularly suitable for 
cloud projects.  
Ruj et al. proposed another form of access control in 2014 (Ruj et al., 2014). In this 
method, there are three types of clients: creator, reader, and writer. For example, Alice 
is the client and a trusted party gives her a token. The trusted party could be any 
government office controlling health records. When submitting a claim, Alice presents 
her identification (e.g., a health card), and the trusted party provides her with the token.  
In this scheme, there are two key distribution centres (KDCs) which are responsible 
for distributing the keys to the clients. Based on the information in the token and the 
keys from one or two of the KDCs, a creator makes a decision on the claim, ensuring 
the identity of Alice and authenticating and encrypting the messages under this claim. 
The signed ciphertext is then sent to the cloud. The cloud system authenticates the 
signature of the ciphertext and keeps it on the cloud servers. When the reader asks to 
read a message, the cloud system will send the ciphertext. Without the appropriate 
keys, the user would not be able to retrieve the plaintext; however, the access control 
manager has full access to all client information and can decrypt the ciphertexts. 
In the next section, encryption used for some of the proposed security and privacy 
protocols will be reviewed. 
 
2.4 Effective Encryption 
Several advanced encryption algorithms have been used in cloud computing to protect 
the security and privacy of eHealth data. Encryption schemes such as public key 
encryption (PKE) and symmetric key encryption (SKE) are frequently used to protect 
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data in eHealth cloud projects (Abbas & Khan, 2014). Other encryption schemes are 
also used to ensure the security and privacy of eHealth records, including attribute-
based encryption (ABE), fully homomorphic encryption (FHE), and searchable 
encryption (SE). 
 
2.4.1 Attribute-Based Encryption Algorithms 
The first ABE algorithms were presented by Sahai and Waters in 2005 (Sahai & 
Waters, 2005), and by Goyal et al. in 2006 (Goyal et al., 2006). 
ABE is a type of PKE where the ciphertext and shared key of a client are reliant on 
attributes (Pletea et al., 2015). In ABE systems, retrieving a plaintext from ciphertext 
is applicable for clients who have a group of key attributes that match ciphertext 
attributes. One of the most important features of the ABE system is that it is collusion 
resistant; an attacker who has many keys can only access the system when at least one 
key has an endorsed access. Recently, numerous researchers have proposed ABE 
algorithms; some of these are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
 
Figure 2.7 Scheme proposed by Fabian et al. (Fabian et al., 2015) 
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Fabian et al. proposed a new ABE-based scheme for secure data sharing in eHealth 
clouds (Fabian et al., 2015). The proposed scheme aims to preserve the security and 
privacy of patients’ records in partly trustworthy cloud servers. It uses the ABE 
algorithm to manage users’ accessibility to health records and shared keys, and to 
distribute information and health records among several clouds. Figure 2.7 shows a 
patient visiting three different health centres (HCs A, B and C). His/her health record 
is updated at each of the three centres. When the patient visits HC C, the doctors at HC 
C can request the full health record for that patient from HCs A and B through the 
multi-cloud proxy. However, the key management process needs to be reconsidered 
and solved. In addition, the key authority of the ABE algorithm has to be distributed, 
and security responsibilities must be separated. 
Li et al. proposed a new ABE-based framework for secure sharing of PHRs in 
eHealth clouds (Li et al., 2013). The authors assumed that the cloud servers were semi-
trusted; they also argued that the PHR records had to be encrypted to ensure the privacy 
of the patients. They used the ABE algorithm to encrypt PHRs, and patients can 
delegate others from public domains to access their PHR records. This work involved 
verifying key management complexity reduction and privacy enhancement. The 
proposed framework involves multiple data owners, clients, attribute authorities 
(AAs), and SDs. The framework can use one of two ABE algorithms: the revocable 
key policy ABE system proposed by Yu et al. was used for each public and personal 
domain (PSD) (Yu et al., 2010), and the authors proposed their own revocable MA-
ABE system to be used for each personal and public domain (PUD). 
Outsourced ABE (OABE) approaches can significantly decrease the computational 
cost of encryption by moving the large computation to a CSP. However, large 
encrypted files which are saved on the cloud are likely to affect the query processing 
in a negative way. Li et al. therefore proposed a keyword search function (KSF-OABE) 
approach, which aims to solve this problem (Li et al., 2017). KSF-OABE offers key 
issuing, decryption, and keyword search functions. It retrieves part of the ciphertext 
according to a particular keyword. In this approach, operations that consume a large 
amount of time will be moved to the CSP, while users needing less time will process 
consuming operations. Thus, the processing time can be reduced on both the CSP and 
user sides. However, the proposed KSF-OABE approach does not offer verifiability 
features. The proposed approach was tested only for a Replayable Chosen-Ciphertext 
Attack (RCCA) and was not tested for a chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA). CCA-secure 
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approaches are RCCA-secure, although RCCA-secure approaches are not CCA-
secure. Therefore, testing under both CCA and RCCA conditions is suggested.  
A PHR system based on the ABE algorithm was presented by Xhafa et al. for secure 
sharing and storing of PHRs in the cloud (Xhafa et al., 2015 (B)). This system permits 
users to share their PHRs and personal information selectively with health service 
providers. The proposed system is practical as it provides searchability, revocation, 
and local decryption. 
Based on their operations, ABEs can be classified as ciphertext-policy or key-policy 
ABEs. 
 
2.4.1.1 Ciphertext-Policy ABEs  
In the ciphertext-policy (CP-ABE) approaches, the encryptor manages the access 
operation. The public key process is more complex due to the complexity of the access 
operation and hardens the system. Most CP-ABE research concentrates on the access 
control design (Su et al., 2011). 
 
Figure 2.8 Approach proposed by Liu et al. (Liu et al., 2015 (C)) 
 
Liu et al. proposed a new approach based on CP-ABE with a signature 
(SignCryption), called CP-ABSC. It delivers PHR authentication, encryption, and 
access control (Liu et al., 2015 (C)). The proposed approach allows a patient to sign 
the PHR record using a secret key and a group of personal attributes, as shown in 
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Figure 2.8. CP-ABSC has two features: access control and signature encryption 
(SignCryption). The authors claim that a combination of these two features can deliver 
the authenticity, unforgeability, confidentiality and collusion prevention required by a 
PHR system. A revocation process, however, is not considered. In addition, according 
to Rao, this approach cannot provide verifiability for a public ciphertext property 
which is necessary to resist any invalid ciphertext decryption in order to decrease the 
redundant load on the decryptor (Rao, 2017). 
As a result, in 2017, Rao proposed another CP-ABSC approach for PHR cloud projects 
which claims to be verifiable for a public ciphertext (Rao, 2017). This approach 
satisfies the important security properties of the attribute-based signature (ABS) and 
ABE. Furthermore, it uses communication links to a lesser extent than other 
approaches. This CP-ABSC has two assumptions: Existential Unforgeability in 
Selective Signing Predicate and adaptive Chosen Message Attack (EUF-SSP-CMA) 
and the resistance of the Computational Diffie–Hellman Exponent (CDHE) problem, 
and Decisional Bilinear Diffie–Hellman Exponent (DBDHE) problem” (Rao, 2017).  
These assumptions can prevent the “indistinguishability of ciphertext in selective 
encryption predicate and adaptive chosen ciphertext” attack (IND-sEP-CCA2). 
Wang et al. (Wang et al., 2015 (A)) introduced another cloud-based PHR (CB-PHR) 
system. CB-PHR permits the owners of PHRs to safely store their records in a partly 
trustworthy CSP, and to share them with several clients of their choice. PHR clients 
are divided into public and personal domains to decrease the complexity of key 
management. In this approach, health records are encrypted by the owner of the PHRs 
using CP-ABE for presentation to the public domain, whereas health records are 
encrypted using a nameless multi-receiver identity-based encryption algorithm for the 
personal domain. Therefore, only accredited clients whose identification can meet the 
CP specifications can decrypt health records (Wang et al., 2015 (A)). The authors 
suggest services such as statistics and retrieval of data. It should be mentioned that the 
CB-PHR has a high computational cost, as it encrypts the same record twice. 
Motivated by cloud security requirements, Xu et al. modified the CP-ABE scheme 
to propose a new Verifiable Delegation CP-ABE (VDCPABE) (Xu et al., 2016). This 
cloud computing scheme is based on verifiable technology and multilinear maps. 
Hybrid encryption is used to encrypt data by its owner. For each ciphertext block, a 
verifiable message authentication code (MAC) is generated privately, and the full 
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ciphertext is then uploaded to the cloud. When the data owner is not online, the client 
who requests the data can ask the cloud server directly (Xu et al., 2016). 
Health records are usually represented using a multilayer hierarchical structure. 
However, according to Wang et al., this hierarchical characteristic of health records 
has not been investigated thoroughly in terms of CP-ABE (Wang et al., 2016 (B)). 
They, therefore, proposed a data hierarchy ABE approach for such cloud projects. A 
single access control method is used rather than levelled access control methods, and 
the hierarchical data are encrypted using this single access control method. The 
proposed scheme was shown to reduce storage and time costs, since the parts of the 
ciphertext related to attributes are distributed by the records (Wang et al., 2016 (B)).  
A PHR privacy preserving approach based on a multi-authority CP-ABE which 
offers revocation features and ensures fine-grained access was proposed by Qian et al. 
(Qian et al., 2015). The authors show that this approach can be implemented in a partly 
trustworthy server and encrypted PHRs with multiple owners stored on that server. 
The proposed approach is able to work in public cloud PHR systems (Li et al., 2013). 
Once PHRs encryption is complete, to achieve a fine-grained access, the patient can 
combine ciphertext with multilayer access attributes. A key exchange scheme is used 
to preserve the privacy of the PHRs. This key exchange scheme ensures that if cracked, 
authorities will expose zero information regarding the client’s global identifier (GId). 
As a result, the tracing of a GId by an attacker yields no information about the client’s 
attributes. The revocation of lazy client and on-demand services are features provided 
by this approach to decrease the computational overhead (Qian et al., 2015). 
 Another approach based on CP-ABE was proposed by Guo et al. to secure 
EHRs in health cloud environments (Guo et al., 2016). This approach uses a CP-ABE 
algorithm to encrypt tables published by healthcare providers, such as EHRs. The 
patient’s identification number is used as a primary key to store these records in a 
database. This permits multiple clients with multiple constraints to search multiple 
database columns. The authors highlight that their work differs from others in terms 
of securing outsourcing records, as the search management of columns in the database 
is emphasised (Guo et al., 2016). 
Xhafa et al. presented a multi-authority CP-ABE approach with a patient 
accountability feature to secure PHR sharing in a health cloud project (Xhafa et al., 
2015 (A)). In the proposed work, patient privacy is secured by the access control policy 
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being hidden. The reduction of authority and PHRs trust assumptions are ensured 
through the accountability feature. 
 
2.4.1.2 Key-Policy ABE (KP-ABE) 
In the Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (KP-ABE) schemes, ciphertext has 
a group of attributes, and the access regulations are controlled by the client's private 
key. Ciphertext can be decrypted only when these groups of attributes match the 
structure of access to the client's private key (Attapadung et al., 2012). 
Based on the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption, a privacy-
preserving KP-ABE (PP KP-ABE) approach was proposed for secure data sharing in 
a cloud system (Rahulamathavn et al., 2016). This approach permits clients to retrieve 
data from the cloud and then decrypt it, without exposing any attribute information to 
a third party. The issue of collusion attacks is resolved in this research, as PP KP-ABE 
is collusion resistant. The authors of PP KP-ABE utilise a key management scheme to 
strengthen the connection between client and the secret key, thus multiple clients 
cannot use their secret keys to produce a secret key for an unapproved client 
(Rahulamathavn et al., 2016). 
Another KP-ABE-based scheme named access policy re-definable ABE (APR-
ABE) was proposed by Qin et al. for securing EHRs in cloud environments (Qin et al., 
2015). In APR-ABE, attribute vectors are used to implement access control. This 
access control is linked to clients’ secret keys; higher level clients can easily redefine 
their access control to be commensurate with their roles, and can then provide lower 
level clients with a secret key that has more limitations. 
 
2.4.2 Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) 
FHE is a type of encryption that has a special feature permitting operations to be 
conducted on a ciphertext as well as on plaintext (Maral et al., 2016). This is a vital 
feature, especially in modern ICT systems, as it enables the possibility of chaining 
several services together without leaking information. There are several schemes 
which secure health records using FHE, and some of these are discussed in the 
following paragraphs. 
A FHE-based scheme was proposed to secure computations for the Genome-Wide 
Association Study (GWAS) (Lu et al., 2015). The proposed scheme aims to preserve 
the privacy of patients’ genomic data. It adapts FHE to encrypt genotype and 
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phenotype data for all patients to implement meaningful operations on a ciphertext. 
However, the authors do not consider the computational complexity of the FHE in 
their proposed scheme, which is a major issue for the proposed FHE scheme 
(Kumarage et al., 2016). 
Another approach based on FHE was proposed to preserve the privacy of health 
data in a public cloud (Kocabas & Soyata, 2015; Page et al., 2014). A detailed analysis 
was provided based on heart rate (average), heart rate (max/min), and the automated 
detection of irregular heartbeats. The authors provided a set of experimental results 
over 24 hours using an electrocardiogram (ECG) signal dataset and a homomorphic 
encryption library (HElib). The results show that the proposed approach can be 
adapted for a health cloud system to secure data from these sources (Kocabas & 
Soyata, 2015; Page et al., 2014). However, the proposed scheme does not solve the 
problem of computational complexity in FHE. The implementation of this approach in 
a real-time parallel system also needs to be considered to reduce the procedure time. 
Zhao et al. proposed a different FHE-based system to solve the issue of lack of data 
safety in a health cloud (Zhao et al., 2014). The authors claim that the proposed method 
is suitable for both retrieving and processing ciphertext for secure storage of health 
data on cloud servers and transmission of data between the cloud and the clients. This 
method was able to offer search date for a third party. However, in the same way as 
the previous methods, this method also suffers from high computation requirements. 
 
2.4.3 Searchable Encryption (SE) 
SE is a cryptographic scheme that provides safe searching in a ciphertext. For 
enhanced effectiveness, SE typically constructs keyword indexes to verify client 
requests. SE schemes can be based on either a public key or secret key. Many proposals 
have been offered to deliver secure search over encrypted text, and some of these are 
described below. 
Yang and Ma proposed a time-dependent SE approach with a designated tester and 
timing enabled proxy re-encryption function (Re-dtPECK) (Yang & Ma, 2016). This 
approach allows patients to give limited access privileges to others, which helps to 
control search procedures over the health records within a particular timeframe. People 
who are given access privileges by patients can search and decrypt health records 
within this limited timeframe. In addition, Re-dtPECK offers a linked word search, 
and can prevent guessing attacks (Yang & Ma, 2016). However, the revocation feature 
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is not considered in this approach as the patient holds the same key most of the time, 
meaning that Re-dtPECK needs to consider redistributing secret keys among 
authorised clients. 
A scheme named secure channel-free searchable encryption (SCF-PEKS) has been 
proposed to offer a secure search over encrypted EHR (Wu et al., 2016 (B)). This 
version of SCF-PEKS was shown to be able to reduce storage and computational costs 
when compared to the previous SCF-PEKS. Moreover, it can resist keyword guessing 
attacks. However, despite reductions in storage and computation costs, ranked and 
fuzzy keyword searches were not provided, and integrity checks were missing.  
Another proposed scheme uses a Bloom filter tree index to permit accredited users 
to retrieve data from ciphertext in a cloud (Song et al., 2017). In addition to the 
proposed scheme, the authors introduced a ranking method based on keyword 
membership, to retrieve only vital keywords. The authors argued that their work was 
the first to be able to retrieve full encrypted text from a large cloud storage database. 
However, a collusion attack could possibly threaten the proposed scheme. 
Liu et al. proposed a novel EHR cloud project which aimed to safely share and store 
EHR records in a cloud environment (Liu et al., 2016). The proposed approach is based 
on binary trees for saving EHR ciphertext, and the ABE algorithm is adopted for 
efficient encryption of the shared keys. The authors claimed that the proposed project 
was designed to secure EHRs, and these were encrypted using a symmetric algorithm. 
With fewer cryptographic operations, a searchable encryption scheme might improve 
the system further. However, integrity checks were not offered by the proposed 
system. 
Since the security of data sharing is an important factor for any cloud-based system, 
especially health cloud systems, Liang and Susilo defined a new notation searchable 
attribute-based proxy re-encryption (ABPRE) scheme to address this issue (Liang & 
Susilo, 2015). However, the authors did not state how they might reduce the search 
token size, and how a key holder could create tokens. A modified scheme was 
recommended to address these issues. 
In addition, Li et al. introduced two fine-grained multi-keyword search (FMS) 
schemes, FMS_I and FMS_II (Li et al., 2016 (A)). FMS_I was designed to provide an 
accurate search by considering common keyword factors and related scores. FMS_II 
was built to offer a secure complex search, which might contain several keywords 
connected with logical operations such as “AND” and “OR” operations. Finally, to 
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enhance the efficiency of the proposed schemes, FMS classified support (FMSCS) 
sub-dictionaries were proposed. However, the proposed method cannot deal with a 
multi-user cloud. 
Finally, a multi-keyword SE method was proposed to safely search over encrypted 
text on a cloud (Xia et al., 2016). This method was able to offer dynamic operations 
such as insert and delete operations. The authors designed their own tree-based index, 
as well as a “greedy depth-first search” method to enhance the ranked search using 
multiple keywords. They chose the KNN algorithm to encrypt the query and the index. 
In addition, this algorithm was chosen to compute the score of the connections between 
the query and the index. Shade terms were inserted into the index to prevent statistical 
attacks. However, a revocation feature is not offered by the proposed approach, as the 
patient holds the same key most of the time, as in Re-dtPECK discussed above. 
In the next section, the data security requirements will be reviewed. 
 
2.5 Data Security Requirements 
Several security issues are related to cloud systems such as EHR cloud-based 
systems. These issues include not only common concerns such as DDoS attacks (Sahi 
et al., 2017 (A)), but also specific issues in the cloud such as side channel attacks, etc. 
(Tang et al., 2016). Thus, setting security requirements for any cloud systems is 
essential and must be included in the review. From an eHealth cloud perspective, the 
security requirements (R) of cloud system include the following. 
 
2.5.1 Confidentiality (R1) 
The confidentiality of data in a health cloud system means that unauthorised clients 
cannot decrypt or retrieve health records. The data owner, for example the patient, 
does not control the health records stored in the cloud (Li et al., 2013). Authorised 
clients are the only users who can access the records; even CSPs are not allowed to 
access any information regarding the data. Furthermore, patients expect full control 
over their health records in the cloud, without any leakage to other legitimate users or 
attackers. 
 
2.5.2 Access Controllability (R2) 
Access controllability means that a data owner controls his/her data by implementing 
certain carefully constructed rules in order to ensure the security and privacy of 
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records, and by allowing only legal users to have controlled access (Tang et al., 2016). 
Other users cannot access health records without permission. Users have different 
access rights to access different parts of the data. This is called fine-grained access 
control. In an untrusted cloud system, the data owner is the only one permitted to grant 
access. 
 
2.5.3 Integrity (R3) 
Integrity is a security feature that ensures the completeness and accuracy of data. In 
other words, data must stay complete and must not be altered or deleted; users 
normally expect their data to be kept safe in cloud storage (Liu et al., 2015 (A)). 
Furthermore, users must be able to detect any unsolicited modification, loss, or 
corruption of this data, and to retrieve lost pieces. 
 
2.5.4 Authenticity (R4) 
Authenticity is assurance that a message, transaction, or other exchange of information 
is from the source it claims to be from (Abbas & Khan, 2014). Authenticity involves 
proof of identity. We can verify authenticity through authentication. 
 
2.5.5 Reliability (R5) 
Reliability means that the system performs as users expect (Lehr, 2015). One of the 
main factors of reliability is availability, which means that continuity of service is 
provided. In other words, availability means how long the system is expected to serve 
users without interruption (Lehr, 2015). 
 
2.5.6 Accountability (R6) 
As cited in (Felici & Pearson, 2015), “defining what exactly accountability means in 
practice is complex”. One definition is that the controller of the data must be 
responsible for acting in accordance with procedures that affect the privacy of data. 
 
2.5.7 Auditability (R7) 
Auditability means monitoring security, privacy, and all access activities on eHealth 
clouds (Abbas & Khan, 2014). To ensure that no errors accrue, auditing must be done 
from time to time. 
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2.5.8 Non-Repudiation (R8) 
Non-repudiation means that no one can falsely deny any unethical behaviour (Chen et 
al., 2014; Mihaita et al., 2017). In eHealth cloud environment, patients and physicians 
cannot deny any misuse or mishandling of health records. 
 
2.5.9 Anonymity (R9) 
The anonymity of the user means preventing a third party from obtaining valid user 
information that leads to accessing the server (Jiang et al., 2016 (B); Sharma & Kalra, 
2016). As the attacker is unable to learn any personal information, anonymity ensures 
the privacy of legitimate users in the cloud. A lack of anonymity means an attacker 
can be fake identity as an authenticated user. 
 
2.5.10 Unlinkability (R10) 
Unlinkability means that, in order to ensure a user’s privacy, associating information 
with a particular user must be difficult (Wu et al., 2016 (A)). Although sometimes a 
group of words needs to be used for a particular function, this group of words should 
be different each time. Thus, a random generation function is required (Liu et al., 2015 
(B)). 
 
2.5.11 Maintainability (R11) 
Maintainability means the ability to perform fast maintenance on a project as the 
development of very large projects is often not fully complete (Biswas et al., 2014). 
Maintainability can therefore ensure the delivery of services without error for different 
parties. In addition, a testing method is needed to decrease the time of maintenance.  
 
2.5.12 Revocability (R12) 
Revocability means that users’ access rights should be revoked after a period of time 
so that they cannot access specific data later on using old keys (Thilakanathan et al., 
2014). Revocability is a vital feature for eHealth cloud systems and needs to be well 
implemented to ensure the privacy of users and the secrecy of the contents (Yang, 
2015). Once a manager chooses to revoke a particular user’s rights, the corresponding 
keys need to be eliminated from the system. 
Table 2.1 shows a comparison of security approaches for eHealth clouds in terms 
of data security requirements. Techniques, aims, limitations, and server assumptions 
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of twelve approaches have been compared in this table. For each approach, all listed 
security requirements have been checked to see whether these approaches have 
ensured them or not, each requirement can be valid, invalid or not as specified by the 
author. For example, the first approach used proxy re-encryption and El-Gamal 
encryption techniques (Thilakanathan et al., 2014). The aim of this approach is to 
design in-home monitoring. However, a data sharing service is assumed to take place 
between fully trusted parties. Server assumptions also have not been specified. In terms 
of security requirements, R1, R2, and R12 are valid in this approach, R5 is not 
specified, and all other security requirements are invalid. 
In the next section, the literature of disaster recovery plans is reviewed. 
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2.6 Disaster Recovery Plans 
The CSPs must establish continuity and recovery plans to ensure that services will 
remain available and can recover all lost data even after disasters such as floods, 
earthquakes, or electricity power failures. The data recovery plan may be established 
solely by CSPs, or in consultation with clients. 
Several suggestions have been made to facilitate disaster recovery, and some of 
these are discussed below. 
Sahi et al. presented a disaster recovery plan to ensure the availability of PHRs 
and HERs in a health cloud environment (Sahi et al., 2016). The authors assume that 
the cloud storage consists of three or more data centres. Distributing signals called 
heartbeats are used between data centres and the CSP, in order to keep track of the 
status of these data centres. Each health record is divided into several parts, and 
multiple copies of each part are stored in different data centres. In the case of a disaster, 
the heartbeat from a data centre will stop if the data centre machine is damaged, which 
alerts the manager. The manager can recover or retrieve the records from the other data 
centres, with no need to access the damaged record. Finally, the authors point out that 
the data centres must be physically located in different geographic locations (for 
example in different countries) to ensure the availability of the data and the services 
(Sahi et al., 2016). 
Another disaster recovery plan has been proposed based on three different 
techniques: TCP/IP, VM snapshots, and replication (Chang, 2015). The proposed plan 
claims to achieve 99.94% data recovery in the event of a disaster. The proposed 
approach was implemented with real data and tests involving backing up all sister site 
records in London, Southampton, and Leeds. However, the data centres in the 
proposed approach are not integrated with any existing centres. In addition, all data 
centres are located within the same geographical area, which could be considered a 
major drawback.  
Gu et al. proposed backup and recovery models for implementing a disaster 
recovery plan (Gu et al., 2014). In terms of the backup model, clients are provided 
with accounts with limited rights. The CSP is responsible for sending and receiving 
data to/from clients. A client is able to request a backup from the CSP within a certain 
timeframe; the CSP will hold this request, make three copies of the data and store these 
in different locations. In the recovery model, the client can request a data recovery 
from the CSP. The CSP can retrieve the data from the stored three copies and send it 
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back to the client. However, storing the data in full at three different locations can 
significantly increase the backup data size.  
Mansoori et al. presented a disaster recovery plan based on two servers, a local 
server and a disaster recovery server (Mansoori et al., 2014). The proposed plan 
considers four scenarios to provide availability and continuity of services. The authors 
implemented the proposed plan in a university hospital health system to ensure 
constant access to the picture archiving and communication system (PACS) 
application and its controlled radiology images. However, the authors did not consider 
a scenario in which a disaster affects a relatively wide geographic area leading to 
damage to the backup images. 
In the cloud environment, users’ data are controlled by the service providers rather 
than by users themselves. As a result, there is the potential for data leaks, either 
intentional or accidental, which is unacceptable (Gonzales, et al., 2012; Ma, 2012). 
Furthermore, data in the cloud are stored in geographically diverse locations. Thus, 
confidentiality, authentication, and communication between parties becomes an 
important concern (Hussain & Ashraf, 2014). When users use cloud services, they may 
not know precisely where their information is held (Gampala et al., 2012). In this 
situation, it is better for cloud service providers to offer high levels of encryption to 
secure the confidentiality of data wherever they are stored, and an appropriate key 
exchange method should be adopted. 
Confidentiality is not enough to guarantee cloud computing security. Users want to 
ensure that their data cannot be modified or compromised by a third party. Cloud 
service suppliers should also apply methods to guarantee data integrity (Sugumaran et 
al., 2014). Big data are usually stored in distributed locations, therefore parallel 
encryption is needed to encrypt the large number of blocks or chunks of data 
separately, taking much longer when using sequential encryption. 
In addition to encryption, availability of service must be ensured, flood attacks need 
to be detected and prevented, and excessive energy consumption must be reduced. 
Therefore, the following research questions have been identified: 
1. Has a researcher in this area reviewed the major and relevant literature on cloud 
security and privacy? 
2. How can the security of key exchange between parties be hardened, and different 
types of attacks prevented? 
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3. How can the performance of the adopted encryption algorithm be improved on 
top of security assurance? 
4. How can security and privacy be preserved in eHealth clouds? How can a client 
be enabled to connect to the system at any time, even during a disaster? 
5. How can DDoS TCP flood attacks be detected and prevented? How can the 
energy consumption caused by DoS attacks be reduced?  
Subsequent chapters (4 to 7) review more literature related to each of the identified 
gaps.  
 
2.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter reviews security and privacy issues and the state-of-the-art solutions 
proposed for eHealth clouds in five main directions:  security and privacy, security 
controls, effective encryption, data security requirements, and disaster recovery plans.  
This chapter collects, evaluates, and classifies the state-of-the-art eHealth security 
and privacy schemes. In addition, it covers the most recent studies in this area, 
discusses drawbacks of the existing proposals to help improve the security and privacy 
of eHealth clouds, and compares several research works in terms of data security 
requirements. 
This chapter investigated and reviewed the relevant literature on eHealth clouds 
security and privacy. Research directions were decided, and research questions are 
listed.  So, hypothesis H1 (Investigation and review of the relevant literature on 
eHealth cloud security and privacy would facilitate the researcher’s decisions on 
research directions) is proved and research question 1 is answered. 









Chapter 2 summarised and analysed security and privacy issues and state-of-the-art solutions 
proposed for eHealth clouds. An extensive review was conducted and research questions were 
listed. This chapter introduces different research methods and describes the research design 
methodology and process used to carry out the research objectives.  
  
3.1 Introduction 
Research can be defined as an organised investigation undertaken to obtain new knowledge. 
The research philosophy refers to the assumptions that are made regarding ontology and 
epistemology. The technique or procedure that is applied in doing research is called the 
research method, and the study of research methods to solve research problems is called 
research methodologies (Edgar & Manz, 2017). To ensure research quality, research methods, 
methodologies and the research process are discussed in the following sections. Focusing on 
the actual research work is important but considering research methods and methodologies at 
the beginning of the process is also vital as they affect the outcome of the research (Håkansson, 
2013).  
Quantitative and qualitative are the main approaches to research. Researchers must choose 
one of these, or a combination of both (mixed methods). Quantitative research is utilised to 
investigate problems by generating numerical information that can be changed into usable 
statistics. While this research requires experiments and the testing and verifying of hypotheses 
and the functionalities of a system, the quantitative methods was chosen. “Qualitative research 
is an approach for exploring and understanding the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a 
social or human problem.” (Creswell & Creswell, 2017, p.4). Qualitative methods support 
research that involves the collection and analysis of behaviours and opinions. To gain a more 
3 
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complete view of the research subject area, mixed methods (sometimes called triangulation) 
can be used. 
In general, there are four types of research: observational research, theoretical research, 
experimental research, and applied research (Edgar & Manz, 2017). Research where the 
researcher tries to observe or understand the ongoing behaviour of a real system, is called 
observational research. Observational research includes three kinds of studies: exploratory 
studies, descriptive studies and machine learning. Exploratory studies are conducted for the 
kind of problems that are not deeply studied and that have not achieved significant 
performance. Descriptive studies seek to improve performance by observation, description and 
the analysis of real problems. The third is machine learning, which is most popular where 
electronic data is the basis of problem analysis. Theoretical research is research that involves 
theories and/or definitions of how a system behaves and then explores the implications for the 
definition of that system’s behaviour. This research can be in the form of a formal theory or a 
simulation. In experimental research, a researcher uses experiments to generate evidence that 
answers the research questions. There are two types of experimental research: hypothesis-based 
research that tests whether the hypotheses are acceptable or not (called hypothetic-deductive 
research); and quasi-experimental research which is used when the researcher is involved with 
independent variables that cannot be randomly allocated. The fourth research type is applied 
research. This research measures and evaluates how effectively we apply certain knowledge to 
solve problems. Applied research can be further classified as applied experimentation studies 
and applied observational studies. As this study uses computer experiments to test and verify 
the proposed methods, experimental research is an appropriate research method choice. 
 
Figure 3.1. A framework for research – philosophy, design, and research methods (Creswell 
& Creswell, 2017, p.5) 
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As shown in Figure 3.1, a research framework is an interconnection of philosophy, design, 
and research methods (Creswell & Creswell, 2017). This research uses positivist assumptions 
(philosophy) in which outcomes are influenced by causes. In other words, the problems 
affecting the outcomes were identified and the research questions were then set. According to 
Creswell and Creswell (2017), “these (positivist) assumptions hold true more for quantitative 
research than qualitative research” (p.6). To help determine whether the research proposal 
could affect the research outcomes, an experimental quantitative design was adopted. Finally, 
pretest and posttest performance measures were included in the research method. These 
research methods are discussed in Section 3.4 using five different phases. 
 
3.2 The Research Philosophy 
The research philosophy adopted for a research project is of the utmost importance. If a 
phenomenon or an area is to be investigated in a systematic way, there needs to be a coherent 
research philosophy (Creswell, 2014). The philosophy of the study refers to the assumptions 
that are made regarding ontology and epistemology. 
The concept of ontology refers to the examination of being the ultimate nature of reality and 
the relationship between the various properties in the world. In this study; the elements in a 
cloud security system. The researcher adopted a positivist approach to the nature of reality. 
This is the belief that there exists a fixed and independent reality that is outside the mental 
experience of the subject (Creswell, 2014). The positivist approach to, and theory of the nature 
of being, are based on the scientific method. That is, there exists an objective reality that is not 
dependent on the subject and that is fully independent of the human mind. In this case the 
positivist approach is applied to cloud computing security. It holds that reality is a set of fixed 
and regular laws and is highly predictable (Creswell, 2014). The positivist approach holds that 
reality outside the human mind can nonetheless be known by the subject. The laws that occur 
in reality can be comprehended by the human mind, which can measure and conceptualise these 
laws and understand them in an objective way. This means that the researcher can collect 
objective and verifiable data about information systems such as cloud computing security. 
The second important element in the research philosophy is that of the epistemological 
stance. This is the researcher’s theory of knowledge. The researcher adopted the objectivist 
theory of knowledge. The objectivist theory of knowledge tells that there exists an independent 
and objective reality. For example, cloud security is a phenomenon that exists in the world. It 
holds that the human mind can use reason to understand and to establish facts about reality. 
Reason can be used to understand the laws of nature and those relating to information systems 
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and cloud security (Williamson & Johanson, 2017). Objectivism holds that we can interact with 
the physical world, and from these interactions we receive impressions. We can then abstract 
these impressions to form ideas. For example, conceptualising the functions and the roles of 
cloud security computing. This means that there is a definite connection between what we 
experience and our knowledge of what we experience. This theory of knowledge holds that the 
concepts that we develop are accurate representations of reality, and that we can employ logic 
to determine the relationship between properties. This theory of knowledge means that the 
researcher can establish facts and principles in relation to the research questions.  
This research project reviewed the literature in the area of eHealth cloud security and 
privacy. It studies the problems that influenced the security and privacy of eHealth clouds, such 
as problems related to confidentiality, authentication, and availability. Solutions to such 
problems may help in securing cloud projects in the health sector. After identifying the 
problems, five research questions are listed and shown in Table 3.1. The research hypotheses 
and assumptions were then created to help develop concepts that affect outcomes. Finally, facts 
were drawn from the outcomes according to the selected theory of knowledge and experience. 
These facts will potentially improve eHealth clouds and open new research directions to benefit 
the researcher and other researchers by identifying the first step in other research. 
 
3.3 The Research Design 
The main influence on the choice of effective research design is the nature of the research 
questions. Having identified the research questions, the researcher had to determine the 
research design most likely to achieve the research goals. Basically, using a research design is 
very important for any successful research as it can facilitate the extraction of appropriate 
information and knowledge from the data. 
The research design is the methodology, or the strategy, used to perform the research. The 
research design is the overall methodology of the research that is used to integrate the different 
methods/parts of the research to implement in a particular case so that it leads to the best 
possible solution to the research problem. This study adopted an experimental quantitative 
design which determined whether the proposals could affect the outcomes.  
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Table 3.1: Mapping of research questions, objectives, methods and validations, and outcomes 
 Research questions Research objectives Methods and validations Outcomes 
1 
Has a researcher in this 
area reviewed the major 
and relevant literature 
on cloud security and 
privacy? 
To investigate and review the 
state of the art in privacy and 
security in eHealth clouds, in 
order to fully explore current 
research directions 
 Summarise and analyse state 
of the art publications in 
eHealth cloud security and 
privacy 
 Comparison 
An extensive review was conducted, and over 100 studies from 
several peer-reviewed databases, such as IEEE Xplore, were 
investigated. The selected studies were reviewed and 
summarised in terms of their benefits and risks.  
Details given in Chapter 2; the content of this chapter has 
been submitted to the journal Computer Science Review. 
2 
How can the security of 
key exchange between 
parties be hardened, and 
different types of attacks 
prevented? 
To develop a TPAKE protocol 
based on the CDH assumption 
to securely distribute keys 
between parties, and to 
protect systems against 
multiple attacks 
 Theoretical proofs 
 AKE security 
 Random Oracle Model 
 Programming 
 Statistical tests 
 Prototyping 
 Lab experiment 
 Analysis 
 Results evaluation 
The presentation of a TPAKE protocol based on the CDH that 
securely distributes keys among users and that protects systems 
against multiple attacks. 
Details given in Chapter 4; part of the content of this chapter 
has been accepted by the International Journal of 
Communication Networks and Distributed Systems, and the 
remainder was presented at the International Conference on 
Telecommunications (ICT2015) 22nd: Proceedings of the 
IEEE. 
3 
How can the 
performance of the 
adopted encryption 
algorithm be improved 
on top of security 
assurance? 
To introduce an efficient hash-
based PBC mode of operation 
to increase the performance of 
the encryption process while 




 Lab experiment 
 Analysis 
 Results evaluation 
A PBC mode of operation was introduced in which blocks of 
cipher were processed in parallel to ensure both high 
performance and security.  
Details given in Chapter 5; part of the content of this chapter 
was presented at the 4th International Conference on Computer 
and Communication Systems (ICCCS2018), Japan. The 
remainder was presented at the 10th International Conference 
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on Information Technology and Applications (ICITA2015), 
Sydney. 
4 
How can security and 
privacy be preserved in 
the eHealth cloud? How 
can a client be enabled to 
connect to the system at 
any time, even during a 
disaster? 
To integrate Objectives 2 and 3 
into security and privacy-
preservation approaches in 
eHealth clouds, and to ensure 
the connectivity of users 
during disasters 
 Integration of the PBC and 
the TPAKE 
 Availability check 
 Lab experiment 
 Analysis 
 Comparison 
 Results evaluation 
Security and privacy preservation approaches in eHealth clouds 
that ensure both the privacy and the security of the eHealth 
cloud. In addition, ensure connectivity for users during a 
disaster.  
Details given in Chapter 6; the content of this chapter has been 
published in the journal Computers in Biology and Medicine. 
5 
How can DDoS TCP 
flood attacks be 
detected and 
prevented? How can 
the energy 
consumption caused by 
DoS attacks be 
reduced?  
To provide a classification-
based system for detecting 
and mitigating DDoS TCP 
flood attacks in eHealth cloud 
environments and an energy-
efficient TCP DoS attack 
mitigation method 
 Classification 
 K-Fold-Cross validation 
 Accuracy, sensitivity and 
specificity 
 Kappa coefficient 
 Filtering 
 Programming 
 Lab experiment 
 Packets analysis 
 Comparison 
 Results evaluation 
A classification-based security system that helps to detect and 
mitigate DDoS TCP flood attacks.  
A method to mitigate DoS attacks in the cloud by reducing 
excessive energy consumption via limiting the number of 
packets. Rather than a system shutdown, this method can 
ensure the availability of service.  
Details given in Chapter 7; part of the content of this chapter 
has been published in the journal IEEE Access, and the 
remainder was presented at the First MoHESR and HCED Iraqi 
Scholars Conference in Australasia 2017, Melbourne. 




Many research design methodologies that can be used to process a research project. 
Some examples of these methodologies can be found in relevant studies (Gregg et al., 
2001; Hevner et al., 2004; March & Smith, 1995; Nunamaker et al., 1991; Peffers et 
al., 2008; Purao, 2013). 
This thesis adopted the Vaishnavi and Kuechler research methodology (Vaishnavi 
& Kuechler 2004) which includes five main phases: Awareness of Problem, 
Suggestion, Development, Evaluation, and Conclusion, as shown in Figure 3.2. This 
study requires each research question to be tackled following a similar procedure and 
an individual answer for each research question. The answers are collated to answer 
the ultimate question: “How to secure clouds?” The Vaishnavi and Kuechler research 
methodology was chosen because it can be easily applied to the methodology for each 
research question and eventually obtain the research questions’ answers. For example, 
to answer the second research question; it is necessary to understand the problem, 
suggest a tentative design, develop the artefact, and then evaluate the performance. 
The same process is repeated for each research question. The individual conclusions 
may also be used to help achieve the other objectives and the final conclusion about 
“securing clouds using cryptography and traffic classification”. 
 
 
Figure 3.2. The selected research design methodology (Vaishnavi & Kuechler, 2004) 
 




As shown in Figure 3.2, Awareness of Problem is the first phase in this 
methodology, and it represents the overall picture of the problems and some 
suggestions for problem solving. Problems normally come from searching in a linked 
discipline that may also give the opportunity to obtain new results. The output of the 
Awareness of Problem phase fell into two different parts of this study: First, the 
introductory chapter (Chapter 1), which highlighted the research questions and which 
set up the research objectives according to the listed questions and second, the 
literature review chapter (Chapter 2). In addition to Chapter 2, Chapters 4 to 7 include 
more literature specific to the chapter but not included in Chapter 2.  
The Suggestion phase follows, and uses information from the Awareness of 
Problem phase to draw a tentative design for the research question. The Development 
phase is the implementation of the tentative design. Various implementation 
techniques may be used depending on the artefact to be created. Required software and 
tools to be used must be identified in the Development phase. In the Evaluation phase, 
the artefact obtained from the Development phase is tested and evaluated against the 
hypotheses. Evaluation results may generate a list of future work that can be used as 
input into another round of Suggestions. Conclusion is the last phase of the research 
design. This phase provides answers to the research questions by accepting or rejecting 
the hypotheses.  The results and knowledge gained can be repeatedly applied to further 
research. 
Problems are identified in Chapter 1. Chapter 2 provides an overview of cloud 
computing, in terms of its security and privacy, and some necessary background 
knowledge. Each subsequent chapter is offered as a cycle of its own. Chapter 8 
concludes the research. 
Table 3.1 maps the five research questions with their corresponding research 
objectives, methods and validations, and outcomes to provide an overall picture of the 
study.  
 
3.4 The Research Design Process 
This study uses pretest and posttest performance measures as research methods. These 
research methods are explained in this section using five different phases. Starting with 
the Awareness of Problem Phase, the overall research process is shown in Figure 3.2. 
 
 




3.4.1 The Awareness of Problem Phase 
The literature related to the scope of this study was reviewed and gaps identified.  
Factors influencing the outcomes of eHealth security and privacy are summarised as 
follows. Clouds are used by millions of people around the world. Cloud services give 
users the opportunity to store data in the cloud for easy access, anytime and anywhere 
(Carroll et al., 2011). However, the use of a cloud poses many security and privacy 
problems. Both security and privacy are vital for data distribution in the cloud (Chen 
& Zhao, 2012). In the cloud environment, a user’s data are controlled by the service 
providers rather than by the users themselves. There is, therefore, the potential for data 
leaks (either intentionally or accidentally), which is unacceptable (Gonzales, et al., 
2012; Ma, 2012). Furthermore, the data in the cloud are stored in geographically 
diverse locations. Thus, confidentiality, authentication, and communication between 
parties become important concerns (Hussain & Ashraf, 2014). When users use cloud 
services, they may not know precisely where their information is held (Gampala et al., 
2012). In this situation, it is better for cloud service providers to offer high levels of 
encryption to secure the confidentiality of the data wherever they are stored, and an 
appropriate key exchange method should be adopted. 
Confidentiality is not enough to guarantee cloud computing security. Users want to 
ensure that their data cannot be modified or compromised by a third party. Cloud 
service suppliers should also apply methods to guarantee data integrity (Sugumaran et 
al., 2014). Big data are usually stored in distributed locations, therefore parallel 
encryption is needed to encrypt the large number of blocks or chunks of data 
separately, taking much longer when using sequential encryption. 
In addition to encryption, availability of service must be ensured; flood attacks must 
be detected and prevented, and excessive energy consumption must be reduced. 
With the problems identified, tentative research designs can now be suggested.  
 
3.4.2 The Suggestion Phase 
Data security and privacy are sensitive and critical, and play a vital role in the 
information technology world (Ritchey et al., 2013). Cryptography can be used 
effectively to support and enhance data security and users’ privacy in cloud computing 
(Jaber & Zalkipli, 2013). This study is focused on security, privacy, prevention and 
mitigation of attacks on clouds such as eHealth clouds using encryption and other 
techniques. As a result, the following is suggested: analyse and summarise the relevant 




literature; propose a secure key distribution scheme; propose a high performance block 
cipher mode of operation; integrate the proposed key distribution scheme with the 
block cipher mode to preserve security and privacy in eHealth clouds; use a 
classification-based security system that can detect and mitigate DDoS TCP flood 
attacks and finally, use a method to mitigate DoS attacks in the cloud to reduce 
excessive energy consumption. This study aims to fulfil these suggestions by 
developing new approaches to preserving the security and privacy of eHealth clouds, 
and by ensuring the continuous availability of data by establishing a disaster recovery 
plan and preventing flood attacks. 
 
3.4.3 The Development Phase 
As mentioned above, Development is the implementation of the tentative design. 
Various implementation techniques are used depending on the artefact to be created. 
Software development and a package of tools are needed to begin the Development 
phase. 
Chapter 4 answers Research Question 2 by achieving Objective 2. A TPAKE 
protocol based on the CDH assumption is developed using the Geffe generator, 
encryption, and a hash function. This TPAKE protocol is implemented using Microsoft 
Visual Studio 2010, the high level language C#, and some HTML code. 
Chapter 5 answers Research Question 3 by achieving Objective 3.  A block cipher 
mode of operation is developed to ensure both high performance and security. As an 
implementation, Microsoft Visual Studio 2010 and Dot Net Framework 4.5 are used 
to implement two console applications using C#. Microsoft Visual Studio 2010 is used 
for the execution of the CBC mode and Dot Net Framework 4.5 for the execution of 
the PBC mode. These applications are then tested on a simulated network with eight 
virtual machines that are created on a single machine that has Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-
2600 CPU (8 CPUs) and 16GB RAM. 
Chapter 6 answers Research Question 4 by achieving Objective 4.  Two approaches 
are proposed based on the outcome of Chapter 4 (TPAKE protocol) and Chapter 5 
(PBC mode) to preserve the security and privacy of eHealth clouds. A disaster 
recovery plan that ensures connectivity for users during disasters is also designed in 
the form of a flow chart. 
Chapter 7 answers Research Question 5 by achieving Objective 5.  A virtual 
network is developed using a virtual box. Then DDoS attacks are launched to attack 




the victim network. Packets are captured using Wireshark Network Analyser 2.0.0 
(Wireshark, 2017). An algorithm is developed using MATLAB R2015b to classify 
network packets using four different classifiers (Least Squares Support Vector 
Machine, Naïve Bayes, K-nearest, and Multilayer perceptron) to detect and prevent 
the DDoS attacks. In addition, an energy efficient TCP DoS attacks mitigation method 
is developed based on a packet filtering method to reduce excessive energy 
consumption by limiting the number of packets. Rather than system shutdown, this 
method ensures continued availability of the service.  
 
3.4.4 The Evaluation Phase 
This phase describes how the proposed methods can be evaluated. The Evaluation 
phase measures the performance of the developed methods and concludes with their 
outcomes. The Evaluation phase can also be used as feedback for another round of 
Awareness of Problem. 
In Chapter 4, the presented TPAKE protocol is followed by theoretical proof and 
a practical demonstration. The proof section seeks to prove the security and 
correctness of the proposed protocol under the AKE security protocol. The TPAKE 
security protocol is then tested against relevant attacks. Having evaluated the 
protocol’s ability to resist multiple attacks, the developed protocol is compared with 
related protocols. In the practical demonstration section, the protocol is demonstrated 
to show how it might look and why attackers cannot intercept the communication 
channels. Statistical tests also used as part of the evaluation process. 
In Chapter 5, the PBC mode is tested and compared with the CBC mode in three 
different scenarios. First, a single data file is used as an input for the PBC mode that 
uses only one process. In the second scenario, the data file is split manually into data 
blocks and used as input for the PBC mode using multiple processes. Finally, a single 
data file is used as inputs for the PBC mode using multiple processes. In the last 
scenario, the PBC mode automatically splits the data file, processes the blocks, and 
re-combines encrypted blocks into a single encrypted data file. The output of these 
three scenarios is analysed and compared to show how the PBC performs when 
compared with the CBC.  
In Chapter 6, security and privacy approaches are evaluated under five factors 
(security, privacy, revocation, break-glass, and the disaster recovery plan), and then 
compared with relevant approaches. 




In Chapter 7, the performance of the CS_DDoS method is evaluated using the four 
classifiers: LS-SVM, Naïve Bayes, K-nearest, and Multilayer perceptron. Different 
training data sizes (window sizes) and different thresholds are used in the 
experiments. Algorithm 1 is applied to the training data for all the classifiers. To 
choose the most suitable classifier for the proposed method, the CS_DDoS system is 
evaluated in terms of accuracy, sensitivity (detection rate) and specificity (false alarm 
rate). The descriptive statistic Kappa coefficient is also used. The K-Fold-Cross 
validation is adopted for the validation and for conducting a performance comparison 
of the four predictive modelling algorithms used in CS_DDoS. The four algorithms 
are then compared for their prediction results. Sequence diagrams are also used as 
part of the evaluation process. Furthermore, the energy efficient TCP DoS attacks 
mitigation method is evaluated in the lab using another network. The Wireshark is 
used to capture the packets before they are analysed both logically and theoretically. 
 
3.4.5 The Conclusion Phase 
The Conclusion phase draws conclusions about the research questions from the results 
of the Evaluation phase. The results and knowledge gained from this phase can be 
repeatedly applied to further research cycles to produce research questions, and/or to 
provide answers to the research questions by accepting or rejecting hypotheses. 
 
3.5  Chapter Summary 
This chapter described the research philosophy and research design methodologies. 
The Vaishnavi and Kuechler research methodology was selected, and its five phases 
were described to provide an overall picture of the study’s research design. Positivist 
assumptions were also adopted the research philosophy. 
The following chapters present the Development and Evaluation phases for each 
of the four research objectives; Objective 2 to Objective 5. The next chapter begins 
with the second objective: “To develop a TPAKE protocol based on the CDH 
assumption to distribute keys securely between parties, and to protect systems against 
multiple attacks.” In addition, the literature review for each particular objective 
continues in each one of the chapters. However, Objective 1 is ongoing and is achieved 
only after completing all of the other objectives. 
 









AUTHENTICATED KEY EXCHANGE PROTOCOL 
 
This chapter presents a Three-party Password-based Authenticated Key Exchange 
(TPAKE) protocol that can be used to securely distribute keys to users and protect 
systems against multiple attacks. The proposed TPAKE protocol shares no plaintext 
data; data shared between the parties are either hashed or encrypted. Using the Random 
Oracle Model (ROM), the security of the proposed TPAKE protocol is formally proven 
under the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption. The Geffe binary 
sequence generator and several statistical tests are used in this protocol.  
 
4.1 Introducing Password Authenticated Key Exchange Protocols 
Password Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) protocols (Katz and Vaikuntanathan, 
2013; Lee et al., 2013; Farash and Attari, 2014 (A); Farash and Attari, 2014 (B)) are 
user-friendly solutions that ensure the security of the session key for a cryptosystem. 
This gives end-users the freedom to choose their own password freely without machine 
intervention. The PAKE protocols were initially introduced in the form of a two-party 
protocol (2PAKE) (Jiang et al., 2013; Tang et al., 2013; Farash and Attari, 2013). 
However, 2PAKE protocols are impractical for high numbers of users in a large 
network since each user needs to recall numerous different passwords for the many 
different users with whom they communicate (Farash and Attari, 2014 (B)). In other 
words, in a group of m users, there are m (m-1)/2 user pairs. Its management of the 
passwords is O (m2) which becomes impractical if m >>2. 
3PAKE protocols were proposed to overcome the problems arising in 2PAKE 
protocols (Amin and Biswas, 2015; Deebak et al., 2015; Li et al., 2015). In the 3PAKE 
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protocols, two users typically communicate with each other through a trusted server to 
establish a key in a secure manner. Unlike the 2PAKE protocols, each user needs to 
remember only a single password to commence key sharing with partner through a 
server. Figure 4.1 illustrates 2PAKE and 3PAKE protocols. 
Normally, users choose a natural word from a language or a simple phrase as a 
password, rather than a long random string. However, these kinds of passwords are 
vulnerable to password guessing attacks (Bellare and Rogaway, 1995) such as offline 
and online dictionary attacks (Lee et al., 2013). It is, therefore, desirable to use a 
confidential password authenticated protocol that can prevent password attacks. 
Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman presented the Diffie-Hellman key exchange 
protocol in 1976 (Diffie and Hellman, 1976), and this protocol is now widely used for 
secure key exchange. The process underlying this protocol supposes that Alice and 
Bob have different private keys. They need to agree upon two relatively prime numbers 
p, g before each of them can use this information to calculate the public keys. 
Following agreement, they share their public keys with each other, and each uses these 
in conjunction with the private key, p and g, to obtain the same shared key. As a result, 
both Alice and Bob can obtain the shared key without sending their private keys 
through the channel (Kumar et al., 2012). 
 
(a) 2PAKE protocol (b) 3PAKE protocol 
Figure 4.1 The 2PAKE and 3PAKE protocols 
 
Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange (DHKE) is one of the best protocols for the safe 
exchange of keys. However, this algorithm is vulnerable to Man-In-The-Middle attack 
(MITM) in which Eve can attack (actively, i.e. she can modify) all communications 
between Alice and Bob (Ibrahem, 2012). 




4.2 Related Work 
The literature related to the PAKE protocols and their associated issues is reviewed in 
this section. 
The first two-party protocol was proposed by Bellovin and Merritt (1992). Using this 
protocol, two users can negotiate the session key using their passwords via public or 
insecure communication channels. However, in a large network, the management of 
passwords becomes challenging. If we assume that the network has m users and adopt 
Bellovin and Merritt’s protocol to exchange a session key between two of these users, 
there are m(m_1)/2 passwords to be shared, as shown in Figure 4.1-a. These passwords 
need to be kept safely (Bellare and Rogaway, 1995). Hence, many researchers have 
shifted their attention to 3PAKE protocols in which a trusted server serves as a hub for 
users, ensuring that each user needs to manage only his/her own password for the server, 
as shown in Figure 4.1-b. 3PAKE protocols are more scalable to large networks than 
the 2PAKE protocols. 
Although many well-designed 3PAKE protocols have been proposed, cryptanalysis 
has revealed many issues and vulnerabilities of 3PAKE to various attacks. 
Yang et al. proposed a 3PAKE protocol using two servers as intermediate agents. 
One of these servers connects directly to the users, while the other stays disconnected 
from the users. These authors claim that their protocol had a number of strong security 
features that secure each session key against various attacks, including offline 
dictionary attacks (Yang et al., 2006). However, Amin and Biswas found that this 
protocol is vulnerable to numerous security issues, such as insider attacks (Nose, 2011), 
offline password guessing attacks, and replay attacks (Amin and Biswas, 2015). 
Lu and Cao (2007) proposed a simple 3PAKE protocol. They claimed that since the 
protocol did not require the public key for a server, it could prevent many known 
attacks. However, Guo et al. (2008) showed that this protocol is vulnerable to both 
MITM attacks which could possibly expose authenticated information to an attacker, 
and online dictionary attacks. 
Another simple 3PAKE protocol that works without the public key for a server was 
proposed by Huang (2009). Huang claimed that his protocol was secure against various 
types of attacks and was also more efficient than many other 3PAKE protocols, but 
Yoon and Yoo (2011) showed that this protocol is vulnerable to many attacks such as 
online and offline password guessing attacks. 
 




Wen et al. (2005) proposed a new, provably secure 3PAKE protocol. The authors 
claimed that this protocol had a security proof using a formal model and adversary 
capabilities. However, Nam et al. (Nam et al., 2007) pointed out that this proposed 
3PAKE protocol was absolutely insecure and that the security proof was incorrect, 
giving a full analysis of the weaknesses in this protocol and its proof. 
A communication-efficient 3PAKE protocol was also proposed by Chang et al. as 
mentioned in (Bellare and Rogaway, 1995). This protocol requires neither the server’s 
public key nor a symmetric encryption scheme and has a security proof based on the 
computational Diffie-Hellman assumption. Although the authors claimed that their 
protocol was more practical than other 3PAKE protocols, Wu et al. demonstrated that 
it was vulnerable to partition attacks, in which attackers could guess the real password 
offline (Wu et al., 2012). 
The weaknesses of these 3PAKE protocols have motivated the researcher to design 
a TPAKE protocol that can overcome the issues described above. 
 
4.3 Preliminaries  
23.9% of the 14.3 million HTTPS servers currently support the Diffie-Hellman 
protocol (Adrian et al., 2015), which is based on the Diffie-Hellman Problem (DHP). 
In this chapter, the proposed TPAKE protocol is also based on the DHP. The hardness 
of the traditional DHP is based on the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP).  
Definition 1 (DLP): The DLP is the problem of determining an integer 𝜒, where 1 ≤
 𝜒 ≤ 𝑝 − 1 (p is prime number), such that αx ≡ 𝛾, where both the primitive element α 
and another element 𝛾 are elements in ℤ𝑝 
∗  (α, 𝛾 ∈ ℤ𝑝 
∗ , ℤ𝑝 
∗ is a finite cyclic group). 
The only known way to solve the DHP is to compute 𝜒 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝛼𝛾 or α
xy, where x, y 
are randomly picked from ℤ𝑝
∗ . This computation has been shown to be infeasible 
(Chung and Ku, 2008). Thus, to prevent attacks we need to choose a large prime 
number p. 
The proposed protocol adopts a well-known complexity assumption known as the 
Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption (Diffie and Hellman, 1976; 
Chevalier et al., 2008). 
Definition 2 (CDH assumption): To ensure that the DLP defined in ℤ𝑝
∗  is hardened to 
attack, p should be a large prime number. Let 𝔾 ⊆ ℤ𝑝
∗  be a finite cyclic group of prime 




order q with generator g, where p = 2q+1. Given (g, p), A = ga, B = gb (public keys), 
where a, b (private keys) are randomly picked from ℤ𝑝
∗   by Alice (?̂?) and Bob (?̂?). ?̂? 
and ?̂? represent the initiator client and the responder client, respectively, of a key 
exchange protocol run. We consider that the CDH assumption holds for 𝔾 if the CDH 
attacker β is given a challenge ψ= (ga, gb), in order to compute gab. The probability of 




𝑎,  𝑔𝑏) = 𝑔𝑎𝑏] ≤ 𝜀 
where 𝜀 is negligible. 
Definition 3 (Negligible function): A function 𝜀: ℤ+ ⟶ℝ+ is negligible ⇔ ∀ 𝑐 >
0, ∃𝜆0 > 0, such that ∀𝜆 ≥ 𝜆0, 𝜀(𝜆) ≥ 𝜆
−𝑐. 
In other words, a function 𝜀 is negligible if it approaches zero faster than any inverse 
polynomial (Guo et al., 2011; Cash et al., 2009). 
Note that modulo operations (mod p) in this chapter are omitted for clarity. All 
operations are carried out under modulo p. 
Definition 4 (Encryption scheme): 𝛤{𝐸𝑛𝑐, 𝐷𝑒𝑐} is a symmetric encryption/decryption 
scheme that involves two algorithms (Yi et al., 2013): 
 Encryption: 𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑘(𝑚) → 𝑐, where k is the session key, m is the entered plaintext 
message, and c is the resulting ciphertext. 
 Decryption: 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑘(𝑐) → 𝑚, where k is the session key, c is the entered ciphertext, 
and m is the resulting plaintext. 
Subsequent sections present the proposed TPAKE protocol followed by the 
theoretical proof and a practical demonstration of how the protocol works. The 
theoretical proof part proves the security and correctness of the proposed protocol. 
TPAKE protocol security against various attacks is then discussed, followed by the 
evaluation of the ability of this protocol to resist multiple attacks and a comparison 
with related protocols. For the demonstration part, an instance of the protocol is 
implemented and why attackers cannot intercept the communication channels is 
highlighted. 
The next section presents the proposed TPAKE protocol, based on the CDH 
assumption. 
 




4.4 The Proposed TPAKE Protocol 
Suppose that ?̂? and ?̂? wish to exchange an agreed session key SK through a trusted 
server S. Agreement is reached in two rounds, as described below: 
Round 1. Private Key setup: 
In this round, users ?̂? and ?̂?, set up their private keys a and b based on private 
information, such as passwords PWU, the Geffe generator, and statistical tests. 
The process of using the Geffe generator to generate a private key from the user’s 
information is shown in Figure 4.2. 
Note: S/U means that both the server and the users are carrying out the same process. 
Step 1. S/U: (PWU) 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡
→      (𝑃𝑊𝑈
𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒2) 
The user’s password PWU is converted from a printable string to a binary 𝑃𝑊𝑈
𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒2.  
Step 2. S/U: (𝑃𝑊𝑈
𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒2) 
𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡
→   (L1, L2, L3) 
𝑃𝑊𝑈
𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒2 is split into three sequences. The lengths of these sequences must be 
relatively prime, for example, a 64 bit 𝑃𝑊𝑈
𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒2 is divided into sequences of length 
L1=20, L2=21 and L3=23. Since L1, L2, and L3 are relatively prime, the Greatest 
Common Divisor (𝐺𝐶𝐷) of (𝐿1, 𝐿2, 𝐿3) = 1, and these form legitimate input for the 
Geffe generator. 
Step 3. S/U: (L1, L2, L3) 
𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑 𝐺𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟
→                  (seqbase2) 
The Geffe generator is used to generate a new binary pseudorandom sequence 
seqbase2. The Geffe generator has three Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSRs) which 
use 𝐿1, 𝐿2, 𝐿3, as their initial values. The feedback functions of these LFSRs are 
assumed to be K1= S10+S19, K2= S10+S20, K3= S10+S22. The outputs of the LFSRs, K1, 
K2, and K3, have length 2
L-1 without repetitions, since L1=20, L2=21 and L3=23. This 
is a valid choice as the pseudo random sequence passed the frequency test, serial test 
and Poker test in Section 4.5.2.3.2. According to Table 4.3, the lengths of 
K1=1048575, K2=2097151 and K3=8388607. The Geffe generator then processes K1, 
K2, and K3, as shown below: 
 
Z1 = K1 ⋀ K2 
Z2 = ⌐K2 ⋀ K3 
seqbase2 = Z1 ⊕Z2 




The resulting seqbase2 has a length of (2L1-1) (2L2-1) (2L3-1) = 
18446715486418763775 without repetitions. As mentioned in (Khader and Lai, 2015), 
the best length to use from seqbase2 is only the first 256 bits, in order to reduce time 
consumption. The Geffe generator is explained briefly in Section 4.4.1. 
Step 4. S/U: (seqbase2) 
𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑠
→    (test, result) 
a. Success; continue 
b. Failure; go to Step 1. 
In this step, three types of randomness test are used to check whether the sequence 
has sufficient randomness. If all the tests are passed successfully, the next step is 
carried out. If any of these tests fail, the calculation is aborted and the process restarted. 
The randomness tests are briefly explained in Section 4.4.2. 
Step 5. S/U: (seqbase2) 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡
→      (seqbase10) 
We now convert the 256 bits from binary to decimal using the ASCII code table, 
and then extract only eight digits from seqbase10, following (Khader and Lai, 2015). 
Step 6. S/U: (seqbase10) 
𝑜𝑏𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑
→       (a, b) private keys, where a, b ∈ ℤ𝑝 
∗  
We compute a, b, which represent the private keys of ?̂? and ?̂?, respectively. 
After this step, ?̂? and ?̂? have obtained their private keys, a and b, using their 
passwords. In addition to the passwords, the server S has a copy of private keys a and 
b. 
Step 7. S: (PWU) 
ℎ𝑎𝑠ℎ∥𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑡
→       (ℏ(PWU) ∥ salt) 
Server S hashes the PWU to ℏ(PWU) for use as a checksum, in order to ensure the 
identity of the initiator or the responder in the subsequent key exchange 
communications. It then concatenates ℏ(PWU) with the salt (a random number used to 
add complexity and security) and stores it in a hash table. 
Step 8. S: (a, b) 
𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡 𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑘𝑒𝑦∥𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑡
→                        (Enc(a, b) ∥ salt) 
S encrypts a and b using the admin key AK, and then concatenates the ciphertext of 
a and b with salt. 
 
𝐶𝑎 = 𝐸𝑛𝑐𝐴𝐾(𝑎) 
𝐶𝑎𝑠 = 𝐶𝑎  ∥ 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑡 
𝐶𝑏 = 𝐸𝑛𝑐𝐴𝐾(𝑏) 




𝐶𝑏𝑠 = 𝐶𝑏  ∥ 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑡 
 
Step 9. End. a and b were successfully calculated. 
 
Round 2. Session key negotiation: 
In this round, ?̂? and ?̂? begin negotiation about the SK through the trusted server S. 
The process of negotiating the session key is illustrated in Figure 4.3. 
Step 1. Set counter i=1 
 
Step 2. S: (p, g, a, b) 
𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑘𝑒𝑦𝑠
→                 (A, B) 
S generates the public keys, A and B of ?̂? and ?̂? as follows (Kumar et al., 2012; 
Farash and Attari, 2013): 
𝐴 =  𝑔𝑎 
𝐵 =  𝑔𝑏 
Figure 4.2 Private Key setup 
 
 











𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑎(𝑝,  𝑔,  𝐵,  𝐼𝐷?̂?) 𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑏(𝑝,  𝑔,  𝐴,  𝐼𝐷𝐴) 




Step 3. S: (p, g, A|B, IDU) 
𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡 & 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠
→             U (𝐶?̂?𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜, 𝐶?̂?𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜) 
IDU is the user’s identification name ID. S sends the following encrypted information 
packages to ?̂? and ?̂?: 
 S to ?̂? 
𝐶 ?̂?𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜 = 𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑎(𝑝, 𝑔, 𝐵, 𝐼𝐷?̂?) 
 S to ?̂?  
𝐶?̂?𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜 = 𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑏(𝑝, 𝑔, 𝐴, 𝐼𝐷?̂?) 
Step 4. U: (𝐶?̂?𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜 , 𝐶?̂?𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜) 
𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡
→      (p, g, A|B, IDU) 
Upon receiving 𝐶 ?̂?𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜 and 𝐶?̂?𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜, ?̂? and ?̂? use their private keys a and b to decrypt 
the packages as follows: 
?̂?𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜 =  𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑎(𝑝, 𝑔, 𝐴, 𝐼𝐷?̂?) 
?̂?𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜 =  𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑏(𝑝, 𝑔, 𝐵, 𝐼𝐷 ?̂?) 
Step 5. S/U: (p, g, A|B)  
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒
→       (SK) 
In this step S, ?̂? and ?̂? compute the session key SK, as follows (Kumar et al., 2012; 
Li, 2010): 
 S & ?̂? 
𝑆𝐾?̂? = 𝐵
𝑎 
 S & ?̂? 
𝑆𝐾?̂? = 𝐴
𝑏 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑆𝐾 ?̂? = 𝑆𝐾?̂? 
Step 6. S/U: (SK) 
ℎ𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑆𝐾𝑠
→                   (ℏ(SKU ),ℎ(SKU)) 
a. True; continue 
b. False; go to Step 8. 
S, ?̂? and ?̂? hash the generated SKs, send these hashes to each other, and match the 
checksums received from others to ensure the correctness of the session key. In other 
words, this protocol provides non-repudiation property as it can identify the sender and 
receiver from their user information. At this stage, a time stamp can be used to identify 
replay attack. 
Step 7. SK is ready; go to Step 10. 
Step 8. If i=<3 then i++ and go to Step 2; else go to Step 9. 




The user has three attempts to generate the SK if this fails after three attempts, the 
user’s account will be locked for 24 hours and a warning message will be sent. 
Step 9. Lock account for 24 hours and send a warning message: “Your data was 
compromised and your account will be locked for 24 hours”. 
Step 10. End. 
A detailed practical demonstration is presented in Section 4.5.2.3. 
4.4.1 The Geffe Generator 
As shown in Figure 4.2, the Geffe generator is used to generate a pseudo-random 
sequence with a balanced distribution of zeros and ones (Wei, 2006) from the user 
input. This sequence will be used as a user private key if it passes the statistical tests 
for randomness. The process of the Geffe generator is illustrated in Figure 4.4. 
 
4.4.2 Statistical Tests 
Random sequences derived from user inputs using the Geffe generator are tested using 
the frequency, serial and poker tests (Shehata et al., 2003) to ensure their randomness. 
Once a sequence passes these statistical tests, it will be converted to a user private key. 
The frequency test checks the distributions of zeros (n0) and ones (n1) in the 
sequence (n). The serial test checks the distribution of two-digit patterns (n00, n01, n10, 
and n11), and the poker test checks the distribution of patterns with an arbitrary length. 
The statistical formulas used are:  
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𝑖=0         (4.2) 





𝑖=1 ) − 𝑘                          (4.3) 
 
Figure 4.4 The Geffe generator 




 The accepted threshold values for these randomness tests are (X1 < 3.8415), 
(X2 < 5.9915) and (X3 < 14.0671), respectively (Hosseini et al., 2014). The proposed 
TPAKE protocol is shown in Table 4.1. 
 
4.5 Security Analyses 
Typically, a security prove investigates the communication of many parties. One of 
these parties is an attacker 𝛽. In a traditional prove, most of the users are authentic, 
meaning they will work exactly as defined in the protocol. However, 𝛽 may do 
anything she likes to break the protocol. 
 The claim that the TPAKE protocol is provably secure, means that the key exchange 
remains confidential under certain assumptions. This section proves that the proposed 
protocol is secure under the CDH assumption. The CDH assumption is hard to solve, 
and there is no algorithm that can solve it efficiently (Yao and Zhao, 2014; Yantao and 
Jianfeng, 2010). 
 
4.5.1 Formal Analysis 
This section analyses the security of the TPAKE protocol. Typically, authentication 
between parties and the setting up of session keys SK are essential to the security of an 
authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol. This section shows that the TPAKE 
protocol is secure under the AKE security protocol, using the same approach as in 
(Bellare et al., 2000). In other words, the proposed TPAKE protocol is secure under 
the AKE security protocol, in which both communication parties ?̂? and ?̂? obtain an 
authenticated session key SK after running the TPAKE protocol. However, no other 
parties are able to discover any information about this session key SK, except the 
trusted server S. Therefore, when the TPAKE protocol achieves an AKE security 
protocol, this means that it has completed both essential security authentication and 
the setting up of SK. This chapter proves that the proposed TPAKE protocol is secure 
under the AKE protocol using the ROM (Bellare et al., 2000; Bellare and Rogaway, 
1993; Bellare and Rogaway, 1995; Canetti et al., 2004). 
The ROM (also called the black box) is a random function introduced by Bellare 
and Rogaway (1993), and can be a perfect hash function.  However, a random function 
is impractical since it is very large to store and very slow to compute. Bellare and 
Rogaway (1993) showed that using ROM as a random function is practical for the 




purposes of a security proof. As a result, the ROM has been adopted in this chapter to 
prove the security of the proposed TPAKE protocol. 




Table 4.1 The proposed TPAKE protocol 
 ?̂? Trusted S ?̂? 
1 
Request connection channel 
with ?̂?   
  
  𝑃𝑊?̂? ,   𝐼𝐷?̂?
→                                                                          
- 
Request connection channel 
with ?̂? 
 𝑃𝑊?̂?,   𝐼𝐷?̂?
←        
2 
Retrieve 𝑎 ∈ ℤ𝑝 
∗ ,
𝑎 extracted from 𝑃𝑊?̂? 
Retrieve  𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ ℤ𝑝 
∗ , 
𝑎 extracted from 𝑃𝑊?̂? 
& 
𝑏 extracted from 𝑃𝑊?̂? 
Retrieve 𝑏 ∈ ℤ𝑝 
∗ , 
𝑏 extracted from 𝑃𝑊?̂? 
3 - 
Store ℏ(𝑃𝑊?̂? ) ∥ 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑡, 
ℏ(𝑃𝑊?̂?) ∥ 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑡, 𝐶𝑎𝑠 & 
𝐶𝑏𝑠 
Where: 𝐶𝑎 =
 𝐸𝑛𝑐𝐴𝐾(𝑎), 𝐶𝑎𝑠 =
𝐶𝑎  ∥ 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑡 
𝐶𝑏 = 𝐸𝑛𝑐𝐴𝐾(𝑏), 
𝐶𝑏𝑠 = 𝐶𝑏  ∥ 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑡 
& the 𝐴𝐾 is the admin key 
- 
4 - 
Set counter i=1 & 
Calculate A, B 
A = ga, B = gb 
- 
5 - 
𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑎(𝑝,   𝑔,   𝐵,   𝐼𝐷?̂?)
←                                  
𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑏(𝑝,   𝑔,   𝐴,   𝐼𝐷?̂?)
→               
- 













If 𝑆𝐾?̂? = 𝑆𝐾?̂? then 
ℏ(𝑆𝐾?̂?)
←                                            
ℏ(𝑆𝐾?̂?)
→     
-
9 - 
If the matching failed, 




If ℎ(𝑆𝐾?̂?) = ℏ(𝑆𝐾𝐴) then 
𝑆𝐾?̂? is secure 
- 
If ℎ(𝑆𝐾?̂?) = ℏ(𝑆𝐾?̂?) then 
𝑆𝐾?̂? is secure 




4.5.1.1 Characteristics of Participants 
The characteristics of participants are participants and the long-lived keys, the 
characteristics terms of the adversary are explained below. 
Participants: The proposed protocol (∏) is divided into two sets of participants: a 
client C and a trusted server S. Two clients ?̂? ∈ 𝐶 and ?̂? ∈ 𝐶 authenticate each other 
and set up an SK via S in ∏. During the execution of ∏, the participants (C | S) may 
have many instances (oracles). An instance i of a participant U is symbolised as ∏𝑈
𝑖 . 
Long-lived keys: ?̂? ∈ 𝐶 stores her password 𝑃𝑊?̂? as her long-lived key, ?̂? ∈ 𝐶 stores 
his password 𝑃𝑊?̂? as his long-lived key, and S stores its admin password AK as its 
long-lived key. 
In relation to the adversary’s capabilities, it is assumed that β (the adversary) is 
attacking ∏, and that β has full control over all communication channels between 
participants. β’s capabilities are modelled in the following Oracle queries: 
 Send (∏𝑈
𝑖 , 𝑚): This query models β sending a message 𝑚 to ∏𝑈
𝑖 . ∏𝑈
𝑖  computes a 
response using the protocol algorithm and sends the result back to β. Moreover, β 
can send (∏𝑈
𝑖 , 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡) to start a new execution of ∏𝑈












𝑘. β should have an authentic execution access. This query 
deals with dictionary attacks 
 Reveal (∏𝑈
𝑖 ): This query models β yielding an SK from ∏𝑈
𝑖 . If ∏𝑈
𝑖  has accepted 
the SK, it sends the SK back to β; otherwise, it sends nothing to β. This query deals 
with known key attacks 
 Corrupt (U): This query models β sending a query to U, yielding his/her long-lived 
key. The previous SK must not be revealed after losing the long-lived key. This 
query demonstrates the concept of perfect forward secrecy 
 𝛤({𝐸𝑛𝑐, 𝐷𝑒𝑐}, 𝑘, {𝑚, 𝑐}): This query models β accessing the oracle of encryption 
and decryption 𝛤 set out in Definition 4. This means that when β sends 𝛤(𝐸𝑛𝑐, 𝑘,𝑚) 
to 𝛤, 𝛤 encrypts 𝑚 using 𝑘 and returns 𝑐 to β. When β sends 𝛤(𝐷𝑒𝑐, 𝑘, 𝑐) to 𝛤, 𝛤 
will decrypt 𝑐 using 𝑘 and returns 𝑚 to β 
 ℎ(𝑚): This query models β obtaining a hash value from this query. If the message 
𝑚 has not been queried before, a completely random hash will be sent back to β and 




stored in the hash table with 𝑚; otherwise, the previous hash value will be sent to 
β. The ROM is used as a cryptographic hash function (Bellare and Rogaway, 1993) 
 Test (∏𝑈
𝑖 ): This query models β distinguishing between a SK and a random string. 
β can send a single test query to ∏𝑈
𝑖 , and a value b of the query will be flipped by 
∏𝑈
𝑖 . The result returned from ∏𝑈
𝑖  will be conditioned. If b=1, then the query returns 
the SK; otherwise, it returns a random string with the same length as that of the SK. 
The test query is accessible only when ∏𝑈
𝑖  is fresh (the term ‘freshness’ will be 
explained in the next section). 
 
4.5.1.2 Definitions 
This section defines the terms used in proving the security of ∏. 
 Definition 5 (Partnership): ∏?̂?
𝑖  and ∏
?̂?
𝑗
 are defined as partnered when the following 
conditions are satisfied (Wei, 2009): 
o ∏?̂?
𝑖  and ∏
?̂?
𝑗
 exchange m directly 
o ∏?̂?
𝑖  and ∏
?̂?
𝑗
 have the same SK 
o No one else besides ∏?̂?
𝑖  and ∏
?̂?
𝑗
 has the SK, except S 
 
 Definition 6 (Freshness): ∏𝑈
𝑖  is fresh when the following conditions are satisfied 
(Guo et al., 2011): 
o ∏𝑈
𝑖  has an accepted SK 




𝑖  nor ∏
?̂?
𝑗
 has been sent a reveal query. 
A SK is fresh if and only if ∏𝑈
𝑖  is fresh. 
 
4.5.1.3 AKE security 
In the execution of ∏, β wins the game and breaks the security of the AKE of ∏ if he 
creates a fresh instance ∏𝑈
𝑖  from a single test query and the selected bit (b) is guessed 
correctly by ∏𝑈
𝑖  (Bresson et al., 2007; Wen et al., 2016). It is assumed that the guessed 
bit by β is ?̀? after making several instance queries. Thus, the probability of β guessing 
b correctly is denoted by ℙ(?̀? = 𝑏) = 1, and the probability of β guessing b incorrectly 




is denoted by ℙ(?̀? = 𝑏) = 0. The advantage of β in breaking the security of the AKE 
in ∏, denoted by 𝑎𝑑𝑣∏
𝐴𝐾𝐸(𝛽), is defined as: 
 
𝑎𝑑𝑣∏
𝐴𝐾𝐸(𝛽) = |2ℙ(?̀? = 𝑏) − 1|     (4.4) 
 
The TPAKE protocol ∏ is secure under the AKE protocol only when 𝑎𝑑𝑣∏
𝐴𝐾𝐸(𝛽) is 
negligible. 
Theorem 1. Let 𝑎𝑑𝑣∏
𝐴𝐾𝐸(𝛽) be the advantage of β in breaking the security of the AKE 
security of ∏ within a time bound t, and creating the queries sq (Send), eq (Execute), 
and hq (Hash). Then: 
 
𝑎𝑑𝑣∏
𝐴𝐾𝐸(𝑡, 𝑠𝑞 , 𝑒𝑞 , ℎ𝑞 ) ≤
𝑠𝑞
𝑛
+ ℎ𝑞 ∙ (𝑠𝑞 + 𝑒𝑞) ∙ 𝑠𝑢𝑐𝐺
𝐶𝐷𝐻(𝑡)̀      (4.5) 
  
where 𝑡̀ is the running time of 𝑠𝑢𝑐𝐺
𝐶𝐷𝐻 and n is the number of possible passwords. 
Proof. Let assume that ℙ[𝑥] is the probability of 𝛽 breaking the AKE security of ∏. 
Let ℙ[𝑥1] be the probability of 𝛽 breaking the AKE security of ∏ by breaking the 
password security, and let ℙ[𝑥2] be the probability of 𝛽 breaking the AKE security of 
∏ without breaking the password security. Then: 
 
ℙ[𝑥] = ℙ[𝑥1] + ℙ[𝑥2]      (4.6) 
  
ℙ[𝑥] is constructed from ℙ[𝑥1] and ℙ[𝑥2] as follows: 
 The probability ℙ[𝑥1] of 𝛽 breaking the AKE security of ∏ by breaking the 
password security: 𝛽 could break the security of the password (either 𝑃𝑊?̂? or 𝑃𝑊?̂?) 
in ∏ in two ways: online dictionary attacks or offline dictionary attacks. The 
probability of 𝛽 breaking the security using an online dictionary attack is denoted as 
ℙ[𝑥1








]       (4.7) 
 
The probabilities of online and offline dictionary attacks are analysed below. 




Online dictionary attacks: 𝛽 can check the correctness of a choice of either 𝑃𝑊?̂? or 
𝑃𝑊?̂? by executing it in Round 1 of the algorithm to retrieve either a or b. Then, 𝛽 uses 
a or b as a decryption key in Round 2 of the algorithm (Step 4) to retrieve p, g, A | 𝐵 
and IDU. Finally, 𝛽 uses the obtained information to calculate the SK and then sends 
ℏ(SK) as in Round 2 of the algorithm (Step 6) to check the accuracy of either 𝑃𝑊?̂? or 
𝑃𝑊?̂?. Therefore, ℙ[𝑥1






         (4.8) 
 
Offline dictionary attacks: As mentioned in Definition 2, 𝛽 can break the CDH 
assumption with probability 𝜀 ̀within time bound 𝑡̀, where 𝑠𝑢𝑐𝐺
𝐶𝐷𝐻(𝑡)̀ = 𝜀.̀ In the CDH 
assumption, 𝛽 is given a challenge ψ= (ga, gb). Since in the proposed protocol, a and 
b are driven from 𝑃𝑊?̂? and 𝑃𝑊?̂?,  𝛽 then has to attack 𝑃𝑊?̂? and 𝑃𝑊?̂?. 𝑃𝑊?̂? and 𝑃𝑊?̂? 
are stored as hash values in the hash table in S, and are concatenated with salt, as in 
Round 1 of the algorithm (Step 7) ℏ(𝑃𝑊?̂?) ∥ 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑡 and ℏ(𝑃𝑊?̂?) ∥ 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑡. Therefore, the 
probability 𝜀1 that 𝛽 can correctly pick the hash value ℏ(𝑃𝑊?̂?) from the possible hash 
(ℏ(𝑃𝑊?̂?) ∥ 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑡) queries or pick the hash value ℏ(𝑃𝑊?̂?) from the possible hash 





         (4.9) 
 
The probability 𝜀2 that 𝛽 correctly picks 𝑃𝑊𝑈 to retrieve any user’s password is 





       (4.10) 
 
As a result, the probability 𝑠𝑢𝑐𝐺
𝐶𝐷𝐻(𝑡̀) of 𝛽 breaking the CDH assumption is 
equivalent to the probability ℙ[x1] of 𝛽 breaking the AKE security of ∏ by breaking 
the password security using offline dictionary attacks. This probability is equal to the 
probability ℙ[𝑥1
𝑜𝑓𝑓
] that 𝛽 correctly picks the password of either PWÂ or PWB̂ using 
offline dictionary attacks, multiplied by the probability 𝜀1 that 𝛽 can correctly pick the 
hash value ℏ(𝑃𝑊?̂?) from the possible hash (ℏ(𝑃𝑊?̂?) ∥ 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑡) queries or pick the hash 




value ℏ(𝑃𝑊?̂?) from the possible hash (ℏ(𝑃𝑊𝐵) ∥ 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑡) queries from the hash table on 
S, multiplied by the probability 𝜀2 that 𝛽 correctly picks the 𝑃𝑊𝑈: 
 
𝑠𝑢𝑐𝐺
𝐶𝐷𝐻(𝑡)̀ = 𝜀̀ = ℙ[𝑥1
𝑜𝑓𝑓



































𝐶𝐷𝐻(𝑡)̀ ∙ ℎ𝑞 ∙ 𝑒𝑞  (4.11) 
 
The probability ℙ[𝑥2] of 𝛽 breaking the AKE security of ∏ without breaking the 
password security. 𝛽 could break the security of the AKE of ∏ without knowing either 
𝑃𝑊?̂? or 𝑃𝑊?̂? by breaking either A or B (public keys) or by guessing the private key 
(either a or b) by sending fake public key queries to either ?̂? or ?̂?. Breaking A or B can 
lead to a MITM attack (Khader and Lai, 2015). However, 𝛽 needs to know the hash 
value of either 𝐴 or 𝐵  in order to attack. The probability 𝜀3 that 𝛽 correctly picks a 





      (4.12) 
 
The probability 𝜀4 that 𝛽 correctly guesses the private key (either a or b) by sending 
fake public key queries to either ?̂? or ?̂? is equivalent to the probability of 𝛽 picking 




      (4.13) 
 
As a result, the probability 𝑠𝑢𝑐𝐺
𝐶𝐷𝐻(𝑡̀) of 𝛽 breaking the CDH assumption is 
equivalent to the probability ℙ[x2] that 𝛽 breaks the AKE security of ∏ without 
breaking the password security, multiplied the probability 𝜀3 that 𝛽 knows the hash 
value of 𝑃𝑊?̂? or 𝑃𝑊?̂? in order to generate a or b, multiplied the probability 𝜀4 that 𝛽 




correctly guesses the private key (either a or b) by sending fake public key queries to 
either ?̂? or ?̂?: 
 
𝑠𝑢𝑐𝐺















ℙ[x2] ≤ ℎ𝑞 ∙ 𝑠𝑞 ∙ 𝑠𝑢𝑐𝐺
𝐶𝐷𝐻(𝑡̀), 
∵ ℙ[𝑥] = ℙ[𝑥1] + ℙ[𝑥2] 









𝐶𝐷𝐻(𝑡)̀ ∙ ℎ𝑞 ∙ 𝑒𝑞 + ℎ𝑞 ∙ 𝑠𝑞 ∙ 𝑠𝑢𝑐𝐺
𝐶𝐷𝐻(𝑡)̀        (4.14) 
∴ ℙ[𝑥] = 𝑎𝑑𝑣∏
𝐴𝐾𝐸(𝑡, 𝑠𝑞 , 𝑒𝑞 , ℎ𝑞 ) ≤
𝑠𝑞
𝑛
+ ℎ𝑞 ∙ (𝑒𝑞 + 𝑠𝑞) ∙ 𝑠𝑢𝑐𝐺
𝐶𝐷𝐻(𝑡)̀  ∎ 
 
To sum up, as in Definition 2, the CDH assumption holds for 𝑠𝑢𝑐𝐺
𝐶𝐷𝐻, and 𝑠𝑢𝑐𝐺
𝐶𝐷𝐻 
is less than the negligible 𝜀. Also, ℎ𝑞 , 𝑒𝑞 , and 𝑠𝑞 cannot be large due to the limited 
number of attempts and length of time in Round 2. Therefore, 𝑎𝑑𝑣∏
𝐴𝐾𝐸 is negligible 
and the CDH assumption holds in this case. Hence, ∏ is AKE secured. 
 
4.5.2 Discussion 
This section discusses the security of the TPAKE protocol against various attacks. The 
ability of the protocol to resist multiple attacks was evaluated and it was then compared  
with recently proposed related protocols (Yang et al., 2006; Lu and Cao, 2007; Huang, 
2009; Wen et al., 2005; Xie et al., 2017; Amin et al., 2016; Islam, 2016;  Farash and 
Attari, 2014b; Lee et al., 2013). Table 4.2 shows performance comparisons for the 
proposed protocol and several other related protocols. From Table 4.2, it is clear that 
the TPAKE is more secure than other protocols as it is protected against multiple 
attacks and provides more security features. The following six proven propositions 
ensure the security of the proposed protocol against many attacks, and provide perfect 
forward secrecy. 





Proposition 1. The proposed protocol ∏ can mitigate MITM attacks. 
Proof. The public keys A and B are necessary for establishing a MITM attack. In order 
to begin attacking protocol ∏ using a MITM attack, 𝛽 needs to know both A and B as 
well as g and p. However, as shown in Round 2 of the algorithm (Step 3) in ∏, all 
these parameters are encrypted using the user private key (a or b), which is known 
only by user (?̂? or ?̂?) and S. Thus, the proposed protocol ∏ can mitigate the MITM 
attack. ∎ 
Proposition 2. The proposed protocol ∏ can mitigate online dictionary attacks. 
Proof. Online dictionary attacks can be mitigated by validating the correctness of the 
input every time. In this proposed protocol, integrity checks are provided. ∏ checks 
the SK sent by matching the hashes stored on S, and also checks them with the end 
users ?̂? and ?̂?. In other words, S, ?̂? and ?̂? can validate one another using the stored 
hash values, as in Round 2 of the algorithm (Step 6). Thus, the proposed protocol ∏ 
can mitigate online dictionary attacks. ∎ 
Proposition 3. The proposed protocol ∏ can mitigate offline dictionary attacks. 
Proof. Offline dictionary attacks can be performed by a passive attacker 𝛽 who may 
have control over the session between ?̂? and ?̂?. 𝛽 tries to guess one of the passwords, 
either  𝑃𝑊?̂? or 𝑃𝑊?̂?, in order to compute the SK. However, 𝛽 cannot check the 
correctness of the password until the verification process in Round 2 of the algorithm 
is completed (Step 6). To do so, 𝛽 needs to know the SK before knowing either  𝑃𝑊?̂? 
or 𝑃𝑊?̂?, which is not possible. Thus, the proposed protocol ∏ can mitigate an offline 
dictionary attack. ∎ 
Proposition 4. The proposed protocol ∏ can mitigate replay attacks. 
Proof. Replay attacks can be performed by an active attacker 𝛽 who may compromise 
the message sent between the parties. It is assumed that 𝛽 can capture ?̂?’s message and 
replay the compromised message to ?̂?. Due to the time stamp feature provided by the 
proposed protocol, ?̂? can easily detect that the message was compromised by 𝛽 
(Khader and Lai, 2015). Thus, the proposed protocol ∏ can mitigate replay attacks. ∎ 
Proposition 5. The proposed protocol ∏ can mitigate known key attacks. 
Proof. An attacker 𝛽 may use a previous SK in order to create known key attacks. 
However, p and g are changed at each session (Khader and Lai, 2015) therefore the 
public keys A and B will differ. Consequently, the SK will differ at each session. 




Furthermore, the private keys a and b are hard to retrieve due to the CDH assumption. 
Thus, the proposed protocol ∏ can mitigate known key attacks. ∎ 
Proposition 6. The proposed protocol ∏ can ensure perfect forward secrecy. 
Proof. We can define perfect forward secrecy as follows: if either  𝑃𝑊?̂? or 𝑃𝑊?̂? is 
exposed by 𝛽 in order to compute the SK, the previous SK should remain safe. The 
proposed protocol can ensure perfect forward secrecy as 𝛽 cannot find out a previous 
SK even when the current SK is known, since all the old SKs are stored as hashes. Thus, 
the proposed protocol ∏ can ensure perfect forward secrecy. ∎ 
 
4.5.2.2 Comparison 
The TPAKE protocol can also be compared with several existing protocols in terms of 
attacks, perfect forward secrecy, and security proofs. A comparison of these results is 
shown in Table 4.2. 
 






































































1 Yang et al. (2006) ˟ √ ˟ ˟ √ ˟ √ 
2 Lu and Cao (2007) ˟ ˟ √ √ √ √ ˟ 
3 Huang (2009) √ ˟ ˟ √ √ ˟ ˟ 
4 Wen et al. (2005) ˟ ˟ ˟ √ √ ˟ ˟ 
5 Xie et al. (2017) ˟ √ √ ˟ ˟ √ √ 
6 Amin et al. (2016) √ ˟ √ √ √ ˟ √ 
7 Islam (2016) √ ˟ √ √ ˟ √ √ 
8 Farash & Attari (2014) (B) ˟ √ √ √ √ √ ˟ 
9 Lee et al. (2013) ˟ √ √ √ ˟ ˟ ˟ 
10 TPAKE √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
 
4.5.2.3 Demonstration  
Users typically have usernames and passwords, and these are used to connect them 
with their systems. Passwords comprise a mixed string, that can contain numbers, 
symbols, lowercase and uppercase letters. These mixtures can be represented in binary 




using ASCII code. This can be used to generate a different binary sequence using 
random number generators and to extract new information that can be helpful to 
overcome the problem. 
The proposed work aims to distribute keys between Alice and Bob without being 
compromised by Eve. Figure 4.5 briefly explains the way in which Alice and Bob 
communicate with the server and how the data would be sent through the channels to 
retrieve the shared key. 
 Example: Assume that Alice’s password contains eight characters (password = 
abcdefgh (a character string), 64 bits). The binary representation of the ASCII code 
for “abcdefgh” is: 
 
a=97 (01100001) + b=98 (01100010) + c=99 (011000011) + d=100 (01100100) + 
e=101 (01100101) + f=102 (01100110) + g=103 (01100111) + h=104 (01101000).  
 
We have then obtained the password in binary digits. The sequence will be:  
0110000101100010011000110110010001100101011001100110011101101000 (64 bits) 
 To make this more secure, a pseudo-random sequence generator is used to generate 
a longer sequence. 
 
 
Figure 4.5 Alice and Bob communicate with the server to obtain the shared key 
 
 




Figure 4.6 LFSR 1 
 
 
Figure 4.7 LFSR 2 
 
 
Figure 4.8 LFSR 3 
4.5.2.3.1 Generating a random sequence 
As described in Section 4.4.1, the Geffe generator uses three registers to generate a 
random sequence. The Geffe generator was chosen to generate the new sequence as it 
is in stream cipher cryptography. This generator was chosen for several reasons. First, 
the complexity of this generator could be superior for a different configuration of the 
steps. Second, it has certain desirable features. For example, it has a balanced 
distribution of zeros and ones in its output. It also has the benefit of being useful as a 
module when constructing similar arrangements. It could play the role of LFSR1 in the 
same arrangement with similar generators, and this complexity would increase 




accordingly (Wei, 2006). The Geffe generator needs three LFSRs, the lengths of which 
should be relatively prime, meaning that the GCD of the length of the initial values that 
can be input into the three registers LFSR1 (Len1), LFSR2 (Len2) and LFSR3 (Len3) 
is one: 
                         GCD (Len1, Len2, Len3) = 1                      (4.15) 
We assume that the first register has 20 bits for input (LFSR1), the second has 21 
bits for input (LFSR2), and the last register has 23 bits for input (LFSR3). Together, 
this gives 64 bits (it is possible to choose any three relatively prime numbers to give 64 
bits). 
 
20 bits       21 bits            23 bits 
01100001011000100110, 001101100100011001010, 11001100110011101101000 
These should be connected as shown in Figure 4.4. 
   The initial values of these three registers with their feedback functions (K1= 
S10+S19, K1= S10+S20, K1= S10+S22) are shown in Figures 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8. 
As shown in Section 4.4, the feedback functions are: K1= S10+S19, K2= S10+S20 and 
K3= S10+S22, respectively. The output of these registers is three long binary sequences 
K1, K2 and K3, each of which have length 2n−1 without repetition, meaning that 
K1=1048575, K2=2097151 and K3=8388607. The Geffe generator will then mix these 
together to generate a single binary sequence S of length (2K1−1) (2K2−1) (2K3−1) = 
18446715486418763775 without repetition, as shown in Table 4.3. 
 
  Table 4.3 Period of the registers and their feedback functions 
Bits Feedback Function Period 
n  2n-1 
20 K1= S10+S19 1048575 
21 K2= S10+S20 2097151 
23 K3= S10+S22 8388607 
64 S = K1 K2+K2 K3+K3 
(2K1-1)(2K2-1)(2K3-1) 
=18446715486418763775 




 If we generate this extremely large number (S), the system will slow down or stop. 
It is therefore assumed that sequences (S) that are 1024, 512, 256 or 128 bits long can 
be generated, which would be more convenient to deal with. After obtaining the binary 
sequence from the Geffe generator, three basic types of statistical tests are used to check 
whether the randomness of the sequence is sufficient. If the test succeeds, we will 
continue with the next steps; otherwise, the system will ask the user to change the 
password. Finally, when the tests are complete, which length will give better results 
(1024, 512, 256 or 128 bits) will be decided.  
 
4.5.2.3.2 Testing the generated sequence 
 Frequency test: For every binary random sequence, we expect half of the digits to 
be zeros and the other half ones. The purpose of this test relies on the number of 
zeros (n0) and ones (n1) in the sequence (n), which is what we need to test. The 
statistic used is given in Equation 4.1. 
For the sequence to pass this test, the value of X1 should be less than the acceptance 
threshold values of the test (X1 < 3.8415) for one degree of freedom (Hosseini et 
al., 2014). 
 Serial test: This test depends upon the repetition of (n00, n01, n10, and n11), which 
denote the numbers (00, 01, 10, and 11) appearing in S, respectively. It is expected 
that each of these will represent approximately a quarter of n. The statistic used is 
given in Equation 4.2. 
For the sequence to pass this test, the value of X2 should be less than the acceptance 
threshold values of the test (X2 < 5.9915) for two degrees of freedom (Hosseini et 
al., 2014). 
 Poker test: This test procedure involves dividing the sequence S into a number of 
blocks (K) of length (M), and then checking the repetition of these blocks to 
determine whether they appear approximately the same number of times as would 
be expected in a random sequence, i.e. the number of blocks K=n/M (without 
fractions). The statistic used is given in Equation 4.3. 
For the sequence to pass this test, the value of X3 should be less than the acceptance 
threshold values of the test (X3 < 14.0671), for 2m−1 degrees of freedom (Hosseini et 




al., 2014). The poker test is a generalisation of the frequency test; for m=1, the same 
results as for the frequency test is obtained.  
 
 
The current work used these three tests to check sequences S of length 1024, 512, 
256 and 128 bits (for the current password), and the results are shown in Table 4.4. 
When the sequence S was 128 bits long, it failed the frequency test (the sequence 
generated by password=abcdefgh did not pass the test). A length for S of 256 bits was 
chosen since this was the shortest successful length that could still ensure that the 
sequence had good randomness and a small size. As illustrated in Table 4.4, the 
frequency test increased each time the length decreased, and this was the reason behind 
a choice of 256 bits rather than 128 bits. The 256-bit sequence obtained from the 




Table 4.4 Statistical results 
Length of 
Pseudo 







Frequency test 0.03515625 1 3.8415 
Serial test 2.04011256720423 2 5.9915 
Poker test 9.19354838709677 7 14.0671 
512 bits 
Frequency test 0.0703125 1 3.8415 
Serial test 0.452192392367863 2 5.9915 
Poker test 7.2235294117647 7 14.0671 
256 bits 
Frequency test 1 1 3.8415 
Serial test 1.42745098039217 2 5.9915 
Poker test 7.51764705882353 7 14.0671 
128 bits 
Frequency test 5.28125 1 3.8415 
Serial test 4.56914370078741 2 5.9915 
Poker test 7.90476190476191 7 14.0671 




 This sequence was derived from Alice’s password and passed all the tests. Next,  
each group of 8 bits is converted into a decimal number using ASCII code, giving the 
following numbers: 68 228 100 18 5 65 253 213 84 49 49 30 112 26 169 8 252 217 
168 141 92 165 180 37 194 183 201 37 143 115 190 58. Each of these is then moduloed 
by 10 to ensure that all of the numbers can be represented by a single digit (0, 1, 2, 3, 
4, 5, 6, 7, 8 or 9). Merging these together generates a single number with 32 digits, 
88085533499026982781250743173508. It is then assumed that the user’s private key 
is eight digits long (the private key will be between 2 and P−2 (Paar and Pelzl, 2009), 
where P is provided by the server). The 32-digit number is therefore divided into eight 
blocks, and one number is taken from each block; these eight digits will be the private 
key (taking the first number from each block (the choice is random, a different number 
can be chosen), the private key will be PrK=85422243). At this stage, each user has 
his/her own private key, and the server stores all of these together in a single table. 
 Alice and Bob obtain two numbers, g and p, where p is a prime and g (generator) 
is a primitive root modulo p. These two numbers are received from the server with the 
public key: Alice will receive p, g, Bob’s public key and her username, and Bob will 
receive p, g, Alice’s public key and his username. These will be encrypted using the 
receiver’s private key. As mentioned above, the private key should be less than the 
prime p (Paar and Pelzl, 2009); this private key with fewer than nine digits satisfies 
these requirements. For this example, let p=100000007 and g=5. The public key will 
be PuK=15071649. If Alice’s password=abcdefgh and Bob’s password=12345678 (a 
character string), then Alice’s private key PrK=85422243 and Bob’s private key PrK 
= 68203955. After combining these with p and g, we get Alice’s (PuK=15071649) and 
Bob’s (PuK = 6629794). As a result, the shared key will be SK=68202249 (for both 
Alice and Bob). 
 Eve can therefore only obtain hashed and encrypted data, and cannot use these 
data to intercept the communication channels. 
 In summary, MITM attacks occur when keys are shared in plaintext. Eve can sit 
in the middle and pretend she is the intended destination for both Alice and Bob; Alice 
and Bob have no way of knowing that Eve is there and believe they are communicating 
directly with each other. The proposed method proves that Alice and Bob can generate 
their keys without sending them in plaintext, using data obtained from the server that 
will be controlled by the server. Although some may argue that Eve can compromise 
all the data on the channels, there are insufficient data for her to obtain the shared key, 




and all data are hashed and encrypted. In addition, the private key is never sent to any 
party. If an attacker steals the private key from the server, this would not be useful, as 
the entire collection of private keys on the server are encrypted using the admin key. 
This offers high levels of security and helps prevent MITM attacks in the Diffie-
Hellman protocol.  
 Many applications use Diffie-Hellman as a key exchange mechanism. Examples 
of these are secure socket layers (SSL), secure shell (SSH) and IP security (IPSec) 
(Ahmed et al., 2012). The proposed infrastructure can distribute the keys in a secure 
manner, meaning that applications using Diffie-Hellman as a key exchange 
mechanism would benefit from the proposed infrastructure.  
 Source code for an implementation of  the TPAKE practical demonstration are 
shown in Appendix A. Screen shots of sample runs are also provided in the same 
appendix. Microsoft Visual Studio 2010 was used to develop and run the code. 
It is notable that the central server would not use existing identification techniques 
such as X.509, for several reasons: X.509 certificates require digital signatures for 
integrity, and thus the same problems arise as in the use of Digital Signature (Toma, 
2009). In addition, X.509 certificates experience problems when certificates expire; 
sometimes it is not clear that a certificate has expired until the website or server goes 
down, meaning that their use is challenging in practice. 
 
4.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter introduced a TPAKE protocol based on the Computational Diffie-
Hellman assumption and the ROM. The proposed protocol performs better than other 
3PAKE protocols as it never shares information in plaintext through insecure 
channels. A security analysis using the ROM shows that the proposed protocol 
achieves mutual authentication, and a safe and secure session key ensures perfect 
forward secrecy and can prevent several attacks. Therefore, hypothesis H2 
(Developing a key exchange protocol based on the Computational Diffie-Hellman 
assumption should secure key distribution between parties and protect systems 
against multiple attacks) has been proven in this chapter. TPAKE key exchange 
protocol has been developed based on the Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption. 
Analysis and tests show that the TPAKE protocol is a secure key distribution protocol 
and can protect systems against multiple attacks. 




Hardening the security of communications between parties and preventing attacks, 
such as MITM, is not enough to secure a cryptosystem. Other factors need to be 
considered, such as enhancing the adopted encryption algorithm. This will be the main 
focus in Chapter 5. 
 







PARALLEL BLOCK CIPHER MODE 
 
Chapter 4 presented an authenticated key exchange protocol TPAKE, which securely 
distributes keys among users, and protects systems against multiple attacks. This 
chapter presents a Parallel Block Cipher (PBC) mode in which blocks of cipher can be 
processed in parallel to ensure high performance on top of security.  
 
5.1 Introducing Block Cipher Modes of Operation 
A block cipher is a generic process in which data are handled in fixed sized blocks. It 
can be used to handle a single chunk as well as a stream of data. Different ways of 
handling the data blocks will end up in different modes of operation for the block 
cipher. Five modes of operation for block cipher  have been approved (Stallings, 2010)  
for encryption use: Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode, Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) 
mode, Cipher Feedback (CFB) mode, Output Feedback (OFB) mode and Counter 
(CTR) mode. 
The Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode is the simplest of the encryption modes. 
The plaintext is split into blocks, and each block is processed independently (Dworkin, 
2001). The mathematical formulae for the ECB are: 
𝐶𝑖 = 𝐸𝑘(𝑃𝑖)            (5.1) 
𝑃𝑖 = 𝐷𝑘(𝐶𝑖)            (5.2) 
The Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode was developed in 1978 by Ehrsam, Meyer, 
Smith and Tuchman (Ehrsam et al. , 1978). In the CBC mode, each plaintext block is 
XORed with the previous ciphertext block before being encrypted. To be probabilistic, 
an initialisation vector (IV) should be utilised in the first block (Dworkin, 2010 (A, 
5 
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B)). The mathematical formulae for the CBC are: 
 
𝐶𝑖 = 𝐸𝑘(𝑃𝑖  ⊕ 𝐶𝑖−1)           (5.3) 
𝑃𝑖 = 𝐷𝑘(𝐶𝑖)  ⊕ 𝐶𝑖−1           (5.4) 
where, 𝐶0 =  𝐼𝑉  
      
The Cipher Feedback (CFB) mode uses the previous ciphertext as input for 
encryption. The encryption output is XORed with the current plaintext block to 
produce the ciphertext of the current block. The mathematical formulae for the CFB 
are: 
 
𝐶𝑖 = 𝐸𝑘(𝐶𝑖−1)  ⊕ 𝑃𝑖           (5.5) 
𝑃𝑖 = 𝐷𝑘(𝐶𝑖−1)  ⊕ 𝐶𝑖           (5.6) 
where,  𝐶0 =  𝐼𝑉 
     
The Output Feedback (OFB) mode uses block cipher as a key stream generator. The 
OFB is XOR the plaintext blocks with the generated stream to obtain the ciphertext. 
Since the XOR operation results in symmetry, encryption and decryption are the same. 
The mathematical formulae for the OFB are: 
𝐶𝑖 = 𝑃𝑖 ⊕ 𝑂𝑖            (5.7) 
𝑃𝑖 = 𝐶𝑖 ⊕ 𝑂𝑖            (5.8) 
𝑂𝑖 = 𝐸𝑘(𝐼𝑖)            (5.9) 
where,  𝐼𝑖 = 𝑂𝑖−1 & 𝐼0 = 𝐼𝑉 
    The Counter (CTR) mode was introduced in 1979 by Whitfield Diffie and Martin 
Hellman (Lipmaa et al. , 2000). It is similar to the OFB, and suitable for 
implementation on multi-processor devices where many blocks can be encrypted in 
the same time. Furthermore, successive values of a counter are applied to a block 
cipher encryption process to generate the key stream. 
Another mode of encryption was proposed by the Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers (IEEE Std, 2008) and recommended by the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST of USA) (Paar and Pelzl, 2009) called XTS. XTS 
mode is XEX-based tweaked-codebook mode with ciphertext stealing. 
Generally speaking, cryptography can be the best solution for data security (Paar 
and Pelzl, 2009, Van Tilborg and Jajodia, 2014). In fact, cryptography can help 
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improve data security in many scenarios. First, the provider of services cannot acquire 
any information about encrypted user data (Kamara and Lauter, 2010). Second, 
cryptography applications can easily be installed in computers, smart phones and other 
mobile devices so users can conveniently protect and share their data with trusted 
parties. Thus, a cryptosystem can provide authentication, confidentiality and integrity, 
as well as trusted data sharing (Kahate, 2013, Kamara and Lauter, 2010). 
There are two main cryptographic schemes, deterministic encryption and 
probabilistic encryption. For deterministic encryption, encrypting identical plaintext 
multiple times yields identical ciphertext every time. On the other hand, encrypting 
identical plaintext many times using probabilistic encryption yields a different 
ciphertext every time even if the same encryption key is used (as different Initial 
Vectors (IV) are used). For example, the ECB mode uses deterministic encryption 
while the CBC mode uses probabilistic encryption.  
Deterministic encryption is vulnerable to substitution attack, which means it is easy 
to attack the ciphertext if the same message is sent twice (Paar and Pelzl, 2009). 
Therefore, Goldwasser and Micali brought in probabilistic encryption in 1984 
(Goldwasser and Micali, 1984). This is a scheme for encryption where a plaintext is 
encrypted into one of many possible ciphertext (not only a single ciphertext as in 
deterministic scheme) and is immune to substitution attacks (Fuchsbauer, 2006).  
Table 5.1 shows the definitions of symbols, operations, functions, inputs and outputs 
for the PBC mode used in this chapter. 
If a hacker can launch a successful attack to an exposed service, he/she may be able 
to get all the user’s information. Furthermore, if the hacker tries to use or re-sell the 
stolen information, it would be a privacy and security problem. To overcome these 
issues, service providers often use secure and reliable encryption techniques to secure 
their systems. While cryptography can offer a high level of data security, there are 
security concerns (Chen and Zhao, 2012, Gonzalez et al. , 2012). Cryptanalysis also 
shows some weaknesses in various block cipher modes, such as the sequential nature 
of the CBC mode (Beeputh et al. , 2010). In response, a parallel block cipher mode 
was developed (Sahi et al., 2015). 
In the next section, the literature of the block cipher operation modes will be 
reviewed. 
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5.2 Related Works 
The five approved block cipher modes (ECB, CBC, CFB OFB and CTR) are divided 
into two types.  The ECB and CBC modes use block cipher for encryption, while the 
CFB, OFB and CTR use block cipher as a key stream generator. 
Each of these five modes has its own shortcomings. The deterministic properties of 
Table 5.1 Definitions of symbols, operations, functions, inputs and outputs 
 Symbols Operations and Functions 
1 P is the plaintext; ⊕ (XOR) is the bitwise exclusive-OR operation; 
2 Pi is the ith plaintext block;  𝐸𝐾(𝑃𝑖) is the encryption function that encrypts Pi 
under the primary secret key K; 
3 Ci is the ith ciphertext block; 𝐸𝐾1(𝑃𝑖) the encryption function that encrypts Pi 
under the 2nd key K1; 
4 C0(W) is the 1st ciphertext block which 
represents the encrypted hash value W; 
𝐸𝐾2(𝑃𝑖) the encryption function that encrypts Pi 
under the 3rd key K2; 
5 C1(Y0), C2(Y1), etc.  is the rest of the 
ciphertext block (starting from the 2nd to 
the end) which represents the encrypted 
plaintext; 
𝐷𝐾(𝐶𝑖) is the decryption function that decrypts Ci 
under the primary secret key K; 
6 IV is the initialisation vector; 𝐷𝐾1(𝐶𝑖) is the decryption function that decrypts 
Ci under the 2nd key K1; 
7 K is the primary secret key; 𝐷𝐾2(𝐶𝑖) is the decryption function that decrypts 
Ci under the 3rd key K2; 
8 K1 = IV ⊕ K is the 2nd key (obtained 
from K), used to encrypt the hash value 
H(P); 
H(P) is the hash function that change the plaintext 
P to hash value H(P); 
9 K2 = ((IV⊕ K) ⊕ H(P)) is the 3rd key 
(obtained from K & K1), used to encrypt 
the plaintext Pi; 
H2(P) is the hash value of the decrypted P; 
10 W is the encryption of the hash value 
H(P); 
Combination is the operation of combining the 
encrypted hash value block W and the encrypted 
plaintext blocks Yi to deliver the ciphertext blocks 
Ci; 
11 Yi is the encryption of the plaintext Pi; Extraction is the operation of extracting the 
encrypted hash value block W and the encrypted 
plaintext blocks Yi from the received ciphertext 
blocks Ci; 
12 Oi is the output of the OFB mode before 
XORing with the plaintext; 
AES128 is the encryption process using Advanced 
Encryption Standard with a block size of 128 bits; 
13 Ii is the input of the OFB mode; AES-1128 is the decryption process using 
Advanced Encryption Standard with a block size 
of 128 bits. 
14 ID is the bank identification number; CIPHk and E are the encryption functions that 
encrypt under the key K; 
15 # is the customer account number; αj is sequence number of the 128bit block inside 
the data unit raises to the power j which is counter, 
in XTS mode. 
16 $ is the money amount;  
 Inputs and Outputs 
 Input (K, IV, P): 
1 K whose length is 128 bits; 
2 IV with the length of 128 bits; 
3 P of any length. 
 Output (C): 
4 C having the same length of P plus one block of hash value H(P); 
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the ECB is the biggest issue in this mode leading to a substitution attack (Paar and 
Pelzl, 2009), as shown in the following example. 
Assume the data shown in Figure 5.1 are to be transferred between banks. Let 
assume that each of the fields has exactly the same sized block used in the block cipher 
(16 bytes in the case of AES). The encryption key shared between the two banks does 
not change too frequently. Due to the nature of the deterministic properties of ECB 
mode, an attacker can easily substitute block number 4 (which contains the receiving 
account number) without deciphering with the ciphertext block with his own account 
number. As a consequence, all transfers from bank A to bank B will be redirected to 
the attacker’s account. Interestingly, the attack works without having to attack the 
block cipher (e.g. AES) itself. 
The CBC mode does not allow the encryption process to be parallelised to make it 
work faster as there is reliance on the previous ciphertext block (Beeputh, Doomun, 
2010). Furthermore, in the CBC mode, chaining between the blocks means one 
corrupted cipher block will result in two corrupted blocks (Stamp, 2011). An example 
of breaking the CBC chain is shown in Table 5.2. 
The CFB and OFB modes have similar issues as the CBC mode, in that they cannot 
parallelise their encryption processes to make them faster (Paar and Pelzl, 2009). 
Therefore, they will struggle in terms of speed, especially with big data. In addition, 
there is a common problem for the CFB, OFB and CTR stream modes; the flipping 
bits. If a bit flip error arises in ciphertext in a particular block, then after decryption, 
the error is limited to the exact bit of the exact block of plaintext (Lipmaa et al. , 2010). 
Flipping a ciphertext bit flips the corresponding plaintext bit. The attack aims to 
change a bit in the decrypted plaintext by flipping a bit in the ciphertext thereby 
changing the decrypted plaintext.  
For example, assume an attacker knows the ciphertext for an electronic fund 
transfer, which contains the ASCII string "$1000.00" for the transfer amount. The 
attacker can alter the amount to "$9000.00" by XOR the part of cipher text for the 
string with the result of (“$1000.00" ⊕ "$9000.00”): 




          "$1000.00" ⊕ ("$1000.00" ⊕"$9000.00")  
      = "$1000.00" ⊕ "$1000.00" ⊕ "$9000.00"  
      = "$9000.00" 
Note that: 
 "$1000.00" ⊕ "$1000.00" = all zeros 
 All zeros ⊕ "$9000.00" = "$9000.00" 
 
In addition, there is no chaining between blocks in the CTR mode. Thus, if Eve (an 
attacker) modifies any block, Bob (a receiver) will never know about that. Moreover, 
the CTR requires synchronisation of the initial counter value between the encryption 
party and decryption party. A policy to ensure that the next communication's initial 
counter value is unique and correct should be in place and enforced. This might require 
a private communication channel (Tarhuni et al. , 2003).  
XEX-based Tweaked-codebook mode with ciphertext Stealing (XTS) mode is was 
developed based on the XOR Encrypt XOR (XEX)  mode (Andreeva et al. , 2013, 
Rogaway, 2004) with Ciphertext Stealing (CTS) mode feature. However, it is slower 
than the CBC mode due to more mathematical operations, such as XOR and 
multiplication (Alomari et al. , 2009). XTS mode uses the XOR function, before and 
Blocks     
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Figure 5.1 Example for a substitution attack against the ECB mode 
Table 5.2 Example of breaking the CBC chain 
 
CBC Encryption: CBC Decryption: If C1 is corrupted to X then: 
C0 = Ek (P0 ⊕ IV) 
C1 = Ek (P1 ⊕ C0) 
C2 = Ek (P2 ⊕ C1) 
C3 = Ek (P3 ⊕ C2) 
C4 = Ek (P4 ⊕ C3) 
P0 = Dk (C0) ⊕ IV 
P1 = Dk (C1) ⊕ C0 
P2 = Dk (C2) ⊕ C1 
P3 = Dk (C3) ⊕ C2 
P4 = Dk (C4) ⊕ C3 
P0  = Dk (C0) ⊕ IV 
P1’ =  Dk (X) ⊕ C0     ≠ P1 
P2’ =  Dk (C2) ⊕ X   ≠ P2 
However: 
P3 = Dk (C3) ⊕ C2 
P4 = Dk (C4) ⊕ C3 
Chapter 5 Parallel Block Cipher Mode   
87 
after each encryption process (like XEX), and uses two keys instead of one key (Liskov 
and Minematsu, 2008). Since there is no built-in mechanism to detect alterations (an 
active attack) (Dworkin, 2010 (A)), any altered ciphertext (by attacker) will be 
decrypted to some legitimate plaintext.  
Some may argue that the CTR_CBC-MAC mode (CCM) can provide an integrity 
check in addition to performing encryption (Zukarnain, 2014). However, the inherently 
sequential nature of the CBC mode, and the need for two passes with AES, can make 
CCM-AES a slower scheme (Rogaway, 2011). CCM mode requires a longer 
processing time than the CBC mode (CBC is a special case of CCM).  
A Galois/Counter mode of operation (GCM) was proposed by McGrew and Viega 
in 2004 (McGrew and Viega, 2004). The GCM mode has been approved by the NIST 
of USA as an authenticated mode of operation (Dworkin, 2007). The GCM mode 
ensures data confidentiality using the CTR mode. It delivers a guarantee of the 
authenticity of the confidential data using a hash function which is defined over a 
binary Galois field (Dworkin, 2007). However, while the CTR mode is a part of the 
GCM mode, it could be vulnerable to the flipping bits attack mentioned above. In 
addition, the GCM mode is vulnerable to replay attacks (Dworkin, 2007). In other 
words, similar to numerous authentication modes, GCM does not naturally stop an 
attacker from interrupting the message and replaying it for authenticated decryption 
later. For example, in an attempt to imitate a party that has access to the key. 
The Extended Codebook (XCB) Mode of Operation was proposed by McGrew and 
Fluhrer in 2004 (McGrew and Fluhrer, 2004).  The XCB was the first block cipher that 
was constructed using the hash-CTR-hash. The XCB used the CTR mode of operation 
in order to ease tackling variable-length messages. However, Chakraborty and Sarkar 
reported that the XCB has limitations (Chakraborty and Sarkar, 2008). While the XCB 
mode adopts the ciphertext block as a key, the key length and the length of the block 
must be identical (Chakraborty and Sarkar, 2008). Thus, it is impossible to use the 
XCB mode once the length of the key is different from the length of the block, as is 
the case in AES with 192-bit key and 128-bit block. 
Parallel ciphering can improve the speed performance of the encryption. Big data 
are usually stored in distributed locations, therefore parallel encryption is needed to 
encrypt the large number of blocks or chunks of data separately, which takes much 
longer when using sequential encryption. 
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The next section presents the proposed Parallel Block Cipher (PBC) mode. 
5.3 Parallel Block Cipher Mode   
Data encryption is one of the most common practical choices for computing developers 
and database designers (Gampala et al. , 2012) working to protect data. The biggest 
database management systems like Microsoft’s SQL Server and Oracle adopted the 
CBC mode in block cipher algorithms (Dansereau et al. , 2006, Fazackerley et al. , 
2012). Furthermore, most cryptosystems nowadays adopt the CBC in their block 
cipher. Because of its popularity, the CBC has been chosen by this research study as 
the sequential block cipher mode to compare with Parallel Block Cipher (PBC) mode. 
Before presenting the comparison, PBC is briefly introduced below. 
The PBC mode parallelises the encryption process. It converts plaintext blocks to 
ciphertext blocks without any chaining occurring between data or outputs from another 
block. The hash of the file is utilised to generate encryption and decryption keys. 
Multiple blocks can be encrypted in one round and each plaintext block does not need 
to wait for outputs from a previous block to start or complete the encryption process; 
making parallelisation possible. The proposed PBC mode makes use of 128 bit key 
AES and a hash function (Wang et al. , 2011). The encryption diagram is shown in 
Figure 5.2. 
Figure 5.2 The PBC encryption diagram 
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The following steps are used to encrypt data using the PBC mode: 
Step 1. 𝑃
ℎ𝑎𝑠ℎ(𝑃)
→     𝐻(𝑃) 
First of all, the plaintext P will be hashed to obtain the hash value of the 
data H(P) in order to mix it with the key. 
Step 2. 𝐻(𝑃)
𝐸𝐾1(𝐻(𝑃)),   𝐴𝐸𝑆128
→              𝑊 
𝑃𝑖
𝐸𝐾2(𝑃𝑖),   𝐴𝐸𝑆128
→            𝑌𝑖  
In the second step, the hash value H (P) is encrypted using K1 = IV ⊕ 
K (where K is the session key) to obtain W. Then, encrypt the plaintext 
Pi using K2 = ((IV⊕ K) ⊕ H (P)) to yield the ciphertext of the data Yi. 
Step 3. 𝑊 + 𝑌𝑖
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
→         𝐶𝑖 
Finally, W and Yi are combined to produce the complete ciphertext Ci 
which involves the ciphertext of the data and the hash value. 
 
The following steps are used to decrypt data using the PBC mode: 
Step 1. 𝐶𝑖
𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
→       𝑊 + 𝑌𝑖 
To decrypt the ciphertext Ci using the PBC mode, the ciphertext of the 
hash value W which is located in the first block of the ciphertext must 
be extracted, the rest of the ciphertext is Yi. 
Step 2. 𝑊
𝐷𝐾1(𝑊),   𝐴𝐸𝑆
−1128
→              𝐻(𝑃)  
Second, the ciphertext of the hash value W will be decrypted to retrieve 
a copy of the original hash value H (P). 
Step 3. 𝑌𝑖
𝐷𝐾2(𝑌𝑖),   𝐴𝐸𝑆
−1128
→              𝑃𝑖      
Then decrypt using K2 the rest of the ciphertext Yi to retrieve Pi which 
represents the original data. 
Step 4. Integrity check, H2(P) = H(P), (optional) 
Furthermore, the PBC mode facilitates a message integrity check (Step 
4). The PBC mode can check the integrity of the message by comparing 
the hash of the copy of the original file which derived from Ci with 
H(P). This step is optional, because the proposed PBC mode is an 
encryption mode and not an authenticated encryption mode. 
Decryption diagram is shown in Figure 5.3. 




Microsoft Visual Studio (MVS) 2010 and Dot Net Framework 4.5 were used to 
implement the CBC mode and the PBC mode. Two console applications were 
developed. The first for the execution of the CBC mode and the other for the execution 
of the PBC mode. System.Security.Cryptography Namespace is used to utilise 
cryptographic services in MVS such as secure encryption and decryption of data using 
AES, as well as calculating hash values using hash functions. 
To parallelise the PBC mode, a Task Parallel Library (TPL) was also used. The TPL 
is a set of public types and Application Programming Interfaces in the 
System.Threading and System.Threading.Tasks Namespaces. The TPL aims to 
simplify the process of adding parallelism to applications and efficiently use all the 
CPUs that are available. In this project’s case, the TPL can let a multiple-cores 
computer run eight CPUs at the same time to allow the program to run in parallel. 
The executions of the sequential CBC mode and the parallel PBC mode have been 
conducted using thirteen data samples with different sizes (100MB, 200MB, 300MB, 
400MB, 500MB, 600MB, 700MB, 800MB, 900MB, 1GB, 1.1GB, 1.2GB and 1.3GB). 
The next section discusses and evaluates the results obtained. 
Figure 5.3 The PBC decryption diagram 
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5.5 Results and Evaluation 
5.5.1 Experimental Results 
The PBC mode has been tested and compared with the CBC mode in three different 
scenarios. First, a single data file was used as input for the PBC mode that uses only 
one process. In the second scenario, the data file was manually split into data blocks 
and used as input for the PBC mode using one process from one server at one time. 
Finally, a single data file was used as input for the PBC mode using multiple processes. 
In the last scenario, the PBC mode automatically splits the data file, processes the 
blocks, and re-combines encrypted blocks to a single encrypted data file. 
5.5.1.1 Scenario 1  
The PBC mode has been tested using a single process and compared with the CBC 
mode (Sahi et al., 2015) in computers running Windows 7, with an Intel(R) Core(TM) 
i7-2600 CPU and 16GB RAM. CrypTool 2.1 and AES128 algorithm was also used. 
The CBC_AES parameters were: action is encryption, key size is 128 bytes, block size 
is 128 bytes, chaining mode is the CBC, and padding mode is zeros. The PBC and 
CBC modes both run with a single process and a single input file, which was not split 
into blocks. The PBC mode was running like the CBC mode in a sequential manner. 
The results, as shown in Figure 5.4, indicate that the PBC mode is slightly faster than 
the CBC mode even when both were running on a single process. However, the time 
difference between the CBC mode and the PBC mode is quite small; only 1.61% on 
average. 
5.5.1.2 Scenario 2 
When a single process is used, parallel processing for the data blocks were in fact not 
tested. So, the PBC mode was tested with input data broken manually into 8 sub-files. 
Each sub-file was fed sequentially to a single process of one single server. Outputs 
from all eight processes were manually combined to generate the encrypted file. The 
time difference between the CBC mode and the PBC mode increased by 19.61% on 
average. The PBC can save approximately one fifth of the execution time as compared 
to the CBC mode. 
5.5.1.3 Scenario 3 
Nowadays, most performance computers have more than one processor (CPU) and 
running multi-processes. These computers can be treated as multiple computers in a 
single box. 
This experiment uses one computer with Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2600 CPU (8 CPUs), 
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16GB RAM, MS Visual Studio 2010, Dot Net framework 4.5, CrypTool 2.1, and 
AES128 algorithm. Eight processes were running in parallel. 
Assumption 1. This computer has multiple processors, can be multiple servers in a 
single box simulating eight servers, as shown in Figures 4.5a and 4.5b.  
Assumption 2. Every server mentioned in this chapter uses 1 CPU. 
Limitation 1. Using test data files ranges from 100MB to 1.3GB due to computer 
hardware limitation. 
Limitation 2. A multi-processor machine (single machine due to hardware 
limitation) was used to simulate multi-servers. Issues such as memory contention, 
queueing delays, blocked access to memory and secondary storage, concurrency issues 
and scheduling overheads may affect the overall performance of the PBC to a certain 
extent. 
To produce the results of this chapter, one computer with Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2600 
CPU (8 CPUs) and 16GB RAM were used. Windows 7 as an operating system, and 
Microsoft Visual Studio 2010 as well as Dot Net Framework 4.5 were used to 
implement the CBC mode and the PBC mode. Two console applications for CBC and 
PBC modes were developed. The first was used to execute encryption using the CBC 
mode and the other for the PBC mode. Files with sizes ranging from 100MB to1.3GB 
were used as input. The implementation code for PBC are listed in Appendix B. 
While the CBC cannot run in parallel (Yeh et al. , 2009) due to the block chaining 
feature, it was run on a single server, as shown in Figure 5.5b. There were two options 
to create a single server using a multi-processor computer. The first option was to use 
a virtual machine (VM) that runs on one server. Figure 5.6a shows the CPU usage 
when the CBC mode is run using of VM which uses one server.  
Figure 5.4 Execution times of the PBC and the CBC modes using single process 
Chapter 5 Parallel Block Cipher Mode   
93 
 
Encrypting 1.3GB file takes about 99.49 seconds (1:39.49), as shown in Figure 5.6b. 
The second option was to use a CPU Affinity Mask (AM) to force the multi-
processor computer to use a single CPU and 16GB RAM. As a result, encrypting a 
1.3GB file using the CBC mode took about 92.84 seconds (1:32.84), as shown in 
Figure 5.7b. This is very close to the previous result and the improvement may be 
attributed to the larger RAM used. 
In scenario 3, the PBC can run processes in parallel using all the servers in the box 
(eight servers in this test), as shown in Figure 5.8a. The whole duration of hashing, 
breaking the file into parts, encrypting and combining the encrypted parts into one 
encrypted file using the PBC mode takes an average 41.4 seconds for a 1.3GB data 
file. The result is shown in Figure 5.8b, which is significantly better than the previous 
results. It shows that the PBC mode is more than twice as fast as the CBC mode. 
(a) The PBC servers’ box (multiple servers 
are running) 
(b)   The CBC servers’ box (single server is 
running) 
Figure 5.5 Using single machine with multiprocessor to provide a single server and 
multiple servers 
(a) Single server using VM 




(b)   The execution result of CBC mode using virtual machine  
 
Figure 5.6 Running the CBC mode using single server in a virtual machine 
(a) Single server using AM 
(b)   The execution result of CBC mode using Affinity Mask  
 
Figure 5.7 Running the CBC mode using Affinity Mask 
 













(b)   The execution result of the PBC mode  
 
Figure 5.8 Running the PBC mode on multiple servers 
 
(a) Eight servers running in parallel 
Figure 5.9 Execution times of the PBC and the CBC modes using multiple processes 
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Note that when 8 servers (processors) are used, the expected encryption time is 
around one eighth of that used by the CBC mode (approximately 13 s). The actual time 
used was around 17.42 s. With overheads for splitting the data file (14.68 s) and joining 
the cipher blocks (9.30 s), the total time span adds up to 41.40 s. 
Multiple servers’ tests were executed using data files from 100MB to 1.3GB, with 
an increment of 100MB for each data file. Execution time was measured in seconds. 
The percentage time saving between the PBC mode and the CBC mode was about 60% 
on average for all data file sizes. In other words, the PBC mode takes only 40% of the 
CBC mode execution time to encrypt the same amount of data. The test results are 
shown in Figure 5.9. 
5.5.2 Discussion 
The PBC mode is faster than the standard CBC mode in terms of execution time. As 
mentioned in the experimental results section, the proposed mode proves to be superior 
to the original CBC mode in terms of execution time under a multiple server’s 
environment. As shown in Figure 5.9, the PBC can save up to 60% of the CBC mode’s 
encryption time.  
Furthermore, the proposed PBC mode provides confidentiality. The PBC mode has 
an essentially similar concept of chaining blocks as the CBC block cipher in terms of 
security performance. The PBC mode chains all the blocks together using the hash 
value of the plaintext. The key used to encrypt the plaintext blocks is generated using 
the hash value therefore, the hash value is used in encrypting every single block. If one 
cipher block is corrupted, then the corresponding plaintext block will also be 
corrupted. The hash of the decrypted plaintext will differ from the original hash sent 
to the receiver. This will provide an integrity check on top of the confidentiality 
provided by encryption. Accordingly, the security concept of the CBC can be applied 
straight away to those of the PBC mode. Since the CBC mode of operation is revealed 
to be safe against numerous attacks such as chosen ciphertext attacks, ciphertext only 
and, known plaintext, the proposed PBC mode can also be said to be safe against these 
attacks. The key stream of the CBC mode involves two inputs (key and IV), while the 
PBC mode key stream involves key, IV, and the hash value of all blocks, which adds 
more degree of randomness, and is more secure. 
Moreover, the proposed PBC mode has faster error recovery than the CBC mode. 
As mentioned in Table 5.2, in the CBC mode one corrupted ciphertext block will affect 
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two plaintext blocks as a result. However, in the PBC mode one corrupted ciphertext 
block will affect the corresponding block only. As a result, in the case of AES, 
corrupting 16 bytes block in the CBC mode affects 32 bytes blocks, and corrupting 16 
bytes block in the PBC mode affects only 16 bytes block. 
A multi-processors machine (single machine due to hardware limitations) was used 
to simulate multi-servers. Issues such as memory contention, queueing delays, blocked 
access to memory and secondary storage, concurrency issues and scheduling 
overheads may affect the overall performance of the PBC to a certain extent. However, 
a significant 60% improvement using a single machine with multi-processors, and 
PBC demonstrated that PBC (parallel processing) has a better performance than 
sequential processing. 
In relation to the CTR mode that is intended for parallelised processes and has been 
commonly utilised in high speed network standards, the PBC mode does not require 
counter synchronisation.  The unique values of IV and the hash deliver better security 
than the CTR mode. 
The implementation code for PBC are listed in Appendix B. 
 
5.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presented the PBC mode which considerably increases the speed of the 
encryption process. Results of speed performance tests of the PBC mode using various 
settings were presented and compared with the standard CBC mode. While 
maintaining security, the PBC mode was shown to offer a significant increase in 
performance when compared with the CBC mode. Therefore, hypothesis H3 (A new 
parallel hash-based block cipher mode of operation would be able to improve the 
encryption process on top of security assurance) has been proven and research 
question 3 is answered in this chapter. 
The next chapter gives the details about integrating the PBC mode presented in this 
chapter and the TPAKE presented in Chapter 4 to preserve security and privacy of 
eHealth clouds and answer research question 4.  Chapter 6 also presents a disaster 
recovery plan. 







SECURITY AND PRIVACY APPROACHES OF 
EHEALTH CLOUDS  
 
Chapter 4 presented an authenticated key exchange (TPAKE) protocol. Chapter 5 
presented a Parallel Block Cipher (PBC) mode. This chapter adopts the PBC mode and 
the TPAKE protocol to introduce a security-preserving approach and a privacy-
preserving approach to preserve the privacy and the security of an eHealth cloud. 
The chapter also presents a disaster recovery plan which ensures the connectivity 
of users during disaster time (Sahi et al., 2016).  
 
6.1 Introducing eHealth Cloud Security and Privacy Approaches 
The technologies of cloud computing (CC) provide simple and easy on-demand 
network access to a shared group of computing resources which are simple to install 
and maintain with minimal effort. They have become an important keystone 
technology. Many scientists and researchers claim that cloud computing has changed 
the computing processes and IT markets. When access is powered by cloud computing, 
users can adopt comprehensive sets of tools for assessing various applications, storage 
and platforms through the Internet, as well as using other services offered by cloud 
producers. 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) stated that CC is a 
model for using computer resources and other modern technological functionality in 
the information technology world to provide services such as storage and applications 
(Mell and Grance, 2011). Users can access and use cloud computing services without 
the need to acquire knowledge, expertise or even administration of infrastructure that 
6 
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support these services. There are three main types of services offered by the cloud 
(Sugumaran et al., 2014): Software as a Service (SaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS) 
and Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) (Kushida et al., 2015).  
In addition, four deployment models have been identified for cloud architecture 
solutions; namely Private cloud, Community cloud, Public cloud and Hybrid cloud 
(Hsu and Cheng, 2015; Zissis and Lekkas, 2012). Since cloud computing shares 
resources distributed throughout the Internet and among intranets, security is an 
important issue. 
CC can be applied in many sectors. This research focuses on the health sector. CC 
gives healthcare providers the ability to diagnose and evaluate a patient’s health even 
though the patient is not at the hospital. This requires the patient’s medical data to be 
distributed between physicians, nurses, insurance companies as well as the data owner, 
so delivering flexible and prompt care to patients. The distribution of the patient’s 
medical data raises security and privacy issues. Therefore, this research proposes two 
approaches designed to preserve privacy and security in eHealth clouds. 
Before presenting the approaches, it is necessary to define Personal Health 
Records (PHRs) and Electronic Health Records (EHRs). 
Personal Health Records (PHRs): A PHR is medical data owned and managed by 
the patient himself/herself (Abbas and Khan, 2014). A good PHR contains a precise 
and short record of the patient’s medical history data collected from various sources 
(such as EHRs). Everyone having the required authorisations to display the PHR can 
easily reach these data. 
Electronic Health Records (EHRs): According to Zapata (Zapata et al., 2014), the 
International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) stated that the EHR is a 
“repository of information regarding the health status of a subject of care, in computer 
processable form”. Using the words of ISO/TS 18308 (ANSI, 2003), the main purpose 
of an EHR is to deliver a registered record of healthcare which supports current and 
upcoming healthcare received by the patient from various healthcare providers. 
Today, cloud computing is used by millions of people around the world. Cloud 
computing gives users the opportunity to store data in the cloud for easy access 
anytime and anywhere (Carroll et al., 2011). However, in the cloud environment, the 
user’s data are controlled by service providers and not by the users themselves. The 
potential for data leaks is real, either intentionally or accidentally, which is 
unacceptable (Gonzalez et al., 2012). Common problems of security and privacy in 
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eHealth clouds include confidentiality, integrity, authentication, access control, and 
non-repudiation (Rosado et al., 2012). 
The overall cloud computing theme is that we should be able to use all kinds of 
functionality and services provided by the cloud, but we would like to maintain our 
data privacy and security. Therefore, issues regarding privacy and security of data are 
the main factors limiting the widespread use of cloud computing. Much research has 
been done on these issues and several researchers claim that a versatile cryptography 
system may handle data security and data privacy issues more effectively than other 
methods (Talbot, 2010). With the use of cryptography systems, the security and 
privacy approaches proposed by this research can tackle security and privacy issues.  
Although security is the most important factor in any cloud project, disaster 
recovery (DR) planning must also be considered. 
There are three types of disaster that may cause major damage to any system: (1) 
natural disasters, such as flood, earthquake, and volcano, (2) man-made disasters, such 
as cybercrime and technological terrorism, and (3) technological accidents, such as 
infrastructure failure, and transportation failure (Snedaker, 2013). To overcome these 
kinds of disaster, a recovery plan must be set up. 
In the next section, the literature of the health cloud security and privacy will be 
reviewed. 
 
6.2 Related Work 
This section reviews related work on the preservation of security and privacy in 
eHealth clouds as well as the DR planning. 
Users are using CC in various ways, such as checking email by Yahoo, writing 
documents by Google Docs, and storing data in iCloud. CC delivers numerous 
benefits. For example, low costs due to pay-as-you-go models, extraordinary 
availability as data is commonly distributed between a numbers of servers, and load 
balancing (Mell and Grance, 2011). Furthermore, CC is benefiting health organisations 
(Giniat, 2011). 
Health organisations have been quick to move to CC for the obvious advantages 
of data storage and sharing. These organisations are keen to store and share PHRs and 
EHRs using the cloud, thereby eliminating the geographical boundaries between health 
organisations and patients (Wu, 2012). Sharing data using CC has rapidly become a 
very important component for healthcare providers and many other organisations. 
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According to Thilakanathan et al. (Thilakanathan et al., 2014), for most organisations, 
the percentage of the data shared with clients using CC is about 74% and with dealers 
is about 64%. 
On the other hand, it is important for medical data to be safe from unauthorised 
access and unwanted modifications. CC, however, is vulnerable to various security 
and privacy attacks. Consequently, many healthcare providers are unwilling to 
implement CC technologies as a patient’s information privacy may be breached. 
According to Van et al. (Van Gorp et al., 2014), the main hurdle delaying the growth 
and extensive acceptance of CC is privacy and security issues. Actually, most privacy 
and security attacks are caused by the Cloud Service Providers (CSP) themselves 
(Rocha et al., 2011) as they commonly have access to the Cloud Storage (CS) and they 
may also sell the data records to gain profits. Indeed, insider attacks are one of the 
main problems related to CC, as pointed out by El-Gazzar et al. and Pasupuleti et al. 
(El-Gazzar et al., 2016; Pasupuleti et al., 2016). 
Fujisaki et al. proposed a PKE-based (Public Key Encryption) approach named 
RSA-OAEP (Fujisaki et al., 2004) however, PKE-based approaches are 
computationally inefficient because of the larger key size and slower operation. 
Jafari et al. introduced an approach which gives the patient the possibility of 
controlling his EHRs. This approach limits the patient to managing records authored 
by other parties, such as physicians and nurses (Jafari et al., 2011). On the other hand, 
the cloud service provider cannot retrieve the records in plaintext format. The patient 
himself and data consumers are given the private and public keys for encryption and 
decryption (Khalil et al., 2014). 
Another approach presented by Zhang et al. (Zhang et al., 2014) is a time-based 
approach. The approach is efficient in ensuring the privacy of the EHRs at the cloud 
storage and enhances the operation of key distribution between trusted parties. This 
approach adopts time-bound hierarchical key management (Bertino et al., 2008). 
Time-bound hierarchical key management permits trusted parties to gain short-term 
access to the EHRs, which are encrypted using Symmetric Key Encryption (SKE).  
However, Zhang’s approach is logically inadequate due to the fact that users have to 
take on multiple roles. Therefore, the users are required to hold and control multiple 
keys. 
Tran et al. (Tran et al., 2011) proposed an approach based on the proxy re-
encryption idea. A trusted user can obtain a data record as the proxy will convert the 
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encrypted data on the data owner’s side to differently encrypted data which can be 
decrypted to plaintext by the trusted user’s key. However, because Tran’s approach 
uses ElGamal public key cryptography, the encryption or decryption of very large data 
is not practical and, unfortunately, very large data is a feature of medical data 
(Thilakanathan et al., 2014). In addition, this approach does not solve the situation 
where a revoked party re-joins using another access key. 
Liang et al. presented an approach which adopts Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-
Based Encryption (CP-ABE) for data sharing in the situation of a revocation operation, 
which at the same time allows high flexibility, access control and revocation (Liang et 
al., 2015). This approach, however, is also not effective when considering very large 
data (Thilakanathan et al., 2014). 
An Access Control technique is a policy or rule that allows the restriction of access 
to a cloud project (Khan, 2012). It also detects unauthorised users who try to access a 
cloud project. Access Control allows one application to trust the identity of another 
application (Sosinsky, 2010).  While a robust authentication technique is a compulsory 
requirement for any cloud project, access control cannot secure data at rest and in 
transit (Sen, 2013; Younis et al., 2014), and it is not satisfactory enough to achieve 
privacy for PHRs (Yang et al., 2016). Encryption methods are definitely a better choice 
for protecting data at rest, as well as the choice for protecting data in transit (Sen, 
2013). In addition, cryptography offers an integrity check to verify that the data is not 
compromised or corrupted in transit. 
Regarding DR plans, Wood et al. presented a DR plan that utilises three servers 
and one database, as shown in Figure 6.1. One of the servers is nominated to be used 
in the event of a disaster, and all users are redirected to that server during the disaster 
(Wood et al., 2010). However, the authors did not consider the case in which the 
disaster also affects the nominated server itself. In addition, the redirecting may 
influence the performance of the system and all users will be disconnected while they 
are being redirected to the nominated server. 
In eHealth clouds environment, a user’s data are controlled by the service providers 
rather than by users themselves. There is therefore a potential for data leaks, either 
intentional or accidental, which is unacceptable (Gonzales, et al., 2012; Ma, 2012). 
Furthermore, data in the cloud are stored in geographically diverse locations. Thus, 
confidentiality, authentication, and communication between parties become an 
important concern (Hussain & Ashraf, 2014).  
Chapter 6 Security and Privacy Approaches of eHealth Clouds  
103 
Confidentiality is not enough to guarantee eHealth clouds security. Users want to 
ensure that their data has not been modified or compromised by a third party. Cloud 
service suppliers should also apply methods to guarantee data integrity (Sugumaran et 
al., 2014). In addition to encryption, availability of service must be ensured. 
Therefore, the following research question have been raised “How can security and 
privacy be preserved in eHealth clouds? How can a client be enabled to connect to the 
system at any time, even during a disaster?” 
 
Figure 6.1 Wood et al. DR plan (Wood et al., 2010). 
 
This chapter is concerned with the following issues when strengthening the 
security and privacy of health records in the cloud: 
 How to design compatible security and privacy approaches which can preserve 
the security of the EHR and the privacy of the PHR at the same time in eHealth 
clouds: 
o How the proposed approaches perform in emergency situations 
o How to revoke old session keys 
o How to ensure the availability and the continuity of the system during a 
disaster. 
From the point-of-view of this project, security, privacy, and disaster recovery 
plans are crucial and should be designed together to be homogeneous, accurate, and 
easy to implement. The lack of any one of these will certainly affect the performance 
of the others. Thus, designing one of them only, as in most of the related studies, is not 
enough to deal with the real world. 
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To build a better cryptography cloud project, four requirements need to be 
satisfied: authentication, non-repudiation, integrity, and confidentiality (Zissis and 
Lekkas, 2012). Most previous studies focus on either the security of the EHR or the 
privacy of PHR, which is not enough to achieve the requirements. Many researchers 
propose good security approaches to ensure confidentiality, while others propose good 
privacy approaches to ensure authentication. However, these approaches may not 
integrate seamlessly. Besides, non-repudiation and integrity must be provided by the 
same system. Therefore, the researcher was motivated to propose approaches that can 
be easily implemented and integrated in any distributed system to cover requirements 
for both security and privacy. Moreover, on top of the security of the EHR and privacy 
of the PHR, this research study designed a disaster recovery plan to guarantee the 
availability and the continuity of the system during a time of disaster. While disaster 
recovery is not considered by most of the studies in the eHealth domain, the proposed 
approaches and disaster recovery plan will enable data owners and patients to have full 
and safe control over their records. 
This chapter will: 
 Propose a security-preserving approach which can ensure the security and 
integrity of Electronic Health Records 
 Propose a privacy-preserving approach which can ensure the privacy of Personal 
Health Records 
 Provide a break-glass access feature to be used in emergency situations. A 
revocation feature is also provided 
 Design a disaster recovery plan to guarantee the availability and the continuity of 




Sahi et al. (Sahi et al., 2015) first introduced the Parallel Block Cipher (PBC) as a 
block cipher mode of operation. The PBC adopted the Advanced Encryption Standards 
(AES) as an encryption algorithm. The PBC mode significantly enhances the 
encryption process in terms of speed and provides a data integrity check. In the PBC, 
each block uses the hash value of the shared data to ensure that the key stream has very 
good randomness. Fast parallel processes and integrity checks are the reasons for 
Chapter 6 Security and Privacy Approaches of eHealth Clouds  
105 
choosing the PBC-AES. Figure 6.2 together with Equations 6.1–6.5 briefly describe 
the process of the algorithm. 
Encryption: 
𝑊 = 𝐸(𝐾⊕IV)(H(𝑋𝑖))     (6.1) 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝐸(𝐾⊕IV)⊕H(𝑋𝑖)(𝑋𝑖)    (6.2) 
𝐶𝑖 = 𝑊 + 𝑌𝑖     (6.3) 
 
Decryption: 
𝐻(𝑋𝑖) = 𝐷(𝐾⊕IV)(W)     (5.4) 
𝑋𝑖 = 𝐷𝐻(𝑋𝑖)⊕(𝐾⊕IV)(𝑌𝑖)    (5.5) 
 
 
(a) Encryption process. 
 (b) Decryption process. 
Figure 6.2 PBC-AES processes (Sahi et al., 2015). 
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6.3.2 Key exchange protocol 
 To ensure the privacy of users, the proposed approach adopts a three-party password-
based authenticated key exchange (TPAKE) protocol which was introduced in 
(Khader and Lai, 2015). This protocol ensures both authentication and non-repudiation 
features. A Geffe generator is used to produce a pseudorandom binary sequence. The 
resulting sequence is tested using statistical tests including a frequency test, serial test 
and poker test. Private keys are then generated from the success sequence. In this 
protocol, data will have a non-repudiation property and no clear data will be sent via 
the channel. Figure 6.3 shows the process of Khader and Lai protocol. 
The next section presents the proposed approaches. 
 
Figure 6.3 Key exchange protocol (Khader and Lai, 2015) 
 
6.4 The Proposed Approaches 
While CC is facing numerous privacy and security issues, and despite the fact that 
most of these issues are caused by Cloud Service Providers (CSPs) themselves, all data 
in CSPs and Cloud Storage (CSs) must be encrypted. In other words, all medical 
records including PHRs and EHRs must be encrypted before CC stores and shares it. 
This will resist any attacks from outsiders as well as from insiders (the CSPs 
themselves) trying to obtain any valuable data without permission (Khader and Lai, 
2015). The patient’s privacy needs to be ensured on top of the security for medical 
records.  
The proposed approaches are shown in Figure 6.4 and Figure 6.5. They consist of 
data consumers, trusted party, patients, and cloud which are defined as follows: 
Data consumers: Data consumers are people or companies which are interested in 
using PHR or EHR data. In other words, data consumers are the healthcare providers, 
including physicians and nurses. 
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Controller: The controller is responsible for negotiating and generating session keys 
in order for them to be used by parties. 
Data owner: The data owner is the owner of the data in the proposed system and is 
the only party who has full access to the EHR data. 
Trusted party: The controller and data owner are trusted by all parties in the proposed 
approaches. 
Patients: The patient is the owner of his/her PHR and has complete control over the 
privacy of his/her PHR information. He/she can delegate his/her patient role to other 
parties, such as a family member or friend in order to access the PHR in an emergency 
situation.  
Cloud: The cloud consists of the cloud service provider and cloud storage. The cloud 
service provider responds to the demands from the data consumers and provides 
corresponding services. The cloud storage is used to store the shared encrypted data 
from the data owner. 
To achieve the goals of the proposed approaches, two main points must be 
satisfied. Since the patient is the only one with full control over the access to his/her 
PHR information, the patient’s privacy must be ensured in the first place. Second, all 
data consumers must be able to access an up-to-date version of their EHRs in the cloud 
at any time and in a secure manner, hence data security must be guaranteed. 
The following sections explain the privacy-preserving approach, which can be 
used to ensure the privacy of the PHRs in eHealth clouds. It then describes the security-
preserving approach, which can be applied to ensure the security of the EHRs in 
eHealth clouds. 
 
6.4.1 Privacy-preserving approach 
Authentication is vital for archiving and retrieving information from PHRs (Kaelber 
et al., 2008). Since PHRs are controlled by patients themselves (Abbas and Khan, 
2014), an efficient authentication approach which ensures the privacy of PHRs is 
required. 
In order to ensure the PHRs’ privacy, the TPAKE protocol by Khader and Lai 
(Khader and Lai, 2015) has been adopted. 
According to the TPAKE protocol, the primitive root (p) and the generator (g) 
should be changed in each communication session (Khader and Lai, 2015). This suits 
the proposed approach as it ensures that the patient is the only one who has complete 
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access to his PHR, and all data consumers will be revoked after the session. Otherwise, 
if p and g are not changed, data consumers will be able to access the patient’s PHRs 
using an old session key. 
The privacy-preserving approach works as follows: 
1. The data owner stores an encrypted PHR at the CS. The data are stored according 
to the disaster recovery plan in Section 6.6 
2. Therefore, the CSP has a copy of the PHR. However, this copy is encrypted and the 
privacy of the PHR is secured. To make any modification to the PHR, the patient’s 
permission is required. Data are retrieved according to the disaster recovery plan in 
Section 6.6 
3. Data consumers ask the controller to begin a Session Key (SK) negotiation in order 
to access the PHR 
4. The controller will control the communication between the data consumers and the 
patient. In this step, the controller will ask the patient to initiate the SK agreement 
5. The patient will then send the relevant information through the channel back to the 
controller to authorise the data consumer to gain access to his/her PHR 
6. The data consumer calculates the SK using the information received from the 
controller 
7. Data consumers can access the PHR at the CSP once they get permission. 
Figure 6.4 Privacy-Preserving approach 
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6.4.2 Security-preserving approach 
EHRs are managed by healthcare providers (Abbas and Khan, 2014; Huang et al., 
2009) (in the proposed system, healthcare providers are data consumers). However, 
patients may have to follow various policies, such as medical, dental, and vision policy 
or be registered with different insurance companies which make it hard for all parties 
to access up-to-date EHR records every time. Therefore, the proposed approach shifts 
the management of the data to the data owner or his delegate, thus ensuring that all the 
consumers can access an up-to-date version of the EHR in the cloud at any time, and 
in a secure manner. 
The data owner stores the EHRs at their own preferred CC storage servers, and 
cloud projects must retrieve the EHRs from these servers. Therefore, a robust approach 
which can ensure the security of the EHRs is required. 
The AES encryption algorithm with the PBC mode was adopted to secure the data 
at the data owner database as well as at the cloud storage (Sahi et al., 2015). 
The security-preserving approach works as follows: 
1. The data owner stores encrypted EHRs at the CS. Data are stored according to the 
disaster recovery plan in Section 6.6 
2. Therefore, the CSP has a copy of the EHRs. However, this copy is encrypted to 
ensure the security of the EHRs. To use the EHRs, the CSP needs the data owner’s 
permission to do so. Data are retrieved according to the disaster recovery plan in 
Section 5.6 
3. Data consumers ask the controller to begin the SK negotiation to access the EHRs 
4. The controller will control the communication between the data consumers with the 
data owner. In this step, the controller will ask the data owner to initiate the SK 
agreement 
5. The data owner will send the relevant information through the channel back to the 
controller in order to authorise the data consumer to gain access to the EHR 
6. The data consumer calculates the SK using the information received from the 
controller 
7. Data consumers can access the EHR at the CSP once they get permission. 
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Figure 6.5 Security-Preserving approach 
 
6.4.3 Break-glass access 
In an emergency situation, such as in a life-threatening situation for an unconscious 
patient, healthcare providers may require temporary access to a patient’s PHR. Those 
staff members must have temporary authorisation to decipher the PHR information. 
While the patient is the only one in this system who has complete control of his/her 
PHR, as mentioned earlier, the patient can also delegate the role to a family member 
or friend in advance. Therefore, a family member or friend can play the patient’s role 
to authorise access to the patient’s PHR. In the proposed privacy and security 
preserving approaches this can be achieved by encouraging a patient to delegate an 
emergency key to a family member or friend when the patient registers for the first 
time in the system. The process of delegation can be as simple as entering a user name 
and password, just like using a phone to send a text message. If the patient has 
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6.5 Discussion 
To ensure the security and privacy of any cryptography-based system, four 
requirements must be considered: authentication, non-repudiation, integrity, and 
confidentiality (Zissis and Lekkas, 2012). This section analyses and evaluates the 
security of the proposed approaches from three different perspectives: security 
requirements, comparison with existing work, and when under several kinds of attacks. 
 
6.5.1 Security requirements 
CSP should utilise robust authentication and non-repudiation techniques to guarantee 
authentication and non-repudiation. According to Khader and Lai in (Khader and Lai, 
2015), these two features are ensured by the TPAKE key exchange protocol. Since the 
protocol is employed in this chapter, the proposed privacy-preserving approach 
inherited the authentication and non-repudiation features from the adopted TPAKE 
protocol. 
 
Figure 6.6 Security and privacy of the PHR and the HER 
In addition, as mentioned in Chapter 5 (Step 4, decryption algorithm) the PBC-AES 
can check the integrity of the message by comparing the hash of the copy of the 
original data with the hash received from the other party.  
The public keys are necessary for establishing a MITM attack. In order to begin 
attacking the system using a MITM attack, the attacker needs to know public keys of 
both parties, generator and primitive root. However, in the proposed TPAKE protocol 
all these parameters are encrypted using the user private key. Thus, it can be claimed 
that the proposed system does mitigate the MITM attack.  
Security & privacy of the PHR & EHR
Security-preserving approach
Confidentiality Integrity check 
Privacy-preserving approach
Authentication Non-repudiation 
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Figure 6.6 illustrates the security and privacy features that can be provided by 
combining the privacy-preserving approach with the security-preserving approach in 
the cloud environment. 
 
6.5.2 Comparison with existing work 
This section compares the proposed approaches with several existing approaches in 
terms of security, privacy, revocation, break-glass access and DR plan. 
Table 6.1 shows the comparison. As shown in the table, the proposed approaches 
together with the disaster recovery plan achieved all the listed features, whereas some 
vital features are missing in other approaches. On top of this, some of the other 
approaches have limitations in various aspects. In the RBTBAC approach (Zhang et 




The approach by Tran et al. and the new CP-ABPRE approach (Liang et al., 2015;  
Tran et al., 2011) are not effective when considering very large data, and unfortunately 
very large data is a feature of medical data (Thilakanathan et al., 2014). Furthermore, 
Table 6.1 Comparison of delivered security features 


































1 Jafari et al. (Jafari et al., 2011) ˟ √ ˟ √ ˟ 
2 RBTBAC (Zhang et al., 2014) √ √ ˟ ˟ ˟ 
3 Tran et al. (Tran et al., 2011) √ ˟ √ ˟ ˟ 
4 New CP-ABPRE (Liang et al., 2015) √ ˟ √ ˟ ˟ 
5 Wang et al. (Wang et al., 2012) ˟ √ ˟ ˟ ˟ 
6 Fabian et al. (Fabian et al., 2015) √ √ ˟ ˟ ˟ 
7 Chen et al. (Chen et al., 2012) ˟ √ √ ˟ ˟ 
8 CP-ABE  (Ibraimi et al., 2009) √ √ ˟ ˟ ˟ 
9 Zheng (Zhen, 2011) ˟ √ √ ˟ ˟ 
10 Proposed approaches √ √ √ √ √ 
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the approach by Fabian et al. is not well-suited for emergency cases, as stated by the 
authors themselves (Fabian et al., 2015). Finally, the approach of Chen et al. gives the 
ability to manage the PHR to every healthcare staff member in addition to patients and 
doctors. Apart from the requirement that PHR needs to remain safe at all times and be 
able to be managed by the patient and his/her doctor (Chen et al., 2012), a revocation 
feature is needed to cancel the management rights of a doctor later. 
 
6.5.3 When Under Attack 
This section shows how the proposed approaches work when the PHR and EHR are 
under different attacks.  
 Outside attacks: In outside attacks, an adversary attempts to gain electronic records 
without any identity or access credentials. However, he can only get the PHR/EHR 
records in an encrypted format, which he cannot decrypt without an appropriate key. 
While keys are held only by the patient (and delegate health practitioner) and the 
controller, obtaining the correct key is impossible. Thus, this approach can claim to 
prevent outside attacks. 
Man-in-the-middle attacks: In the proposed approaches, it is impossible for an 
adversary to perform a man in the middle attack. The adversary needs to know at least 
the public keys to perform a man in the middle attack, whereas these public keys are 
encrypted using private user keys according to the adopted TPAKE protocol (Khader 
and Lai, 2015). In the TPAKE protocol, only the user (either the patient or controller) 
can know the public and private keys, so he/she is the only one who can decrypt the 
electronic records. Thus, the proposed approaches can prevent man-in-the-middle 
attacks. 
Offline and online dictionary attacks: The TPAKE protocol can also be secure 
against offline and online dictionary attacks. For an adversary to perform an offline 
dictionary attack, he needs to guess the password of the user to calculate the session 
key. This is going to fail during the verification process due to the fact that the session 
key is required for verification of the identity credential in advance. 
An integrity check is provided in this protocol, and it helps prevent on-line 
dictionary attacks using checksum validations. As parties are required to validate one 
another using a stored checksum, online dictionary attacks can thus be prevented. 
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The next section investigate a disaster recovery plan in case something unexpected 
occurs. 
 
6.6 Disaster Recovery Plan 
In the event of a disaster, several questions will require answering. For example, how 
long will the system take to resume service? Therefore, a DR plan must be prepared to 
answer this and other questions. 
First of all, data such as PHRs and EHRs are stored in the cloud storage, which 
should include a minimum of three nodes or data centres. At the beginning of the 
process, the data owner will send a heartbeat signal (a heartbeat is a signal sent between 
the data owner, nodes, and the CSP to check whether those nodes are still in working 
condition or not) to check the status of the nodes. After that, the data owner asks the 
controller to break the data records into three partitions (three in this example, but it 
could vary), distribute and store them between the nodes. When a client attempts to 
use the data through the CSP, the CSP will send a heartbeat signal to the nodes, and 
then ask the controller to retrieve the three partitions from the nodes and combine them 
in one record file. 
The controller is responsible for the number of partitions and the size of each. Each 
partition must be stored in several nodes (in this case, three nodes). The three nodes 
must be located at three different physical locations to ensure that the cloud project 
can be continued even in a disaster situation. 
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For example, let assume that the area where the second node is located has an 
earthquake which causes complete damage to this node. The original record can be 
retrieved immediately from node 1 and node 3 with no time wasted or client 
disconnection. Therefore, this DR plan can answer the above questions and ensure the 
continuity of the system, as shown in Figure 6.7. 
 
6.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter set up new approaches to harden the security of the EHRs and the privacy 
of the PHRs in eHealth cloud projects, as well as ensuring the continuity of projects 
during times of disasters. These two approaches are able to satisfy the most important 
requirements in cryptosystems, such as authentication, non-repudiation, integrity, and 
confidentiality. In addition, a DR plan was introduced to enable a client to connect to 
its system at any time, even at a time of disaster. The two approaches and the DR plan 
all together provide a private, secure and robust cloud computing environment for the 
health sector.  
As the TPAKE protocol and the PBC mode have been integrated to preserve 
privacy and security of eHealth clouds, Hypothesis H4 (Integration of potential key 
exchange protocol and block cipher mode would preserve privacy and security on 
eHealth clouds. A disaster recovery plan with heartbeat signals will result in 24/7 
services availability) has been proven in this chapter. In addition, the presented DR 
plan ensures the connectivity of users 24/7. 
To this stage, the proposed system is supposed to be secure against many inside 
and outside attacks however, it still vulnerable to flood attacks, which is concern of 
research question 5. Therefore, the next chapter presents a security system that helps 
to mitigate flood attacks such as Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) TCP flood 
attacks. It also presents a method to mitigate the Denial of Service (DoS) attacks in a 
cloud, reduces excessive energy consumption during attack and ensures the 
availability of service. 







MITIGATION OF DDOS TCP FLOOD ATTACKS IN 
EHEALTH CLOUDS  
 
Chapter 6 presented a security-preserving approach and a privacy-preserving 
approach based on the PBC mode and the TPAKE protocol. A disaster recovery plan 
ensuring the connectivity of users in disaster time was also presented (Sahi et al., 
2016). This chapter presents two different systems: a classification based security 
system that can help to mitigate Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) TCP flood 
attacks (Sahi et al., 2017 (A)) and an energy efficient DoS attacks mitigation method. 
Instead of system shutdown, the proposed method ensures availability of service.  
 
7.1 Classification Based System for Detecting and Preventing DDoS TCP 
flood Attacks 
7.1.1 Introducing DDoS Attacks Detection and Prevention 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) TCP flood attacks are a kind of DoS attack in 
which attackers flood a victim machine with packets to exhaust the resources of the 
victim machine or cause  bandwidth consumption (Girma et al., 2016). As the attack 
may be distributed over multiple machines, it is very hard to differentiate authentic 
users from attackers. In fact, a DDoS flood attack is not only a widespread attack, it is 
the second largest cybercrime attack causing financial losses (Cisco, 2018), according 
to the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). 
The use of cloud computing is growing quickly in many sectors, especially the health 
sector, as a result of its vital features such as availability and on demand services (Yan 
et al., 2016). Most people think of cloud computing as virtual networks which can 
offer flexible and accessible on demand services (Laplante et al., 2008). Whereas, 
7 
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Balding (Balding, 2012) pointed out that cloud computing is much more than that, 
which leads this research to re-consider its security more seriously. Also, as mentioned 
in an electronic cybercrime study published by KPMG in collaboration with the 
eCrime Congress in 2009, most of clouds’ virtual clients are threaten and that threats 
grow as time goes (E-CrimeCongress, 2009). 
Many procedures (Wang et al., 2015 (D)) can be adopted to detect and/or mitigate 
DDoS flood attacks. These include classifications used as a detection method (Taravat 
et al., 2015; Xia et al., 2015), and encryption techniques used as a mitigation method 
(Khader and Lai, 2015; Sahi et al., 2015; Sahi et al., 2016). As DDoS flood attacks can 
be implemented in many forms, we cannot foresee the form of attacks. Therefore, this 
new proposed Classifier System for detecting and preventing DDoS TCP flood attacks 
(CS_DDoS) is classification based, and can identify the attacks on data no matter the 
form in which they come to the cloud system. Classification can be defined as a 
common procedure to classify, distinguish, and differentiate multiple objects. 
Different classifiers, such as Least Squares Support Vector Machine (LS-SVM), Naïve 
Bayes, K-nearest-neighbour, and Multilayer perceptron (Acharya et al., 2017; Hameed 
et al., 2016), are used in this study to perform the classification process.  
In the next section, the literature of DDoS security will be reviewed. 
 
7.1.2 Related Work 
A DDoS attack is basically a number of DoS attacks running together to attack the 
same victim. According to Darmohray and Oliver (2000), in a test for the effectiveness 
of firewall against DoS attacks, a rate of 500 SYN flood per second will cripple a 
server (Darmohray & Oliver, 2000). In addition, Moore et al. (2006) performed a 
quantitative study of the prevalence of DoS attacks on the Internet from 2001 to 2004. 
They found that only 4% of the DoS attack were over 14,000 packets per second and 
a server can be disabled by a flood of 14,000 packets per second (Moore et al., 2006).  
Many detection and prevention methods to mitigate the DDoS flood attacks were 
reported by Zargar (Zargar, 2013). 
The Rank Correlation-based Detection (RCD) scheme was proposed by Wei et al. 
(Wei et al., 2013). The authors of the RCD claimed that their scheme can distinguish 
whether the incoming requests are from genuine users or attackers. An ALPi algorithm 
was introduced by Ayres et al (Ayres et al., 2006), increasing the accuracy of detecting 
and differentiating attacks by extending the concept of packet scoring. Therefore, the 
Chapter 7 Mitigation of DDoS Attacks in eHealth Clouds  
118 
ALPi raises the percentage of detection accuracy of attacks. Another DDoS attacks 
prevention architecture, Secure Overlay Services (SOS), was presented by Keromytis 
(Keromytis et al., 2004). The SOS architecture is a combination of three parts: secure 
overlay tunnelling, routing via consistent hashing, and filtering. The authors claimed 
that the SOS can proactively prevent DoS and DDoS attacks using a combination of 
secure overlay tunnelling, routing via consistent hashing, and filtering. 
Moreover, Wang and Reiter (Wang and Reiter, 2010) proposed the Web Referral 
Architecture for Privileged Service (WRAPS). The WRAPS adopted the structure of 
a web graph to resist DDoS flood attacks. The WRAPS requires authentic users to be 
authenticated using a referral hyperlink from a trusted site. Another approach, called 
the ‘group testing based approach’, was introduced to detect application DoS attacks 
on backend servers (Xuan et al., 2010). The authors extended the old group testing 
approach and reallocated user requests to several servers.  The probability theory of 
Markov Chain was adopted by Salah et al. when proposing an analytical queueing 
approach which examines the performance of firewalls when under DDoS attacks 
(Salah et al., 2012). 
In addition, Dou et al (Dou et al., 2013) presented a Confidence Based Filtering 
(CBF) scheme for cloud projects. In the CBF, information about authentic user packets 
is gathered during the non-attack period to extract features for generating an 
information profile during non-attack periods. The CBF scheme will decide to remove 
the packets or not using the information profile. Another approach to detect flood 
attacks, is the fast lightweight detection approach presented by Yu et al. (Yu et al., 
2008). This approach utilises the SNMP-MIB (Simple Network Management 
Protocol-Management Information Base) statistical data as an alternative to the raw 
data, as well as a SVM classifier for attack classification. Lee et al (Lee et al., 2008) 
introduced a practical DDoS detection scheme based on DDoS architecture. In this 
scheme, they selected variables based on particular features that were extracted from 
a DDoS architecture. A Cloud Trace Back (CTB) method was proposed in (Chonka et 
al., 2011). The authors of the CTB claimed that their method could identify the sources 
of the attacks. Also, they proposed a Cloud Protector (CP) that made use of a back-
propagation classifier in order to detect such attacks. 
Furthermore, a new framework was presented by Lu et al in (Lu et al., 2007 A). This 
framework was able to effectively identify the compromised packets. The framework 
uses a perimeter-based DDoS prevention system in which traffic is analysed only at 
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the edge routers of an internet service provider (ISP) network. Wang et al. introduced 
a DDoS attack mitigation architecture that integrates  programmable network 
monitoring to enable attack detection and a flexible control structure to allow a fast 
and specific attack reaction - (Wang et al., 2015 (D)). In (Khanna et al., 2012), an 
adaptive selective verification (ASV) system was proposed. The ASV does not need 
network assumptions, and it utilises bandwidth efficiently. Another approach was 
presented based on five features (average number of packets per flow, percentage of 
correlative flow, one direction generating speed, ports generating speed, and 
percentage of abnormal packets) combined with Bloom filter (Feng et al., 2009). In 
this approach, only users in the white list are allowed to reach their destinations. This 
white list is generated to include legitimate users only. However, this approach was 
implemented on switches side (hardware), making any future amendments or update 
problematic (Braga et al., 2010). 
While there are many mechanisms proposed to detect and prevent the DDoS flood 
attacks, most of them do not provide high accuracy and are not efficient fast detection 
and prevention techniques (Bhuyan et al., 2015). Furthermore, many of the presented 
DDoS attacks protection mechanisms face scalability issues due to the fact that 
networks are getting larger and faster (Ayres et al., 2006).  
Therefore, cloud computing (especially eHealth clouds) needs an efficient DDoS 
mitigation approach that can offer fast and accurate detection, and is scalable. The 
proposed CS_DDoS was designed with these factors in mind. 
 
7.1.3 The DDoS TCP Flood Attacks 
The DDoS attacks can be established in two different ways: direct and/or indirect 
(Al-Shaer and Gillani, 2016; Somani et al., 2016). Direct attacks target the weakness 
in the system of the victim machines and damage the machines directly. On the other 
hand, indirect attacks are not targeting victim machines directly. They prey on other 
elements associated with the victim machines and hinder their work (Kumarand 
Gomez, 2010). The following discussion uses the TCP flood attack which is an indirect 
attack as it consumes most of the network resources and make them unavailable to 
other users. 
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A TCP flood attack was performed using software on a virtual cloud network and 
Wireshark Network Analyser 2.0.0 (Wireshark, 2017) to capture and analyse the traffic 
before and during the attack. 
 
 
Figure 7.1 Test network architecture 
 
7.1.3.1 Before the attack 
A network was simulated as shown in Figure 7.1. 
First of all, using TCP Ping, a 50 TCP probes (pings) test was sent to a server (server 
machine, 10.25.129.5:80), the reply was 1.3ms on average, as shown below: 
Ping statistics for 10.25.129.5:80 
 50 probes sent. 
Approximate trip times in milliseconds: 
 Minimum = 0.25ms, Maximum = 26.065ms, Average = 
1.323ms 
TCP protocol uses several flags to manage the state of a connection in the packet 
header (Albanese et al., 2016). Testing focused on two that were used in establishing 
TCP connections: 
 SYN (Synchronise) which represents the connection initiation 
 ACK (Acknowledge) which represents the data receiving. 
The traffic of those 50 probes were monitored at the server machine using Wireshark 
by capturing the packets that were associated with the server using the filter of “ip.addr 
= = 10.25.129.5”. As the traffic was normal, the server machine replied to all 
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(a) Captured packets 
(b) TCP flags 
 
Figure 7.2 Captured packets and TCP flags (normal)   
Figure 7.3 The I/O graph (no TCP errors) 
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In addition, the I/O graph was stable. All packets were answered and almost no TCP 
errors occurred. Note that the number of requesting packets was approximately less 
than 10 per second, as shown in Figure 7.3. 
 
7.1.3.2 During the attack 
An attack was launched using software, which performed a DDoS TCP flood attack 
on a particular server. Once the DDoS TCP flood attack on the victim machine in the 
cloud was commenced, the arriving packets were seen to be much more than the server 
could handle. Consequently, the server could not respond to all requesting packets, 
from normal users and the attackers alike. Note that 10.25.129.5 was the IP address of 
the victim server and 10.31.133.235 was the IP address of the attacker. The first request 
packet from the attacker was successful as it was treated like a normal requesting 
packet. The subsequent ones were not successful as the server was too busy and could 
not respond. A screen shot of the packet capture is shown in Figure 7.4 (a and b). The 
I/O graph was filled with TCP errors, as shown in Figure 7.5. 
Finally, to test the connection, a 50 TCP probes test was sent within a few seconds 
to the victim machine during the attacking time. The reply time was in 9.6ms on 
average, which differs considerably from the first test as shown below: 
 
Ping statistics for 10.25.129.5:80 
 50 probes sent. 
Approximate trip times in milliseconds: 
 Minimum = 0.181ms, Maximum = 152.341ms, Average 
= 9.586ms 
 
To sum up, the DDoS TCP flood attack affected the cloud server’s performance 
within a short time, slowing down the response and even stopping service completely.  
TCP errors were also increased.  
Therefore, efficient and effective detection and prevention techniques are in 
demand. 
The next section presents the proposed CS_DDoS System. 
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(a) Captured packets 
(b) TCP flags 
Figure 7.4 Captured packets and TCP flags (abnormal)   
 
Figure 7.5 The I/O graph (with TCP errors) 
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7.1.4 The Proposed CS_DDoS System 
This section presents the proposed CS_DDoS system which can prevent DDoS TCP 
flood attacks. First, assume that the IP addresses of the attackers are not spoofed. 
Examples of how to prevent IP spoofing can be found in (Wang et al., 2016 (A)). The 
proposed system includes two subsystems: detection sub-system and prevention sub-
system, as shown in Figure 7.6. 
 
7.1.4.1 Detection phase 
During the detection phase the Detection Sub-system collects the incoming packets 
within a timeframe; let’s say 60 seconds. The collected packets go through a blacklist 
check to test whether their sources were blacklisted as attackers to the cloud system or 
not. If the packet source was listed in the attacker blacklist, the detection system will 
send the packets directly to the Prevention Sub-system without further processing. If 
the packet source was not blacklisted, the incoming packet will be passed to the 
classifier to decide whether the packets are normal (coming from a client) or abnormal 
(coming from an attacker). A packet is considered an attacking one if the source 
requests connect to the same destination more frequently than an assumed threshold. 
The threshold can be manually adjusted by the system administrator to cater for the 
varying requirements of a particular network. If a packet is considered to be normal, 
the detection system will send it to its destination (the cloud service provider). 
Otherwise, the Detection Sub-system will send the packet to the Prevention Sub-
system.  
Four different classifiers have been used in the Detection Sub-System for the 
classification operation. The classifiers will be explained and evaluated in Section 
7.1.5. 
 
7.1.4.2 Prevention phase 
While the packets reach the prevention system, they are considered as attacking 
packets by the Detection Sub-system. The Prevention Sub-system will first alert the 
system administrator of the attacks. Then, the Prevention Sub-system will add the 
attacking source address to the attacker blacklist used by the Detection Sub-system if 
it is not on the list. Finally, the attacker packet will be dropped. The overall architecture 
of the CS_DDoS system is shown in Figure 7.6. 
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Figure 7.6 The overall architecture of the proposed CS_DDoS system 
 
Algorithm 1 is used to determine whether these packets are normal or abnormal by 
counting the number of requests for a connection from an IP address and checking if 
it exceeds a predefined threshold within a certain timeframe. This algorithm is applied 
to the training data used for each classifier. As a result, each classifier used will predict 
the behaviour of the attackers according to Algorithm 1. 
 
Algorithm 1: Pre-processing  
1: Load data 
2: For I=1: n     
3:      P=data (I, 2)    
4:      P2= (I, 1) 
5: K=100 
6:     For J=1: n    
7:          N=find (data (J, 1) ==P2) & (data (J, 2) ==P)  
8:          If N>=K    
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10:               New_data (I, 2) =-1 
11:          Else 
12:               New_data (I, 1) =data (I, 1)  
13:               New_data (I, 2) =1 
14: End 
where: n is the packets number 
P is the destination IP address 
P2 is the source IP address 
N is the number of packets from the same source to the same destination 
within 60 seconds 
K is the threshold for a packet to be considered as an attacking packet (we 
will test K with four different values K=100, K=200, K=300 and K=400, see 
Section 7.1.5.2.1.1) 
-1 indicates abnormal packets (blacklist array) 
1 indicates normal packets 
New_data () is a new entry list with tag “1” or “-1” 
 
The proposed CS_DDoS system can be carried out in three possible scenarios. The 
first scenario is a normal service request packet. The requested service will be 
delivered as usual. The next scenario is when the source IP address is not blacklisted 
but the number of services requesting packets exceeds a predefined threshold within a 
certain timeframe. The packet in this scenario will be considered as a DDoS attack 
packet. The source address will be blacklisted and the packet will be dropped. The last 
scenario is when the source address of a packet is blacklisted and the packet is dropped 
without any further processing.  
The three scenarios are illustrated in the following sequences diagram. The code 
used is shown in Appendix C. The resulting sequences diagrams are shown in Figures 
6.7 (a, b, and c). 
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(a) First scenario (normal packets) 
(b) Second scenario (store abnormal packets in the blacklist) 
(c) Third scenario (abnormal packets that are already in the blacklist) 
Figure 7.7 CS_DDoS Possible scenarios 
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The proposed CS_DDoS system can be used in any clouds, such as eHealth clouds, 
to ensure the security and availability of health records against the DDoS TCP flood 
attacks. 
 
7.1.5 Experimental results  
7.1.5.1 Classification Algorithms 
This section briefly explains the four commonly used classification algorithms that 
used in the experiments. The classification algorithms are as follows: 
7.1.5.1.1 LS-SVM 
The LS-SVM is a powerful classifier in the field of pattern recognition for the detection 
of abnormalities from signals, images and time series signals. The LS-SVM is an 
efficient classifier for classifying two different sets of observations into their relevant 
classes. It is capable of handling high dimensional and non-linear data. In this work, 
the LS-SVM is employed to detect the illegal activities in network. The parameters of 
the LS-SVM are set during the training session to obtain high detection results 
(Suykens and Vandewalle, 1999). 
 
7.1.5.1.2 Naïve Bayes 
Naïve Bayes is a frequently used classifier and has a straightforward approach based 
on the application of Bayes' theorem (John and Langley, 1995). It is a simple approach 
based on the probabilistic knowledge that accurately predicts test instances. This 
algorithm assumes that the predictive attributes are conditionally independent and 
there are no hidden attributes which can affect the prediction process (John and 
Langley, 1995). Naïve Bayes classifier uses small training sets to provide decent 
performance, which most likely prevents overtraining issues.  
 
7.1.5.1.3 K-nearest-neighbour 
K-nearest-neighbour is one of the most straightforward learning algorithms. In this 
algorithm, the similarity function depends on distance measurements to compute the 
similarity between training members (Duda and Hart, 1973). The value of k is adjusted 
during the training session to assign each instance during the training to a correct class. 
The K-nearest-neighbour classifier is very sensitive to the data size and dimensionality 
that affect the feature space and homogeneous areas, which represent the distribution 
of various classes (Depeursinge et al., 2010). 
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7.1.5.1.4 Multilayer perceptron 
The multilayer perceptron is a particular type of neural network based classifier 
(Lippmann, 1987; Madyastha and Aazhang, 1994). This classifier employs a 
multilayer feed-forward neural network with one or more layers of nodes between the 
input and output layers. These nodes at different layers are interconnected through the 
weighted networks. Using different training algorithms, the parameters (weights) of 
the networks are optimised. In this classifier, the data are put from input to output. 
Each feature is used as one of the inputs in the multilayer perceptron, and the outputs 
are the class categories. The multilayer perceptron can be linear when it is used with 
one layer of nodes. It can also be a nonlinear perceptron when it is applied with 
multilayers of nodes with several hidden layers (Duda and Hart, 1973). 
 
7.1.5.2 Performance Evaluation and Validation 
This section evaluates and validates the performance of the CS_DDoS system using 
classification performance measurements and K-Fold-Cross validation. 
 
7.1.5.2.1 Performance evaluation 
In this section the performance of the CS_DDoS method is evaluated using the four 
classifiers of the LS-SVM, Naïve Bayes, K-nearest-neighbour, and Multilayer 
perceptron. Different training data sizes (window sizes) and different thresholds are 
used in the experiments. Algorithm 1 is applied to the training data for all the 
classifiers.  
The CS_DDoS system was evaluated in terms of accuracy, sensitivity (detection 
rate) and specificity (false alarm rate), as well as the descriptive statistic Kappa 
coefficient. Kappa coefficients are measures used to correlate between categorical 
variables frequently used as reliability or validity coefficients (Kraemer et al., 2002).  
Accuracy represents the rate of the correctly identified results over the entire data 
used by the CS_DDoS. The correctly identified results can be the True Positives (TP) 
and the True Negatives (TN), while incorrectly identified results are the False Positives 
(FP) and the False Negatives (FN). The accuracy of the CS_DDoS system is measured 
by equation (7.1). 
 True Positives (TP): Correctly identified abnormal packets in this research 
 False Positives (FP): Incorrectly identified abnormal packets 
 True Negatives (TN): Correctly identified normal packets 
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 × 100%  (7.1) 
Sensitivity represents the rate of the correctly identified abnormal packets over the 
entire positive results by the CS_DDoS. The sensitivity of the CS_DDoS system is 
measured by equation (7.2). 
𝐶𝑆_𝐷𝐷𝑜𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦  =  
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃+𝐹𝑁
 × 100%   (7.2) 
Specificity represents the rate of the incorrectly identified abnormal packets over the 
entire negative results produced by the CS_DDoS. The specificity of the CS_DDoS 
system is measured by equation (7.3). 
𝐶𝑆_𝐷𝐷𝑜𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦  =  
𝐹𝑃
𝐹𝑃+𝑇𝑁
 × 100%   (7.3) 
Kappa coefficients metric will be used to evaluate the performance of the classifiers 
that use some metrics including true positive percentage and true negative percentage. 
The main formula of Kappa coefficients is given below: 











+ (1 − 
𝑇𝑃+𝐹𝑁
𝑁




𝑁 = (𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑁) 
The proposed CS_DDoS system is evaluated under both single source attack and 
multiple source attack environments as shown below. 
 
7.1.5.2.1.1 Evaluation under single source attack 
Four test data sizes (n) of 1000 packets, 2000 packets, 5000 packets and 6000 packets, 
and four thresholds (K) of 100 requests, 200 requests, 300 requests, and 400 requests 
were randomly selected. Algorithm 1 was implemented using MATLAB R2015b and 
applied to the data according to the window size n, and tested according to the 
threshold K. Each classifier classified the data using four windows and four thresholds. 


















 Accuracy Sensitivity Specificity 
Kappa 
coefficient 
1 LS-SVM 99.5% 95.3% 96% 0.91 
2 Naïve Bayes 80% 92.3% 93% 0.82 
3 K-nearest-neighbour 75% 93.5% 95% 0.74 
4 Multilayer perceptron 88.3% 95.3% 97% 0.78 





 Accuracy Sensitivity Specificity 
Kappa 
coefficient 
1 LS-SVM 94.6% 94% 96% 0.89 
2 Naïve Bayes 82% 93% 94% 0.75 
3 K-nearest-neighbour 80% 95% 93% 0.87 
4 Multilayer perceptron 92% 97% 97% 0.65 





 Accuracy Sensitivity Specificity 
Kappa 
coefficient 
1 LS-SVM 96% 98% 97% 0.90 
2 Naïve Bayes 96% 94% 92% 0.82 
3 K-nearest-neighbour 82% 96% 94% 0.68 
4 Multilayer perceptron 95% 99% 97% 0.75 





 Accuracy Sensitivity Specificity 
Kappa 
coefficient 
1 LS-SVM 98% 99% 98% 0.85 
2 Naïve Bayes 95% 95% 96% 0.67 
3 K-nearest-neighbour 85% 98% 97% 0.62 
4 Multilayer perceptron 97% 99% 97% 0.58 





 Accuracy Sensitivity Specificity 
Kappa 
coefficient 
1 LS-SVM 97% 97% 97% 0.8875 
2 Naïve Bayes 88% 94% 94% 0.765 
3 K-nearest-neighbour 81% 96% 95% 0.7275 
4 Multilayer perceptron 93% 98% 97% 0.69 
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Tables 6.1 to 6.4 show the classification performances by the proposed CS_DDoS 
system with different data sizes and thresholds. The performance measurements are 
accuracy (correctly detected data over the entire dataset), sensitivity (correctly 
detected attacks, detection rate), specificity (incorrectly detected attacks, false alarm 
rate), and Kappa coefficient (stability rate).  
According to Tables 6.1 to 6.4, the window sizes and the thresholds did not affect 
the results of each classifier significantly. There are only small differences between 
the tables. Tables 6.1 to 6.4 are summed up in Table 7.5.  
Table 7.5 shows that the LS-SVM classifier has the highest accuracy average 
percentage (97%) and the highest Kappa coefficient (0.89). On the other hand, the K-
nearest-neighbour classifier made the lowest accuracy percentage at about 81%, and 
the multilayer perceptron classifier has the lowest Kappa coefficient 0.69. To sum up, 
the proposed CS_DDoS system is more effective and stable in single source attacks 
when adopting the LS-SVM classifier regardless of the window size and the threshold.  
 
7.1.5.2.1.2 Evaluation under multiple source attacks 
To evaluate the performance under attacks from multiple sources, the same four 
window sizes (1000, 2000, 5000, and 6000) and the same four thresholds (100, 200, 
300, and 400) were used. Algorithm 1 is also used. Results are shown in Tables 6.6-
6.10:  
Tables 6.6 to 6.9 show the classification accuracy results of the proposed CS_DDoS 
system when under multiple DDoS attacks. Tables 6.6 to 6.9 again show that the 
window sizes and thresholds did not significantly affect the results of each classifier.  
 
 





 Accuracy Sensitivity Specificity 
Kappa 
coefficient 
1 LS-SVM 98% 93% 94% 0.91 
2 Naïve Bayes 82% 91.3% 91% 0.82 
3 K-nearest-neighbour 80% 91.5% 92% 0.74 
4 Multilayer perceptron 83.3% 92.3% 95% 0.78 






LS-SVM is again the best performing classifier with accuracy percentage around 
94%, and Kappa coefficient about 0.9. These experiments used different criteria to 
assess classifiers’ performance including: Kappa coefficients, sensitivity, specificity 
and accuracy. All these criteria were used to identify the most effective classifier.  
Based on the simulation results, the SVM gained the highest scores of Kappa 
coefficients, sensitivity, specificity and accuracy among the four classification 
algorithms. As a result, it was considered to be a robust classifier for detecting DDoS 
attacks.  





 Accuracy Sensitivity Specificity 
Kappa 
coefficient 
1 LS-SVM 93% 91% 94% 0.91 
2 Naïve Bayes 85% 92% 95% 0.81 
3 K-nearest-neighbour 79% 96% 92% 0.82 
4 Multilayer perceptron 87% 95% 96% 0.71 





 Accuracy Sensitivity Specificity 
Kappa 
coefficient 
1 LS-SVM 94% 97% 95% 0.92 
2 Naïve Bayes 95% 92% 94% 0.85 
3 K-nearest-neighbour 88% 90% 92% 0.69 
4 Multilayer perceptron 89% 97% 93% 0.81 




 Accuracy Sensitivity Specificity 
Kappa 
coefficient 
1 LS-SVM 92% 97% 94% 0.87 
2 Naïve Bayes 91% 93% 95% 0.65 
3 K-nearest-neighbour 87% 91% 96% 0.69 
4 Multilayer perceptron 94% 97% 94% 0.60 





 Accuracy Sensitivity Specificity 
Kappa 
coefficient 
1 LS-SVM 94% 95% 94% 0.9025 
2 Naïve Bayes 88% 92% 94% 0.7825 
3 K-nearest-neighbour 84% 92% 93% 0.735 
4 Multilayer perceptron 88% 95% 95% 0.725 
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To sum up, the proposed CS_DDoS system is also affective and stable when 
resisting multiple source attacks of up to 30 attackers as well as single source attacks 
when adopting the LS-SVM classifier regardless of the window size and threshold. 
Therefore, the proposed CS_DDoS system can be implemented in a big cloud project, 
such as a health cloud, as well as smaller projects like a private cloud for a medium 
size company. CS_DDoS can prevent the DDoS attacks with 94% accuracy and is 
highly stable (Kappa coefficient 0.9). CS_DDoS outperforms previous approaches as 
either the accuracy percentage of previous approaches are less than that which 
CS_DDoS can achieve, for example 91% in (Moradi and Zulkernine, 2004). Thus, the 
proposed CS_DDoS system is more effective. 
To shed more light on the performance evaluation of the proposed CS_DDoS 
system, the simulation was repeated with different numbers of attackers (source IP) 
under similar conditions, and performance measurements were calculated.   
Figure 7.8 shows the performance of CS_DDoS based on the number of attackers. 
There are slight fluctuations in the performance measurements of all four classifiers.  
Nevertheless, LS-SVM was still the best performer among the four. 
The process complexity times of the four classification algorithms shown in Figure 
7.9. While LS-SVM is only the second less time consuming, the fastest classifier, K-
nearest-neighbour, has lower performance measurements and smaller Kappa 
coefficient compared to LS-SVM, therefore the LS-SVM is the most efficient and 
effective classifier to be adopted by CS_DDoS system to resist the DDoS TCP flood 
attacks. 
 























Detection accuracy based on the number of 
attackers
LS-SVM Naïve Bayes k-nearest Multilayer perceptron
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Figure 7.9 Complexity times 
 
7.1.5.2.2 K-Fold-Cross validation  
In K-Fold-Cross validation, the original sample is randomly partitioned into k equal 
sized subsamples, a single subsample is retrained as the validation data for testing the 
model, and the remaining k-1 subsamples are used as training data. The cross-
validation process is then repeated k times (the folds), with each of the k subsamples 
used exactly once as the validation data. Generally, it is utilised to validate the 
performance accuracy estimation in the practice of a predictive model (Allen, 1974; 
Geisser, 1975; McLachlan et al., 2005; Stone, 1974). 
The K-Fold-Cross validation was adopted to conduct a performance comparison of 
the four predictive modelling algorithms used in CS_DDoS: LS-SVM, Naïve Bayes, 
K-nearest-neighbour, and Multilayer perceptron. These four algorithms were 
compared for their prediction results.  
The dataset was divided into 6 equal sized chunks, k=6. As a validation for model 
testing, one of the 6 chunks was retained, and the rest of chunks (5 chunks) were 
considered as training data. Then the process of the 6-cross model was repeated 6 
times; with each of the 6 chunks used as validation data for each occasion. The results 
are shown in Figure 7.10. The values of all folds are almost the same, which means 
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Figure 7.10 6-Fold-Cross validation diagram 
 
Thus, the classification results are stable and accurate, as each algorithm has 
almost the same result in each fold. 
 
7.2 An Energy Efficient TCP DoS Attacks Mitigation Method 
7.2.1 Introducing DoS Attacks Energy Consumption 
The importance of cloud computing has been increasing significantly within the last 
decade due to the ever increasing number of services and facilities that clouds can 
deliver. In addition, cloud computing services are in extremely high demand from 
organisations and individuals as a result of benefits the services can offer; such as 
better computing power, inexpensive operation costs, good performance, and high 
availability. On the other hand, cloud computing projects have some security issues 
that must be addressed (Sahi et al., 2016). One of the most concerning issues is Denial 
of Service (DoS) attacks (Nezhad et al., 2016). There are many types of DoS and 
distributed DoS attacks. Many of these are mentioned in (Shameli-Sendi et al., 2015). 
One type is the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) DoS flood attack, which is 
discussed in this chapter. TCP DoS attacks can flood the victim’s network with 
extremely large numbers of packets to shut the network down and prevent legitimate 
users from accessing the services, to exhaust the resources and cause overheating, and 
to consume more energy than expected. In 2013 there was an incident of overheating 
Microsoft’s data centre which led to a 16 hour shutdown in Microsoft’s cloud services 







1-fold 2-fold 3-fold 4-fold 5-fold 6-fold 
6 - Cross validation  
LS-SVM Naïve Bayes K-nearest Multilayer perceptron 
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an efficient DoS mitigation method that can keep the services available 24/7 and 
reducing excessive energy consumption is an important research topic. This chapter 
proposes an energy-efficient TCP DoS attack mitigation method that can be 
implemented in the cloud environment. The proposed method is designed to keep the 
incoming packet number under the number of packets the server can handle. Thus, this 
method can improve the services for cloud projects by protecting them against the 
packet floods, as well as reducing cost and energy consumption.  
The next section presents the energy efficient TCP DoS attacks mitigation method. 
 
7.2.2 The Proposed Method 
This section discusses the proposed DoS mitigation method and the cloud architecture 
used in the experiment. The cloud includes: (1) data storage, a single server point 
(Server); (2) several other points that represent the legitimate points (Client); (3) 
spurious points (Attacker); and (4) TCP packets (TCPPackets). Assume that the Attacker 
uses a real, not faked or spoofed IP. Due to time constraints, the case of spoofed IP has 
been left for future studies. It is also assumed that TPackets is the rate of TCPPackets, which 
Server can handle within a time frame Time, and LPackets is the total rate of the 
legitimate TCPPackets, that the Client points send to the server. The following equation 
is a further assumption that the rate of the legitimate packets is at most half of the 
handling capacity of the Server to allow for the bursts of requests: 
 
𝐿𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠 = 𝑇𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠 / 2     (7.4) 
 
In addition, it is assumed that together with the legitimate packets, the Attacker is 
able to send spurious packets to make TCPPackets more than the Server can handle. The 
Attacker spurious packets (unauthentic packets) is denoted as SPackets, such that: 
 
𝐿𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠 +  𝑆𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠 > 𝑇𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠    (7.5) 
 
The proposed method aims to keep the sum of LPackets and SPackets smaller than   
TPackets to ensure the availability of a cloud project, reduce energy consumption, and 
decrease the cost of the cloud maintenance: 
 
𝐿𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠 +  𝑆𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠 ≤ 𝑇𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠   (7.6) 
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In case of a normal traffic when no attack is made on the cloud,  
𝑆𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠 =  0       (7.7) 
From equation (7.5), 𝐿𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠 = 𝑇𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠 / 2, equation (7.6) is satisfied for the 
normal traffic scenario. 
On the other hand, in the case of abnormal traffic when the attack is performed on 
the cloud, a method (∏) is proposed which will drop the TCPPackets of the most frequent 
requesting IP addresses in order to ensure that LPackets + SPackets does not exceed TPackets. 
Most frequent requesting IP addresses can be filtered using any packet filtering method 
such as iptables (Diekmann et al., 2016).  
For example, suppose that the server can handle 10 packets per Time, and there are 
six sources of {attacker | Client} initiating a connection with the Server. The number 
of packets that are sent by the sources are as follows: source1=1 packet, source2=2 
packets, source3=3 packets, source4=4 packets, source5=5 packets, and source6=6 
packets. Therefore, the number of packets that are sent from sources 1 to 6 is about 21 
packets, while the server can handle a maximum of 10 packets within Time. In this 
case, ∏ will use a filter to determine which sources are the most frequent requesting 
IP addresses, and then ∏ will drop them. In the example, source5 and source6 have 
5+6=11 packets, and the rest of the packets are 1+2+3+4=10 packets. Intuitively, 
source5 and source6 that have relatively higher request rates, are more likely the TCP 
DoS attacker sources than other sources with less frequent requesting rate. Even 
though there is a possibility that source5 and source6 could be Client sources, ∏ can 
keep the request rate below TPackets, and the service is still available. Furthermore, using 
∏ will save energy during a DoS attack as shown in the performance evaluation section 
below. 
 
7.2.3 Performance Evaluation 
The proposed method was tested using one Server, one Attacker, and eight legitimate 
Clients.  
TCP DoS attacks were established from the Attacker (IP2) point against the Server 
(IP1) point alongside the legitimate TCP connection requests from Clients (IP3 to P10). 
According to Tables 6.11 and 6.12, the Attacker sent 47807 requests and received only 
21130 responses, and the Server received 47893 requests and made 21219 responses.  
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Table 7.11 Overall packets statistics 
 Sources Destinations 
N Valid Packets 69235 69235 
n TCP Packets 68997 68997 




Wireshark Network Analyser 2.0.0 (Wireshark, 2017) was used to capture the 
packets traversing the experimental network and no missing packets were discovered. 
As shown in Table 7.11, 99.7% of the traffic with 68997 packets were used in TCP 
protocol. In Tables 7.11 and 7.12, sources indicate that the source of a packet and 
destinations present the destination of a packet. 
Let the probability of an accepted TCPPackets within the time frame of Time be 𝜀1. 
The number of all the incoming packets during Time is denoted as n. The number of 
TCPPackets which are expected to be sent to the Server during Time must not exceed 
TPackets ∙ Time. Thus, every single TCPPackets has the following probability of being 
accepted by the Server: 
Table 7.12 Sources and destination statistics 
IP addresses 
Sources Destinations 
Number of packets Percent Number of packets Percent 
(IP1) Server 21219 30.6 47893 69.2 
(IP2) Attacker 47807 69.1 21130 30.5 
(IP3) Client < 30 < 0.04 < 30 < 0.04 
(IP4) Client < 60 < 0.08 < 60 < 0.08 
(IP5) Client < 30 < 0.04 < 30 < 0.04 
(IP6) Client < 30 < 0.04 < 30 < 0.04 
(IP7) Client < 60 < 0.08 < 60 < 0.08 
(IP8) Client < 30 < 0.04 < 30 < 0.04 
(IP9) Client < 60 < 0.08 < 60 < 0.08 
(IP10) Client < 30 < 0.04 < 30 < 0.04 
Total 69235 100.0 69235 100.0 
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𝜀1 . 𝑛 ≤  𝑇𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠 . 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒     (7.8) 
∴  𝜀1   ≤  
𝑇𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠 .𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒
𝑛
       (7.9) 
 
In the case of normal traffic when no attack is performed against the cloud, all 
TCPPackets must be accepted by the Server. As a result, the Server accepts the TCPPackets 
with the following probability: 
 
𝜀1 = {
1,                                   𝑖𝑓 𝑛 ≤  𝑇𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠 . 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒
𝑇𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠 .𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒
𝑛
,             𝑖𝑓 𝑛 >  𝑇𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠 . 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 
  (7.10) 
 
As a result, this can be expressed as follows: 
𝑛 = 68997, 𝑇𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠 = 21219, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 = 3.2 
∵ 𝑛 >  𝑇𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠 . 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 
∴  𝜀1  =  
𝑇𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠 .𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒
𝑛
, from (6.10) 
𝜀1  =  
21219 ∙ 3.2
68997
≃ 0.984  ∎ 
 
Thus, the proposed method ∏ can process 98% of the accepted packets during an 
attack. 
As mentioned above, that the TCPPackets of the most frequent requesting IP addresses 
will be dropped to ensure that LPackets + SPackets won’t exceed TPackets. However, this 
means that LPackets which represents legitimate users packets could be dropped as well, 
and not only SPackets has the potential to be dropped. Therefore, ∏ must be justified in 
terms of the energy consumption. Whether the benefits of ∏  are sufficient enough 
when compared with the loss of LPackets must also be investigated. If  ∏ drops LPackets 
from the traffic, it costs energy of receiving (Renergy) these packets by the Server, 
denoted by ∏𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡. Whereas, if ∏ drops SPackets from the traffic, it saves energy by not 
processing the packets (Penergy), as well as saving the energy Senergy by not sending 
packets from a Server to Client, denoted by ∏𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡. According to the authors in 
(Chen et al., 2002; Feeney and Nilsson, 2001), Senergy is more than Renergy. 
Consequently, the relationship between Renergy and Penergy + Senergy can be formulated 
as follows: 
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𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 + 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 >  𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦      (7.11) 
∏𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 𝑛 . (1 − 𝜀1).
𝐿𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠 
𝐿𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠 + 𝑆𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠 
 . (𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦)   (7.12) 
∏𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡 = 𝑛 . (1 − 𝜀1).
𝑆𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠 
𝐿𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠 + 𝑆𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠 
 . (𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 + 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ) (7.13) 
∏𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 = ∏𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡 −∏𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡       (7.14) 
where ∏𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 is the net energy saved when ∏ is in action.  
 
In the case of no attacks 𝑛 ≤  𝑇𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠 . 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒, from (6.10) the probability of packets 
acceptance will be 𝜀1 = 1, therefore the profit of ∏ will be calculated as follows: 
 
∏𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 𝑛 . (1 − 1).
𝐿𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠 
𝐿𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠 + 𝑆𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠 
 . (𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦) = 0 
∏𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡 = 𝑛 . (1 − 1).
𝑆𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠 
𝐿𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠 + 𝑆𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠 
 . (𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 + 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ) = 0 
∴ ∏𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 = ∏𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡 − ∏𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 0, from (11) 
 
On the other hand, in the case of attacks 𝑛 >  𝑇𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠 . 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒, from (6.10) the 
probability of packets acceptance will be 𝜀1 =
𝑇𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠 .𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒
𝑛
, therefore the profit of ∏ 
will be calculated as follows: 





𝐿𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠 + 𝑆𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠 
 . (𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦)  (7.15) 





𝐿𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠 + 𝑆𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠 
 .  (𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 
+ 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ) 
∵ 𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 + 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 >  𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦, from (6.11) 





𝐿𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠 + 𝑆𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠 
 .  (𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 ) ∙ 𝑍        (7.16) 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑍 > 1 
∴ ∏𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 = 
𝑛∙(𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 + 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦)
𝐿𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠 + 𝑆𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠 
 ∙  (1 −
𝑇𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠 .𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒
𝑛
) ∙ (𝑍 − 1) ∙  𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦      (7.17) 
∵ 𝑍 > 1 
∴ ∏𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 > 0 ∎ 
As a result, dropping TCPPackets of the most frequently requesting IP addresses when 
under attack will always save more energy than not dropping. 
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To recap, this method handles the security problem in cloud computing and proposes 
a method to mitigate TCP DoS attacks by reducing excessive energy consumption via 
limiting the number of packets. Instead of system shutdown, the proposed method 
ensures the availability of service. 
 
7.3 Chapter summary 
This chapter has presented a new approach called CS_DDoS for detection and 
prevention of the DDoS TCP flood attacks based on classification to ensure security 
and availability of stored data, especially eHealth records in emergency cases. The 
results showed that using LS-SVM, the CS_DDoS system can identify attacks 
accurately; at about 97% accuracy with about 0.89 Kappa coefficient when under 
single attack and 94% accuracy with about 0.9 Kappa coefficient when under multiple 
attacks. The performance was validated using the K-Fold validation and shown to be 
stable and accurate. Thus, the proposed approach can efficiently improve health 
records’ security, reduce bandwidth consumption and mitigate resources exhaustion.  
The chapter also presented an energy efficient TCP based DoS attacks’ mitigation 
method to enhance the security of the cloud and at the same time save energy. The 
method maintains service availability by controlling the number of server processed 
TCP packets to below the number of packets that the server can handle. This method 
reduces the energy consumption in the case of a DoS attack thereby reducing the 
chance of shutting down services due to such attacks. 
Hypothesis H5 (Classification techniques can detect DDoS attacks in eHealth 
clouds, and filtering techniques can reduce excessive energy consumption caused by 
DoS attacks) has been proven in this chapter. The LS-SVM classifier successfully 
classified packets and detected potential DDoS attacks on eHealth clouds. Packets 
filtering was also proven to reduce excessive energy consumption caused by DoS 
attacks. 
We will conclude this thesis and discuss future work in Chapter 8. 
 







CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE 
WORK 
 
There is no doubt that personal health records require a high level of security and 
privacy. The proliferation and extensive use of eHealth clouds have highlighted serious 
security and privacy concerns related to sensitive health data, and practical and 
effective methods are therefore required to preserve the privacy and security of health 
data. This chapter summarises the methods and protocols introduced in this thesis, and 
a number of unsolved issues are discussed as possible future research directions. 
 
8.1 Summary and Conclusions of the Thesis 
This thesis consists of eight chapters. Chapter 1 is the introduction. Chapter 2 is an 
overview of cloud computing, in terms of its security and privacy and some necessary 
background knowledge. It briefly introduced information and knowledge related to the 
current research on eHealth cloud security, privacy and associated issues. The chapter 
then summarised the state-of-the-art security and privacy issues related to the cloud. 
Chapter 3 described some research design methodologies and the methodology 
adopted in this research project. The adopted Vaishnavi and Kuechler research design 
methodology and its five phases are described to provide an overall picture of the 
process used in this thesis. In Chapter 4, identified a gap in the security of key 
exchange between parties, and presented a new TPAKE protocol that securely 
distributes keys between users and protects systems against MITM attacks, among 
others. Next, to enhance the speed performance of encryption, the PBC mode was 
introduced in Chapter 5. In the PBC mode, blocks of cipher can be processed in parallel 
to ensure both high performance and security.  Furthermore, in Chapter 6 with the 
8 
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security and privacy for eHealth cloud in mind, the PBC mode is integrated with the 
TPAKE protocol to form a security-preserving approach and a privacy-preserving 
approach for eHealth clouds. In addition, Chapter 6 also presented a disaster recovery 
plan which ensures uninterrupted connectivity for users during disasters. Chapter 7 
presented a classification-based security system that helps to detect and prevent DDoS 
TCP flood attacks. This chapter also introduced a method for mitigating DoS attacks 
in the cloud and reducing excessive energy consumption by limiting the number of 
packets. This method was evaluated with more than 14,900 attacks per second and the 
server could still provide services (no missing packets). Finally, Chapter 8 presents a 
summary and the findings of this study. Possible directions for future work are also 
discussed in this chapter. 
Table 8.1 Research questions and hypotheses 
 Research questions Research hypotheses 
1 
Has a researcher in this area reviewed the 
major and relevant literature on cloud 
security and privacy? 
Investigation and review of the relevant 
literature on eHealth cloud security and 
privacy would facilitate the researcher’s 
decisions on research directions 
2 
How can the security of key exchange 
between parties be hardened, and different 
types of attacks prevented? 
Developing a key exchange protocol based 
on the Computational Diffie-Hellman 
assumption should secure key distribution 
between parties and protect systems against 
multiple attacks 
3 
How can the performance of the adopted 
encryption algorithm be improved on top of 
security assurance? 
A new parallel hash-based block cipher mode 
of operation would be able to improve the 
encryption process on top of security 
assurance 
4 
How can security and privacy be preserved in 
eHealth clouds? How can a client be enabled 
to connect to the system at any time, even 
during a disaster? 
Integration of potential key exchange 
protocol and block cipher mode would 
preserve privacy and security on eHealth 
clouds. A disaster recovery plan with 
heartbeat signals will result in 24/7 services 
availability 
5 
How can DDoS TCP flood attacks be 
detected and prevented? How can the 
energy consumption caused by DoS attacks 
be reduced?  
Classification techniques can detect DDoS 
attacks in eHealth clouds, and filtering 
techniques can reduce excessive energy 
consumption caused by DoS attacks. 
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 Research questions identified and corresponding research hypotheses are listed 
side by side in table 8.1. 
According to the experiments and analyses undertaken in Chapters 4 to 7, 
hypotheses H1 to H5 have been proven and research questions (RQs) RQ1 to RQ5 
have been answered. 
Hypothesis H1 has been proven and RQ1 has been answered in Chapter 2 through 
the investigation and review of the relevant literature on eHealth cloud security and 
privacy.  
Hypothesis H2 has been proven and RQ2 has been answered in Chapter 4. TPAKE 
key exchange protocol has been developed based on the Computational Diffie-
Hellman assumption. Analysis and tests showed that the TPAKE protocol is a secure 
key distribution protocol and can protect systems against multiple attacks. 
In the Chapter 5 experiments, the PBC mode was shown to save 60% of the 
execution time when compared with the CBC mode on top of security assurance. 
Therefore, hypothesis H3 has been proven and RQ3 has been answered. 
Hypothesis H4 has been proven and RQ4 has been answered in Chapter 6. The 
TPAKE protocol and the PBC mode have been integrated. According to the 
experiment in Chapter 6, this integration preserves the privacy and security of eHealth 
clouds. In addition, the presented DR plan will ensure the connectivity of users 24/7. 
Hypothesis H5 has been proven and RQ5 has been answered in Chapter 7. The LS-
SVM classifier successfully classified packets and detected potential DDoS attacks on 
eHealth clouds. Packets filtering was also shown to reduce excessive energy 
consumption caused by DoS attacks. 
The following objectives were formulated to help the researcher to answer the 
research question: 
1. To investigate and review the state of the art in privacy and security in eHealth 
clouds, in order to fully explore current research directions 
2. To develop a TPAKE protocol based on the CDH assumption to securely 
distribute keys between parties, and to protect systems against multiple 
attacks 
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3. To introduce an efficient hash-based PBC mode of operation to increase the 
performance of the encryption process while maintaining an assurance of 
security 
4. To integrate Objectives 2 and 3 into security and privacy-preservation 
approaches in eHealth clouds, and to ensure the connectivity of users 
during disasters 
5. To provide a classification-based system for detecting and mitigating 
DDoS TCP flood attacks in eHealth cloud environments and an energy-
efficient TCP DoS attack mitigation method. 
To accomplish these objectives, the state of the art regarding security and 
privacy in eHealth clouds from five main perspectives: security and privacy, 
security controls, effective encryption, data security requirements and disaster 
recovery plans, was investigated and reviewed. This study therefore provides a 
clear overall picture of the development of eHealth to stakeholders, to facilitate 
better designs and decisions. In summary, this study collects, evaluates, and 
classifies state-of-the-art eHealth security and privacy schemes. It covers the 
most recent studies in this area, and discusses the drawbacks of the existing 
proposals, in order to help improve the security and privacy of eHealth clouds. 
Next, the TPAKE protocol based on the CDH assumption, and a hash-based PBC 
mode of operation were developed which contribute to cloud security. 
The 3PAKE protocol enables the negotiation of a session key between two clients 
through a trusted server over a public channel. Clients only have to present a single 
password to commence negotiating with another partner through a server. Most of the 
3PAKE protocols proposed here use public keys to guarantee users’ identities. 
However, sharing public keys may lead to various types of attacks, such as man-in-
the-middle attacks, which allow an attacker to simply intercept and insert traffic into a 
network. A formal analysis of the TPAKE protocol in terms of its robustness is 
therefore provided. TPAKE is an enhanced three-party password-based 
authenticated key exchange  protocol based on the CDH assumption and the 
random Oracle model. The proposed protocol performs better than other 3PAKE 
protocols, since it never shares clear, plain information through insecure 
channels. A security analysis using the random Oracle model shows that the 
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proposed protocol provides mutual authentication, a safe and secure session key, 
perfect forward secrecy and prevention against multiple attacks.  
Block cipher encryption works on fixed-length blocks, usually of 128 bits. The 
blocks of data are transformed into encrypted data blocks of identical size, using a 
shared session key. A common feature of some modes of block cipher (such as the 
cipher block chaining mode (CBC), cipher feedback mode (CFB) and output feedback 
mode (OFB)) is sequential processing. The ciphering process of a block cannot begin 
until the processing of the preceding block is completed. This feature does not make 
full use of the processing power in multiple processor systems. Thus, a hash-based 
PBC mode of operation that considerably increases the speed of the encryption 
process since it processes data in parallel, is presented. In this mode, each cipher 
block makes use of the characteristics of the entire file (the hash value of the file) 
during encryption, rather than just the previous cipher block as in the CBC, to 
improve the randomness of the key stream. This mode offers high levels of 
security and better speed compared to the standard CBC mode. The PBC mode 
was shown to save 60% in terms of execution time when compared with the CBC 
mode. Furthermore, the hash value of the data file can be used to provide an 
integrity check, as well as encryption using AES128. As a result, the PBC mode 
has better performance in terms of speed while maintaining the confidentiality 
and security provided by the CBC mode. 
Cloud computing has been introduced as an alternative storage and computing 
model within the health sector, as in other sectors, to handle large amounts of data. To 
reduce in-house storage, IT development and maintenance costs, many healthcare 
companies have moved their electronic data to the cloud. However, storing healthcare 
records on a third-party server may create serious storage, security and privacy issues, 
and numerous approaches have been proposed to preserve both security and privacy 
in cloud computing projects. Cryptographic-based approaches have been reported to 
be one of the best ways to ensure the security and privacy of healthcare data in the 
cloud. Nevertheless, the cryptographic-based approaches used to transfer health 
records safely remain vulnerable in terms of security and privacy and lack disaster 
recovery strategies.  
This research study therefore aims to establish new approaches to hardening 
the security of EHRs and the privacy of PHRs in cloud projects, as well as 
ensuring the continuity of projects during disaster events. A privacy preservation 
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approach is proposed based on the TPAKE key exchange protocol that ensures 
the privacy of PHRs, and a security preservation approach is proposed based on 
the PBC that ensures the security of EHRs. 
These two approaches are able to meet the most important requirements of 
every cryptosystem, such as authentication, non-repudiation, integrity and 
confidentiality. In addition, a disaster recovery plan is proposed to enable a client 
to connect to the system at any time, even during an ongoing disaster. A 
combination of these two approaches and the disaster recovery plan provide a 
private, secure and robust cloud computing environment for the health sector.  
Even with the disaster recovery plan, and the privacy preserving and security 
preserving approaches in place, cloud projects are vulnerable to many types of 
attack such as DDoS TCP flood attacks. A new approach has been proposed, 
entitled CS_DDoS, for the detection and prevention of DDoS TCP flood attacks. 
It is based on packet classification and ensures the security and availability of 
stored data, and particularly eHealth records, in cases of emergency. In this 
approach, the incoming packets are classified to determine the behaviour of the 
source within a given timeframe, to discover whether the source is associated 
with a genuine client or an attacker. The results show that using LS-SVM, the 
CS_DDoS system can identify DDoS attacks with about 97% accuracy and a 
Kappa coefficient of about 0.89 when under single attack, and 94% accuracy with 
a Kappa coefficient of about 0.9 when under multiple attacks. The performance 
is validated using the k-fold cross-validation and is shown to be stable and 
accurate. Thus, the proposed approach can efficiently improve the security of 
health records, reduce bandwidth consumption and mitigate resource exhaustion.  
Finally, an energy-efficient TCP-based DoS attack mitigation method to 
enhance the security of the cloud while saving energy was proposed. This method 
maintains the availability of the service by controlling the number of TCP packets 
to below the threshold number of packets that can be handled by the server. This 
method reduces energy consumption in the case of a DoS attack, thereby reducing 
the chance of service shut-down due to such attacks. 
It can be concluded that this research study has established a new, successful 
suite of security protocols, algorithms and approaches for securing, 
authenticating and providing 24/7 availability of cloud services, such as eHealth 
cloud services. This security suite can enable cloud users to store and share their 
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data in a secure manner. The outcomes will help healthcare stakeholders’ access 
efficient, secure and uninterrupted cloud services. 
 
8.2 Future Work 
This research uses cryptography and classification techniques to tackle security 
issues in cloud computing, based on an analytic reading of and critical reflection 
on the relevant literature. The security suite proposed in this thesis can deliver 
secure and robust practice in cloud security, and privacy. However, this work is 
far from perfect. To enable an additional improvement  to the methods presented 
here, a few key issues are highlighted and discussed below. 
The TPAKE protocol was built based on the CDH assumption. The proposed 
protocol is valid while this assumption holds. In the near future, with the rapid 
development of computer processing power, the CDH assumption may become 
invalid. The feasibility of this protocol is tied to the CDH assumption, and 
developing another protocol based on a stronger assumption will be the next 
challenge. 
In addition, the PBC mode was tested in a virtual network to encrypt files of 
up to 5GB. Consideration of future testing in a real network and using a cloud 
environment with larger files to increase confidence in the adoption of this block 
cipher mode in the cloud and eHealth industries is necessary. 
The proposed CS_DDoS system must be tested using a larger number of 
attacking machines; ideally more than 30 attacking machines. A 
patient usability test and an attacker penetration test are also priorities for future 
works. 
Finally, the CS_DDoS system was developed based on another assumption, 
which is that IP addresses of the attackers are not faked or spoofed. Since real 
world attacks use spoofed IPs, the CS_DDoS system needs to be linked to an IP 
spoofing detection and prevention mechanism to provide maximum protection 
against flood attacks. 
In summary, the proposed security suite can successfully secure cloud 
projects and efficiently ensure service availability, although it is far from perfect 
and more research work needs to be done in the future. 
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public partial class _Default : System.Web.UI.Page 
{ 
    protected void Page_Load(object sender, EventArgs e) 
    { 
 
        TextBox1.Focus(); 
        TextBox1.MaxLength = 8; 
        TextBox2.Text = ""; 
        TextBox3.Text = ""; 
        TextBox4.Text = ""; 
        TextBox5.Text = ""; 
        TextBox6.Text = ""; 
        TextBox9.Text = ""; 
        TextBox10.Text = ""; 
        TextBox13.Text = ""; 
        TextBox14.Text = ""; 
        TextBox17.Text = ""; 
        TextBox18.Text = ""; 
        TextBox19.Text = ""; 
        TextBox26.Text = ""; 
 
    } 
 
 
    protected void Button1_Click1(object sender, EventArgs e) 
    { 
        Image2.Visible = true; 
 
        int s = 256; 
Appendix A 
The practical aspect of Chapter 4 were implemented as two main web pages to simulate this project. Each of the simulation pages has a C# 
code, HTML code, and a screen shot. This was implemented using Visual Studio 2010. 
 
A.1 First web page codes 
























        string result = string.Empty; 
        foreach (char ch in TextBox1.Text) 
        { 
            if (ch > 255) 
            { 
                Server.Transfer("Error page.aspx"); 
            } 
            else 
            { 
TextBox3.Text += Convert.ToString((int)ch, 
2).PadLeft(8, '0'); 
                TextBox2.Text += Convert.ToByte(ch); 
                TextBox2.Text += " "; 
            } 




        TextBox4.Text = TextBox3.Text.Substring(0, 20); 
        TextBox5.Text = TextBox3.Text.Substring(20, 21); 
        TextBox6.Text = TextBox3.Text.Substring(41, 23); 
 
 
        ///LFSR 1... start here 
        string lfsr1 = TextBox4.Text; 
 
        for (int i = 0; i < s; i++) 
        { 
            string s10 = lfsr1.Substring(9, 1); 
            string s_last = lfsr1.Substring(0, 1); 
 
            if (s10 == "0") 
                if (s_last == "0") 
                { 
                    TextBox8.Text = "0"; 
                } 
 
                else 
                { 
                    TextBox8.Text = "1"; 
                } 
            if (s10 == "1") 
                if (s_last == "1") 
                { 
                    TextBox8.Text = "0"; 
                } 
                else 
                { 
                    TextBox8.Text = "1"; 
                } 
 
            TextBox7.Text = ""; 
            TextBox7.Text = TextBox8.Text; 
            TextBox7.Text += lfsr1.Substring(0, 19); 
            TextBox9.Text += lfsr1.Substring(19, 1); 
            lfsr1 = TextBox7.Text; 
 
        } 
        ///LFSR 1... finished here 
 
 
        ///LFSR 2... start here 
        string lfsr2 = TextBox5.Text; 
 
        for (int j = 0; j < s; j++) 
        { 
            string s10_2 = lfsr2.Substring(10, 1); 

























            if (s10_2 == "0") 
                if (s_last_2 == "0") 
                { 
                    TextBox12.Text = "0"; 
                } 
                else 
                { 
                    TextBox12.Text = "1"; 
                } 
            if (s10_2 == "1") 
                if (s_last_2 == "1") 
                { 
                    TextBox12.Text = "0"; 
                } 
                else 
                { 
                    TextBox12.Text = "1"; 
                } 
 
            TextBox11.Text = ""; 
            TextBox11.Text = TextBox12.Text; 
            TextBox11.Text += lfsr2.Substring(0, 20); 
            TextBox10.Text += lfsr2.Substring(20, 1); 
            lfsr2 = TextBox11.Text; 
 
 
            string not_str = TextBox10.Text.Substring(j, 1); 
            if (not_str == "0") 
            { 
                TextBox13.Text += "1"; 
            } 
            else 
            { 
                TextBox13.Text += "0"; 
            } 
 
        } 
 
 




        ///LFSR 3... start here 
        string lfsr3 = TextBox6.Text; 
 
        for (int k = 0; k < s; k++) 
        { 
            string s10_3 = lfsr3.Substring(12, 1); 
            string s_last_3 = lfsr3.Substring(0, 1); 
 
            if (s10_3 == "0") 
                if (s_last_3 == "0") 
                { 
                    TextBox16.Text = "0"; 
                } 
                else 
                { 
                    TextBox16.Text = "1"; 
                } 
            if (s10_3 == "1") 
                if (s_last_3 == "1") 
                { 
                    TextBox16.Text = "0"; 
                } 
                else 
                { 
                    TextBox16.Text = "1"; 

























            TextBox15.Text = ""; 
            TextBox15.Text = TextBox16.Text; 
            TextBox15.Text += lfsr3.Substring(0, 22); 
            TextBox14.Text += lfsr3.Substring(22, 1); 
            lfsr3 = TextBox15.Text; 
 
        } 
        ///LFSR 3... finished here 
 
 
        ///K1 AND K2... start here 
 
        for (int l = 0; l < s; l++) 
        { 
            string k1 = TextBox9.Text.Substring(l, 1); 
            string k2 = TextBox10.Text.Substring(l, 1); 
 
            if (k1 == "1") 
                if (k2 == "1") 
                { 
                    TextBox17.Text += "1"; 
                } 
                else 
                { 
                    TextBox17.Text += "0"; 
                } 
            if (k1 == "0") 
            { 
                TextBox17.Text += "0"; 
            } 
 
        } 
 
        ///K1 AND K2... finished here 
        /// 
        ///Not K2 AND K3... start here 
 
 
        for (int z = 0; z < s; z++) 
        { 
            string nk2 = TextBox13.Text.Substring(z, 1); 
            string k3 = TextBox14.Text.Substring(z, 1); 
 
            if (nk2 == "1") 
                if (k3 == "1") 
                { 
                    TextBox18.Text += "1"; 
                } 
                else 
                { 
                    TextBox18.Text += "0"; 
                } 
            if (nk2 == "0") 
            { 
                TextBox18.Text += "0"; 
            } 
 
        } 




        ///S... start here 
 
        for (int x = 0; x < s; x++) 
        { 
            string and1 = TextBox17.Text.Substring(x, 1); 
            string and2 = TextBox18.Text.Substring(x, 1); 
 
























                if (and2 == "0") 
                { 
                    TextBox19.Text += "0"; 
                } 
                else 
                { 
                    TextBox19.Text += "1"; 
                } 
            if (and1 == "1") 
                if (and2 == "1") 
                { 
                    TextBox19.Text += "0"; 
                } 
                else 
                { 
                    TextBox19.Text += "1"; 
                } 
        } 
 
         
        ///S... finished here 
 
 
        ///Statistics results... start here 
double i0 = 0, i1 = 0, i00 = 0, i11 = 0, i01 = 0, 
i10 = 0, n = TextBox19.Text.Length; 
        for (int y = 0; y < TextBox19.Text.Length; y++) 
        { 
            string s0 = TextBox19.Text.Substring(y, 1); 
            if (s0 == "0") 
            { 
                i0 = i0 + 1; ; 
            } 
            string s1 = TextBox19.Text.Substring(y, 1); 
            if (s1 == "1") 
            { 
                i1 = i1 + 1; ; 
            } 
        } 
        for (int yy = 0; yy < TextBox19.Text.Length - 1; yy++) 
        { 
            string s00 = TextBox19.Text.Substring(yy, 2); 
            if (s00 == "00") 
            { 
                i00 = i00 + 1; ; 
            } 
            string s11 = TextBox19.Text.Substring(yy, 2); 
            if (s11 == "11") 
            { 
                i11 = i11 + 1; ; 
            } 
            string s01 = TextBox19.Text.Substring(yy, 2); 
            if (s01 == "01") 
            { 
                i01 = i01 + 1; ; 
            } 
            string s10 = TextBox19.Text.Substring(yy, 2); 
            if (s10 == "10") 
            { 
                i10 = i10 + 1; ; 
            } 
 
        } 
 TextBox20.Text = "0=" + i0 + ", " + "1=" + i1 + 
", " + "00=" + i00 + ", " + "11=" + i11 + ", " + 
"01=" + i01 + ", " + "10=" + i10 + ", " + "n=" + 
n; 
 



























        ///Frequency test 
        double x1 = Math.Pow((i0 - i1), 2) / n; 
        TextBox22.Text = Convert.ToString(x1); 
        if (x1 < 3.8415) 
        { 
            Label22.Text = "Frequency test succeeded"; 
        } 
        else 
        { 
            Label22.Text = "Frequency test failed"; 
        } 
 
        ///Serial test 
double x2 = (4 / (n - 1)) * (Math.Pow(i00, 2) + 
Math.Pow(i01, 2) + Math.Pow(i10, 2) + Math.Pow(i11, 
2)) - (2 / n) * (Math.Pow(i0, 2) + Math.Pow(i1, 2)) 
+ 1; 
        TextBox23.Text = Convert.ToString(x2); 
        if (x1 < 5.9915) 
        { 
            Label23.Text = "Serial test succeeded"; 
        } 
        else 
        { 
            Label23.Text = "Serial test failed"; 
        } 
 




double m = 3, kk = 85, c = 0, c0 = 0, c1 = 0, c2 = 
0, c3 = 0, c4 = 0, c5 = 0, c6 = 0, c7 = 0; 
        for (int ff = 0; ff < kk; ff++) 
        { 
            string blocks = TextBox19.Text.Substring(ff * 3, 3); 
 
 
            if (blocks == "000") 
            { 
                c0 = c0 + 1; 
            } 
            if (blocks == "001") 
            { 
                c1 = c1 + 1; 
            } 
            if (blocks == "010") 
            { 
                c2 = c2 + 1; 
            } 
            if (blocks == "011") 
            { 
                c3 = c3 + 1; 
            } 
            if (blocks == "100") 
            { 
                c4 = c4 + 1; 
            } 
            if (blocks == "101") 
            { 
                c5 = c5 + 1; 
            } 
            if (blocks == "110") 
            { 
                c6 = c6 + 1; 
            } 
            if (blocks == "111") 
























                c7 = c7 + 1; 
            } 
 
            /* for (int f = 0; f < m; f++) 
             { 
                 string f1 = blocks.Substring(f, 1); 
                 if (f1 == "1") 
                 { 
                     c++; 
                 } 
             } 
             if (c == 0) 
                 c0 = c0 + 1; 
             if (c == 1) 
                 c1 = c1 + 1; 
             if (c == 2) 
                 c2 = c2 + 1; 
             if (c == 3) 
                 c3 = c3 + 1; 
             if (c == 4) 
                 c4 = c4 + 1; 
             if (c == 5) 
                 c5 = c5 + 1; 
             if (c == 6) 
                 c6 = c6 + 1; 
             if (c == 7) 
                 c7 = c7 + 1; 
             if (c == 8) 
                 c8 = c8 + 1; 
             if (c == 9) 
                 c9 = c9 + 1; 
             if (c == 10) 
                 c10 = c10 + 1; 
 
             c = 0; 
             */ 
        } 
// TextBox6.Text = Convert.ToString(c0) + ", "+ 
Convert.ToString(c1) + ", "+Convert.ToString(c2) + 
", "+Convert.ToString(c3) + ", 
"+Convert.ToString(c4) + ", "+Convert.ToString(c5); 
double x3 = Math.Pow(2, m) / kk * (Math.Pow(c0, 2) + 
Math.Pow(c1, 2) + Math.Pow(c2, 2) + Math.Pow(c3, 2) 
+ Math.Pow(c4, 2) + Math.Pow(c5, 2) + Math.Pow(c6, 
2) + Math.Pow(c7, 2)) - kk; 
        TextBox24.Text = Convert.ToString(x3); 
 
        if (x3 < 14.0671) 
        { 
            Label24.Text = "Poker test succeeded"; 
        } 
        else 
        { 
            Label24.Text = "Poker test failed"; 
        } 
        /* 
        /// Autocorrelation test 
        double ad = 0; 
        string si, sid; 
        int succeeded = 0, failed = 0; 
        for (int d = 1; d < n/2; d++) 
        { 
            si = TextBox19.Text; 
            string pading = TextBox19.Text.PadRight(s + d, '0'); 
 
            sid = pading.Substring(d, s); 
            //TextBox7.Text = sid; 
 
            for (int fff = 0; fff < n-d-1; fff++) 
























                string fff1 = si.Substring(fff, 1); 
                string fff2 = sid.Substring(fff, 1); 
                if (fff1 == "1" & fff2 == "1") 
                { 
                    c++; 
                } 
            } 
            ad = c; 
            c = 0; 
            //TextBox6.Text += Convert.ToString(ad)+","; 
double mm = Math.Pow(i1, 2) * (n - d) / 
Math.Pow(n, 2); 
            double ad_mm = ad - m; 
            //double x4 = Math.Pow(ad_mm, 2) / mm; 
            double x4 = 2 * (ad - (n - d) / 2) / Math.Sqrt(n - d); 
            TextBox25.Text += x4 + "," + mm + "@@@@"; 
            if(1.96>x4) 
            if (x4 > -1.96) 
           // if (x4 < 3.841) 
            { 
                succeeded++; 
                Label25.Text = "Autocorrelation test succeeded"; 
            } 
            else 
            { 
                failed++; 
                Label25.Text = "Autocorrelation test failed"; 
                d = s; 
            } 
 
//Label25.Text = succeeded+","+failed+"Failed 
percentage:" + (failed * (100 / s)) + "%"; 
            int Percentage = 0; 
            if (x1 < 3.8415){Percentage=Percentage+25;} 
                if (x1 < 3.8415){Percentage=Percentage+25;} 
                    if (x3 < 
14.0671){Percentage=Percentage+25;} 
                        if(1.96 > x4) 
                            if (x4 > -1.96) { 
Percentage = Percentage + 25; } 
Label26.Text = "This password is " + 
Percentage + "% successful"; 
             
        }*/ 
 
 
        /// Convert Binary to decimal 
 
        for (int dec = 0; dec < s / 8; dec++) 
        { 
            string dec1 = TextBox19.Text.Substring(dec * 8, 
8); 
            int dec11 = Convert.ToInt32(dec1, 2); 
            dec11 = dec11 % 10; 
            TextBox26.Text += Convert.ToString(dec11); 
        } 
 
        //private key 
        /* 
        string half1 = TextBox26.Text.Substring(0, 16); 
        long p1 = Convert.ToInt64(half1); 
        p1 = p1 % 100000000; 
        string p11 = Convert.ToString(p1); 
        string half2 = TextBox26.Text.Substring(16, 16); 
        long p2 = Convert.ToInt64(half2); 
        p2 = p2 % 100000000; 
        string p22 = Convert.ToString(p2); 
        string p3 = p11 + p22; 
        long p33 = Convert.ToInt64(p3); 
























        TextBox27.Text = Convert.ToString(privateKey); 
         */ 
        TextBox27.Text = ""; 
        for (int p1 = 0; p1 < 8; p1++) 
        { 
            string block = TextBox26.Text.Substring(p1 * 4, 1); 
            // long p2 = Convert.ToInt64(block); 
            TextBox27.Text += block; 
        } 
 
        int privateKey = Convert.ToInt32(TextBox27.Text); 
        ///-------------------------------------------------
---- 
        /* 
         int publickey = 1; 
        int mod1 = 1; 
        for (int i = 1; i <= privateKey; i=i+i) 
        { 
            publickey = publickey * 5; 
            publickey = publickey % 100000007; 
            if (publickey != 0) 
            { 
                mod1 = mod1 * publickey; 
            } 
        } 
         
//int publickey =Convert.ToInt32(BigInteger.Pow(5, 
privateKey) % 100000007); 
        */ 
        BigInteger t1 = 5; 
        BigInteger t2 = Convert.ToInt64(privateKey); 
        BigInteger t3 = 100000007; 
        BigInteger publickey = BigInteger.ModPow(t1, t2, t3); 
        TextBox28.Text = Convert.ToString(publickey); 
 




    } 
 
 
    protected void Button2_Click1(object sender, EventArgs e) 
    { 
        Session["field1"] = TextBox27.Text; 
        Session["field2"] = TextBox28.Text; 
        Response.Redirect("Default2.aspx"); 





A.1.2 HTML code: 
 
<%@ Page Language="C#" AutoEventWireup="true" 
CodeFile="Default.aspx.cs" Inherits="_Default" %> 
 






    <title></title> 
    <style type="text/css"> 
        .style1 
        { 
            width: 100%; 
        } 
























        { 
            line-height: 115%; 
        } 
    </style> 
</head> 
<body style="font-family: 'Times New Roman', Times, serif; 
font-size: small"> 
    <form id="form1" runat="server"> 
    <div> 
     
    </div> 
    <table class="style1"> 
        <tr> 
            <td> 
                Password:</td> 
            <td> 
                <asp:TextBox ID="TextBox1" runat="server" 
Width="500px">abcdefgh</asp:TextBox> 
                <asp:Button ID="Button1" runat="server" 
onclick="Button1_Click1"  
                    Text="Calculate" /> 
                <asp:Button ID="Button2" runat="server" 
Text="Go to the second party side"  
                    onclick="Button2_Click1" /> 
            </td> 
            <td> 
                &nbsp;</td> 
        </tr> 
        <tr> 
            <td> 
                Password in decimal:</td> 
            <td> 
                <asp:TextBox ID="TextBox2" runat="server" 
Width="500px"></asp:TextBox> 
            </td> 
            <td> 
                &nbsp;</td> 
        </tr> 
        <tr> 
            <td> 
                Password in binary:</td> 
            <td> 
                <asp:TextBox ID="TextBox3" runat="server" 
Width="500px"></asp:TextBox> 
            </td> 
            <td> 
                &nbsp;</td> 
        </tr> 
        <tr> 
            <td> 
                &nbsp;</td> 
            <td> 
                &nbsp;</td> 
            <td> 
                &nbsp;</td> 
        </tr> 
        <tr> 
            <td> 
                LFSR 1:</td> 
            <td> 
                <asp:TextBox ID="TextBox4" runat="server" 
Width="500px"></asp:TextBox> 
            &nbsp;20bits<br /> 
                <asp:TextBox ID="TextBox7" runat="server" 
Width="500px"></asp:TextBox> 
&nbsp;Final state<br /> 
                <asp:TextBox ID="TextBox8" runat="server" 
Width="500px"></asp:TextBox> 
























                <asp:TextBox ID="TextBox9" runat="server" 
Width="500px" Height="100px"  
                    TextMode="MultiLine"></asp:TextBox> 
            &nbsp;K1</td> 
            <td> 
                &nbsp;</td> 
        </tr> 
        <tr> 
            <td> 
                &nbsp;</td> 
            <td> 
                &nbsp;</td> 
            <td> 
                &nbsp;</td> 
        </tr> 
        <tr> 
            <td> 
                LFSR 2:</td> 
            <td> 
                <asp:TextBox ID="TextBox5" runat="server" 
Width="500px"></asp:TextBox> 
                &nbsp;21bits<br /> 
                <asp:TextBox ID="TextBox10" runat="server" 
Width="500px" Height="100px"  
                    TextMode="MultiLine"></asp:TextBox> 
            &nbsp;K2<br /> 
                <asp:TextBox ID="TextBox11" runat="server" 
Width="500px"></asp:TextBox> 
            &nbsp;Final state<br /> 
                <asp:TextBox ID="TextBox12" runat="server" 
Width="500px"></asp:TextBox> 
                <br /> 
                <asp:TextBox ID="TextBox13" runat="server" 
Width="500px" Height="100px"  
                    TextMode="MultiLine"></asp:TextBox> 
            &nbsp;Not K2</td> 
            <td> 
                &nbsp;</td> 
        </tr> 
        <tr> 
            <td> 
                &nbsp;</td> 
            <td> 
                &nbsp;</td> 
            <td> 
                &nbsp;</td> 
        </tr> 
        <tr> 
            <td> 
                LFSR 3:</td> 
            <td> 
                <asp:TextBox ID="TextBox6" runat="server" 
Width="500px"></asp:TextBox> 
            &nbsp;23bits<br /> 
                <asp:TextBox ID="TextBox14" runat="server" 
Width="500px" Height="100px"  
                    TextMode="MultiLine"></asp:TextBox> 
            &nbsp;K3<br /> 
                <asp:TextBox ID="TextBox15" runat="server" 
Width="500px"></asp:TextBox> 
            &nbsp;Final state<br /> 
                <asp:TextBox ID="TextBox16" runat="server" 
Width="500px"></asp:TextBox> 
            </td> 
            <td> 
                &nbsp;</td> 
        </tr> 
        <tr> 
            <td> 
























            <td> 
                &nbsp;</td> 
            <td> 
                &nbsp;</td> 
        </tr> 
        <tr> 
            <td> 
                K1 ^ K2:</td> 
            <td> 
                <asp:TextBox ID="TextBox17" runat="server" 
Width="500px" Height="100px"  
                    TextMode="MultiLine"></asp:TextBox> 
            </td> 
            <td> 
                &nbsp;</td> 
        </tr> 
        <tr> 
            <td> 
                Not K2 ^ K3:</td> 
            <td> 
                <asp:TextBox ID="TextBox18" runat="server" 
Width="500px" Height="100px"  
                    TextMode="MultiLine"></asp:TextBox> 
            </td> 
            <td> 
                &nbsp;</td> 
        </tr> 
        <tr> 
            <td> 
                S:</td> 
            <td> 
                <asp:TextBox ID="TextBox19" runat="server" 
Width="500px" Height="100px"  
                    TextMode="MultiLine"></asp:TextBox> 
            </td> 
            <td> 
                &nbsp;</td> 
        </tr> 
        <tr> 
            <td> 
                Statistics results:</td> 
            <td> 
                <asp:TextBox ID="TextBox20" runat="server" 
Width="500px"></asp:TextBox> 
            </td> 
            <td> 
                &nbsp;</td> 
        </tr> 
        <tr> 
            <td> 
                S:</td> 
            <td> 
                <asp:TextBox ID="TextBox21" runat="server" 
Width="500px"></asp:TextBox> 
            </td> 
            <td> 
                &nbsp;</td> 
        </tr> 
        <tr> 
            <td class="style3"  
                style="mso-ascii-theme-font: major-bidi; 
mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-theme-font: 
minor-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-bidi; mso-bidi-
theme-font: major-bidi; mso-ansi-language: EN-AU; mso-
fareast-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA"> 
                Frequency test:</td> 
            <td> 
                <asp:TextBox ID="TextBox22" runat="server" 
Width="500px"></asp:TextBox> 
























            <td> 
                &nbsp;</td> 
        </tr> 
        <tr> 
            <td class="style3"  
                style="mso-ascii-theme-font: major-bidi; 
mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-theme-font: 
minor-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-bidi; mso-bidi-
theme-font: major-bidi; mso-ansi-language: EN-AU; mso-
fareast-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA"> 
                Serial test:</td> 
            <td> 
                <asp:TextBox ID="TextBox23" runat="server" 
Width="500px"></asp:TextBox> 
            </td> 
            <td> 
                &nbsp;</td> 
        </tr> 
        <tr> 
            <td class="style3"  
                style="mso-ascii-theme-font: major-bidi; 
mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-theme-font: 
minor-latin; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-bidi; mso-bidi-
theme-font: major-bidi; mso-ansi-language: EN-AU; mso-
fareast-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA"> 
                Poker test:</td> 
            <td> 
                <asp:TextBox ID="TextBox24" runat="server" 
Width="500px"></asp:TextBox> 
            </td> 
            <td> 
                &nbsp;</td> 
        </tr> 
        <tr> 
            <td> 
                &nbsp;</td> 
            <td> 
                <asp:TextBox ID="TextBox25" runat="server" 
Width="500px"></asp:TextBox> 
            </td> 
            <td> 
                &nbsp;</td> 
        </tr> 
        <tr> 
            <td> 
                S in decimal:</td> 
            <td> 
                <asp:TextBox ID="TextBox26" runat="server" 
Width="500px"></asp:TextBox> 
            </td> 
            <td> 
                &nbsp;</td> 
        </tr> 
        <tr> 
            <td> 
                First party private key:</td> 
            <td> 
                <asp:TextBox ID="TextBox27" runat="server" 
Width="500px"></asp:TextBox> 
            </td> 
            <td> 
                &nbsp;</td> 
        </tr> 
        <tr> 
            <td> 
                First party public key:</td> 
            <td> 
                <asp:TextBox ID="TextBox28" runat="server" 
Width="500px"></asp:TextBox> 
























            <td> 
                &nbsp;</td> 
        </tr> 
        <tr> 
            <td> 
                &nbsp;</td> 
            <td> 
                <asp:Image ID="Image2" runat="server" 
ImageUrl="~/Image2.gif" Visible="False" /> 
            </td> 
            <td> 
                &nbsp;</td> 
        </tr> 
        <tr> 
            <td> 
                &nbsp;</td> 
            <td> 
                <asp:Label ID="Label22" runat="server" 
Text="Label"></asp:Label> 
            </td> 
            <td> 
                &nbsp;</td> 
        </tr> 
        <tr> 
            <td> 
                &nbsp;</td> 
            <td> 
                <asp:Label ID="Label23" runat="server" 
Text="Label"></asp:Label> 
            </td> 
            <td> 
                &nbsp;</td> 
        </tr> 
        <tr> 
            <td> 
                &nbsp;</td> 
            <td> 
                <asp:Label ID="Label24" runat="server" 
Text="Label"></asp:Label> 
            </td> 
            <td> 
                &nbsp;</td> 
        </tr> 
        <tr> 
            <td> 
                &nbsp;</td> 
            <td> 
                &nbsp;</td> 
            <td> 
                &nbsp;</td> 
        </tr> 
        <tr> 
            <td> 
                &nbsp;</td> 
            <td> 
                &nbsp;</td> 
            <td> 
                &nbsp;</td> 
        </tr> 
        <tr> 
            <td> 
                &nbsp;</td> 
            <td> 
                &nbsp;</td> 
            <td> 
                &nbsp;</td> 
        </tr> 
    </table> 




























A.2 Second web page codes 










public partial class Default2 : System.Web.UI.Page 
{ 
    protected void Page_Load(object sender, EventArgs e) 
    { 
        Label1.Text = (string)(Session["field1"]); 
        Label2.Text = (string)(Session["field2"]); 
    } 
    protected void Button1_Click(object sender, EventArgs e) 
    { 
        Image1.Visible = true; 
         
        //uint secretkey = 1; 
        long publicvalue = Convert.ToInt64(Label2.Text); 
        long basevalue = Convert.ToInt64(TextBox1.Text); 
 
        long secretkey = basevalue; 
        //Label4.Text = 
Convert.ToString(secretkey*secretkey); 
         
        for (long i = 0; i < publicvalue; i++) 
        { 
            secretkey = secretkey * basevalue; 
            secretkey = secretkey % 100000007; 
        } 
                
         
        Label3.Text = Convert.ToString(secretkey); 
 
        Image1.Visible = false; 




A.2.2 HTML code: 
 
<%@ Page Language="C#" AutoEventWireup="true" 
CodeFile="Default2.aspx.cs" Inherits="Default2" %> 
 









    <title></title> 
</head> 
<body> 
    <form id="form1" runat="server"> 
























     
    </div> 
    Alice private key is :<asp:Label ID="Label1" 
runat="server" Text="Label"></asp:Label> 
    <br /> 
    Alice public key is :<asp:Label ID="Label2" 
runat="server" Text="Label"></asp:Label> 
    <br /> 
    <br /> 
    Bob private key is: 
    <asp:TextBox ID="TextBox1" 
runat="server">6629794</asp:TextBox> 
    &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
    <asp:Button ID="Button1" runat="server" 
onclick="Button1_Click"  
        Text="Calculate the shared key" /> 
    <br /> 
    <asp:Label ID="Label4" runat="server"></asp:Label> 
    <br /> 
    <br /> 
    The shared key is :<asp:Label ID="Label3" 
runat="server"></asp:Label> 
    <p> 
        &nbsp;</p> 
    <p> 
        &nbsp;</p> 
    <p style="text-align: center"> 
        <asp:Image ID="Image1" runat="server" 
ImageUrl="~/Image2.gif"  
            style="text-align: center" Visible="False" /> 
    </p> 
    <p> 
        &nbsp;</p> 
    <p> 
        &nbsp;</p> 
    <p style="text-align: center"> 
        &nbsp;</p> 








A.3 Screen shots 



































































































































    class Program 
    { 
        static void Main(string[] args) 
        { 
            Console.WriteLine("CipherMode: Parallel Block 
Cipher (PBC)"); 
            Stopwatch sw = Stopwatch.StartNew(); 
            //////////////////////////////// 
            var t01 = Task.Factory.StartNew(() => 
            { 
                Stopwatch sw0 = Stopwatch.StartNew(); 
                string pathSrc = "C:\\test.iso"; 
                String md5Result; 
                StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder(); 
                MD5 md5Hasher = MD5.Create(); 
                using (FileStream fs = 
File.OpenRead(pathSrc)) 
                { 
                    foreach (Byte b in 
md5Hasher.ComputeHash(fs)) 
                        
sb.Append(b.ToString("x2").ToLower()); 
                } 
                md5Result = sb.ToString(); 
                string hash = md5Result; 
                Console.WriteLine("Hash: {0}", hash); 
                string password = hash.Substring(0, 1) + 
hash.Substring(4, 1) + hash.Substring(8, 1) + 
hash.Substring(12, 1) + hash.Substring(16, 1) + 
hash.Substring(20, 1) + hash.Substring(24, 1) + 
hash.Substring(28, 1); 
                Console.WriteLine("Key:  {0}", password); 
                sw0.Stop(); 
                Console.WriteLine("Hashing time: " + 
sw0.Elapsed); 
            }); 
 
Appendix B 
The practical aspects of Chapter 5 were implemented as a console application using Visual Studio 2010 and C# language. The PBC mode was 
implemented and tested it within this console application. 
 
























            //////////////////////////////////// 
            var t02 = Task.Factory.StartNew(() => 
            { 
                Stopwatch sw1 = Stopwatch.StartNew(); 
                SplitFile("C:\\test.iso", "C:\\", 8); 
                
//SplitFile("C:\\Users\\u1050771\\Desktop\\file\\test_encryp
ted.iso", "C:\\Users\\u1050771\\Desktop\\file", 8); 
                sw1.Stop(); 
                Console.WriteLine("Splitting time: " + 
sw1.Elapsed); 
            }); 
            var tasklist12 = new List<Task> { t01, t02 }; 
            Task.WaitAll(tasklist12.ToArray()); 




            Stopwatch sw2 = Stopwatch.StartNew(); 
            var t1 = Task.Factory.StartNew(() => 
            { 
                EncryptFile("C:\\test.iso.0000.part", 
"C:\\test_encrypted.iso.0000.part", "aqeel",1); 









                
//File.Delete("C:\\Users\\u1050771\\Desktop\\file\\test_encr
ypted.iso.0000.part"); 
            }); 
            var t2 = Task.Factory.StartNew(() => 
            { 
                EncryptFile("C:\\test.iso.0001.part", 
"C:\\test_encrypted.iso.0001.part", "aqeel",2); 
                
//File.Delete("C:\\Users\\u1050771\\Desktop\\file\\test.iso.
0000.part"); 





                
//File.Delete("C:\\Users\\u1050771\\Desktop\\file\\test_encr
ypted.iso.0001.part"); 
            }); 
            var t3 = Task.Factory.StartNew(() => 
            { 
                EncryptFile("C:\\test.iso.0002.part", 
"C:\\test_encrypted.iso.0002.part", "aqeel",3); 









                
//File.Delete("C:\\Users\\u1050771\\Desktop\\file\\test_encr
ypted.iso.0002.part"); 
            }); 
























            { 
                EncryptFile("C:\\test.iso.0003.part", 
"C:\\test_encrypted.iso.0003.part", "aqeel",4); 









                
//File.Delete("C:\\Users\\u1050771\\Desktop\\file\\test_encr
ypted.iso.0003.part"); 
            }); 
            var t5 = Task.Factory.StartNew(() => 
            { 
                EncryptFile("C:\\test.iso.0004.part", 
"C:\\test_encrypted.iso.0004.part", "aqeel",5); 









                
//File.Delete("C:\\Users\\u1050771\\Desktop\\file\\test_encr
ypted.iso.0004.part"); 
            }); 
            var t6 = Task.Factory.StartNew(() => 
            { 
                EncryptFile("C:\\test.iso.0005.part", 
"C:\\test_encrypted.iso.0005.part", "aqeel",6); 









                
//File.Delete("C:\\Users\\u1050771\\Desktop\\file\\test_encr
ypted.iso.0005.part"); 
            }); 
            var t7 = Task.Factory.StartNew(() => 
            { 
                EncryptFile("C:\\test.iso.0006.part", 
"C:\\test_encrypted.iso.0006.part", "aqeel",7); 









                
//File.Delete("C:\\Users\\u1050771\\Desktop\\file\\test_encr
ypted.iso.0006.part"); 
            }); 
            var t8 = Task.Factory.StartNew(() => 
























                EncryptFile("C:\\test.iso.0007.part", 
"C:\\test_encrypted.iso.0007.part", "aqeel",8); 









                
//File.Delete("C:\\Users\\u1050771\\Desktop\\file\\test_encr
ypted.iso.0007.part"); 
            }); 
 
 
            var tasklist = new List<Task> { t1, t2, t3, t4, 
t5, t6, t7, t8 }; 
            Task.WaitAll(tasklist.ToArray()); 
            sw2.Stop(); 
            Console.WriteLine("Encrypting|Decrypting time: " 
+ sw2.Elapsed); 
            ////////////////////////////////////// 
 




            var t9 = Task.Factory.StartNew(() => 
            { 
                ConcatenateFiles("C:\\test_encrypted.iso", 
"C:\\test_encrypted.iso.0000.part", 
                                                                    
"C:\\test_encrypted.iso.0001.part", 
                                                                   
"C:\\test_encrypted.iso.0002.part", 
                                                                    
"C:\\test_encrypted.iso.0003.part", 
                                                                    
"C:\\test_encrypted.iso.0004.part", 
                                                                   
"C:\\test_encrypted.iso.0005.part", 
                                                                    
"C:\\test_encrypted.iso.0006.part", 
                                                                    
"C:\\test_encrypted.iso.0007.part"); 
                
File.Delete("C:\\test_encrypted.iso.0000.part"); 
                
File.Delete("C:\\test_encrypted.iso.0001.part"); 
                
File.Delete("C:\\test_encrypted.iso.0002.part"); 
                
File.Delete("C:\\test_encrypted.iso.0003.part"); 
                
File.Delete("C:\\test_encrypted.iso.0004.part"); 
                
File.Delete("C:\\test_encrypted.iso.0005.part"); 
                
File.Delete("C:\\test_encrypted.iso.0006.part"); 
                
File.Delete("C:\\test_encrypted.iso.0007.part"); 
 




























                //                                                            
"C:\\Users\\u1050771\\Desktop\\file\\test_decrypted.iso.0001
.part", 
                //                                                            
"C:\\Users\\u1050771\\Desktop\\file\\test_decrypted.iso.0002
.part", 
                //                                                            
"C:\\Users\\u1050771\\Desktop\\file\\test_decrypted.iso.0003
.part", 
                //                                                            
"C:\\Users\\u1050771\\Desktop\\file\\test_decrypted.iso.0004
.part", 
                //                                                            
"C:\\Users\\u1050771\\Desktop\\file\\test_decrypted.iso.0005
.part", 
                //                                                            
"C:\\Users\\u1050771\\Desktop\\file\\test_decrypted.iso.0006
.part", 
                //                                                            
"C:\\Users\\u1050771\\Desktop\\file\\test_decrypted.iso.0007
.part"); 
                
//File.Delete("C:\\Users\\u1050771\\Desktop\\file\\test_decr
ypted.iso.0000.part"); 
                
//File.Delete("C:\\Users\\u1050771\\Desktop\\file\\test_decr
ypted.iso.0001.part"); 
                
//File.Delete("C:\\Users\\u1050771\\Desktop\\file\\test_decr
ypted.iso.0002.part"); 
                
//File.Delete("C:\\Users\\u1050771\\Desktop\\file\\test_decr
ypted.iso.0003.part"); 
     
//File.Delete("C:\\Users\\u1050771\\Desktop\\file\\test_decr
ypted.iso.0004.part"); 
     
//File.Delete("C:\\Users\\u1050771\\Desktop\\file\\test_decr
ypted.iso.0005.part"); 
     
//File.Delete("C:\\Users\\u1050771\\Desktop\\file\\test_decr
ypted.iso.0006.part"); 




            }); 
 var t10 = Task.Factory.StartNew(() => 
            { 
                File.Delete("C:\\test.iso.0000.part"); 
     File.Delete("C:\\test.iso.0001.part"); 
                File.Delete("C:\\test.iso.0002.part"); 
                File.Delete("C:\\test.iso.0003.part"); 
                File.Delete("C:\\test.iso.0004.part"); 
                File.Delete("C:\\test.iso.0005.part"); 
                File.Delete("C:\\test.iso.0006.part"); 
                File.Delete("C:\\test.iso.0007.part"); 
 
                
//File.Delete("C:\\Users\\u1050771\\Desktop\\file\\test_encr
ypted.iso.0000.part"); 
                
//File.Delete("C:\\Users\\u1050771\\Desktop\\file\\test_encr
ypted.iso.0001.part"); 


























                
//File.Delete("C:\\Users\\u1050771\\Desktop\\file\\test_encr
ypted.iso.0003.part"); 
                
//File.Delete("C:\\Users\\u1050771\\Desktop\\file\\test_encr
ypted.iso.0004.part"); 
                
//File.Delete("C:\\Users\\u1050771\\Desktop\\file\\test_encr
ypted.iso.0005.part"); 
      
//File.Delete("C:\\Users\\u1050771\\Desktop\\file\\test_encr
ypted.iso.0006.part"); 




            }); 
 
            var tasklist9 = new List<Task> { t9, t10 }; 
            Task.WaitAll(tasklist9.ToArray()); 
            sw3.Stop(); 
            Console.WriteLine("Joining time: " + 
sw3.Elapsed); 
            //////////////////////////////////// 
 
            sw.Stop(); 
            Console.WriteLine("Total time: " + sw.Elapsed); 
            Console.WriteLine("Processes completed.. Press 
any ket to exit..."); 
            Console.ReadKey(); 
            //////////////////////////////////// 
        } 
 
        private static void SplitFile(string FileInputPath, 
string FolderOutputPath, int OutputFiles) 
        { 
            // Store the file in a byte array 
            Byte[] byteSource = 
System.IO.File.ReadAllBytes("C:\\test.iso"); 
            // Get file info 
            FileInfo fiSource = new 
FileInfo("C:\\test.iso"); 
            // Calculate the size of each part 
            int partSize = 
(int)Math.Ceiling((double)(fiSource.Length / OutputFiles)); 
            // The offset at which to start reading from the 
source file 
            int fileOffset = 0; 
 
            // Stores the name of each file part 
            string currPartPath; 
            // The file stream that will hold each file part 
            FileStream fsPart; 
            // Stores the remaining byte length to write to 
other files 
            int sizeRemaining = (int)fiSource.Length; 
 
            // Loop through as many times we need to create 
the partial files 
            for (int i = 0; i < OutputFiles; i++) 
            //Parallel.For(0, OutputFiles, i => 
            { 
                // Store the path of the new part 
                currPartPath = FolderOutputPath + "\\" + 
fiSource.Name + "." + String.Format(@"{0:D4}", i) + ".part"; 
                // A filestream for the path 
                if (!File.Exists(currPartPath)) 
                { 

























                    fsPart = new FileStream(currPartPath, 
FileMode.CreateNew); 
                    // Calculate the remaining size of the 
whole file 
                    sizeRemaining = (int)fiSource.Length - 
(i * partSize); 
                    // The size of the last part file might 
differ because a file doesn't always split equally 
                    if (i == (OutputFiles - 1)) 
                    //if (sizeRemaining < partSize) 
                    { 
                        partSize = sizeRemaining; 
                    } 
                    // Write the byte chunk to the part file 
                    fsPart.Write(byteSource, fileOffset, 
partSize); 
                    // Close the file stream 
                    fsPart.Close(); 
                    // Set the new offset 
                    fileOffset += partSize; 
                } 
            } 
        } 
 
        //public static void SplitFile(string SourceFile, 
string Split, int nNoofFiles) 
        //{ 
 
        //    try 
        //    { 
        //        FileStream fs = new FileStream(SourceFile, 
FileMode.Open, FileAccess.Read); 
        //        int SizeofEachFile = 
(int)Math.Ceiling(Convert.ToDouble((double)fs.Length / 
nNoofFiles));// 
        //        for (int i = 0; i < nNoofFiles; i++) 
        //        { 
        //            string baseFileName = 
Path.GetFileNameWithoutExtension(SourceFile); 
        //            string Extension = 
Path.GetExtension(SourceFile); 
        //            FileStream outputFile = new 
FileStream(Path.GetDirectoryName(SourceFile) + "\\" + 
baseFileName + 
        //                 Extension + "." + 
i.ToString().PadLeft(4, Convert.ToChar("0")) + ".part", 
FileMode.Create, FileAccess.Write); 
        //            string mergeFolder = 
Path.GetDirectoryName(SourceFile); 
        //            int bytesRead = 0; 
        //            byte[] buffer = new 
byte[SizeofEachFile]; 
        //            if ((bytesRead = fs.Read(buffer, 0, 
SizeofEachFile)) > 0) 
        //            { 
        //                outputFile.Write(buffer, 0, 
bytesRead); 
        //                //outp.Write(buffer, 0, 
BytesRead); 
        //                string packet = baseFileName + "." 
+ i.ToString().PadLeft(3, Convert.ToChar("0")) + 
Extension.ToString(); 
        //                //Packets.Add(packet); 
        //            } 
        //            outputFile.Close(); 
        //        } 
        //        fs.Close(); 
        //    } 
        //    catch (Exception Ex) 
























        //        throw new ArgumentException(Ex.Message); 
        //    } 
 
 
        //} 
 
        static void ConcatenateFiles(string outputFile, 
params string[] inputFiles) 
        { 
            using (Stream output = 
File.OpenWrite(outputFile)) 
            { 
                foreach (string inputFile in inputFiles) 
                { 
                    using (Stream input = 
File.OpenRead(inputFile)) 
                    { 
                        input.CopyTo(output); 
                    } 
                } 
            } 
        } 
 
        private static void EncryptFile(string inputFile, 
string outputFile, string password, int i) 
        { 
 
            try 
            { 
                //string password = @"myKey123"; // Your Key 
Here 
                UnicodeEncoding UE = new UnicodeEncoding(); 
                byte[] key = UE.GetBytes(password); 
 
                string cryptFile = outputFile; 
                FileStream fsCrypt = new 
FileStream(cryptFile, FileMode.Create); 
 
                RijndaelManaged RMCrypto = new 
RijndaelManaged(); 
                RMCrypto.Mode = CipherMode.ECB; 
                //RMCrypto.Padding = PaddingMode.Zeros; 
                CryptoStream cs = new CryptoStream(fsCrypt, 
RMCrypto.CreateEncryptor(key, key), CryptoStreamMode.Write); 
 
                FileStream fsIn = new FileStream(inputFile, 
FileMode.Open); 
 
                int data; 
                while ((data = fsIn.ReadByte()) != -1) 
                    cs.WriteByte((byte)data); 
 
 
                fsIn.Close(); 
                cs.Close(); 
                fsCrypt.Close(); 
                Console.WriteLine("Encryption success on 
Server "+i, "Error"); 
            } 
            catch 
            { 
                Console.WriteLine("Encryption failed!", 
"Error"); 
            } 
        } 
 
        private static void DecryptFile(string inputFile, 
string outputFile, string password) 
        { 
























            { 
                //string password = @"myKey123"; // Your Key 
Here 
                UnicodeEncoding UE = new UnicodeEncoding(); 
                byte[] key = UE.GetBytes(password); 
 
                FileStream fsCrypt = new 
FileStream(inputFile, FileMode.Open); 
 
                RijndaelManaged RMCrypto = new 
RijndaelManaged(); 
                RMCrypto.Mode = CipherMode.ECB; 
                //RMCrypto.Padding = PaddingMode.Zeros; 
 
                CryptoStream cs = new CryptoStream(fsCrypt, 
                    RMCrypto.CreateDecryptor(key, key), 
                    CryptoStreamMode.Read); 
 
                FileStream fsOut = new 
FileStream(outputFile, FileMode.Create); 
 
                int data; 
                while ((data = cs.ReadByte()) != -1) 
                    fsOut.WriteByte((byte)data); 
 
                fsOut.Close(); 
                cs.Close(); 
                fsCrypt.Close(); 
                Console.WriteLine("Decryption success!", 
"Error"); 
            } 
            catch 
            { 
                Console.WriteLine("Decryption failed!", 
"Error"); 
            } 
        }}} 
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Appendix C 
C.1 Sequence diagrams generation codes 
Sequence diagrams shown in Chapter 7 were drawn using Quick Sequence Diagram 
Editor 4.2, and using the following generation codes. 
 




















First scenario { 
+1 
(1) Client:d.Request data() 
d:IP address not 
found=b.Checking IP 
address() 























Second scenario { 
+3 
(3)Attacker:d.Request data() 
d:IP address not 
found=b.Checking IP 
address() 




d:p.Send abnormal packets() 
p:Packets 
termination=p.Process 






(4)p:Admin.Send info & 
alarm 
+4 b 










Admin:d.Listenning to port() 
Admin:p.Listenning to port() 
 
+5 Attacker 













(6)d:Admin.Send info & 
alarm 
+6 Admin 
Third scenario } 
+6 
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ABSTRACT Although the number of cloud projects has dramatically increased over the last few years,
ensuring the availability and security of project data, services, and resources is still a crucial and challenging
research issue. Distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks are the secondmost prevalent cybercrime attacks
after information theft. DDoS TCP flood attacks can exhaust the cloud’s resources, consume most of its
bandwidth, and damage an entire cloud project within a short period of time. The timely detection and
prevention of such attacks in cloud projects are therefore vital, especially for eHealth clouds. In this paper,
we present a new classifier system for detecting and preventing DDoS TCP flood attacks (CS_DDoS) in
public clouds. The proposed CS_DDoS system offers a solution to securing stored records by classifying
the incoming packets and making a decision based on the classification results. During the detection phase,
the CS_DDOS identifies and determines whether a packet is normal or originates from an attacker. During
the prevention phase, packets, which are classified asmalicious, will be denied to access the cloud service and
the source IP will be blacklisted. The performance of the CS_DDoS system is compared using the different
classifiers of the least squares support vector machine (LS-SVM), naïve Bayes, K-nearest, and multilayer
perceptron. The results show that CS_DDoS yields the best performance when the LS-SVM classifier is
adopted. It can detect DDoS TCP flood attacks with about 97% accuracy and with a Kappa coefficient of
0.89 when under attack from a single source, and 94% accuracy with a Kappa coefficient of 0.9 when under
attack from multiple attackers. Finally, the results are discussed in terms of accuracy and time complexity,
and validated using a K-fold cross-validation model.
INDEX TERMS Classification, cloud computing, DDoS attacks, LS-SVM.
I. INTRODUCTION
Distributed denial of service (DDoS) TCP flood attacks are
DoS attacks in which attackers flood a victim machine with
packets in order to exhaust its resources or consume band-
width [1]. As the attack may be distributed over multiple
machines, it will be very hard to differentiate authentic users
from attackers. In fact, a DDoS flood attack is not only a
widespread attack; it is the second most common cybercrime
attack to cause financial losses [2] according to the United
States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
The use of cloud computing is quickly increasing in many
sectors, and especially in the health sector, as a result of
its vital features, such as availability and on-demand ser-
vices [3]. Most people think of cloud computing as virtual
network which can offer flexible and accessible on-demand
services [4]. However, the author in [5] pointed out that cloud
computing involves much more than this, which has led
researchers to re-consider its security more seriously. In addi-
tion, as mentioned in an electronic cybercrime study pub-
lished by KPMG in collaboration with eCrime Congress in
2009, most of the cloud’s virtual clients are under threat, and
these threats increase as time passes [6].
There are many procedures [7] which can be adopted
to mitigate the DDoS flood attacks, such as classifications
[8], [9], encryption techniques [10]–[12]. As DDoS flood
attacks can be implemented in many forms, the form of these
attacks cannot be foreseen. Therefore, our new proposed
classifier system for the detection and prevention of DDoS
TCP flood attacks (CS_DDoS) is classification based, and
can identify these attacks data regardless of the form in which
they arrive at the cloud system. Classification can be defined
as a common procedure for classifying, distinguishing and
6036
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differentiating multiple objects. Different classifiers, such
as least squares support vector machine (LS-SVM), naïve
Bayes, K-nearest and multilayer perceptron [13], [14] are
used in this study to perform the classification process.
This paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we review
related work, and Section 3 introduces the simulation plat-
form, with and without DDoS TCP flood attacks. Section 4
presents our proposed CS_DDoS system, and its performance
is evaluated and validated in Section 5. Finally, we conclude
this study and discuss future work in Section 6.
II. RELATED WORK
Many detection and prevention methods for mitigating DDoS
flood attacks have been reported in the last few years [15].
The rank correlation-based detection (RCD) scheme was
proposed by Wei et al. in [16]. The authors of the RCD
claimed that their scheme could distinguish whether the
incoming requests were from genuine users or from attackers.
In [17], the ALPi algorithm was introduced, which decreased
difficulties in packet flows and improved functionality by
extending the concept of packet scoring. The ALPi therefore
raises the detection accuracy percentage and attack recogni-
tion. Another DDoS attack prevention architecture, known as
secure overlay services (SOS), was presented in [18]. The
SOS architecture is a combination of three parts: secure over-
lay tunneling, routing via consistent hashing, and filtering.
The authors claimed that the SOS can successfully decrease
the probability of these attacks using filtering close to the
secure edge and randomness close to the front edge.
Moreover, Wang and Reiter proposed the web refer-
ral architecture for privileged service (WRAPS) [19]. The
WRAPS adopted the structure of a web graph to resist DDoS
flood attacks, and requires authentic users to be authenti-
cated using a referral hyperlink from a trusted site. Another
approach was introduced to detect application DoS attacks on
backend servers called the group testing-based approach [20].
The authors extended the existing group testing approach
by reallocating users’ requests to several servers. Markov
Chain probability theory was adopted by Salah et al. when
proposing an analytical queuing approach which examines
the performance of firewalls under DDoS attacks [21].
In addition, Dou et al. [22] presented a confidence-based
filtering (CBF) scheme for cloud projects. In the CBF, packets
of information from authentic users is gathered during non-
attack periods to extract features, which can generate an infor-
mation profile of these non-attack periods. With this profile,
the CBF scheme will be endorsed using a packet-scoring
calculation during attacks to make a decision on whether to
remove these packets or not. Another approach to detecting
flood attacks, the fast lightweight detection approach, was
presented by Yu et al. [23]. This approach utilized SNMP-
MIB (simple network management protocol-management
information base) statistical data as an alternative to raw
data, as well as a SVM classifier for attack classification.
Lee et al. [24] introduced a practical DDoS detection scheme
based on DDoS architecture. In this scheme, they selected
variables based on particular features that were extracted
from a DDoS architecture. A cloud trace back (CTB) method
was proposed in [25]. The authors of the CTB claimed that
their method could identify the sources of the attacks. They
also proposed a cloud Protector (CP), which made use of a
back-propagation classifier in order to detect such attacks.
Furthermore, a new framework was presented by
Lu et al. in [26]. This framework was able to effectively
identify compromised packets. It analyzed these packets at
the router end using a perimeter-based DDoS prevention
system.Wang et al. introduced a graphics-based DDoS attack
prevention and detection scheme, which was able to work
with the data shift issue [7]. This scheme works by preven-
tion, using network monitoring and a precise response with
an elastic control structure. In [27], an adaptive selective veri-
fication (ASV) system was proposed. The ASV does not rely
on network assumptions, and utilizes bandwidth efficiently.
Another approach was presented based on five features (aver-
age number of packets per flow, percentage of correlative
flow, one-direction generating speed, ports generating speed,
and percentage of abnormal packets) combined with a Bloom
filter [28]. In this approach, only users on the whitelist are
allowed to reach their destinations; this whitelist is generated
to include legitimate users only. However, this approach was
implemented on the switches side (i.e. in hardware), which
makes any future amendments or updates challenging [29].
While many mechanisms have been proposed to detect and
prevent DDoSflood attacks, most of these do not provide high
accuracy and are not efficient or fast detection and prevention
techniques [30]. Furthermore, many of the DDoS attack pro-
tection mechanisms described here face scalability issues due
to the fact that networks are becoming larger and faster; in
addition, industrial deployment needs to be considered [17].
Therefore, cloud computing needs an efficient DDoS mit-
igation approach that can offer fast and accurate detec-
tion while remaining scalable. The proposed CS_DDoS was
designed with all of these factors in mind.
III. DDoS TCP FLOOD ATTACKS
DDoS attacks can be established in two different ways: either
directly and/or indirectly [31], [32]. Direct attacks target a
weakness in the system of the victim machines and damage
the machines directly. On the other hand, indirect attacks
do not target victim machines directly; they prey on other
elements with which the victim machines are associated and
hinder their work [33]. In the following discussion, the TCP
flood attack is used; this is an indirect attack, as it consumes
most of the network’s resources, meaning that they are not
readily available to other users.
A TCP flood attack was carried out using software on a
virtual cloud network; Wireshark Network Analyzer 2.0.0
[34] was used to capture and analyze traffic both before and
during the attack.
A. BEFORE THE ATTACK
The network was simulated as shown in Figure 1.
VOLUME 5, 2017 6037
A. Sahi et al.: Efficient DDoS TCP Flood Attack Detection and Prevention System in a Cloud Environment
FIGURE 1. Test network architecture.
Firstly, using TCP Ping, we sent 50 TCP test probes (pings)
to a server (server machine 10.25.129.5:80). The reply took
1.3 ms on average, as shown below:
Ping statistics for 10.25.129.5:80
50 probes sent.
Approximate trip times in milliseconds:
Minimum = 0.25 ms, Maximum = 26.065 ms,
Average = 1.323 ms
The TCP protocol uses several flags to manage the state of
a connection in the packet header [35]. We focused on two of
these, which are used in establishing TCP connections:
• SYN (Synchronize) which represents the initiation of a
connection; and
• ACK (Acknowledge) which represents data received.
We monitored the traffic of the 50 probes at the server
machine using Wireshark, by capturing the packets that were
associated with the server using the filter ‘‘ip.addr = =
10.25.129.5’’. As the traffic was normal, the server machine
replied to all requested packets according to the TCP proto-
col, as shown in Figure 2 (a and b).
In addition, the I/O graph was stable. All packets were
answered and almost no TCP errors occurred. Note that the
number of requesting packets was approximately less than 10
per second, as shown in Figure 3.
B. DURING THE ATTACK
An attack was launched using a software program which
performed a DDoS TCP flood attack on a particular server.
Once the DDoS TCP flood attack commenced on the victim
machine in the cloud, the arriving packets were much more
numerous than the server could handle. Consequently, the
server could not respond to all the requesting packets from
either normal users or the attackers. Note that 10.25.129.5
was the IP address of the victim server and 10.31.133.235was
the IP address of the attacker. The first request packet from
the attacker was successful, as it was treated like a normal
requesting packet. The subsequent ones were not successful,
as the server was too busy and could not respond. A screen
shot of the packet capture is shown in Figure 4 (a and b).
Finally, we sent 50 TCP test probes within a few seconds
to the victim machine during the attack period to test the
connection. The reply time was 9.6 ms on average, which
differs considerably from the first test as shown below:
Ping statistics for 10.25.129.5:80
50 probes sent.
Approximate trip times in milliseconds:
Minimum = 0.181 ms, Maximum = 152.341 ms,
Average = 9.586 ms
To sum up, the DDoS TCP flood attack can affect the
cloud server’s performance within a short time, slowing down
the response, and can even stop the service completely. TCP
errors will also be increased, as shown in Figure 5. Therefore,
an efficient and effective detection and prevention technique
is required.
IV. THE PROPOSED CS_DDoS SYSTEM
In this section we present the proposed CS_DDoS system,
which can prevent DDoS TCP flood attacks. Firstly, it was
assumed that the IP addresses of the attackers are not spoofed.
Examples of how to prevent IP spoofing can be found in [36].
Our proposed system includes two sub-systems: the detection
sub-system and prevention sub-system, as shown in Figure 6.
A. DETECTION PHASE
During the detection phase, the detection sub-system collects
the incoming packets within a time frame, for example 60 sec-
onds. The collected packets are subjected to a blacklist check
to test whether their sources are blacklisted as attackers of
the cloud system. If the packet source is listed in the attacker
blacklist, the detection system will send the packets directly
to the prevention sub-system without further processing.
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FIGURE 2. Captured packets and TCP flags (normal). (a) Captured packets. (b) TCP flags.
If the packet source is not blacklisted, the incoming packet
will be passed to the classifier to decide whether the packets
are normal (originating from a client) or abnormal (origi-
nating from an attacker). A packet is considered to be an
attacking one if the source requests connections to the same
destination more frequently than an assumed threshold. The
threshold can be manually adjusted by the system adminis-
trator to cater for the varying requirements of a particular
network. If a packet is considered to be normal, the detec-
tion system will send it to its destination (the cloud service
provider). Otherwise, the detection sub-system will send the
packet to the prevention sub-system.
Four different classifiers are used in the detection sub-
system for the classification operation. The classifiers used
are explained and evaluated in Section 5.
B. PREVENTION PHASE
When the packets reach the prevention system, they are con-
sidered to be attacking packets by the detection sub-system.
The prevention sub-system first alerts the system adminis-
trator of the attacks. Then, the prevention sub-system will
add the attacking source address to the attacker blacklist used
FIGURE 3. The I/O graph (no TCP errors).
by the detection sub-system, if it is not already on the list.
Finally, the attacking packet will be dropped. The overall
architecture of the CS_DDoS system is shown in Figure 6.
Algorithm 1 is used to determine whether these packets
are normal or abnormal by counting the number of requests
for a connection from an IP address and checking whether it
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FIGURE 4. Captured packets and TCP flags (abnormal). (a) Captured packets. (b) TCP flags.
FIGURE 5. The I/O graph (with TCP errors).
exceeds a predefined threshold within a certain time frame.
This algorithm is applied to the training data used for each
classifier. As a result, each classifier used will predict the
behavior of the attackers according to Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Pre-Processing
1: Load data
2: For I=1: n
3: P=data (I, 2)
4: P2= (I, 1)
5: For J=1: n
6: N=find (data (J, 1) ==P2) & (data (J, 2) ==P)
7: If N>=K
8: New_data (I, 1) =data (I, 1)
9: New_data (I, 2) =−1
10: Else
11: New_data (I, 1) =data (I, 1)
12: New_data (I, 2) =1
13: End
where:
n is the number of packets
P is the destination IP address
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FIGURE 6. The overall architecture of the proposed CS_DDoS system.
P2 is the source IP address
N is the number of packets from the same source to the
same destination within 60 seconds
K is the threshold for a packet to be considered an attacking
packet
−1 indicates abnormal packets (blacklist array)
1 indicates normal packets
New_data () is a new entry list with tag ‘‘1’’ or ‘‘−1’’
The proposed CS_DDoS system can be implemented in
three possible scenarios. The first scenario is a normal service
request packet. The requested service will be delivered as
usual. The next scenario is when the source IP address is
not blacklisted but the number of service requesting packets
exceeds a predefined threshold within a certain time frame.
The packet in this scenario will be considered a DDoS attack
packet. The source address will be blacklisted and the packet
will be dropped. The last scenario is when the source address
of a packet is blacklisted and the packet is dropped without
any further processing.
The three scenarios are illustrated using Quick Sequence
Diagram Editor 4.2 [37]. The code used is shown
in Table 11. The resulting sequence diagrams are shown in
Figure 7 (a, b and c).
In case of flash crowd scenario, all packets must wait in a
queue to be served sequentially.
The proposed CS_DDoS system can be used in any type
of cloud, such as eHealth clouds, to ensure the security




In this section, we briefly explain the four commonly used
classification algorithms used in our experiments. The clas-
sification algorithms are as follows:
1) LS-SVM
The LS-SVM is a powerful classifier in the field of pattern
recognition for the detection of abnormalities from signals,
images and time series signals. The LS-SVM is an effi-
cient method of classifying two different sets of observations
into their relevant classes. It is capable of handling high
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FIGURE 7. CS_DDoS possible scenarios. (a) First scenario (normal packets). (b) Second scenario (store abnormal packets
in the blacklist). (c) Third scenario (abnormal packets already in the blacklist).
dimensional and non-linear data. In this work, the LS-SVM
is employed to detect illegal activities in a network. The
parameters of the LS-SVM are set during the training session
to obtain a high proportion of detected results [38].
2) Naïve Bayes
Naïve Bayes is a frequently used classifier and has a straight-
forward approach based on the application of Bayes’ the-
orem [39]. It is a simple approach which relies on proba-
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TABLE 1. Classification performance measurements (n=1000 and K=100).
TABLE 2. Classification performance measurements (n=2000 and K=200).
TABLE 3. Classification performance measurements (n=5000 and K=300).
TABLE 4. Classification performance measurements (n=6000 and K=400).
bilistic knowledge to accurately predict test instances. This
algorithm assumes that predictive attributes are conditionally
independent and that there are no hidden attributes which
can affect the prediction process [39]. The naïve Bayes
classifier uses small training sets to provide relatively good
performance, which generally overcomes any overtraining
issues.
3) K-NEAREST
K-nearest is one of the most straightforward learning algo-
rithms. In this algorithm, the similarity function relies on
distance measurements to compute the similarity between
training members [40]. The value of k is adjusted during the
training session to assign each instance during training to the
correct class. The k-nearest classifier is very sensitive to data
size and dimensionality, and this affects the feature space
and homogeneous areas, which represent the distribution of
various classes [41].
4) MULTILAYER PERCEPTRON
The multilayer perceptron is a particular type of neural
network-based classifier [42], [43]. This classifier employs
a multilayer feed-forward neural network with one or more
layers of nodes between the inputs and output layers. These
nodes at different layers are interconnected through weighted
networks. Using different training algorithms, the parameters
(weights) of the networks are optimized. In this classifier, the
data are transferred from input to output. Each feature is used
as an input in the multilayer perceptron, and the outputs are
the class categories. The multilayer perceptron may be linear,
when it is used with a single layer of nodes. It can also be a
nonlinear perceptron, when it is applied using multiple layers
of nodes with several hidden layers [40].
B. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND VALIDATION
In this section, the performance of the CS_DDoS system
is evaluated and validated using classification performance
measurements and K-fold cross-validation.
1) PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, the performance of the CS_DDoS method is
evaluated using the four classifiers of the LS-SVM, naïve
Bayes, k-nearest, and multilayer perceptron. Various training
data sizes (window sizes) and thresholds are used in the
experiments. Algorithm 1 is applied to the training data for
all the classifiers.
The CS_DDoS system was evaluated in terms of accu-
racy, sensitivity (detection rate) and specificity (false alarm
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TABLE 5. Classification performance average.
TABLE 6. Classification performance measurements (n=6000 and K=400).
TABLE 7. Classification performance measurements (n=6000 and K=400).
TABLE 8. Classification performance measurements (n=6000 and K=400).
TABLE 9. Classification performance measurements (n=6000 and K=400).
TABLE 10. Classification performance average.
rate), as well as the descriptive statistic Kappa coefficient.
Kappa coefficients are procedures used to connect between
categorical variables, and are frequently used as consistency
or legitimacy coefficients [44].
The accuracy represents the rate of correctly identi-
fied results over the entire data used by the CS_DDoS.
or true negatives (TN), while incorrectly identified results
are false positives (FP) and false negatives (FN). The
accuracy of the CS_DDoS system is measured by
Equation (1).
• True positives (TP): correctly identified abnormal pack-
ets in this research.
• False positives (FP): incorrectly identified abnormal
packets.
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FIGURE 8. Detection accuracy for multiple attacks.
FIGURE 9. Complexity times.
• True negatives (TN): correctly identified normal
packets.




TP+ FP+ TN + FN
× 100%
(1)
The sensitivity represents the rate of correctly identified
abnormal packets over the entire range of positive results
obtained by the CS_DDoS. The sensitivity of the CS_DDoS





The specificity represents the rate of incorrectly identified
abnormal packets over the entire range of negative results
produced by the CS_DDoS.






The proposed CS_DDoS system is evaluated under both
single source and multiple source attack environments, as
described below.
FIGURE 10. Six-fold cross-validation diagram.
a: EVALUATION UNDER SINGLE SOURCE ATTACK
Four test data sizes (n) of 1000, 2000, 5000 and 6000 packets
were randomly selected, and four thresholds (K) of 100, 200,
300 and 400 requests. Algorithm 1 was applied to the data
according to the window size, n, and was tested according to
the threshold K. We have two features fed to each classifier;
these two features are the source IP address and the destina-
tion IP address. Each classifier was used to classify the data
using the four windows and four thresholds. The results are
shown in Tables 1-5:
Tables 1 to 4 show the classification performances of
the proposed CS_DDoS system with different data sizes
and thresholds. The performance measurements are accuracy
(correctly detected data over the entire dataset), sensitivity
(correctly detected attacks, detection rate), specificity (incor-
rectly detected attacks, false alarm rate), and Kappa coeffi-
cient (stability rate).
According to Tables 1 to 4, the results of each classifier
were not significantly affected by the window sizes and
thresholds, since there are only small differences between the
tables. Tables 1 to 4 are summarized in Table 5.
From Table 5, it can be seen that the LS-SVM classifier
has the highest average percentage accuracy (97%) and the
highest Kappa coefficient (0.89). Conversely, the k-nearest
classifier achieved the lowest accuracy percentage of about
81%, and the multilayer perceptron classifier had the low-
est Kappa coefficient 0.69. Overall, the proposed CS_DDoS
system ismore effective and stable in resisting a single-source
attack when adopting the LS-SVM classifier regardless of the
window size and threshold.
b: EVALUATION UNDER MULTIPLE-SOURCE ATTACKS
To evaluate the performance under attacks from multiple
sources, the same four window sizes were used (1000, 2000,
5000 and 6000) and the same four thresholds (100, 200,
300 and 400). Algorithm 1 was also used. The results are
shown in Tables 6–10: Tables 6–9 show the results of the
classification accuracy of the proposed CS_DDoS system
when under multiple DDoS attacks. Tables 6–9 also show that
the results of each classifier were not significantly affected
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TABLE 11. Sequence diagram generation codes implemented using quick sequence diagram editor 4.2.
by the window size and the threshold. LS-SVMwas again the
best performing classifier with percentage accuracy of around
94%, and a Kappa coefficient of about 0.9. Tables 6-9 are
summarized in Table 10.
Overall, the proposed CS_DDoS system is also
effective and stable in resisting both multiple-source and
single-source attacks when using the LS-SVM classifier,
regardless of the window size and threshold. Therefore,
the proposed CS_DDoS system can be implemented in a
large-scale cloud project, such as a health cloud, as well as
in smaller projects such as a private cloud for a medium-
sized company. CS_DDoS can prevent DDoS attacks with
a 94% accuracy and is highly stable (Kappa coefficient 0.9).
CS_DDoS outperforms previous approaches, since either the
percentage accuracy of previous approaches is lower than
those achieved by CS_DDoS, for example 91% in [45], or
are without Kappa coefficient stability measurements for
example in [46].
In addition, the false alarm rate (specificity) of the bench-
mark algorithms are 69.57% on average [47]. Thus, we can
claim that our proposed CS_DDoS system is more effective.
To shed more light on the performance evaluation of the
proposed CS_DDoS system, the simulation was repeated
with various numbers of attackers (source IP) under similar
conditions and the performance measurements were calcu-
lated.
Figure 8 shows the performance of CS_DDoS with an
increasing number of attackers. There are slight fluctuations
in the performance measurements of all four classifiers,
although LS-SVM was still the best performer of the four.
In addition, the process complexity times of the four clas-
sification algorithms is shown in Figure 9. While LS-SVM is
only the second least time-consuming, the fastest classifier, k-
nearest, has lower performance measurements and a smaller
Kappa coefficient compared to LS-SVM. It can therefore
be considered that the LS-SVM is the most efficient and
effective classifier for use in the CS_DDoS system to resist
DDoS TCP flood attacks.
2) K-FOLD CROSS-VALIDATION
K-fold cross-validation is a validation model for measuring
how the outcomes of a numerical examination will simplify
to an independent dataset. Generally, it is utilized to validate
the estimation of performance accuracy in practice for a
predictive model [48-51].
K-fold cross-validation was used to carry out a perfor-
mance comparison of the four predictivemodeling algorithms
used in CS_DDoS: LS-SVM, naïve Bayes, k-nearest, and
multilayer perceptron. These four algorithms were compared
in terms of their prediction results.
The dataset was divided into six equal-sized chunks, k=6.
As a validation for model testing, one of the six chunks
was retained, and the remainder (five chunks) were used as
training data. Then, the process of the six-cross model was
repeated six times, so that each of the six chunks were used
as validation data for each model. The results are shown in
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Figure 10. We can see that the values of all folds are almost
the same, which means that each fold has approximately the
same rate for each of the four classification algorithms. Thus,
we can claim that the classification results are stable and
accurate, since each algorithm gives almost the same results
for each fold.
VI. CONCLUSION
The use of cloud computing in many sectors is becoming
widespread, as this helps to improve the system in many
respects. However, this cloud project is vulnerable to certain
types of attacks, such as DDoS TCP flood attacks. There-
fore, we propose a new approach called CS_DDoS for the
detection and prevention of DDoS TCP flood attacks. The
system is based on classification to ensure the security and
availability of stored data, especially important for eHealth
records for emergency cases. In this approach, the incoming
packets are classified to determine the behavior of the source
within a time frame, in order to discover whether the sources
are associated with a genuine client or an attacker. The results
show that using LS-SVM the CS_DDoS system can identify
the attacks accurately. The system has an accuracy of about
97 percent with a Kappa coefficient of about 0.89 when
under single attack; it is 94 percent accurate with a Kappa
coefficient of about 0.9 when under multiple attacks. The
performance is validated usingK-fold validation and is shown
to be stable and accurate. Thus, the proposed approach can
efficiently improve the security of records, reduce bandwidth
consumption and mitigate the exhaustion of resources. In the
future, we aim to extend CS_DDoS to overcome the problem
of DDoS using spoofed IP addresses as well as to improve
the proposed work to identify the attackers even when they
satisfy the threshold value.
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A review of the state of the art in privacy and security in the eHealth cloud 
 
Abstract  
The widespread proliferation and usefulness of cloud computing within eHealth requires high levels of security and privacy for 
health records. However, eHealth clouds pose serious security and privacy concerns for sensitive health data. Therefore, practical 
and effective methods of resistance are essential in order to preserve the privacy and security of this data. In view of this, and to 
fully explore current research directions in security and privacy in eHealth cloud, this study summarizes and analyses the state of 
the art in security and privacy in the eHealth cloud. An extensive review is conducted, and over 100 studies from several peer-
reviewed databases such as IEEE Xplore are examined. The selected studies are reviewed and summarized in terms of their 
benefits and risks. Thus, eHealth stakeholders can benefit from the knowledge and information presented in this paper. In 
addition, this study compares several research works in terms of data security requirements. This paper can assist in an 
understanding of the research trends in the areas of privacy and security. 
 
Key words Cloud security; cloud privacy; eHealth cloud. 
 
1. Introduction 
The official definition of cloud computing, according to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is as 
follows: “cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of 
configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and 
released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction” (Mell & Grance, 2009). Over the last decade, cloud 
computing has gained popularity within the health sector, as it offers several advantages such as low costs and flexible processes 
(Li et al., 2013). Cloud-based health services allow physicians, patients, and owners of health data to control and share their data 
easily. However, eHealth cloud computing poses a range of challenges, such as data security and privacy for clients and cloud 
service providers (CSPs) (Yu et al., 2017). Security and privacy issues threaten an open network and semi-trusted servers, which 
may lose, leak or disclose data (Tang et al., 2016). This can breach users’ privacy when sharing data in a public cloud. 
 









































A great deal of research has explored the security and privacy issues in the eHealth cloud, and many solutions have been 
suggested to resolve these issues. To obtain a clear picture of the security and privacy problems that can affect the eHealth cloud, 
this study summarizes and analyses the current state of the art in eHealth security and privacy. The aim of this study is to deliver a 
clear and complete picture of eHealth security and privacy issues, and to discuss recent research that targets these issues and the 
proposed solutions. As shown in Figure 1, we divide our study into five main categories: security and privacy, security controls, 
effective encryption, data security requirements, and disaster recovery plans. 
 
Although though cloud computing is widely used in the health sector, numerous issues remain unresolved (Jing et al., 2013; 
Sahi et al., 2015). Several studies have attempted to review the state of the art in security and privacy in the eHealth cloud (Abbas 
& Khan, 2014; Fernandez-Aleman et al., 2013; Gonzalez-Martinez et al., 2015; Sajid & Abbas, 2016; Yuksel et al., 2017); 
however, some of these studies are now rather outdated, and others do not cover certain vital features of cloud security and 
privacy, such as access control, revocation and data recovery plans. In addition, some of the existing review papers focus either on 
the privacy of the cloud or the security of the cloud, but not both. We therefore classify and evaluate these review papers of 
eHealth security and privacy. We believe that our review covers most of the recent studies in this area, and that it can be 
considered a good literature base for researchers in the area of health clouds. 
 
1.1. Paper Selection 
For this research, papers were collected from well-known research databases including IEEE Xplore, Springer, Elsevier, 
Science Direct, and Google Scholar. These databases contain many studies from journals and conferences which are relevant to 
security and privacy in the eHealth cloud. The primary selection was limited to the five years between 2013 and 2017, with certain 
exceptions. We used search terms such as “eHealth cloud security and privacy”, “eHealth cloud access control”, “eHealth cloud 
encryption”, “eHealth cloud security requirements”, and “eHealth cloud recovery plans”. The function words AND, OR, and 
NOT were also used to perform advanced searches, such as “eHealth cloud revocation” AND (“integrity” OR “access control”). 
Finally, we reviewed the selected papers according to their titles, abstracts, keywords, and conclusions to include the most 
relevant papers and to exclude irrelevant ones from the study. Figure 2 shows the inclusion and exclusion processes, and Figure 3 
shows the distribution of the selected articles over the years. 
The contributions of this study are as follows: we collect and evaluate papers on the current state of the art in eHealth security 
and privacy schemes. The collected papers are classified into five categories, as shown in Figure 1. We discuss the proposals and 
issues covered in these selected papers to facilitate better security and privacy in eHealth clouds. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows, using a structure similar to that of Figure 1. Section 2 describes the 
proposed schemes with regard to the security and privacy of the eHealth cloud; Section 3 describes the proposed schemes with 
regard to security controls; Section 4 describes effective encryption of the eHealth cloud; Section 5 discusses the data security 




Fig. 2. The inclusion/exclusion process 
Papers searched for in IEEE Xplore, 
Springer, Elsevier, Science Direct, 
and Google Scholar databases 
Search results 
= 502 
Paper selection based on 
title, abstract, keywords, and 
conclusion  
Relevant papers 
 = 216 
Irrelevant papers   
= 286 
Included papers  
= 101 
Paper selection 
based on a full 
reading 
Excluded papers  





Fig. 3. Distribution of the selected articles by year 
 
2. Security and Privacy in the Cloud 
Cloud computing is a model commonly used to save money and effort in many sectors, and particularly in the health sector. 
However, despite the benefits of the eHealth cloud, there are still many unresolved issues regarding security and privacy which 
require a great deal of research to be resolved.  
 
2.1. Identity Management  
An Identity Management System (IMS) is a comprehensive organizational system used to identify entities in a cloud project. 
Access to information and resources in the project is managed by linking client privileges and constraints with a proven identity. 
The main aim of an IMS is to determine what clients can do within a cloud project and under what conditions. In addition, an IMS 
is utilized to improve the security and privacy of a cloud system, and to reduce the running costs and effort. 
 
In order to manage access to data and resources, cloud service providers (CSP) either use their own IMS (such as CloudID 
(Haghighat et al., 2015)), or incorporate the client’s IMS into their infrastructure, for example using a biometric-based IMS to 
preserve the privacy of the cloud project’s information (Haghighat et al., 2015). A biometric-based IMS is used to connect the 
private data of the clients to their biometrics, which are saved as ciphertexts. To ensure that the CSP or any possible attackers 
cannot obtain any type of access to this private information, the proposed biometric-based IMS is implemented in an encrypted 
domain using a searchable cryptographic system. 
 
Recently, Wang et al. proposed a cost-effective secure eHealth cloud system using the Identity Based Encryption (IBE) 
method (Wang et al., 2017). In this system, there are four parties with different roles: the cloud, the health community, physicians, 
and patients. The system works as follows. Firstly, the system sets up public and private keys for all parties, according to their 
published identities (e.g. email addresses). These identities are considered as public keys, and are used to generate private keys 
using an IBE algorithm. Next, the Electronic Health Records (EHRs) are encrypted by the parties using a block cipher algorithm 
such as AES, and the keys are encrypted using the IBE and sent to the cloud. Following this, the parties can receive the encrypted 
EHRs from the cloud, and decrypt them using their identity keys. 
 
According to a survey conducted in (Khalil et al., 2014), more than 66% of users’ identities are stored in unsafe places. Khalil 
et al. (Khalil et al., 2014) therefore proposed a new IMS system called the Consolidated Identity Management (CIDM) system, 
which they claim is resistant to certain attacks, such as server compromise attacks, mobile device compromise attacks, and traffic 
interception attacks (Khalil et al., 2014). The CIDM mechanism splits permission identifications and spreads them between the 
parties at the IMS to prevent traffic interception attacks. In order to mitigate mobile device compromise attacks, a challenge-
response approach was adopted. Finally, the security of the communication channels between the CIDM and the CSP is addressed 
to reduce the possibility of any effective compromise of that channel (Khalil et al., 2014). However, further investigation is 
required to resolve the problem of insufficient dynamic federated identities and privacy in most of the current IMS systems 
(Sanchez et al., 2012). This is an architectural problem and must be considered at the design level. 
 
Haufe et al. proposed a new framework named the Information Security Management System (ISMS) (Haufe et al., 2014), 
consisting of many vital security procedures for the eHealth cloud. The proposed security management framework was 
implemented based on the ISO 27000 family of standards. The ISMS was able to identify the most frequent cloud computing 
threats and the information that these aimed to collect from the cloud system (Haufe et al., 2014). One drawback is that the ISMS 
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needs specific details from processes, such as input, output, and interfaces, to facilitate communication and interaction between 
processes.  
In another study, the concept of the Identity Management as a Service (IDaaS) was discussed (Nunez & Agudo, 2014). In this 
work, the authors proposed a new IMS called BlindIdM which preserved the privacy of data and delivered them as IDaaS. 
Specifically, the authors described how a system based on the Security Assertion Markup Language (SMAL) was employed with 
proxy encryption to enhance the security of the cloud project with respect to the CSP (Nunez & Agudo, 2014). To improve the 
proposed system, extending the IDaaS from a single domain to a cross-domain approach has been suggested, as in the System for 
Cross-domain Identity Management (SCIM) (Grizzle et al., 2015; SCIM, 2017).  
 
Xiong et al. proposed a scheme named Privacy pReserving Identity and Access Management (PRIAM) (Xiong et al., 2014), 
which had five components: registration, token withdrawal, tenant pre-authorization, access control, and token spending. PRIAM 
is described as being able to fulfil all the requirements of cloud security. The proposed scheme used a hash function, signature, 
and mutual authentication to ensure the privacy of clients. In order to deliver secure access control for clients and CSP, it utilized 
a service-level agreement. Finally, Burrows Abadi Needham (BAN) logic was used to confirm the correctness of the scheme 
(Burrows et al., 1989). 
 
2.2. Physical Security  
Physical security is the concept of securing and controlling access to servers, storage, and workstations. In other words, the 
aim of physical security is to prevent intruders from accessing cloud physical facilities. Cloud hardware, such as servers, switches 
etc., is also physically secured by the CSP from any unusual activities such as attacks, threats, and floods (Regola & Chawla, 
2013), and is provided with the necessary power supplies to reduce any potential interruptions.  
 
Mxoli et al. showed that in order to protect Personal Health Records (PHRs) from any physical intrusion, the system hardware 
must have a physical security border (Mxoli et al., 2014); for example, physical access control, offices and rooms must be 
secured, and resistance against disasters and other environmental situations must be available. All of these security borders must 
be in place to ensure that the cloud and network equipment is not readily accessible to the public. The equipment and applications 
used by the CSP, which may contain PHRs, must not be moved out of the site or repositioned without the administrator’s 
authorization (Mxoli et al., 2014). 
 
The IT equipment building, or the site where data centres and other cloud hardware are located, must be properly secured. 
Rodrigues et al. highlighted that these buildings must be secured by security staff members, video surveillance systems and 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS); in addition, only authorized people should be allowed to enter the building using authenticated 
access controls (Rodrigues et al., 2013). 
 
Carlson stated that CSPs should adopt Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) standards in order to ensure 
the physical security of their records. Since the physical entrances to the physical machines and storage devices are a possible 
route for data compromise, FISMA must be implemented at the client sites as well as at the server sites (Carlson, 2014). 
 
2.3. Privacy  
CSP uses encryption and other techniques to preserve the privacy of clients’ critical information, such as credit card numbers, 
and only authorized clients have the right to access this kind of information.  
 
Abbas et al. reviewed the state of the art in eHealth cloud privacy in 2014 (Abbas & Khan, 2014). Here, we aim to cover not 
only the issues regarding privacy, but also other security concerns, such as storage security, access controls, and disaster recovery 
plans etc. In this section, we will therefore first review some of the proposed approaches with regard to eHealth privacy. More 
details on privacy preservation approaches can be found in Abbas et al.’s paper (Abbas & Khan, 2014). 
 
A three-factor authentication protocol based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) was proposed by Yeh et al. in 2013 (Yeh 
et al., 2013). The protocol had certain disadvantages, such as a vague procedure, impractical IDs, and no shared key (Wu et al., 
2015). In addition, the protocol could not prevent spoofing attacks (Wu et al., 2015). Another authentication protocol based on a 
fingerprint was proposed by Khan et al. (Khan & Kumari, 2013). However, this protocol could not mitigate impersonation or 
desynchronization attacks (Wu et al., 2015). In order to overcome the weaknesses of these protocols, Wu et al. proposed a new 
biometrics-based three-factor authentication protocol that can overcome all those drawbacks as well as ensuring the privacy of 
clients (Wu et al., 2015). This protocol used the ECC and mobile devices, and adopted a fuzzy extractor to deal with inadequate 
biometric inputs. The protocol proposed by Wu et al. was formally proved using random oracles and Elliptic Curve Gap Diffie–
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Hellman (ECGDH) problem assumption to demonstrate the low probability of success of these attacks. However, this protocol is 
vulnerable to other attacks, such as impersonation and offline password guessing attacks, if the mobile device falls into the wrong 
hands; in addition, the user revocation procedure was not included in that protocol (Jiang et al., 2016 (A)). Therefore, another 
three-factor authentication protocol that is able to resist these attacks and offers more security features was proposed by Jiang et 
al. in 2016 (Jiang et al., 2016 (A)). 
Yang et al. presented a privacy preservation approach for health records in the eHealth cloud (Yang et al., 2015). This 
approach was based on the classification of health record attributes; it collected these attributes vertically from the health dataset 
in order to ensure that these were collected from all areas of the dataset with different privacy aspects. Their approach consisted of 
four steps: (1) vertical data collection, (2) data merging, (3) integrity checks, and (4) plain and cipher text searches. Cryptography 
and statistical analysis were combined in order to create multiple approaches which can strike a balance between the use of health 
records and privacy preservation (Yang et al., 2015). However, this approach does not consider the situation where several users 
are using the service at the same time. 
 
Another scheme proposed by Sahi et al. aims to preserve the privacy of the PHRs (Sahi et al., 2016). This scheme adopted a 
three-party password-based authenticated key exchange protocol (3PAKE) based on the computational Diffie–Hellman 
assumption proposed by Khader and Lai (Khader & Lai, 2015). This scheme used a different generator and primitive root in each 
session to ensure that only the specific client has complete access to his/her PHR; clients are revoked at the end of the session. 
This can ensure that old session keys cannot be used to access a client’s PHRs. A disaster recovery plan and a break-glass 
technique are also addressed in this scheme. 
 
According to Wang et al., cryptography can be very expensive when it is used to preserve the privacy of health records in the 
cloud (Wang et al., 2015 (B)). They therefore proposed a privacy preserving scheme which transferred sensitive health 
information to a trusted private cloud and the remainder to a public one. Two protocols were involved in this scheme; the first was 
used to preserve the privacy of the clients, and the second was used to resist any potential collusion between user records and the 
public CSP. To ensure the privacy of the sensitive information, the dataset was divided into several parts. The fragmented 
information was distributed among clouds and could be re-joined (Wang et al., 2015 (B)).  
 
Based on the HireSome-I method, an improved history record-based service optimization method (HireSome-II) was proposed 
by Dou et al. in 2015 (Dou et al., 2015). HireSome-II was proposed in order to ensure the privacy of big data such as health 
records in cloud computing. The cloud rejects requests which can reveal transaction information for privacy reasons, and the 
proposed method can efficiently support the cloud service structure to complete transactions securely (Dou et al., 2015). 
 
Another framework to ensure the privacy of patient data was proposed by Page et al. (Page et al., 2015). This framework 
combines monitoring and analytic methods to deliver secure and authenticated health records. This framework was based on fully 
homomorphic encryption (FHE). However, FHE is known as a heavy technique; therefore, to measure the practicality of the 
proposed framework, the authors developed a proof of concept and a prototype system (Page et al., 2015). 
 
3. Cloud Security Controls 
Security approaches are effective in cloud environments when an excellent protection mechanism is adopted. This mechanism 
must identify the potential problems that may arise during the management process. These problems will be addressed and 
considered by the security controls, thus preserving the security of the system from its own weaknesses and reducing the number 
of attacks (Sajid & Abbas, 2016). There are many cloud security controls, which can be categorized as follows. 
3.1. Deterrent Controls 
Deterrent controls aim to reduce the number of attacks on a cloud project. A “No Trespassing” sign can alert security personnel to 
watch out for intruders as well as highlighting the consequences of intrusion. Deterrent controls serve to warn attackers that there 
will be penalties and punishments if they proceed with attacks (Nedelcu et al., 2015; Rajamani et al., 2016).  
3.2. Preventive Controls 
Preventive controls aim to secure cloud projects by preventing or decreasing vulnerabilities. For example, an effective 
authentication protocol can ensure the security of the cloud’s clients, and prevent any unauthorized access to that cloud. 
Preventive controls can therefore help the cloud system to confidently identify their clients (Nedelcu et al., 2015; Rajamani et al., 
2016). 
3.3. Detective Controls 
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Detective controls aim to detect and respond appropriately to attacks which could threaten the cloud system. During an attack, the 
detective control will notify the preventive control or the corrective control to report the problem. An intrusion detection system 
(IDS) is typically used as a detective control (Li et al., 2013; Yu et al., 2017). 
3.4. Corrective Controls 
Corrective controls aim to reduce the damage of an attack. These controls are usually initiated during or after attacks. Restoring a 
cloud system from a backup to ensure the availability of services is an example of a corrective control (Nedelcu et al., 2015; 
Rajamani et al., 2016). 
Generally, access controls are linked to security policies delivered to clients while accessing the service. A company typically 
has its own security controls which allow staff members access to a set of data rather than giving them full data access. This 
control limits the access of a staff member to a particular group of data. These kinds of security controls need to be put in place in 
cloud projects to avoid unauthorized access. The Software as a Service (SaaS) model must be sufficiently elastic to combine the 
set of controls offered by the company (Subashini & Kavitha, 2011). 
Recently, much research has been done on cloud security controls. We discuss some of these works in the following 
paragraphs. 
Many stakeholders might access PHRs without authorization. Access control is therefore a major problem for the privacy of 
data when health records are stored and shared in the cloud. Thus, a dynamic access control is necessary to ensure the privacy of 
these stored health records. Son et al. proposed a new dynamic access control scheme for securing the privacy of the PHRs in 
cloud projects (Son et al., 2017). Their scheme can detect unauthorized access dynamically by altering the context information, 
meaning that even if the subject has the same role, access authorization will not be defined in the same way, according to the 
conditions and the context information. The proposed scheme was tested using a real-life health system. 
 
Tong et al. proposed another access control architecture which was designed to ensure the privacy of data (Tong et al., 2014). 
The proposed architecture had several features including key exchange, storage data privacy, emergency retrieval, and auditability 
to overcome any misuse of health records. A pseudorandom number generator was used as a key exchange to ensure unlinkability, 
and a redundancy-based secure indexing feature was proposed to preserve the privacy of the data by hiding the search and access 
patterns. Finally, in order to mitigate any potential misbehaviour, an attribute-based encryption was integrated with threshold 
signing, to be used in emergency and normal situations as an access control with auditability. 
 
Based on two-stage keyed access control and a zero-knowledge protocol, Kahani et al. proposed another security control 
method (Kahani et al., 2016). Their method aimed to facilitate access control and authentication in electronic health cloud 
systems. When a user requests access to a health record, a limited amount of access will be extracted based on the user’s rights. In 
order to connect two parties in the system securely, a two-stage key management is used. This two-stage key management is a 
combination of public key encryption and Derived Unique Key Per Transaction (DUKPT) 
 
Fernando et al. proposed a new approach which aimed to reduce leaks of patient information using unlinkability (Fernando et 
al., 2016). This approach provided the health data owner with the ability to make decisions in terms of access control. To fulfil the 
policies of the service provider, the proposed approach utilized a personal information management protocol which could improve 
the privacy of the patients. This approach depended on a scenario in which patient EHRs were stored on a Health Information 
Exchange (HIE) cloud service. The approach demonstrated the communication techniques between EHR consumers, EHR 
owners, EHR creators, and the HIE service. The authors claimed that the privacy of the EHR was ensured by the unlinkability of 
consumers’ sessions with the HIE service; in addition, the HIE service could not reach the consumer classes even when they had 
access policies. The proposed approach works as follows: a patient consults a doctor and the doctor prescribes a medical test. The 
patient goes to a laboratory with the doctor’s instructions, and the laboratory carries out the test. The results of the test are sent by 
the laboratory to the HIE. Finally, the patient provides access to the doctor and the HIE (Fernando et al., 2016).  The proposed 
approach is illustrated in Figure 4. 
 
 




In 2015, Wand et al. proposed a new scheme called Constant-Size Ciphertext Policy Comparative Attribute-Based Encryption 
(CCP-CABE). This method inserts similar characteristics from all attributes into a key, and combines the restrictions of these 
attributes into a single chunk of a ciphertext. This procedure is carried out during the encryption process in order to apply elastic 
access control rules with a variety of relationships. The authors showed that the CCP-CABE scheme was efficient, as it produced 
keys and ciphertexts of the same size each time for any number of attributes, as well as reducing the cost of the computation to a 
trivial size. In order to ensure access privacy, the authors extended CCP-CABE to numerous attribute domains (Wang et al., 2015 
(C)). 
Younis et al. proposed a new model named Access Control for Cloud Computing (AC3) (Younis et al., 2014). This model 
utilized the role and task principles, as shown in Figure 5, and used clients’ jobs as a categorizing factor. Based on the clients’ jobs 
roles, security domains are created to restrict each client to a particular security domain. Each role within the AC3 is given a group 
of related and required tasks for performing those roles. For access to data and resources, security classification is done for each 
task, and an authentic permission is required to complete the task. The authors employed a risk engine to interact with 
unpredictable client behaviours. However, an authentication protocol that can deal with massive storage complexity and high 
performance is required. 
 
Fig.5. Access Control for Cloud Computing (AC3), adapted from (Younis et al., 2014) 
In 2014, Yang and Jia proposed a new multi-authority access control scheme (Yang & Jia, 2014). In this scheme, the authors 
presented a Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-based Encryption (CP-ABE) scheme. This is an extension to a single-authority scheme 
proposed by Lewko and Waters in (Lewko & Waters, 2012). Yang and Jia adopted Chase’s multi-authority scheme (Chase, 2007) 
in which all generated secret keys were combined together for the same client. CP-ABE also used a revocable scheme and could 
mitigate collusion attacks. More specifically, the functionality of a single authority is divided into a certificate authority and 
multiple attribute authorities. The proposed multi-authority access control scheme is shown in Figure 6. 
 
Fig.6. Multi-authority access control scheme, adapted from (Yang & Jia, 2014) 
8 
 
Li et al. adopted Semantic-Based Access Control (SBAC) techniques to propose a new architecture called IntercroSsed 
Secure Big Multimedia Model (2SBM) for securing accesses between different cloud systems (Li et al., 2016 (B)). In addition to 
the architecture shown in Figure 7, the 2SBM architecture can be summarized in three steps: 
 In order to relate attributes to each other, the proposed architecture formats the data by linking the attributes in a matrix; 
 Based on these relationships, the architecture creates interrelations between attributes in the matrix; and 
 The architecture builds a tree of attributes and sorts the attributes according to their frequency, to improve the efficiency 
of access control. 
 
Fig.7. Architecture of 2SBM, adapted from (Li et al., 2016 (B)) 
Choi et al proposed the ontology-based Access Control Model (Onto-ACM) in 2014 (Choi et al., 2014). Onto-ACM is a model 
of analysis which recognizes and presents the differences between providers and clients. Based on this analysis, the ontology 
cognitive and context-aware technologies, the proposed model can decide whether or not to allow data access. This model can be 
seen as a detailed access control, which can be used to establish cloud feature boundaries.  
Yu et al. proposed a new scheme which claimed to achieve secure, scalable, and fine-grained access policies for cloud projects 
(Yu et al., 2010). The proposed scheme uses attribute-based encryption (ABE), proxy re-encryption (PRE), and lazy re-
encryption. Specifically, it allows the data owner to pass the operations of computation to the servers without revealing the 
original data. In this scheme, the data owner is therefore responsible for the accessibility of the data, which is particularly suitable 
for cloud projects. 
Ruj et al. proposed another form of access control in 2014 (Ruj et al., 2014). In this method, there are three types of clients: 
creator, reader, and writer. For example, Alice is the client and a trusted party gives her a token. The trusted party could be any 
government office controlling health records. When submitting a claim, Alice presents her identification (e.g., a health card), and 
the trusted party provides her with the token. In this scheme, there are two key distribution centres (KDCs) which are responsible 
for distributing the keys to the clients. Based on the information in the token and the keys from one or two of the KDCs, a creator 
makes a decision on the claim, ensuring the identity of Alice and authenticating and encrypting the messages under this claim. The 
signed ciphertext is then sent to the cloud. The cloud system authenticates the signature of the ciphertext and keeps it on the cloud 
servers. When the reader asks to read a message, the cloud system will send the ciphertext. Without the appropriate keys, the user 
would not be able to retrieve the plaintext; however, the access control manager has full access to all client information and can 
decrypt the ciphertexts. 
 
4. Effective Encryption 
Several advanced encryption algorithms have been used in cloud computing to protect the security and privacy of eHealth 
data. Encryption schemes such as public key encryption (PKE) and symmetric key encryption (SKE) are frequently used to 
protect data in eHealth cloud projects (Abbas & Khan, 2014). Other encryption schemes are also used to ensure the security and 
privacy of eHealth records, including attribute-based encryption (ABE), fully homomorphic encryption (FHE), and searchable 
encryption (SE). 
 
4.1. Attribute-Based Encryption Algorithms 
The first ABE algorithms were presented by Sahai and Waters in 2005 (Sahai & Waters, 2005), and by Goyal et al. in 2006 
(Goyal et al., 2006). 
 
ABE is a type of PKE where the ciphertext and shared key of a client are reliant on attributes. In ABE systems, retrieving a 
plaintext from ciphertext is applicable for clients who have a group of key attributes that match ciphertext attributes. One of the 
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most important features of the ABE system is that it is collusion resistant; an attacker who has many keys can only access the 
system when at least one key has an endorsed access. Recently, numerous researchers have proposed ABE algorithms; some of 
these are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
 
Fabian et al. proposed a new ABE-based scheme for secure data sharing in eHealth clouds (Fabian et al., 2015). The proposed 
scheme aims to preserve the security and privacy of patients’ records in partly trustworthy cloud servers. It uses the ABE 
algorithm to manage users’ accessibility to health records and shared keys, and to distribute information and health records among 
several clouds. Figure 8 shows a patient visiting three different health centres (HCs A, B and C). His/her health record is updated 
at each of the three centres. When the patient visits HC C, the doctors at HC C can request the full health record for that patient 
from HCs A and B through the multi-cloud proxy. However, the key management process needs to be reconsidered and solved. In 
addition, the key authority of the ABE algorithm has to be distributed, and security responsibilities must be separated. 
 
 
Fig. 8. Scheme proposed by Fabian et al. (Fabian et al., 2015) 
 
Li et al. proposed a new ABE-based framework for secure sharing of PHRs in the eHealth cloud (Li et al., 2013). The authors 
assumed that the cloud servers were semi-trusted; they also argued that the PHR records had to be encrypted to ensure the privacy 
of the patients. They used the ABE algorithm to encrypt PHRs, and patients can delegate others from public domains to access 
their PHR records. This work involved verifying key management complexity reduction and privacy enhancement. The proposed 
framework involves multiple data owners, clients, attribute authorities (AAs), and SDs. The framework can use one of two ABE 
algorithms: the revocable key policy ABE system proposed by Yu et al. was used for each public and personal domain (PSD) (Yu 
et al., 2010), and the authors proposed their own revocable MA-ABE system to be used for each personal and public domain 
(PUD). 
 
Outsourced ABE (OABE) approaches can significantly decrease the computational cost of encryption by moving the large 
computation to a CSP. However, large encrypted files which are saved on the cloud are likely to affect the query processing in a 
negative way. Li et al. therefore proposed a keyword search function (KSF-OABE) approach, which aimed to solve this problem 
(Li et al., 2017). KSF-OABE offers key issuing, decryption, and keyword search functions. It retrieves part of the ciphertext 
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according to a particular keyword. In this approach, operations that consume a large amount of time will be moved to the CSP, 
while users needing less time would process consuming operations. Thus, the processing time can be reduced on both the CSP and 
user sides. However, the proposed KSF-OABE approach does not offer verifiability features. The proposed approach was tested 
only for a replayable chosen-ciphertext attack (RCCA) and was not tested for a chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA). CCA-secure 
approaches are RCCA-secure, although RCCA-secure approaches are not CCA-secure. Therefore, testing under both CCA and 
RCCA conditions is suggested.  
 
A PHR system based on the ABE algorithm was presented by Xhafa et al. for secure sharing and storing of PHRs in the cloud 
(Xhafa et al., 2015 (B)). This system permits users to share their PHRs and personal information selectively with health service 
providers. The proposed system is practical as it provides searchability, revocation, and local decryption. 
 
Based on their operations, ABEs can be classified as ciphertext-policy or key-policy ABEs. 
 
4.1.1. Ciphertext-Policy ABEs  
In the ciphertext-policy (CP-ABE) approaches, the encryptor manages the access operation. The public key process is more 
complex due to the complexity of the access operation and hardens the system. Most CP-ABE research concentrates on the access 
control design (Su et al., 2011). 
Liu et al. proposed a new approach based on CP-ABE with a signature (SignCryption), called CP-ABSC. It delivers PHR 
authentication, encryption, and access control (Liu et al., 2015 (C)). The proposed approach permits a patient to sign the PHR 
record using a secret key and a group of personal attributes, as shown in Figure 9. CP-ABSC has two features: access control and 
signature encryption (SignCryption). The authors claim that a combination of these two features can deliver the authenticity, 
unforgeability, confidentiality and collusion prevention required by a PHR system. However, a revocation process was not 
considered. In addition, according to Rao, this approach cannot provide verifiability for a public ciphertext property, which is 
necessary to resist any invalid ciphertext decryption in order to decrease the redundant load on the decryptor (Rao, 2017). 
 
 
Fig. 9. Approach proposed by Liu et al. (Liu et al., 2015 (C)) 
 
As a result, in 2017, Rao proposed another CP-ABSC approach for PHR cloud projects, which claimed to be verifiable for a 
public ciphertext (Rao, 2017). This approach satisfies the important security properties of the attribute-based signature (ABS) and 
ABE. Furthermore, it uses communication links to a lesser extent than other approaches. This CP-ABSC has two assumptions: 
existential unforgeability in selective signing predicate and adaptive chosen message attack (EUF-sSP-CMA) and the resistance of 
the computational Diffie–Hellman Exponent (cDHE) problem, and decisional Bilinear Diffie–Hellman Exponent (dBDHE) 
problem” (Rao, 2017). These assumptions can prevent the “indistinguishability of ciphertext in selective encryption predicate and 
adaptive chosen ciphertext” attack (IND-sEP-CCA2). 
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Wang et al. (Wang et al., 2015 (A)) introduced another cloud-based PHR (CB-PHR) system. CB-PHR permits the owners of 
PHRs to safely store their records in a partly trustworthy CSP, and to share them with several clients of their choice. PHR clients 
were divided into public and personal domains to decrease the complexity of key management. In this approach, health records 
are encrypted by the owner of the PHRs using CP-ABE for presentation to the public domain, whereas health records are 
encrypted using a nameless multi-receiver identity-based encryption algorithm for the personal domain. Therefore, only accredited 
clients whose identification can meet the CP specifications can decrypt health records (Wang et al., 2015 (A)). The authors 
suggest services such as statistics and retrieval of data. It should be mentioned that the CB-PHR has a high computational cost, as 
it encrypts the same record twice. 
Motivated by cloud security requirements, Xu et al. modified the CP-ABE scheme to propose a new Verifiable Delegation CP-
ABE (VDCPABE) (Xu et al., 2016). This cloud computing scheme is based on verifiable technology and multilinear maps. 
Hybrid encryption is used to encrypt data by its owner. For each ciphertext block, a verifiable message authentication code 
(MAC) is generated privately, and the full ciphertext is then uploaded to the cloud. When the data owner is not online, the client 
who requested the data can ask the cloud server directly (Xu et al., 2016). 
Health records are usually represented using a multilayer hierarchical structure. However, according to Wang et al., this 
hierarchical characteristic of health records has not been investigated thoroughly in terms of CP-ABE (Wang et al., 2016). They 
therefore proposed a data hierarchy ABE approach for such cloud projects. A single access control method was used rather than 
levelled access control methods, and the hierarchical data were encrypted using this single access control method. The proposed 
scheme was shown to reduce storage and time costs, since the parts of the ciphertext which were related to attributes are 
distributed by the records (Wang et al., 2016). 
A PHR privacy preserving approach based on a multi-authority CP-ABE which offers revocation features and ensures fine-
grained access was proposed by Qian et al. (Qian et al., 2015). The authors show that this approach can be implemented in a partly 
trustworthy server and encrypted PHRs with multiple owners can be stored on that server. The proposed approach was able to 
work in public cloud PHR systems (Li et al., 2013). Once PHRs encryption is complete, in order to achieve a fine-grained access, 
the patient can combine ciphertext with multilayer access attributes. A key exchange scheme was used to preserve the privacy of 
the PHRs. This key exchange scheme ensures that if cracked, authorities will expose zero information regarding the client’s global 
identifier (GId). As a result, the tracing of a GId by an attacker yields no information about the client’s attributes. The revocation 
of lazy client and on-demand services are features provided by this approach to decrease the computational overhead (Qian et al., 
2015). 
Another approach based on CP-ABE was proposed by Guo et al. to secure EHRs in health cloud environments (Guo et al., 
2016). This approach uses a CP-ABE algorithm to encrypt tables published by healthcare providers, such as EHRs. The patient’s 
identification number is used as a primary key to store these records in a database. This permits multiple clients with multiple 
constraints to search multiple database columns. The authors highlight that their work differs from others in terms of securing 
outsourcing records, as the search management of columns in the database is emphasized (Guo et al., 2016). 
Xhafa et al. presented a multi-authority CP-ABE approach with a patient accountability feature to secure PHR sharing in a 
health cloud project (Xhafa et al., 2015 (A)). In the proposed work, patient privacy was secured by the access control policy being 
hidden. The reduction of authority and PHRs trust assumptions were ensured through the accountability feature. 
 
4.1.2. Key-Policy ABE (KP-ABE) 
In the Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (KP-ABE) schemes, ciphertext has a group of attributes, and the access 
regulations are controlled by the client's private key. Ciphertext can be decrypted only when these groups of attributes match the 
structure of access to the client's private key (Attapadung et al., 2012). 
Based on the Decisional Bilinear Deffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption, a privacy-preserving KP-ABE (PP KP-ABE) approach 
was proposed for secure data sharing in a cloud system (Rahulamathavn et al., 2016). This approach permits clients to retrieve 
data from the cloud and then decrypt it, without exposing any attribute information to a third party. The issue of collusion attacks 
has been resolved in this research, as PP KP-ABE is collusion resistant. The authors of PP KP-ABE utilized a key management 
scheme to strengthen the connection between client and the secret key; thus, multiple clients cannot use their secret keys to 
produce a secret key for an unapproved client (Rahulamathavn et al., 2016). 
Another KP-ABE-based scheme named access policy re-definable ABE (APR-ABE) was proposed by Qin et al. for securing 
EHRs in cloud environments (Qin et al., 2015). In APR-ABE, attribute vectors were used to implement access control. This access 
control was linked to clients’ secret keys; higher level clients can easily redefine their access control to be commensurate with 




4.2. Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) 
FHE is a type of encryption that has a special feature permitting operations to be done on a ciphertext as well as on plaintext 
(Maral et al., 2016). This is a vital feature, especially in modern ICT systems, as it enables the possibility of chaining several 
services together without leaking information. There are several schemes which secure health records using FHE, and we discuss 
some of these in the following paragraphs. 
A FHE-based scheme was proposed to secure computations for the Genome-Wide Association Study (GWAS) (Lu et al., 
2015). The proposed scheme aims to preserve the privacy of patients’ genomic data. It adapts FHE to encrypt genotype and 
phenotype data for all patients in order to implement meaningful operations on a ciphertext. However, the authors do not consider 
the computational complexity of the FHE in their proposed scheme, which is a major issue for the proposed FHE scheme 
(Kumarage et al., 2016). 
Another approach based on FHE was proposed to preserve the privacy of health data in a public cloud (Kocabas & Soyata, 
2015; Page et al., 2014). A detailed analysis was provided based on heart rate (average), heart rate (max/min), and the automated 
detection of irregular heartbeats. The authors provided a set of experimental results over 24 hours using an electrocardiogram 
(ECG) signal dataset and a homomorphic encryption library (HElib). The results show that the proposed approach can be adapted 
for a health cloud system to secure data from these issues (Kocabas & Soyata, 2015; Page et al., 2014). However, the proposed 
scheme does not solve the problem of computational complexity in FHE. The implementation of this approach in a real-time 
parallel system also needs to be considered to reduce the procedure time. 
Zhao et al. proposed a different FHE-based system to solve the issue of lack of data safety in a health cloud (Zhao et al., 2014). 
The authors claim that the proposed method is suitable for both retrieving and processing ciphertext for secure storage of health 
data on cloud servers and transmission of data between the cloud and the clients. This method was able to offer search date for a 
third party. However, in the same way as the previous methods, this method also suffers from high computation requirements. 
4.3. Searchable Encryption (SE) 
SE is a cryptographic scheme that provides safe search in a ciphertext. For enhanced effectiveness, SE typically constructs 
keyword indexes to verify client requests. SE schemes can be based either on a public key or secret key. Many proposals have 
been proposed to deliver secure search over encrypted text, and some of these are described below. 
Yang and Ma have proposed a time-dependent SE approach with a designated tester and timing enabled proxy re-encryption 
function (Re-dtPECK) (Yang & Ma, 2016). This approach permits patients to give limited access privileges to others, which helps 
to control search procedures over the health records within a certain timeframe. People who are given access privileges by patients 
can search and decrypt health records within this limited timeframe. In addition, Re-dtPECK offers a linked word search, and can 
prevent guessing attacks (Yang & Ma, 2016). However, the revocation feature was not considered in this approach, as the patient 
holds the same key most of the time, meaning that Re-dtPECK needs to consider redistributing secret keys among authorized 
clients. 
A scheme named secure channel-free searchable encryption (SCF-PEKS) has been proposed to offer a secure search over 
encrypted EHR (Wu et al., 2016 (B)). This version of SCF-PEKS was shown to be able to reduce storage and computational costs 
when compared to the previous SCF-PEKS. Moreover, it can resist keyword guessing attacks. However, despite reductions in 
storage and computation costs, ranked and fuzzy keyword searches were not provided, and integrity checks were missing.  
Another proposed scheme uses a Bloom filter tree index to permit accredited users to retrieve data from ciphertext in a cloud 
(Song et al., 2017). In addition to the proposed scheme, the authors introduced a ranking method based on keyword membership, 
to retrieve only vital keywords. The authors argued that their work was the first to be able to retrieve full encrypted text from a 
large cloud storage database. However, a collusion attack could possibly threaten the proposed scheme. 
Liu et al. proposed a novel EHR cloud project which aimed to safely share and store EHR records in a cloud environment (Liu 
et al., 2016). The proposed approach is based on binary trees for saving EHR ciphertext, and the ABE algorithm was adopted for 
efficient encryption of the shared keys. The authors claimed that the proposed project was designed to secure EHRs, and these 
were encrypted using a symmetric algorithm. With fewer cryptographic operations, a searchable encryption scheme might 
improve the system further. However, integrity checks were not offered by the proposed system. 
Since the security of data sharing is an important factor for any cloud-based system, especially health cloud systems, Liang 
and Susilo defined a new notation searchable attribute-based proxy re-encryption (ABPRE) scheme to address this issue (Liang & 
Susilo, 2015). However, the authors did not state how they might reduce the search token size, and how a key holder could create 
tokens. A modified scheme was recommended to address these issues. 
In addition, Li et al. introduced two fine-grained multi-keyword search (FMS) schemes, FMS_I and FMS_II (Li et al., 2016 
(A)). FMS_I was designed to provide an accurate search by considering common keyword factors and related scores. FMS_II was 
built to offer a secure complex search, which might contain several keywords connected with logical operations such as “AND” 
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and “OR” operations. Finally, to enhance the efficiency of the proposed schemes, FMS classified support (FMSCS) sub-
dictionaries were proposed. However, the proposed method cannot deal with a multi-user cloud. 
Finally, a multi-keyword SE method was proposed to safely search over encrypted text on a cloud (Xia et al., 2016). This 
method was able to offer dynamic operations such as insert and delete operations. The authors designed their own tree-based 
index, as well as a “greedy depth-first search” method to enhance the ranked search using multiple keywords. They chose the 
KNN algorithm to encrypt the query and the index. In addition, this algorithm was chosen to compute the score of the connections 
between the query and the index. Shade terms were inserted into the index to prevent statistical attacks. However, a revocation 
feature is not offered by the proposed approach, as the patient holds the same key most of the time, as in Re-dtPECK discussed 
above. 
 
5. Data Security Requirements 
Several security issues are related to cloud systems, such as EHR cloud-based systems. These issues include not only common 
concerns such as DDoS attacks (Sahi et al., 2017), but also specific issues in the cloud such as side channel attacks, etc. (Tang et 
al., 2016). Thus, setting security requirements for any cloud systems is essential and needs to be included in our review. From an 
eHealth cloud perspective, the security requirements (R) of cloud system include the following. 
5.1. Confidentiality (R1) 
The confidentiality of data in a health cloud system means that unauthorized clients cannot decrypt or retrieve health records. 
The data owner, for example the patient, does not control the health records stored in the cloud (Li et al., 2013). Authorized clients 
are the only users who can access the records; even CSPs are not allowed to access any information regarding the data. 
Furthermore, patients expect full control over their health records in the cloud, without any leakage to other legitimate users or 
attackers. 
5.2. Access Controllability (R2) 
Access controllability means that a data owner controls his/her data by implementing certain carefully constructed rules in 
order to ensure the security and privacy of records, and by allowing only legal users to have controlled access (Tang et al., 2016). 
Other users cannot access health records without permission. Users have different access rights to access different parts of the 
data; this is called fine-grained access control. In an untrusted cloud system, the data owner is the only one permitted to grant 
access. 
5.3. Integrity (R3) 
Integrity is a security feature that ensures the completeness and accuracy of data. In other words, data must stay complete and 
must not be altered or deleted; users normally expect their data to be kept safe in cloud storage (Liu et al., 2015 (A)). Furthermore, 
users must be able to detect any unsolicited modification, loss, or corruption of this data, and to retrieve lost pieces. 
5.4. Authenticity (R4) 
Authenticity means that only an authentic user can request access (Abbas & Khan, 2014). In the health sector, EHR service 
providers must provide verified information to ensure the authenticity of the cloud. 
5.5. Reliability (R5) 
Reliability means that the system performs as users expect (Lehr, 2015). One of the main factors of reliability is availability, 
which means the continuity of services provided. In other words, availability means how long the system is expected to serve 
users without interruption (Lehr, 2015). 
5.6. Accountability (R6) 
As cited in (Felici & Pearson, 2015), “defining what exactly accountability means in practice is complex”. One definition is 
that the controller of the data must be responsible for acting in accordance with procedures that affect the privacy of data. 
5.7. Auditability (R7) 
Auditability means monitoring security, privacy, and all access activities on the eHealth cloud (Abbas & Khan, 2014). 
Auditing must be done from time to time, to ensure that no errors accrue. 
5.8. Non-Repudiation (R8) 
Non-repudiation means that no one can falsely deny any unethical behaviour (Chen et al., 2014; Mihaita et al., 2017). In the 
eHealth cloud environment, patients and physicians cannot deny any misuse or mishandling of health records. 
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5.9. Anonymity (R9) 
The anonymity of the user means preventing a third party from obtaining valid user information that leads to accessing the 
server (Jiang et al., 2016 (B); Sharma & Kalra, 2016). Anonymity ensures the privacy of legitimate users in the cloud, as the 
attacker is unable to learn any personal information. A lack of anonymity means an attacker can be fake an identity as an 
authenticated user. 
5.10. Unlinkability (R10) 
Unlinkability means that in order to ensure a user’s privacy, associating information with a particular user must be difficult 
(Wu et al., 2016 (A)). Although sometimes a group of words needs to be used for a particular function, this group of words should 
be different each time. Thus, a random generation function is required (Liu et al., 2015 (B)). 
5.11. Maintainability (R11) 
Maintainability means the ability to perform fast maintenance on a project, as the development of very large projects is often 
not fully complete (Biswas et al., 2014). Maintainability can therefore ensure the delivery of services without error for different 
parties. In addition, a testing method is needed to decrease the time of maintenance.  
5.12. Revocability (R12) 
Revocability means that users’ access rights should be revoked after a period of time, so that they cannot access specific data 
later on using old keys (Thilakanathan et al., 2014). Revocability is a vital feature for eHealth cloud systems and needs to be well 
implemented in order to ensure the privacy of users and the secrecy of the contents (Yang, 2015). Once a manager chooses to 
revoke a particular user’s rights, the corresponding keys need to be eliminated from the system. 
Table 1 shows a comparison of security approaches for the eHealth cloud in terms of data security requirements. 
 




Technique(s) Aim(s) Limitation(s) 
Server 
assumption(s) 
Data Security Requirements 








Data sharing service assumed to 
be fully trusted party, usability 
tests not available 





Least Significant Bit 
3D medical images secure 
management, limited 
computational power 
Unparalleled, missing many 
security requirements 






Multiple cloud data 
distribution, reduction in 
attackers’ abilities  
Centralized ABE key authority, 
separated security duties, 
usability tests not available 
Semi-trusted 
servers 




Internet of Things (IoT) 
medical sensor 
Secure elder monitoring 
system, medical resource 
reduction 
Computationally inefficient, 
missing some vital security 
requirements such as revocation 





Patient-centric PHR access 










Preventing Denial of Service 
(DoS) attacks, dissemination 
protocol for WBANs 
Unparalleled as it uses CBC, 
many assumptions, missing vital 
requirements such as revocation 





IoT, Body Sensor 
Network (BSN) 
Secure IoT-based healthcare 
system using BSN , 
computationally efficient 
Missing vital security 
requirements such as revocation 









authentication for WBAN, 
computationally efficient 
Vulnerable to client 
impersonation attack 









authentication for WBAN, 
computationally efficient 
Missing vital security 
requirements such as revocation 





MAC, RFC 2631 
Anywhere anytime access 
Missing vital security 
requirements such as anonymity 
and unlinkability 









Claimed to resist all attacks, 
generate keys over distance of 
100km of optical fibre 
Missing vital security 
requirements such as revocation 
Trusted servers √ √ √ √ √ √ X √ √ X X X 
(Yang, 
2015) 
ABE, SE, bilinear pairing 
Ciphertext retrieval, SE scheme 
supports fine-grained access 
control 
Missing vital security 
requirements such as anonymity 
and unlinkability 
Trusted servers √ √ √ X X X X √ X X X √ 
Note: √ = Valid  X = Invalid  — = Not specified 
 
6. Disaster Recovery Plans 
The CSPs must establish continuity and recovery plans to ensure that services will remain available, and can recover all lost 
data even after disasters such as floods, earthquakes, or electricity power failures. The data recovery plan may be established 
solely by CSPs, or in consultation with clients. 
Several suggestions have been made to facilitate disaster recovery, and some of these are discussed below. 
Sahi et al. presented a disaster recovery plan to ensure the availability of PHRs and HERs in a health cloud environment (Sahi 
et al., 2016). The authors assume that the cloud storage consists of three or more data centres. Distributing signals called 
heartbeats are used between data centres and the CSP, in order to keep track of the status of these data centres. Each health record 
is divided into several parts, and multiple copies of each part are stored in different data centres. In the case of a disaster, the 
heartbeat from a data centre would stop if the data centre machine was damaged, which would alert the manager. The manager 
can recover or retrieve the records from the other data centres, with no need to access the damaged one. Finally, the authors 
pointed out that the data centres must be physically located in different geographic locations (for example in different countries) to 
ensure the availability of the data and the services (Sahi et al., 2016). 
Another disaster recovery plan has been proposed based on three different techniques: TCP/IP, VM snapshots, and replication 
(Chang, 2015). The proposed plan claims to achieve 99.94% data recovery in the event of a disaster. The proposed approach was 
implemented with real data and tests involving backing up all sister site records in London, Southampton, and Leeds. However, 
the data centres in the proposed approach are not integrated with any existing ones. In addition, all data centres are located within 
the same geographical area, which could be considered a major drawback.  
Gu et al. proposed backup and recovery models for implementing a disaster recovery plan (Gu et al., 2014). In terms of the 
backup model, clients are provided with accounts with limited rights. The CSP is responsible for sending and receiving data 
to/from clients. A client is able to request a backup from the CSP within a certain timeframe; the CSP will hold this request, make 
three copies of the data and store these in different locations. In the recovery model, the client can request a data recovery from 
the CSP. The CSP can retrieve the data from the stored three copies and send it back to the client. However, storing the data in full 
at three different locations can significantly increase the backup data size.  
Mansoori et al. presented a disaster recovery plan based on two servers, a local server and a disaster recovery server 
(Mansoori et al., 2014). The proposed plan considers four scenarios to provide availability and continuity of services. The authors 
implemented the proposed plan within a university hospital health system to ensure constant access to the picture archiving and 
communication system (PACS) application and its controlled radiology images. However, the authors did not consider a scenario 
in which a disaster affects a relatively wide geographic area leading to damage to the backup images. 
 
7. Conclusion 
The security and privacy of health data in the cloud requires secure solutions that are capable of controlling security and 
privacy while keeping all features of eHealth under consideration. In this paper, we review the state of the art of security and 
privacy in the eHealth cloud from five main perspectives: security and privacy, security controls, effective encryption, data 
security requirements, and disaster recovery plans. This paper therefore provides a clear overall picture of the development of 
eHealth to stakeholders, in order to facilitate better designs and decisions. In summary, this paper collects, evaluates, and 
classifies state-of-the-art eHealth security and privacy schemes. In addition, it covers the most recent studies in this area, and 
discusses the drawbacks of certain proposals to help improve the security and privacy of the eHealth cloud. 
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Cloud computing was introduced as an alternative storage and computing model in the health sector as
well as other sectors to handle large amounts of data. Many healthcare companies have moved their
electronic data to the cloud in order to reduce in-house storage, IT development and maintenance costs.
However, storing the healthcare records in a third-party server may cause serious storage, security and
privacy issues. Therefore, many approaches have been proposed to preserve security as well as privacy in
cloud computing projects. Cryptographic-based approaches were presented as one of the best ways to
ensure the security and privacy of healthcare data in the cloud. Nevertheless, the cryptographic-based
approaches which are used to transfer health records safely remain vulnerable regarding security,
privacy, or the lack of any disaster recovery strategy. In this paper, we review the related work on security
and privacy preserving as well as disaster recovery in the eHealth cloud domain. Then we propose two
approaches, the Security-Preserving approach and the Privacy-Preserving approach, and a disaster re-
covery plan. The Security-Preserving approach is a robust means of ensuring the security and integrity of
Electronic Health Records, and the Privacy-Preserving approach is an efficient authentication approach
which protects the privacy of Personal Health Records. Finally, we discuss how the integrated approaches
and the disaster recovery plan can ensure the reliability and security of cloud projects.
& 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The technologies of Cloud Computing (CC) provide simple and
easy on-demand network access to a shared group of computing
resources, which are simple to install and maintain with minimal
effort. They have become an important technology milestone and
many scientists and researchers claim that cloud computing has
changed the computing processes and IT markets. When access is
powered by cloud computing, users can use comprehensive sets of
tools for assessing various applications, storage and platforms
through the Internet, as well as using the services offered by cloud
producers.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
stated that CC is a model for using computer resources and other
modern technological functionality in the information technol-
ogy world to provide services such as storage and applications
[1]. Users can access and use cloud computing services without
the need to acquire knowledge, expertise or evennd Computing, University of
Heights, QLD 4350, Australia.
.
administration of infrastructures that support these services.
There are three main types of services offered by the cloud [2]:
Software as a Service (SaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS) and
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) [3]. In addition, four deploy-
ment models have been identified for cloud architecture solu-
tions, namely Private cloud; Community cloud; Public cloud and
Hybrid cloud [4,5]. Since cloud computing shares resources
distributed throughout the Internet and among the intranets,
security is therefore an important issue.
CC can be applied in many sectors; in this research we will
focus on the health sector. CC gives healthcare providers the ability
to diagnose and evaluate a patient's health even though the pa-
tient is not at the hospital. This requires the patient's medical data
to be distributed among physicians, nurses, insurance companies
as well as the data owner to deliver flexible and prompt care to
patients. The distribution of the patient's medical data raises se-
curity and privacy issues. Therefore, in this research we propose
two approaches which we designed to preserve privacy and se-
curity in the eHealth cloud.
Before we present the approaches, we will define Personal
Health Records (PHRs) and Electronic Health Records (EHRs).
A. Sahi et al. / Computers in Biology and Medicine 78 (2016) 1–821.1. Personal Health Records (PHRs)
A PHR is medical data owned and managed by the patient
himself [6]. A good PHR contains a precise and short record of the
patient's medical history data collected from various sources (such
as EHRs). These data can be easily reached by everyone having the
required authorizations to display the PHR.
1.2. Electronic Health Records (EHRs)
According to Zapata [7], the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO) stated that the EHR is a “repository of in-
formation regarding the health status of a subject of care, in
computer processable form”. Using the words of ISO/TS 18308 [8],
the main purpose of an EHR is to deliver a registered record of
healthcare which supports current and upcoming healthcare re-
ceived by the patient from various healthcare providers.
Today, cloud computing is used by millions of people around
the world. Cloud computing gives users the opportunity to store
data in the cloud for easy access anytime and anywhere [9].
However, in the cloud environment, the user's data are controlled
by service providers and not by the users themselves. The poten-
tial for data leaks is real, either intentionally or accidentally, which
is unacceptable [10]. Common problems of security and privacy in
the eHealth cloud include: confidentiality, integrity, authentica-
tion, access control, and non-repudiation [11].
The overall cloud computing theme is that we should be able to
use all kinds of functionality and services provided by the cloud,
but we would like to maintain our data privacy and security.
Therefore, issues regarding privacy and security of data are the
main factors limiting the widespread use of cloud computing.
Much research has been done on these issues and several re-
searchers claim that a versatile cryptography system may handle
data security and data privacy issues more effectively than other
methods [12]. With the use of cryptography systems, our proposed
security and privacy approaches can tackle the security and priv-
acy issues. Although security is the most important factor in any
cloud project, disaster recovery (DR) planning needs to be con-
sidered also. There are three types of disaster that may cause
major damage to any system: (1) natural disasters, such as flood,
earthquake, and volcano, (2) man-made disasters, such as cyber-
crime and technological terrorism, and (3) technological accidents,
such as infrastructure failure, and transportation failure [13]. In
order to overcome these kinds of disaster, a recovery plan needs to
be set up.2. Related work
In this section, we review the related work on the preservation
of security and privacy in the eHealth cloud as well as the DR
planning.
Users are using CC in various ways, such as checking email by
Yahoo, writing documents by Google Docs, and storing data in
iCloud. CC delivers numerous benefits, for example, low costs due
to the pay-as-you-go model, extraordinary availability as data is
commonly distributed between a number of servers, and load
balancing [1]. Furthermore, CC is benefiting health organisations
[14].
Health organisations have been quick to move to CC for the
obvious advantages of data storage and sharing. Those organisa-
tions are keen to store and share PHRs and EHRs using the cloud,
thereby eliminating the geographical boundaries between health
organisations and patients [15]. Sharing data using CC has rapidly
become a very important component for healthcare providers and
many other organisations. According to Thilakanathan et al. [16],for most organisations, the percentage of the data shared with
clients using CC is about 74% and with dealers is about 64%.
On the other hand, it is important for medical data to be safe
from unauthorized access and unwanted modifications. CC, how-
ever, is vulnerable to various security and privacy attacks. Conse-
quently, many healthcare providers are unwilling to implement CC
technologies, as a patient's information privacy may be breached.
According to Van et al. [17], the main hurdle delaying the growth
and extensive acceptance of CC is privacy and security issues.
Actually, most privacy and security attacks are caused by the Cloud
Service Providers (CSP) themselves [18] as they commonly have
access to the Cloud Storage (CS) and they may also sell the data
records to gain profits. Indeed, insider attacks are one of the main
problems related to CC, as pointed out by El-Gazzar et al. and
Pasupuleti et al. [19,20].
Fujisaki et al. proposed a PKE-based (Public Key Encryption)
approach named RSA-OAEP [21]; however, PKE-based approaches
are computationally inefficient because of the larger key size and
the slower operation.
Jafari et al. introduced an approach which gives the patient the
possibility of controlling his EHRs. This approach limits the patient
to managing records authored by other parties, such as physicians
and nurses [22]. On the other hand, the cloud service provider
cannot retrieve the records in plaintext format. The patient himself
and data consumers are given the private and public keys for en-
cryption and decryption [23].
Another approach presented by Zhang et al. [24] is a time-
based approach. The approach is efficient in ensuring the privacy
of the EHRs at the cloud storage and enhances the operation of key
distribution between trusted parties. This approach adopts time-
bound hierarchical key management [25]. Time-bound hier-
archical key management permits trusted parties to gain short-
term access to the EHRs, which are encrypted using Symmetric
Key Encryption (SKE). However, Zhang's approach is logically in-
adequate due to the fact that users have to take on multiple roles.
Therefore, the users are required to hold and control multiple keys.
Tran et al. [26] proposed an approach based on the proxy re-
encryption idea. A trusted user can obtain a data record as the
proxy will convert the encrypted data on the data owner side to
differently encrypted data which can be decrypted to plain text by
the trusted user's key. However, because Tran's approach uses
ElGamal public key cryptography, the encryption or decryption of
very large data is not practical and unfortunately, very large data is
a feature of medical data [16]. In addition, this approach does not
solve the situation where a revoked party re-joins using another
access key.
Tu et al. presented an approach which adopts Ciphertext-Policy
Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE) for data sharing in the si-
tuation of a revocation operation, which at the same time allows
high flexibility, access control and revocation [27]. However, this
approach is also not effective when considering very large data
[16].
An Access Control technique is a policy or rule that allows the
restriction of access to a cloud project [28]. It also detects un-
authorized users who try to access a cloud project. Access Control
allows one application to trust the identity of another application
[29]. While a robust authentication technique is a compulsory
requirement for any cloud project, access control cannot secure
data at rest and in transit [30,31], and it is not satisfactory enough
to achieve privacy for PHRs [32]. Encryption methods are defi-
nitely a better choice for protecting data at rest, as well as the
choice for protecting data in transit [30]. In addition, cryptography
offers an integrity check to verify that the data is not compromised
or corrupted in transit.
Wood et al. presented a DR plan which utilizes three servers
and one database, as shown in Fig. 1. One of the servers is
Fig. 1. Wood et al. DR plan [33].
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redirected to that server during the disaster [33]. However, the
authors did not consider the case in which the disaster also affects
the nominated server itself. In addition, the redirecting may in-
fluence the performance of the system and all users will be dis-
connected while they are being redirected to the nominated
server.
In this paper, we are concerned with the following issues when
strengthening the security and privacy of health records in the
cloud:
 How to design compatible security and privacy approaches
which can preserve the security of the EHR and the privacy of
the PHR at the same time in the eHealth cloud.
○ How the proposed approaches perform in emergency
situations.
○ How to revoke old session keys.
○ How to ensure the availability and the continuity of the sys-
tem during a disaster.
From our point of view, security, privacy, and disaster recovery
plans are crucial and need to be designed together to be homo-
geneous, accurate, and easy to implement. The lack of any one of
them will certainly affect the performance of the others. Thus,
designing one of them only, as in most of the related studies, is not
enough to deal with the real world.
To build a better cryptography cloud project, four requirements
need to be satisfied: authentication, non-repudiation, integrity,










Fig. 2. PEM-AES peither the security of the EHR or the privacy of PHR, which is not
enough to achieve the requirements. Many researchers proposed
good security approaches to ensure confidentiality, while others
proposed good privacy approaches to ensure authentication.
However, those approaches may not integrate seamlessly. Besides,
non-repudiation and integrity need to be provided by the same
system. Therefore, we were motivated to propose approaches that
can be easily implemented and integrated in any distributed sys-
tem to cover the requirements for both security and privacy.
Moreover, on top of security of the EHR and privacy of the PHR, we
designed our disaster recovery plan to guarantee the availability
and the continuity of the system during a time of disaster. While
disaster recovery is not considered by most of the studies in the
eHealth domain, our approaches and the disaster recovery plan
will enable data owners and patients to have full and safe control
over their records.
In addition, our contributions:
 Proposed a security-preserving approach which can ensure the
security and integrity of Electronic Health Records.
 Proposed a privacy-preserving approach which can ensure the
privacy of Personal Health Records.
 Provided a break-glass access feature to be used in emergency
situations. A revocation feature is also provided.
 Designed our disaster recovery plan to guarantee the availability
and the continuity of the system during a disaster.3. Preliminaries
3.1. PEM-AES
The Parallel Encryption Mode (PEM) was first introduced by
Sahi et al. [34] as a block cipher mode of operation. The PEM
adopted the Advanced Encryption Standards (AES) as an encryp-
tion algorithm. The PEM mode significantly enhances the en-
cryption process in terms of speed and provides a data integrity
check. In the PEM, each block uses the hash value of the shared
data to ensure that the key stream has a very good randomness.
Fast parallel processes and integrity checks are the reasons for
choosing the PEM-AES. Fig. 2. together with Eqs. (1)–(5) briefly
describe the process of the algorithm.
Encryption:
( )= ( ( )) ( )⊕W E XH 1K iIV
= ( ) ( )( ⊕ )⊕ ( )Y E X 2i K X iIV H i

















Fig. 3. Key exchange protocol [35].
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3.2. Key exchange protocol
In order to ensure the privacy of the users, we adopt a three-
party password-based authenticated key exchange protocol
(3PAKE), which was introduced in [35]. This protocol ensures both
authentication and non-repudiation features. A Geffe generator is
used to produce a pseudorandom binary sequence. The resulting
sequence is tested using statistical tests including a frequency test,
serial test and poker test. Private keys are then generated from the
success sequence. In this protocol, data will have a non-repudia-
tion property and no clear data will be sent via the channel (Fig. 3).4. The proposed approaches
While CC is facing numerous privacy and security issues, and
despite the fact that most of these issues are caused by CSPs
themselves, all data in CSPs and CSs must be encrypted. In other
words, all medical records including PHRs and EHRs must be en-
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Fig. 4. Privacy-presefrom outsiders as well as from insiders (the CSPs themselves)
trying to obtain any valuable data without permission [35]. The
patient's privacy needs to be ensured on top of the security for
medical records.
The proposed approaches are shown in Figs. 4 and 5. They
consist of data consumers, trusted party, patients, and cloud,
which are defined as follows:
Data consumers: Data consumers are people or companies
which are interested in using PHR or EHR data. In other words,
data consumers are the healthcare providers, including physicians
and nurses.
Controller: The controller is responsible for negotiating and
generating session keys in order for them to be used by parties.
Data owner: The data owner is the owner of the data in our
system, and is the only party who has full access to the EHR data.
Trusted party: The controller and data owner are trusted by all
parties in our proposed approaches.
Patients: The patient is the owner of his PHR and has complete
control over the privacy of his PHR information. He can delegate
his patient role to other parties, such as a family member or friend
in order to access his PHR in an emergency situation.
Cloud: The cloud consists of the cloud service provider and
cloud storage. The cloud service provider responds to the demands
from the data consumers and provides corresponding services. The
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Fig. 5. Security-preserving approach.
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must be satisfied. Since the patient is the only one with full control
over the access to his PHR information, the patient's privacy must be
ensured in the first place. Secondly, all data consumers must be able
to access an up-to-date version of their EHRs in the cloud at any time
and in a secure manner, hence data security must be guaranteed.
In the following sections, we will explain the privacy-preser-
ving approach, which can be used to ensure the privacy of the
PHRs in the eHealth clouds. We then describe the security-pre-
serving approach, which can be applied to ensure the security of
the EHRs in the eHealth clouds.
4.1. Privacy-preserving approach
Authentication is vital for archiving and retrieving information
from PHRs [36]. Since PHRs are controlled by patients themselves
[6], an efficient authentication approach which ensures the priv-
acy of PHRs is required.
In order to ensure the PHRs’ privacy, we have adopted a three-
party password-based authenticated key exchange protocol
(3PAKE) based on the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption
by Khader and Lai [35].
According to the 3PAKE protocol, the primitive root (p) and the
generator (g) should be changed in each communication session
[35]. This suits our approach to ensure that the patient is the only
one who has complete access to his PHR, and all data consumers
will be revoked after the session. Otherwise, if p and g are not
changed, data consumers will be able to access the patient's PHRs
using an old session key.The privacy-preserving approach works as follows:
1. The data owner stores an encrypted PHR at the Cloud Storage
(CS). The data are stored according to the disaster recovery plan
in Section 6.
2. Therefore, the Cloud Service Provider (CSP) has a copy of the
PHR. However, this copy is encrypted and the privacy of the PHR
is secured. To make any modification to the PHR, the patient's
permission is required. Data are retrieved according to the
disaster recovery plan in Section 6.
3. Data consumers ask the controller to begin a Session Key (SK)
negotiation in order to access the PHR.
4. The controller will control the communication between the data
consumers and the patient. In this step, the controller will ask
the patient to initiate the SK agreement.
5. The patient will then send the relevant information through the
channel back to the controller in order to authorize the data
consumer to gain access to his PHR.
6. The data consumer calculates the SK using the information re-
ceived from the controller.
7. Data consumers can access the PHR at the CSP once they get the
permissions.
4.2. Security-preserving approach
EHRs are managed by healthcare providers [6,37] (in our sys-
tem, healthcare providers are data consumers). However, patients
may have to follow various policies, such as medical, dental, and
vision, registered with different insurance companies which make
Security & privacy of the PHR & EHR
Security-preserving approach
Confidentiality Integrity check 
Privacy-preserving approach
Authentication Non-repudiation 
Fig. 6. Security and privacy of the PHR and the HER.
Table 1
Comparison of delivered security features.
Proposed
approaches
Security Privacy Revocation Break-
glass
DR plan
1 Jafari et al. [22] ˟ √ ˟ √ ˟
2 RBTBAC [24] √ √ ˟ ˟ ˟
3 Tran et al. [26] √ ˟ √ ˟ ˟
4 New CP-ABPRE [27] √ ˟ √ ˟ ˟
5 Wang et al. [38] ˟ √ ˟ ˟ ˟
6 Fabian et al. [39] √ √ ˟ ˟ ˟
7 Chen et al. [40] ˟ √ √ ˟ ˟
8 CP-ABE [41] √ √ ˟ ˟ ˟
9 Zheng [42] ˟ √ √ ˟ ˟
10 Our approaches √ √ √ √ √
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Therefore, we have shifted the management of the data to the data
owner or his delegate to ensure that all the consumers can access
an up-to-date version of the EHR in the cloud at any time and in a
secure manner.
The data owner stores the EHRs at their own preferred CC
storage servers, and cloud projects must retrieve the EHRs from
these servers. Therefore a robust approach which can ensure the
security of the EHRs is required.
The AES encryption algorithm with the PEM block cipher mode
was adopted to secure the data at the data owner database as well
as at the cloud storage [34].
The security-preserving approach works as follows:
1. The data owner stores encrypted EHRs at the Cloud Storage (CS).
Data are stored according to the disaster recovery plan in Sec-
tion 6.
2. Therefore, the Cloud Service Provider (CSP) has a copy of the
EHRs. However, this copy is encrypted to ensure the security of
the EHRs. To use the EHRs, the CSP needs the data owner's
permission to do so. Data are retrieved according to the disaster
recovery plan in Section 6.
3. Data consumers ask the controller to begin the Session Key (SK)
negotiation in order to access the EHRs.
4. The controller will control the communication between the data
consumers with the data owner. In this step, the controller will
ask the data owner to initiate the SK agreement.
5. The data owner will send the relevant information through the
channel back to the controller in order to authorize the data
consumer to gain access to the EHR.
6. The data consumer calculates the SK using the information re-
ceived from the controller.
7. Data consumers can access the EHR at the CSP once they get
permission.
4.3. Break-glass access
In an emergency situation, such as in a life-threatening situa-
tion for an unconscious patient, healthcare providers may require
temporary access to a patient's PHR. Those staff members must
have a temporary authorisation to decipher the PHR information.
While the patient is the only one in our system who has complete
control of his PHR, as we mentioned earlier the patient can also
delegate the role to a family member or friend. Therefore, a family
member or friend can play a patient role in order to authorize the
data consumers to access the patient's PHR. In our approaches this
can be achieved by encouraging a patient to delegate an emer-
gency key to a family member or friend when the patient registers
for the first time in the system. He will be asked to provide an
emergency contact detail for a family member or friend, and to
assign an emergency key to this person.
5. Discussion
To ensure the security and the privacy of any cryptography-based
system, four requirements need to be considered: authentication,non-repudiation, integrity, and confidentiality [4]. In this section, we
will analyse and evaluate the security of our proposed approaches
from three different perspectives: security requirements, comparison
with existing work, and when under several kinds of attacks.
5.1. Security requirements
CSP should utilize a robust authentication and non-repudiation
technique to guarantee authentication and non-repudiation. Ac-
cording to Khader and Lai in [35], these two features are ensured
by the 3PKAE key exchange protocol. Since we employed the
protocol in this paper, our proposed privacy-preserving approach
inherited the authentication and non-repudiation features from
the adopted 3PAKE protocol.
In addition, the PEM-AES can check the integrity of the mes-
sage by comparing the hash of the copy of the original data with
the hash received from the other party. It has a concept similar to
Chaining Blocks Cipher (CBC) in terms of confidentiality. It con-
nects all the blocks by the hash value of the plaintext. Hence, if one
cipher block is corrupted, then the corresponding plaintext block
will also be corrupted. Since the CBC mode is considered to be
secure against many attacks, we can claim that the PEM-AES mode
is also secure against these attacks. In addition, it provides in-
tegrity on top of the confidentiality [34]. As we adopted the PEM-
AES in our approaches, they too can provide these two features.
Fig. 6 illustrates the security and privacy features that can be
provided by combining the privacy-preserving approach with the
security-preserving approach in the cloud environment.
5.2. Comparison with existing work
In this section, we compare our proposed approaches with
several existing approaches in terms of security, privacy, revoca-
tion, break-glass access and DR plan.
Table 1 shows the comparison. As shown in the table, our
proposed approaches together with the disaster recovery plan
achieved all the listed features, whereas some vital features are
missing in other approaches. On top of that, some of those ap-
proaches have limitations in various aspects. In the RBTBAC ap-
proach [24], each user is required to hold and control multiple
keys, which is logically inadequate. The approach by Tran et al. and
the new CP-ABPRE approach [26,27] are not effective when con-
sidering very large data, and unfortunately very large data is a
feature of medical data [16]. Furthermore, the approach by Fabian
et al. is not well-suited for emergency cases, as stated by the au-
thors themselves [39]. Finally, the approach of Chen et al. gives the
ability of managing the PHR to every healthcare staff member in
addition to patients and doctors; yet the PHR needs to remain safe
at all times and be able to be managed by the patient himself and
his doctor (even for the doctor, a revocation feature is needed to
cancel his managing right later) [40].
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When the PHR and EHR are under different attacks, we will
show how the proposed approaches can mitigate the effects of
some of these attacks.
5.3.1. Outside attacks
In outside attacks, an adversary attempts to gain electronic re-
cords without any identity or access credentials. Let us assume that
he can compromise the communication channels and is able to re-
trieve the PHR/EHR records. However, he can only get the PHR/EHR
records in an encrypted format, which he cannot decrypt without an
appropriate key. While keys are held only by the patient and the
controller, obtaining the correct key is impossible. Thus, we can claim
that our approaches can prevent outside attacks.
5.3.2. Man-in-the-middle attacks
In our proposed approaches, it is impossible for an adversary to
perform a man in the middle attack. Let us assume that the ad-
versary can compromise the communication channels and retrieve
any information sent through this channel. Nevertheless, the ad-
versary needs to know at least the public keys to perform a man in
the middle attack, whereas these public keys are encrypted using
private user keys according to the adopted 3PAKE protocol [35]. In
the 3PAKE protocol, only the user (either the patient or controller)
himself can know the public and private keys, so he is the only one
who can decrypt the electronic records. Thus, the proposed ap-
proaches can prevent man-in-the-middle attacks.
5.3.3. Offline and online dictionary attacks
The 3PAKE protocol can also be secure against offline and on-
line dictionary attacks. For an adversary to perform an offline
dictionary attack, he needs to guess the identity credential of the
user to calculate the session key. This is going to fail during the
verification process due to the fact that the session key is required
for verification of the identity credential in advance.
An integrity check is provided in this protocol, and it helps to
prevent on-line dictionary attacks using checksum validations. As
parties are required to validate one another using a stored
checksum, online dictionary attacks can thus be prevented.6. Disaster recovery plan
In the event of a disaster several questions will need to be
answered. For example: do we have a backup server? Where is it?
How do we reconnect the client back to the system? How long will
the system take to resume service? Therefore, a DR plan must be



















Fig. 7. The propoWe will present our DR plan. First of all, data such as PHRs and
EHRs are stored in the cloud storage, which includes a minimum of
three nodes or data centres. At the beginning of the process, the
data owner will send a heartbeat signal (a heartbeat is a signal
sent between the data owner, nodes, and the CSP to check whe-
ther those nodes are still in working condition or not) to check the
status of the nodes. After that, the data owner asks the controller
to break the data records into three partitions (three in our ex-
ample, but it could be varied), distribute and store them among
the nodes. When a client attempts to use the data through the CSP,
the CSP will send a heartbeat signal to the nodes, and then ask the
controller to retrieve the three partitions from the nodes and
combine them in one record file.
The controller is responsible for the number of partitions and
the size of each of them. Each partition must be stored in several
nodes (in our case, three nodes). The three nodes must be located
at three different physical locations in order to ensure that the
cloud project can be continued even in a disaster situation.
For example, let us assume that the area where the second
node is located has an earthquake, which causes complete damage
to this node. The original record can be retrieved immediately
from node 1 and node 3 with no time wasted or client dis-
connected. Therefore, this DR plan can answer the above questions
and ensure the continuity of the system, as shown in Fig. 7.7. Conclusion
The security and privacy of data are the most important factors
in the cloud. Therefore, this research study aims to set up new
approaches to harden the security of the EHRs and the privacy of
the PHRs in cloud projects, as well as ensuring the continuity of
the projects during a time of disaster. A privacy-preserving ap-
proach was proposed based on a key exchange protocol, which can
ensure the privacy of the PHRs. Also, a security-preserving ap-
proach was proposed based on the PEM-AES, which can ensure the
security of the EHRs. These two approaches are able to provide the
most important requirements in each cryptosystem, such as au-
thentication, non-repudiation, integrity, and confidentiality. In
addition, a DR plan was proposed to enable a client to connect to
its system at any time, even at a time of disaster. The two ap-
proaches and the DR plan all together provide a private, secure and
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1 Introduction 
Password authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocols (Katz and Vaikuntanathan, 
2013; Lee et al., 2013; Farash and Attari, 2014a, 2014b; Misra et al., 2016) are user 
friendly solutions to ensure the security of the session key (SK) for cryptosystems. It 
gives end-users the freedom of picking their own password freely without any machine 
intervention. The PAKE protocols were firstly brought in as a two-party protocol 
(2PAKE) (Jiang et al., 2013; Tang et al., 2013; Farash and Attari, 2013). However, the 
2PAKE protocols are impractical for large numbers of users in a large network, since 
each user needs to recall many different passwords for many different users with whom 
they communicate (Farash and Attari, 2014b). In other words, in a group of m users, 
there are m(m-1)/2 user pairs. Its management of the passwords is an O(m2) which 
becomes impractical if m >>2. 
Three-party password-based authenticated key exchange (3PAKE) protocols were 
proposed to overcome problems occurred in 2PAKE protocols (Amin and Biswas, 2015; 
Deebak et al., 2015; Li et al., 2015). In the 3PAKE protocols two users typically 
communicate with each other through a trusted server to establish a key in a secure 
manner. Unlike the 2PAKE protocols, each user needs to remember only a single 
password to commence the key sharing with his/her partner through a server. Figure 1 
shows 2PAKE and 3PAKE protocols. 
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Figure 1 PAKE protocols, (a) 2PAKE protocol (b) 3PAKE protocol 
  
(a)     (b) 
Normally, users choose a natural word from a language as a password or a simple phrase 
rather than a long random string (Misra et al., 2011). However, these kinds of passwords 
are more vulnerable to password guessing attacks (Bellare and Rogaway, 1995), such as 
offline dictionary attacks and online dictionary attacks (Lee et al., 2013). Therefore, it is 
desirable to have a confidential password authenticated protocol, which may prevent the 
password attacks. 
Khader and Lai in (2015) proposed a 3PAKE protocol which can prevent man-in-the-
middle (MITM) attacks. In this paper we present the TPAKE protocol in detail. We 
added a counter to ensure that each user has only three attempts to generate the SK, 
otherwise, the user’s account will be locked for 24 hours as a security measure. There 
was neither proof nor experiments provided in the original paper. In this paper, we 
analyse and prove formally the correctness of the TPAKE protocol using the random 
oracle model (ROM). Then, we discussed the security of the TPAKE protocol against 
several kinds of attacks in addition to the MITM attacks. 
As a contribution of this study, we present a TPAKE protocol and then analyse its 
security. The proposed TPAKE protocol shares no plaintext data. Data shared between 
the parties are either hashed or encrypted. Using the ROM, the security of the proposed 
TPAKE protocol is formally proven under the Computational Diffie-Hillman (CDH) 
assumption. Furthermore, the analyses included in this chapter show that our protocol can 
ensure perfect forward secrecy and also resist many kinds of common attacks, such as the 
MITM attacks, online dictionary attacks, offline dictionary attacks, replay attacks and 
known key attacks. 
In Section 2 we review the related work, in Section 3 we introduce the proposed 
work, in Section 4 we analyse the security of the proposed work and in Section 5 we 
present the conclusion. 
2 Related work 
The literature of the PAKE protocols with their related issues are reviewed in this section. 
The first two-party protocol was proposed in 1992 by Bellovin and Merritt (1992). 
Two users could negotiate the SK using their passwords via public or insecure 
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communication channels. However, in a large network the management of the passwords 
is challenging. If we assume that the network has m users and adopting Bellovin and 
Merritt’s protocol to exchange a SK between two users, there are m(m_1)/2 passwords to 
be shared as shown in Figure 1(a). Those passwords have to be kept safely (Bellare and 
Rogaway, 1995). Therefore, many researchers shifted their attention to the 3PAKE 
protocols, in which a trusted server serves as a hub for users to ensure that each user 
needs to manage only his/her own password with the server as shown in Figure 1(b). The 
3PAKE protocols are more scalable to large networks than the 2PAKE protocols. 
Many well designed 3PAKE protocols were proposed. However cryptanalysis shows 
many issues and with these protocols and their vulnerability to various attacks. 
Yang et al. (2006) proposed a 3PAKE protocol using two servers as the intermediate 
agents. One of the servers connects directly to the users, while another one stays 
unconnected to the users. They claimed that their protocol had a number of strong 
securities features which could secure the SK against various attacks, such as the offline 
dictionary attacks (Yang et al., 2006). However, Amin and Biswas (2015) stated that this 
protocol would be vulnerable to numerous security issues, such as insider attacks (Nose, 
2011), offline password guessing attacks, and replay attacks (Amin and Biswas, 2015). 
Lu and Cao (2007) proposed a simple 3PAKE protocol. They claimed that as the 
protocol did not require any server’s public key, it could prevent many known attacks (Lu 
and Cao, 2007). On the other hand, Guo et al. (2008) showed that the protocol was 
suffering from the MITM attacks which possibly could expose authenticated information 
to an attacker as well as the online dictionary attacks. 
Another simple 3PAKE protocol that works without a server’s public key was 
proposed by Huang (2009). Huang stated that his protocol was not only secure against 
various types of attacks, but it also was more efficient than many other 3PAKE protocols. 
In contrast, Yoon and Yoo (2011) reported that this protocol was vulnerable to many 
attacks, such as the online and offline password guessing attacks. 
Moreover, Wen et al. (2005) proposed a new provably secure 3PAKE protocol. Wen 
et al. (2005) claimed that this protocol had a security proof using a formal model and 
adversary capabilities. However, Nam et al. (2007) pointed out that Wen et al.’s (2005) 
proposed 3PAKE protocol was absolutely insecure and the security proof was incorrect 
(Nam et al., 2007). Nam et al. illustrated a full analysis of weaknesses in Wen et al.’s 
(2005) protocol and its security proof. 
Furthermore, a communication-efficient 3PAKE protocol as mentioned in Bellare and 
Rogaway (1995). This protocol did not require the server’s public key nor a symmetric 
encryption scheme. It had a security proof based on the computational Diffie Hellman 
assumption. The authors claimed that their protocol was more practical than other 
3PAKE protocols. However, Wu et al. pointed out that Chang et al.’s protocol was 
vulnerable to the partition attacks. Therefore, attackers might guess the real password 
offline (Wu et al., 2012). The weaknesses of the 3PAKE protocols have motivated us to 
design a TPAKE protocol which can overcome the issues mentioned above. 
3 Preliminaries 
Due to the fact that 23.9% of 14.3 million HTTPS servers are supported by the Diffie-
Hellman protocol (Adrian et al., 2015), therefore most of the 3PAKE protocols are based 
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on the Diffie-Hellman problem (DHP). In this paper, the proposed TPAKE protocol is 
also based on the DHP. The hardness of the traditional DHP is based on the discrete 
logarithm problem (DLP). 
Definition 1 (DLP): The DLP is the problem of determining an integer χ, where 1 ≤ χ ≤  
p – 1 (p is prime number), such that x ≡ γ, where both the primitive element  and 
another element γ are elements in * * *( , ,p p pγ  is a finite cyclic group) (Camenisch, 
1998). 
The only known way to solve the DHP is to compute χ = log γ or xy, where x, y are 
randomly picked from * .p  The computation is shown to be infeasible (Chung and Ku, 
2008). Thus, to prevent attacks we should choose a large prime number p. 
In this proposed protocol, we adopt a well-known complexity assumption, which is 
the CDH assumption (Diffie and Hellman, 1976; Chevalier et al., 2008). 
Definition 2 (CDH assumption): To ensure that the DLP defined in *p  is hard enough to 
attack, p should be a large prime number. Let *pG  be a finite cyclic group of prime 
order q with generator g, where p = 2q + 1. Given (g, p), A = ga, B = gb (public keys), 
where a, b (private keys) are randomly picked from *p  by Alice ˆ( )A  and Bob ˆ( )B  
(Diffie and Hellman, 1976; Chevalier et al., 2008). ˆ ˆandA B  represent the initiator client 
and the responder client, respectively, of a key exchange protocol run. We consider that 
the CDH assumption holds for ,G  if CDH attacker  is given a challenge ψ = (ga, gb), in 
order to compute gab, the success probability of  in retrieving gab in time t is denoted by: 
( ) ,CDH a b ababGsuc t g g g εP  (1) 
where ε is negligible. 
Definition 3 (negligible function): A function ε :  is negligible  c >0, λ0 > 
0 such that λ ≥ λ0, ε(λ) ≥ λ–c (Bellare and Rogaway, 1993). 
In other words, function ε is negligible if it approaches zero faster than any inverse 
polynomial does (Guo et al., 2011; Cash et al., 2009). 
Note that modular operations (mod p) in this paper are omitted for clarity. All are 
done under modular p. 
Definition 4 (encryption scheme): {Enc, Dec} is a symmetric encryption/decryption 
scheme that involves two algorithms (Yi et al., 2013): 
 Encryption: Enck(m)  c, where k is the SK, m is the entered plaintext message, and 
c is the resulted ciphertext. 
 Decryption: Deck(c)  m, where k is the SK, c is the entered ciphertext, and m is the 
resulted plaintext. 
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4 The proposed TPAKE protocol 
The proposed TPAKE protocol based on the CDH assumption is explained in this 
section. Suppose that ˆ ˆandA B  wish to exchange an agreed SK SK through a trusted 
server S. The agreement is reached in two rounds, as described below: 
4.1 Round 1: private key setup 
In this round, users ˆ ˆandA B  setup their private keys a and b based on their private 
information, such as passwords PWU, the Geffe generator and the statistical tests. 
The process of using the Geffe generator to generate the user private key from the 
user information is shown in Figure 2. 
Figure 2 Private key setup (see online version for colours) 
 
Note: S/U means both the server and the users are doing the same process. 
Step 1 S/U: 2( ) ( )convert baseU UPW PW  
User password PWU are converted from a printable string to a binary 2.baseUPW  
Step 2 S/U : 2 1 2 3( ) ( , , )splitbaseUPW L L L  
2base
UPW  is split into three sequences. The length of the sequences must be 
relatively prime. For example, a 64 bit 2baseUPW  is divided into sequences of 
length L1 = 20, L2 = 21, and L3 = 23. Since L1, L2, and L3 are relatively prime, the 
greatest common divisor (GDC) of (L1, L2, L3) = 1, and are the legitimate input 
to the Geffe generator. 
Step 3 S/U: (L1, L2, L3) feed Geffe generator  (seqbase2) 
The Geffe generator is used to generate new binary pseudorandom sequence 
seqbase2. The Geffe generator has three linear feedback shift registers (LFSRs). 
Those LFSRs use L1, L2, L3, as their initial values. Assume that the feedback 
functions of LFSRs are K1 = S10 + S19, K2 = S10 + S20, K3 = S10 + S22. The outputs 
of LFSRs, K1, K2, and K3, have length 2L – 1 without repetitions. Since L1 = 20, 
L2 = 21, and L3 = 23, therefore, the length of K1 = 1,048,575, K2 = 2,097,151 and 
K3 = 8,388,607. Next, the Geffe generator will process K1, K2, and K3, as shown 
below: 
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This model represents the process of the Geffe generator, which is used to 
generate a new binary pseudorandom sequence. The resulting seqbase2 has the 
length of (2L1–1) (2L2–1) (2L3–1) = 18,446,715,486,418,763,775 without 
repetitions. As mentioned in (Khader and Lai, 2015), the best length to use from 
seqbase2 is only the first 256 bits to overcome the time consumption. The Geffe 
generator is explained briefly in Section 4.2.1. 
Step 4 S/U: (seqbase2) tests  (test, result) 
a Success, continue 
b Failed, go to Step 1. 
In this step, three types of randomness tests were used to check whether the 
sequence has a good randomness or not. If all the tests are passed successfully, 
we go to the next step. If any test fails we have to abort the calculation and start 
all over again. Randomness tests are explained briefly in Section 4.2.2. 
Step 5 S/U: (seqbase2) obtained  (seqbase10) 
Now we convert the 256 bits from binary to decimal using the ASCII code table, 
then extract only eight digits from seqbase10, as in Khader and Lai (2015). 
Step 6 S/U: (seqbase10) obtained  (a, b) private keys, where a, b  *p  
Computing a, b which represent the private keys of ˆ ˆand ,A B  respectively. 
After this step, ˆ ˆandA B  obtained their private keys, a and b, using their 
passwords. Server S has a copy of those private keys, a and b on top of the 
passwords. 
Step 7 S : (PWU) hash||salt  (ħ(PWU) || salt) 
Server S hashes the PWU to ħ(PWU) to be used as a checksum in order to ensure 
the identity of the initiator or the responder in the next key exchanging 
communications. Then it concatenates ħ(PWU) with the salt (random number, 
used to add complexity and security) and stores it in a hash table. 
Step 8 S : (a, b) encrypt using admin key||salt  (Enc(a, b) || salt) 
S encrypts a and b using the admin key AK, then concatenates the ciphertext of a 
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Step 9 End a and b were successfully setup. 
4.2 Round 2: SK negotiation 
In this round, ˆ ˆandA B  start negotiating about the SK through trusted S. 
The process of negotiating the SK is shown in Figure 3. 
Step 1 Set counter i = 1 
Step 2 S: (p, g, a, b) generate publick keys  (A, B) 
S generate public keys A and B of ˆ ˆandA B  as follows (Kumar et al., 2012; 
Farash and Attari, 2013): 
aA g  (3) 
bB g  (4) 
Step 3 S: (p, g, A|B, IDU) encrypt and sends ˆ ˆ( , )BInfoAInfoU C C  
IDU is user identification name ID. S sends the following encrypted information 
packages to ˆ ˆand :A B  
 S to Â  
ˆ ˆ, , ,a BAInfoC Enc p g B ID  (5) 
 S to B̂  
ˆ ˆ, , ,bBInfo AC Enc p g B ID  (6) 
Step 4 U: decryptˆ ˆ( , )BInfoAInfoC C  (p, g, A|B, IDU) 
Upon receiving ˆ ˆand ,BInfoAInfoC C  ˆ ˆandA B  use their private keys a and b to 
decrypt the packages as follows: 
ˆˆ , , ,a BAInfo Dec p g A ID  (7) 
ˆˆ , , ,a ABInfo Dec p g A ID  (8) 
Step 5 S/U : (p, g, A|B) compute  (SK) 
In this step S, ˆ ˆandA B  compute the SK, as follows (Kumar et al., 2012; Li, 
2010): 
 S and Â  
ˆ
a
ASK B  (9) 
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 S and B̂  
ˆ
b
BSK A  (10) 
where ˆ B̂ASK SK  
Step 6 S/U: (SK) hash and match the sSK  (ħ(SKU), h(SKU)) 
a true, continue 
b false, go to Step 8 
S, ˆ ˆand ,A B  hash the generated SKs, send the hash of the SKs to each other and 
match the checksums received from others to ensure the correctness of the SK. 
Step 7 SK is ready, go to 10 
Step 8 If i =< 3 then i++ and go to 2, else go to 9 
The user has three attempts to generate the SK, if he fails after three attempts, 
his account will be locked for 24 hours and a warning message will be sent to 
him. 
Step 9 Account locked for 24 hours and sends a warning message “Your data were 
compromised and your account was locked for 24 hours”. 
Step 10 End. 
Figure 3 SK negotiation (see online version for colours) 
SK 
 
4.2.1 The Geffe generator 
As shown in Figure 2, the Geffe generator is used to generate a pseudo random sequence 
of a balanced distribution of 0’s and 1’s (Wei, 2006) from the user input. The sequence 
will be used as the user private key if it passes the statistical tests for randomness. The 
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Figure 4 The Geffe generator 
 
Table 1 The proposed TPAKE protocol 
 Â  Trusted S B̂  
1 Request connection 
channel with 
ˆ ˆ,ˆ BAPW IDB  
- Request connection 
channel with 
ˆ ˆ,ˆ B APW IDA  
2 Retrieve a  * ,p  a 
extracted from ÂPW  
Retrieve a, b  * ,p  a extracted from 
ÂPW  and b extracted from B̂PW  
Retrieve b  * ,p  b 
extracted from B̂PW  
3 - Store ˆ ˆ( ) ||  salt, ( ) ||  salt,BAPW PW  
Cas and Cbs where: Ca = EncAK(a), Cas 
= Ca || salt  
Cb = EncAK(b), Cbs = Cb || salt and the 
AK is the admin key. 
- 
4 - Set counter i = 1 and calculate A, B 
A = ga, B = gb 
- 
5 - ˆˆ ( , , , )( , , , ) ba B AEnc p g A IDEnc p g B ID  - 
6 ˆ( , , , )a BDEc p g B ID   ˆ( , , , )b ADEc p g B ID  
7 Calculate 









SK B SK A
 
Calculate 
ˆ ˆ, bB BSK SK A  
8 - If ˆ B̂ASK SK  then  
ˆ ˆ( ) ( )A BSK SK  
- 
9 - If the matching failed, then i ≤ 3, i++, 
else continued 
- 
10 If ˆ ˆ( ) ( )BAh SK SK  
then ÂSK  is secure 
- If ˆ ˆ( ) ( )BAh SK SK  
then B̂SK  is secure 
4.2.2 Statistical tests 
The random sequences which are derived from user inputs using the Geffe generator are 
tested using the frequency test; serial test and Poker test (Shehata et al., 2003) to ensure 
the randomness of the sequence. Once the sequences pass the statistical tests, they will be 
converted to user private keys. 
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The frequency test checks the distributions of zero’s (n0) and one’s (n1) in the 
sequence (n). The serial test checks the distribution of two-digit patterns (n00, n01, n10, and 
n11) and the Poker test checks the distribution of patterns with an arbitrary length. The 









1 1 1 22
2 0 0 0
4 2 1












The accepted threshold values of the randomness tests are (X1 < 3.8415), (X2 < 5.9915) 
and (X3 < 14.0671), respectively (Hosseini et al., 2014). The proposed TPAKE protocol is 
shown in Table 1. 
5 Security analyses 
Typically, a security proof investigates the communication of many parties. One of these 
parties is an attacker . In a traditional proof, most of the users are authentic, which 
means they will work exactly as defined in the protocol. However,  may do anything she 
likes to break the protocol. 
Once we claim that our TPAKE protocol is provably secure, we mean that the key 
exchange remains confidential under certain assumptions. In this section, we prove that 
the proposed protocol is secure under the CDH assumption. The CDH assumption is hard 
to solve and there is no algorithm which can solve it efficiently (Yao and Zhao, 2014; 
Yantao and Jianfeng, 2010). 
5.1 Formal analysis 
In this section we analyse the security of the TPAKE protocol. Typically, authentication 
between parties, and setting up SK SK are essential for the security of an authenticated 
key exchange (AKE) protocol. This section show that the TPAKE protocol is secure 
under the AKE security protocol, using the same approach as in (Bellare et al., 2000). In 
other words, the proposed TPAKE protocol is secure under the AKE security protocol 
when both communication parties Â  and B̂  can have an authenticated SK SK after 
running the TPAKE protocol. However no other parties will be able to find out any 
information regarding this SK SK, except the trusted server S. Therefore, once the 
TPAKE protocol achieves an AKE security protocol, it means that it achieves both 
security essential authentication and SK setting up. In this paper, we prove that the 
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proposed TPAKE protocol is secure under the AKE protocol using the ROM (Bellare  
et al., 2000; Bellare and Rogaway, 1993, 1995; Canetti et al., 2004; Wu and Zhu, 2008). 
The ROM (also called the black box) is a random function. It was introduced by 
Bellare and Rogaway (1993). The random function can be a perfect hash function 
(Bellare and Rogaway, 1993). However, a random function is impractical due to the fact 
that it is very big to store as well as very slow to compute. Bellare and Rogaway (1993) 
stated that using ROM as a random function would be practical for the purposes of 
security proof. Thus, we have adopted the ROM to proof the security of the proposed 
TPAKE protocol in this paper. 
The formal analysis is discussed in three parts, as follows: 
5.1.1 Characteristics of participants’ capabilities 
In terms of characteristics of participants, the terms of participants and long-lived keys of 
the adversary are explained below: 
 Participants: the proposed protocol  is divided into two sets of participants: 
client C and trusted server S. Two clients ˆ ˆandA C B C  are authenticating each 
other and setting up a SK via S in .  During the execution of ,  participants  





 Long-lived keys: Â C  holds her password ÂPW  as her long-lived key, B̂ C  
holds his password B̂PW  as his long-lived key, and S holds its admin password AK 
as its long-lived key. 
In relation to the adversary’s capabilities, let assume  (the adversary) is attacking. 
Assume  has a full control over all communication channels between participants. ‘s 
capabilities are modelled in the following oracle queries: 
 Send , :
i
U




computes the response using the protocol algorithm and resends the result back to . 
Moreover,  can send , start
i
U
 to start a new execution of 
i
U
 with another 
user. 
 Execute ˆ ˆ, , :
i i K
A B S
 this query models  gaining an authentic  
execution among ˆ ˆ, , and .
i i K
A B S
 should have an authentic execution 








accepted the SK, it sends the SK back to  or else it sends nothing to . This query 
deals with known key attacks. 
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 Corrupt (U): this query models  sending a query to U and yields his/her long-lived 
key. The previous SK must not be revealed after losing the long-lived key. This 
query shows the idea of the perfect forward secrecy. 
 ({Enc, Dec}, k, {m, c}): this query models  accessing to the query oracle of 
encryption and decryption  defined in Definition 4. This means that when  sends 
(Enc, k, m) to ,  will encrypt m using k and returns c to . When  sends (Dec, 
k, c) to ,  will decrypt c using k and returns m to . 
 h(m): this query models  obtaining a hash value from this query. If message m has 
not been queried before, a completely random hash will be sent back to  and stored 
in the hash table with m. Otherwise, the previous hash value will be sent to . The 




 this query models  distinguishing between a SK and a random 
string.  can send a single test query to ,
i
U




 The returned result from 
i
U
 will be conditioned. If b = 1, then the 
query returns the SK, else it returns a random string having the same length as that of 
the SK. The Test query is accessible only when 
i
U
 is fresh (freshness term will 
be explained in the following section). 
5.1.2 Definitions 
In this section we will define terms used in proving the security of .  
Definition 5 (partnership): We define as partnered when the following conditions are 








 have the same SK. 
 No one else besides ˆ ˆand
i i
A B
 has the SK, except S. 
Definition 6 (freshness): 
i
U
 is fresh when the following conditions are satisfied (Guo 




 has an accepted SK. 




 Neither ˆ ˆnor
i j
A B
 has been sent a reveal query. 
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A SK is fresh if and only if 
i
U
 is fresh. 
5.1.3 AKE security 
In  execution,  wins the game and breaks the security of the AKE of ,  if he 
makes a fresh instance 
i
U
 from a single test query, and the selected bit (b) by 
i
U
 is guessed correctly (Bresson et al., 2007; Wen et al., 2016). Assume that the 
guessed bit by  is b̀  after making some instances queries. Thus, the probability of 
guessing correctly b by  is denoted by ( ) 1,b̀ bP  and the probability of guessing 
incorrectly b by  is denoted by ( ) 0.b̀ bP  The advantage of  in breaking the 
security of the AKE in ,  denoted by ( ),AKEadc  it is defined to be: 
( ) 2 ( ) 1`AKEadc b bP  (14) 
The TPAKE protocol  is secure under the AKE protocol, only when ( )AKEadc  is 
negligible. 
Theorem 1: Let ( )AKEadc  be the advantage of  in breaking the security of the AKE 
security of  in a time bound t, and making the queries sq(send), eq(excute), and  
hq(hash). Then we have: 
, , , ( )`qAKE CDHq q q q q q G
s
adc t s e h h s e suc t
n
 (15) 
where t̀  is the running time of CDHGsuc  and n is the number of possible passwords. 
Proof: Let us assume that [ ]xP  is the probability of  in breaking the AKE security of 
.  Let 1[ ]xP  is the probability of  in breaking the AKE security of  by breaking 
the password security. Let 2[ ]xP  is the probability of  in breaking the AKE security of 
 without breaking the password security. Then, we get: 
1 2[ ]x x xP P P  (16) 
[ ]xP  is breaking AKE security: 
 1[ ]xP  breaking AKE security by breaking the password 
 2[ ]xP  breaking AKE security without breaking the password. 
If 1[ ]xP  = 0.5, then 2[ ]xP  must also be 0.5. Because we have two choices only, whether 
it is breaking the password or not (cannot choose both cases). The population will be 
divided into two values, and the summation should be less or equal to. 
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We have built [ ]xP  from 1[ ]xP  and 2[ ]xP  as follows: 
1 The probability 1[ ]xP  of  in breaking the AKE security of  by breaking the 
password security.  could break the security of the password (either ˆ ˆor )BAPW PW  
in  in two ways: online dictionary attacks or offline dictionary attacks. We 
denote the probability of  breaking the security by an online dictionary attacks as 
1[ ],onxP  and the probability of  breaking the security by an offline dictionary attack 
as 1[ ].
offxP  Then, we get: 
1 1 1
offonx x xP P P  (17) 
The probabilities of online dictionary attacks and offline dictionary attacks are 
analysed below: 
Online dictionary attacks:  can check the correctness of picking either 
ˆ ˆor BAPW PW  by executing it in Round 1 algorithm to retrieve either a or b. Then  
uses a or b as a decryption key in Round 2 algorithm (Step 4) to retrieve p, g, A | B 
and IDU. Finally,  uses the obtained information to calculate the SK and then 
sending ħ(SK) as in Round 2 algorithm (Step 6) to check the accuracy of either 




P  (18) 
Offline dictionary attacks: as mentioned in Definition 2,  can break the CDH 
assumption with the probability ὲ  within time bound , ( ) .` ` `CDHGt suc t ε  In the CDH 
assumption,  is given a challenge ψ = ( , ).a bg g  While in the proposed protocol a 
and b are driven from ˆ ˆand ,BAPW PW  then  has to attack ˆ ˆand .BAPW PW  ÂPW and 
B̂PW  are stored as hash values in the hash table in S, and they are concatenated with 
salt, as in Round 1 algorithm (Step 7) ˆ ˆ( ) || salt ( ) || salt.BAPW PW  Therefore, the 
probability ε1 that  can correctly pick the hash value ˆ( )APW  from the possible 
hash ˆ( ( ) || salt)APW  queries or pick the hash value ˆ( )BPW  from the possible hash 







The probability ε2 that  correctly picks PWU to retrieve any user’s password is 
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As a result, the probability ( )`CDHGsuc t  of  in breaking the CDH assumption is 
equivalent to the probability 1[ ]xP  of  in breaking the AKE security of  by 
breaking the password security using offline dictionary attacks. The probability is 
equal to the probability 1[ ]
offxP  that  correctly picks the password of either 
ˆ ˆor BAPW PW  by offline dictionary attacks multiplied by the probability ε1 that  can 
correctly pick the hash value ˆ( )APW  from the possible hash ˆ( ( ) || salt)APW  
queries or pick the hash value ˆ( )BPW  from the possible hash ˆ( ( ) || salt)BPW  






1 1( ) ,` `

















x suc t h e
s








2 The probability 2[ ]xP  of  in breaking the AKE security of  without breaking 
the password security.  could break the security of the AKE of  without 
knowing either ˆ ˆor BAPW PW  by breaking either A or B (public keys) or by guessing 
the private key (either a or b) by sending fake public key queries to either A to Â  or 
B to ˆ.B  Breaking A or B can lead to the MITM attacks (Khader and Lai, 2015). 
However,  needs to know the hash value of either A or B in order to do the attacks. 







The probability ε4 that  correctly guesses the private key (either a or b) by sending 
fake public key queries to either A to Â  or B to B̂  is equivalent to the probability of 







As a result, the probability ( )`CDHGsuc t  of  in breaking the CDH assumption is 
equivalent to the probability 2[ ]xP  that  breaks the AKE security of  without 
breaking the password security multiplied the probability ε3 that  knows the hash 
value of ˆ ˆor BAPW PW  in order to generate a or b multiplied the probability ε4 that  
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correctly guesses the private key (either a or b) by sending fake public key queries to 
either A to Â  or B to ˆ :B  





1 1( ) ,` `
















q q q qG G




x h s suc t
x x x
s
x suc t h e
n
s












[ ] , , , ( )`qAKE CDHq q q q q q q G
s
x adv t s e h h e s suc t
n
∵P  (25) 
To sum up, as in Definition 2, the CDH assumption holds for ,CDHGsuc  and CDHGsuc  
is less than the negliglible ε. Also, hq, eq, and sq cannot be large due to the limited 
attempts and time in Round 2. Therefore, AKEadv  is negligible and the CDH 
assumption holds in this case. Hence,  is AKE secured. 












1 Yang et al. 
(2006) 
 √   √  √ 
2 Lu and Cao 
(2007) 
  √ √ √ √  
3 Huang (2009) √   √ √   
4 Wen et al. 
(2005) 
   √ √   
5 Xie et al. 
(2017) 
 √ √   √ √ 
6 Amin et al. 
(2016) 
√  √ √ √  √ 
7 Islam (2015) √  √ √  √ √ 
8 Farash and 
Attari (2014b) 
 √ √ √ √ √  
9 Lee et al. 
(2013) 
 √ √ √    
10 Our TPAKE √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
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5.2 Discussion 
This section discusses the TPAKE protocol security against relevant attacks. We 
evaluated the ability of our protocol in resisting multiple attacks and then compared it 
with related protocols Yang et al. (2006), Lu and Cao (2007), Huang (2009), Wen et al. 
(2005), Xie et al. (2017), Amin et al. (2016), Islam (2015), Farash and Attari (2014b), 
and Lee et al. (2013) proposed recently. Table 2 shows the performance comparisons of 
our protocol and some other related protocols. From Table 2, it is clear that the TPAKE is 
more secure than other protocols as it is protected against multiple attacks, and provides 
more security features. The following six proven propositions ensure the security of the 
proposed protocol against many attacks, and provide perfect forward secrecy features. 
Proposition 1: The proposed protocol  can mitigate the MITM attacks. 
Proof: The public keys A and B are necessary for establishing a MITM attack. In order to 
begin attacking protocol  using the MITM attack,  needs to know both A and B on 
top of g and p. However, as shown in Round 2 algorithm (Step 3) in ,  all these 
parameters are encrypted using the user private key (a or b), which is known only by the 
user himself ˆ ˆ( or )A B  and S. Thus, the proposed protocol  can mitigate the MITM 
attack.■ 
Proposition 2: The proposed protocol can mitigate online dictionary attacks. 
Proof: Online dictionary attacks can be mitigated by validating the correctness of the 
input every time. In this proposed protocol, integrity checks are provided.  checks 
the sent SK by matching the hashes which are stored at S, as well as checking them with 
end users ˆ ˆand .A B  In other word, S, ˆ ˆandA B  can validate one another using the stored 
hash values, as in Round 2 algorithm (Step 6). Thus, the proposed protocol  can 
mitigate online dictionary attacks.■ 
Proposition 3: The proposed protocol can mitigate offline dictionary attacks. 
Proof: Offline dictionary attacks can be performed by a passive attacker  who may have 
control over the session between ˆ ˆand .A B   tries to guess one of the passwords, either 
ˆ ˆor ,BAPW PW  in order to compute the SK. However,  cannot check the correctness of 
the password until he passes the verifications process in Round 2 algorithm (Step 6). To 
do so,  needs to know the SK before knowing either ˆ ˆor ,BAPW PW  which is not 
possible. Thus, the proposed protocol can mitigate offline dictionary attacks.■ 
Proposition 4: The proposed protocol can mitigate replay attacks. 
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Proof: Replay attacks can be performed by an active attacker  who may compromise the 
message sent between the parties. Assume  can catch Â ‘s message and replay the 
compromised message to ˆ.B  Due to the non-repudiation feature provided by the 
proposed protocol, B̂  can easily detect that the message was compromised by  (Khader 
and Lai, 2015). Thus, the proposed protocol can mitigate replay attacks.■ 
Proposition 5: The proposed protocol can mitigate the known key attacks. 
Proof: An attacker  may use a previous SK in order to make the known key attacks. 
However, p and g are going to be changed in each session (Khader and Lai, 2015), 
therefore the public keys A and B will differ. As the consequence the SK will differ in 
each session. Furthermore, it is hard to retrieve the private keys a and b due to the CDH 
assumption. Thus, the proposed protocol can mitigate the known key attacks.■ 
Proposition 6: The proposed protocol can ensure a perfect forward secrecy. 
Proof: We can define the perfect forward secrecy as, if either ˆ ˆor BAPW PW  is exposed by 
 in order to compute the SK, the previous SK should remain safe. The proposed protocol 
can ensure the perfect forward secrecy as  cannot find out the previous SK even when he 
knows the current SK, because all the old SKs are stored as hashes. Thus, the proposed 
protocol can ensure the perfect forward secrecy.■ 
In addition, we compare our TPAKE protocol with several existing protocols in terms 
of attacks, perfect forward secrecy, and security proves. Comparison results are shown in 
Table 2. 
6 Conclusions 
An enhanced robust TPAKE protocol based on the CDH assumption and the ROM was 
presented in this paper with its formal analyses. Compared with other 3PAKE protocols, 
the proposed protocol performs better results due to the fact that the TPAKE protocol 
never shares clear plain information through insecure channels. The analysis of security 
using the ROM shows that the proposed protocol achieves the mutual authentication, safe 
and secure SK, ensures the perfect forward secrecy and prevents against multi types of 
attacks. 
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Abstract— The acceleration in developments in 
communication technology has led to a consequent increase in the 
vulnerability of data due to penetration attacks. These attacks 
often came from outside where non-qualified companies develop 
IT projects. Cryptography can offer high levels of security but 
has recently shown vulnerabilities such as the man-in-the-middle 
(MITM) attack in areas of key exchange protocols, especially in 
the Diffie-Hellman (DH) protocol. Firstly, this paper presents an 
overview of MITM attacks targeted at the DH protocol then 
discusses some of the shortcomings of current defenses. A 
proposed method to secure DH, which helps secure systems 
against MITM attacks, is then presented. This method involves 
the use of Geffe generation of binary sequences. The use of Geffe 
generator offers high levels of randomness. Data hashed and 
encrypted using this proposed method will be so difficult to 
intercept and decrypt without the appropriate keys. This offers 
high levels of security and helps prevent MITM attacks. 
Keywords— public key; random number generation; data 
security; cryptography; message authentication; digital signatures. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays, data security and privacy are a controversial 
issue. Researchers are trying to do their best to find out the 
perfect way to secure the data efficiently. One of these 
solutions is encrypting the data using cryptography algorithms. 
Cryptography is the science of converting the readable 
information into unreadable or hidden, and only the authorized 
persons or machines can retrieve or obtain the original texts. It 
is divided into two major types (symmetric and asymmetric) 
regarding their keys. (1) Symmetric cryptosystems require the 
users to have the same key to be used for encryption and 
decryption processes. (2) Asymmetric cryptosystems require 
the users to have two different keys (encryption key and 
decryption key). Symmetric key should be changed from time 
to time to make it more secure and unbreakable to prevent 
other users from obtaining the plain text. Therefore, the 
security of any symmetric cryptography system depends on key 
exchange protocol used by the system. Key exchange protocol 
is the way of distributing the keys in a secure manner among 
the users [1]. There are so many ways to exchange the keys 
between Alice and Bob, Alice can choose a key then to send to 
Bob physically (mail or person). Alternatively, if they have an 
old key so Alice can choose new key and encrypt it by the old 
one and send to Bob. Unfortunately, those techniques are not 
secure in wide distributed systems nowadays for many reasons. 
Consequently, the secrecy of their messages will rely heavily 
on the chosen key exchange protocol, for example, Diffie-
Hellman. Furthermore, asymmetric cryptosystems process is 
slower than symmetric one [1]. Symmetric cryptosystems uses 
a shared secret key to be used for encrypt and decrypt 
processes. While asymmetric cryptosystems does not use a 
single shared secret key, as an alternative it uses mathematical 
key pairs: a private and public key. In this cryptosystems the 
communications are decrypted with the private key and are 
encrypted with the public key. As a result asymmetric 
cryptosystems have consuming too much computing power to 
produce the two keys (private and public) and that is why it’s 
slower than symmetric cryptosystems. 
Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol was brought in 1976 
by Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman [2], this protocol is 
widely used for secure key exchange. The process of this 
protocol supposes that Alice and Bob have different private 
keys and they have to agree upon two relatively prime numbers 
p, g then each of them uses the obtained information to 
calculate the public keys. After that they share their public keys 
between each other and use it with the private one, p and g to 
get the same shared key. As a result, both of Alice and Bob 
obtained the shared key without sending their private keys 
through the channel [3]. 
In this paper, we will explain the problem of Man-In-The-
Middle (MITM) attack in Diffie-Hellman protocol and the 
current defenses. This paper proposes improvements which can 
help preventing MITM attack. These can verify and secure the 
communications between Alice and Bob. 
Users have usernames and passwords, and these will be 
used to connect them with their systems. Passwords as known 
are a mixed string, and it can contain numbers, symbols, 
lowercase, and uppercase. These mixtures can be represented 
in binary using ASCII code. The binary can be used to generate 
a different binary sequence using random number generators 
and extract new information, which can be helpful to overcome 
the problem. 
978-1-4799-8078-9/15/$31.00 ©2015 IEEE
22nd International Conference on Telecommunications (ICT 2015)
204
In section II discuss the related work, section III present the 
proposed work and section IV describe the conclusion and 
future work. 
II. RELATED WORKS  
 As mentioned, the scheme of DH was brought in 1976 by 
Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman [2], Diffie-Hellman Key 
Exchange (DHKE) is one of the best protocols to exchange 
the keys safely. It has so many advantages that made most of 
the cryptographers feel confidante when they use it in their 
cryptosystems. However, DHKE has a serious issue called 
Man-In-The_Middle attack (MITM); this algorithm is 
vulnerable to this kind of attack in which Eve can  attack 
(active attack, she can modify) all communications between 
Alice and Bob [4]. Because of this type of attack, researchers 
tried to find the best defense for that, as a result they came 
out with several answers. The most famous solutions that the 
researchers have found are: Digital Signatures (DS) and 
Message Authentication Code (MAC). Even though they are 
convenient for many systems, but they still have some 
weaknesses we need to think about. 
 Digital Signatures (DS): Generally, DS used the private 
key to sign the message and uses the public key to verify the 
message in the other party. DS faces difficulties with securing 
the private keys, verification and secrecy. In terms of 
securing the private keys, if they are exposed, all security 
promises are gone [5]. Therefore, most of developers and 
cryptosystem designers believe that we should keep the 
private keys in a safe way (like never send or store the private 
keys in plain text). If we lose them, we could have so many 
damages. Subsequently, anyone who gets the private key can 
sign the message and send to the other party (the person who 
has the public key, Bob), he will recognize it as a valid 
message (the private key holder signed the message, Alice), 
hence Bob will believe that the message was sent by Alice. 
Every person who holds the private key can sign a document. 
In other words, the DS does not automatically ensure that 
Alice signed the document. It does ensure the Alice document 
was signed by someone who had access to the private key [6]. 
So it is like stamps, it can be stolen and utilize by other 
people. In relation to verification and secrecy, when the DS 
failed to be verified by Bob (the PuK holder) the system will 
flag the message as invalid because it cannot be determined 
whether the message was corrupted by Eve or Alice used a 
false private key. This means that Alice has to be responsible 
for the security of each of her private keys. The DS can 







encryption and decryption are required to add security. 
Without this, DS cannot prevent the message from being 
intercepted changed by MITM [6]. 
 Message Authentication Code (MAC): MACs differ from 
DS as in MAC both side (Alice and Bob) need to use the 
same key for generating the keyed MAC tag and verification. 
 Commonly, Alice generates MAC tag using MAC algorithm 
and sends the tag with the message to Bob. Bob uses the same 
MAC algorithm with the same key to generate the keyed 
MAC tag. Then Bob check his MAC tag with Alice MAC tag 
if they are identical, then he will mark the message as a valid 
message, else he will mark the message as an invalid 
message.  
 Therefore, both of sender and receiver must agree on the 
same shared key and MAC algorithm before they start their 
communications, just like the case with symmetric-key 
systems. Because of that, Bob cannot prove that the message 
coming from Alice (unlike digital signature), which mean 
MAC does not provide a non-repudiation property. Anyone 
who receives the message and can confirm a MAC, for 
example Bob, can  produce MACs for different messages. 
Thus, ‘MACs are symmetric-key schemes, and they do not 
provide a non-repudiation’ [7]. 
  As a result, Eve can attack the communication channels and 
record the messages that would be sent from Alice to Bob, and 
later  Eve sends a copy of the messages to Bob. This will make 
Bob feels that those messages coming from Alice. Eve might 
send the message back to Alice, who would trust that it came 
from Bob [8]. 
III. PROPOSED WORK 
 The proposed work aims to distribute the keys between 
Alice and Bob without being compromised by Eve. Figure 1 
explains the way that Alice and Bob communicates with the 
server and the data that would be sending through the 
channels to retrieve the shared key.  
 Assume that the password of Alice contains eight 
characters (password = abcdefgh (a character string), 64 bits). 
The binary representation of the ASCII code for “abcdefgh” 
is: a=97 (01100001) + b=98 (01100010) + c=99 (011000011) 
+ d=100 (01100100) + e=101 (01100101) + f=102 
(01100110) + g=103 (01100111) + h=104 (01101000). As a 
result we have obtained the password in binary numbers. The 
sequence will be: 
01100001011000100110001101100100011001010110011001100111011010








Fig. 1. Alice And Bob Communicate With The Server to Obtain The Shared Key 
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 To make it more secure we used a pseudo random 
sequence generator to generate longer sequence. 
A. Geffe Generator 
Geffe generator is a pseudo random sequence generator. It 
uses three registers to generate one random sequence. The 
Geffe generator chose as it is in stream cipher cryptography to 
generate the new sequence. This generator used for several 
reasons: Firstly, the complexity of this generator could be 
superior in a different configuration of the steps. Secondly, the 
device does have some necessary features; for example, it has 
a balanced distribution of 0’s and 1’s in its output. It also gives 
the benefit of being useful as a module of a building of similar 
arrangements. The whole device could play the role of LFSR1 
(linear feedback shift registers) in the same arrangement with 
like generators, and this complexity would escalate 
accordingly [9]. The Geffe generator needs three (LFSRs). 
The length of those LFSRs should be relatively prime, which 
mean the greatest common divisor (GCD) of the length of the 
initial values that would be input into the three registers 
LFSR1 (Len1), LFSR2 (Len2) and LFSR3 (Len3) is one: 
                        GCD (Len1, Len2, Len3) = 1                         (1) 
      Suppose the first one will have 20 bits as input for LFSR1, 
the second will have 21 bits as input for LFSR2 and the last 
one will have 23 bits as input for LFSR3, all together will be 
64 bits (it is possible to choose any three numbers relatively 
primes and give us 64 bits). 
20 bits  21 bits   23 bits 
01100001011000100110, 001101100100011001010, 11001100110011101101000 
And they should be connected as shown below: 
 
Fig. 1. Geffe Generator 
       The feedback functions are: K1= S10+S19, K2= S10+S20 
and K3= S10+S22, successively. As an output of those 
registers, we will have three long binary sequences K1, K2 and 
K3, and each of them have the length 2n-1 without repetition, 
which mean K1=1048575, K2=2097151 and K3=8388607. 
Then Geffe generator will mix them together and generate one 
binary sequence S have the length (2K1-1) (2K2-1) (2K3-1) = 
18446715486418763775 without repetition. As shown in table 
I: 
TABLE I.  REGISTER'S PERIOD AND THEIR FEEDBACK FUNCTIONS 
Bits Feedback Function Period 
n  2n-1 
20 K1= S10+S19 1048575 
21 K2= S10+S20 2097151 
23 K3= S10+S22 8388607 
64 S = K1 K2+K2 K3+K3 
(2K1-1)(2K2-1)(2K3-1) 
=18446715486418763775 
     Definitely if we generate this extreme large number (S) our 
system will slow down if not stop. So, we assume that we can 
generate sequences (S) with 1024, 512, 256 or 128 bits long, 
and that would be convenient to deal with. And after obtaining 
the binary sequence from Geffe generator, we will use three 
basic kinds of statistical test to check whether the randomness 
of the sequence is good or not. If the test successes we will 
continue with the next steps, else the system will ask the user to 
change his/her password. Finally, when the tests finished will 
decide which length could give us better results (1024, 512, 
256 or 128). 
B. Statistical tests 
• Frequency test 
     For every binary random sequence, we expect that half of 
the sequence is 0's, and the other half is 1’s, the purpose of 
this test relies on the number of 0’s (n0) and the number of 1’s 
(n1) in the sequence (n), which is we need to test. The static 
used is: 
                                                                        (2) 
 
     To check whether the sequence passes this test or not, for 
one degree of freedom, the value of X1 should be less than the 
acceptance threshold values of the test (X1 < 3.8415) [10]. 
• Serial test 
       This test depends upon the repetition of (n00, n01, n10, 
and n11) which denotes the numbers (00, 01, 10, and 11) in S 
respectively. And we expect that each of them represents 




       To check whether the sequence passes this test or not, for 
two degree of freedom, the value of X2 should be less than the 
acceptance threshold values of the test (X2 < 5.9915) [10]. 
• Poker test 
     This test is divide the sequence S into a number of blocks 
(K) have the length (M), and then check the repetition of those 
blocks and determine whether they appear approximately the 
same number of times as would be expected for a random 
sequence, the number of block's K=n/M (without fractions). 




     To check whether the sequence passes this test or not, for 
2m-1 degree of freedom, the value of X3 should be less than 
the acceptance threshold values of the test (X3 < 14.0671) 
[10]. The poker test is a generalization of frequency test when 
we use m=1 we obtain results as frequency tests results.  
In our work, we used those three tests to check the sequence S 
with 1024, 512, 256 and 128 bits long (with the current 
password), and the results are shown in the table below: 
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TABLE II.  STATISTICAL RESULTS 
Length of 
Pseudo Statistical test 












Frequency test 0.03515625 1 3.8415 
Serial test 2.04011256720423 2 5.9915 
Poker test 9.19354838709677 7 14.0671 
512 bits 
Frequency test 0.0703125 1 3.8415 
Serial test 0.452192392367863 2 5.9915 
Poker test 7.2235294117647 7 14.0671 
256 bits 
Frequency test 1 1 3.8415 
Serial test 1.42745098039217 2 5.9915 
Poker test 7.51764705882353 7 14.0671 
128 bits 
Frequency test 5.28125 1 3.8415 
Serial test 4.56914370078741 2 5.9915 
Poker test 7.90476190476191 7 14.0671 
      As shown in Table II, three statistical tests have been used 
to check the randomness os the sequences. When the sequence 
S was 128 bits, it failed with frequency test (the sequence 
generated by password = abcdefgh does not pass the test). S 
equal to a 256 bit have been chosen, because it’s the shortest 
successful length, and still can ensure that the sequence has a 
good randomness and small size. As illustrated in Table II, the 
frequency test increased every time when the bits' size 
decreased, and that was the reason behind stopping until 128 






 This sequence derived from Alice password and it has 
passed all the tests. Next, convert every 8 bits into decimal 
number using ASCII code. As a result we got those numbers: 
68 228 100 18 5 65 253 213 84 49 49 30 112 26 169 8 252 
217 168 141 92 165 180 37 194 183 201 37 143 115 190 58, 
then modular each of them by 10 to ensure that all the 
numbers will be represented by one digit (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 
or 9). Merge them all together to get one number with 32 
digits 88085533499026982781250743173508. Then assumed 
that the user’s private key will be eight digits (the private key 
should be between 2 and P-2 [7], P will be provided by the 
server), therefore will divide the 32 digits number into eight 
blocks and take one number from each block, and those eight 
digits will be the private key (take the first number from each 
block (randomly), the private number will be 
PrK=85422243). In this stage, every user has his/her own 
private key and the server has all of them together in one 
table. 
        Alice and Bob get two numbers g and p, where p is a 
prime and g (generator) is a primitive root Modulo p, and 
those two numbers are coming from the server with the public 
key, Alice will receive p, g, Bob public key and username, 
Bob will receive p, g, Alice public key and username. They 
will be encrypted using the receiver private key. As mentioned 
above, the private key should be less than the prime p [7]. 
Hence, our private key less than nine digits will satisfy the 
requirements. For our example let p=100000007 and g=5. The 
public key will be PuK=15071649. If Alice pw=abcdefgh and 
Bob pw=12345678 (a character string), then the private key of 
Alice PrK=85422243 and Bob PrK = 68203955. After mix 
them with p and g will get the PuK  of Alice PuK=15071649 
and Bob PuK = 6629794. As a result the shared key SK = 
68202249 (for both Alice and Bob). 
Noticeably, the central server would not use the existing 
identification technique such as X.509 for some reasons: 
X.509 certificate require digital signature to be used for 
integrity, thus it has the same problems of using DS [11]. In 
addition X.509 certificate has problem with certificates 
expire, sometimes no one knows that the certificate has been 
expired until the website or sever goes down. It is really hard 
to figure out what is going on. 
C. Algorithm 
• Registration time 
1. The system converts the eight character password 
into a 64 bit binary sequence using ASCII code. 
2. The binary sequence is divided into three registers 
with lengths of 20, 21, and 23 respectively as 
indicated in section III. The Geffe pseudo random 
sequence generator is used to generate one sequence 
with 256 bit. 
3. The resulting sequence, S is tested using the three 
basic statistical tests frequency, serial and poker: 
a. If the sequence passes all the tests, then 
continue, 
b. Else, go back to step 1 and ask the user to 
try another password. 
4. Convert the successful sequence into a decimal 
number. This is then divided into eight blocks to 
obtain the eight digit private key using a digit from 
each of the block. 
5. The server uses the same method to calculate PrK1 
and PrK2. 
6. The administrator sends an activation message to 
Alice and Bob asking them to activate their 
passwords: 
a. Alice and Bob receive the activation 
message, and then continue, 
b. Else, Pw1 and Pw2 have changed by Eve. 
Go to 15 
7. The server hashs Pw1and Pw2, encrypts PrK1 and 
PrK2 using the admin key, and add salt (random 
number) then saves these in one table: the user info 
table. 
• Log in time 
8. The server redirects Alice and Bob to the second 
page and provides them with p, g, PuKs and 
usernames. These will be encrypted using the 
received private key where p and g will change for 
every session. Alice and Bob will need their 
password to access the information. The public keys 
are calculated using the following equations [3]: 
                        PuK1 = gPrK1 mod p                                (5) 
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                        PuK2 = gPrK2 mod p                                (6) 
9. The server redirects Alice and Bob to the second 
page and provides them with p, g, PuKs and 
usernames. These will be encrypted using the 
receiver private key. Alice and Bob have to use their 
password to access the information. 
10. Alice and Bob compute their shared key (SK), and 
the server also calculates shared key (SK). The 
following equations are used to calculate the shared 
keys [3]. 
               SKAlice = PuK2PrK1 mod p                           (7) 
                  SKBob = PuK1PrK2 mod p                            (8) 
11. The server hashes the SK and saves it in the user info 
table. 
12. Alice and Bob hash their shared keys (Sk) and send 
H(Sk) to the server.  
13. The server checks the resulted hashed shared key 
H(Sk) with the hash table: 
a. If H(Sk) matches with one of the hashes in 
the hash table, then continue. 
b. Else, Sk has come from Eve. Go to 15 
14. Alice and Bob are ready to share their messages 
encrypted with the shared key. Go to 16 
15. Warning message: “Your data were compromised”. 
16. End. 
TABLE III.  OBTAINED DATA 








2 Pw1, PrK1 Pw1, Pw2, PrK1 & PrK2 H(Pw) Pw2, PrK2 
3 P, g P, g E(P, g, PuKs, username) P, g 
4 PuK1 PuK1, PuK2 -- PuK2 
5 SK SK -- SK 
      
As shown in Table III, Eve can only obtain hashed and 
encrypted data and she cannot use them to intercept the 
communication channels. 
       To sum up, the MITM attacks occur when we share our 
keys in plain text. Eve can sit in the middle and pretend she is 
the intended destination for both Alice and Bob, Alice and 
Bob have no way of knowing Eve is there and believe they are 
communicating directly with each other. The proposed method 
proved that Alice and Bob could generate the keys without 
sending them in plain text using the data obtained from the 
server, so that will be controlled by the server. Even though 
some may argue that Eve can compromise all the data on the 
channels, but that will be not enough for her to get the shared 
key, all the data will be hashed and encrypted. In addition, the 
private key will never be sent to any party. If an attacker steal 
the private key from the server it would be not useful for 
him/her due to the entire private keys in the server are 
encrypted using the admin key. This offers high levels of 
security and helps prevent MITM attacks in DH. There are 
many applications used DH as a key exchange like SSL 
(Secure Sockets Layer), Secure Shell (SSH) and IP Security 
(IPSec) [12]. The proposed infrastructure could distribute the 
keys in secure manner and these applications would benefit 
from the proposed infrastructure. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
An efficient method to harden the Diffie-Hellman protocol 
against man-in-the-middle attack was described within this 
paper. Geffe generator was used to generate a binary sequence 
with a high level of randomness. Furthermore, statistical tests 
are used to check these sequences, before calculating the 
private key and the shared key. The proposed method ensures 
that the private keys will not be sent through the channels, and 
will be saved as hashes in the server. Additionally, it provides 
a non-repudiation property, as it can identify the sender and 
the receiver from their user information. As a result, this 
method provides more security properties than existing 
methods and prevents MITM attack. In the future, we will 
employ this method over other encryption methods to provide 
a secure cryptosystem for sharing our messages securely. The 
researchers are planning to employ the proposed algorithm in 
real cloud cryptosystem. 
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Abstract—Block cipher encryption works on fixed length 
blocks, usually 128bits. The blocks of data are transformed 
into encrypted data blocks of identical size using a shared 
session key. A common feature of some modes of block cipher, 
such as Cipher Block Chaining mode (CBC), Cipher Feedback 
mode (CFB), Output Feedback mode (OFB), is the sequential 
processing. The ciphering process of a block cannot begin until 
the processing of the preceding block is completed.  This 
feature does not make full use of the processing power in 
multiple processor systems. In this paper, we proposed a 
Parallel Block Cipher (PBC) mode, in which blocks of cipher 
can be processed in parallel.  Results of speed performance 
tests of the PBC mode using various settings are presented and 
compared with the standard CBC mode. The PBC mode was 
shown to save 60% of execution time when compared with the 
CBC mode.  Furthermore, the hash value of the data file might 
be utilized to provide integrity check in addition to encryption 
using AES128. As a result, the PBC mode has a better speed 
performance on top of the confidentiality and security 
provided by the CBC mode. 
Keywords-block cipher; cryptography; data encryption; mode 
of operation; parallel processing 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Block cipher is a generic process in which data are 
handled in fixed size blocks. It can be used to handle a single 
chunk as well as a stream of data. Different ways to handle 
the data blocks will end up in different modes of operation 
for the block cipher. There are five modes of operation for 
block cipher that have been approved by the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST of USA) [1] to 
be used for encryption: Electronic Codebook mode (ECB), 
Cipher Block Chaining mode (CBC), Cipher Feedback mode 
(CFB), Output Feedback mode (OFB) and Counter mode 
(CTR). 
The Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode is the simplest 
mode among the encryption modes. The plaintext is split into 
blocks, and each block is processed independently [2]. The 
mathematical formulas for the ECB are: 
Ci= Ek (Pi)   (1) 
Pi= Dk (Ci)   (2) 
The Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode was brought to 
us in 1978 by Ehrsam, Meyer, Smith and Tuchman [3]. In 
the CBC mode, each plaintext block is XOR with the 
previous ciphertext block before being encrypted. To be 
probabilistic, an initialization vector (IV) should be utilized 
in the first block [4]. The mathematical formulas for the 
CBC are: 
Ci= Ek (Pi  ⊕ C(i-1))   (3) 
Pi= Dk (Ci) ⊕ C(i-1)   (4) 
where, C0= IV 
The Cipher Feedback (CFB) mode uses the previous 
ciphertext as input for encryption. The encryption output is 
XOR with the current plaintext block to produce the 
ciphertext of the current block. The mathematical formulas 
for the CFB are: 
Ci= Ek (C(i-1)) ⊕ Pi   (5) 
Pi= Dk (C(i-1)) ⊕ Ci   (6) 
where, C0= IV 
The Output Feedback (OFB) mode uses block cipher as a 
key stream generator. The OFB is XOR the plaintext blocks 
with the generated stream to obtain the ciphertext. Since the 
XOR operation results in symmetry, encryption and 
decryption are exactly the same. The mathematical formulas 
for the OFB are: 
Ci= Pi⊕ Oi   (7) 
Pi=Ci⊕ Oi   (8) 
Oi= Ek (Ii)   (9) 
where, Ii= O(i-1)  & I0=IV 
The counter (CTR) mode was introduced in 1979 by 
Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman [5], it is similar to the 
OFB, and suitable to be implemented on multiprocessor 
devices where many blocks can be encrypted in the same 
time. Furthermore, successive values of a counter are applied 
to a block cipher encryption process to generate the key 
stream. 
Another mode of encryption was proposed by Institute of 
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) [6] and 
recommended by NIST of USA [7] called XTS. XTS mode 
is XEX-based tweaked-codebook mode with ciphertext 
stealing. 
Generally, cryptography could be the best solution for 
data security [7]. In fact, cryptography can help improve data 
security from different aspects: firstly, the provider of 
services cannot acquire any information about encrypted user 
data. Secondly, if user data are corrupted by an attacker, the 
corruption can be easily identified by the user himself/herself 
[8]. Also, cryptography applications can easily be installed in 
computers, smart phones and other mobile devices so users 
can conveniently protect and share their data with trusted 
parties. Thus, cryptosystem can provide authentication, 
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confidentiality and integrity, as well as trusted data sharing 
[8]. 
There are two main cryptographic schemes, deterministic 
encryption and probabilistic encryption. For deterministic 
encryption, encrypting identical plaintext multiple times 
yield identical ciphertext every time. On the other hand, 
encrypting identical plaintext many times using probabilistic 
encryption yield different ciphertext every time even if the 
same encryption key is used (and different Initial Vectors 
(IV) are used). For example, the ECB mode uses 
deterministic encryption while the CBC mode uses 
probabilistic encryption.  
Deterministic encryption is vulnerable to substitution 
attack, which means it is easy to attack the ciphertext if the 
same message is sent twice [7]. Therefore, Goldwasser and 
Micali brought in probabilistic encryption in 1984 [9]. This 
is a scheme for encryption where a plaintext is encrypted into 
one of many possible ciphertext (not only a single ciphertext 
as in deterministic scheme) and is free from substitution 
attack [10].  
Some people have concerns about putting all of their data 
and files in online servers. If a hacker can launch a 
successful attack to an exposed service, he/she may be able 
to get all the user’s information. Furthermore, if the hacker 
tries to use or resell the stolen information, it would be a 
privacy and security catastrophe. To overcome these issues, 
service providers often use secure and reliable encryption 
techniques to secure their systems. While cryptography can 
offer a high level of data security, there are security concerns 
[11]. Cryptanalysis also shows some weaknesses in various 
block cipher modes, such as the sequential nature of the CBC 
mode [12]. In response, a parallel block cipher mode was 
developed [13]. 
II. RELATED WORKS 
The five approved block cipher modes (ECB, CBC, CFB 
OFB and CTR) are divided into two types.  The ECB and 
CBC modes use block cipher for encryption, while the CFB, 
OFB and CTR use block cipher as a key stream generator. 
Each of these five modes has its own shortcomings. 
Deterministic encryption is the biggest issue in the ECB 
mode which leads to a substitution attack [7], as shown in the 
following example. 
Assume the data shown in Figure 1 is to be transferred 
between banks. Let us assume that each of the fields has 
exactly the same size of a block used in the block cipher (16 
bytes in the case of AES). And the encryption key shared 
between the two banks does not change too frequently. Due 
to the nature of the ECB mode and deterministic scheme, an 
attacker can easily substitute block number 4 (which contains 
the receiving account number) without deciphering with the 
ciphertext block with his own account number. As a 
consequence, all transfers from bank A to bank B will be 
redirected to the attacker’s account. Interesting enough, the 
attack works without having to attack the block cipher (e.g. 
AES) itself. 
The CBC mode does not allow the encryption process to 
be parallelized to make it work faster as there is reliance on 
the previous ciphertext block [12]. Furthermore, in the CBC 
mode, chaining between the blocks means one corrupted 
cipher block will result in two corrupted blocks [14]. 
Example of breaking the CBC chain is shown in table I. 
The CFB and OFB modes have similar issues as the CBC 
mode, in that they cannot parallelize their encryption 
processes to make them faster [7]. Therefore, they will 
struggle in terms of speed, especially with big data. In 
addition, there is a common problem for the CFB, OFB and 
CTR stream modes, it is the flipping bits. If a bit flip error 
arises in ciphertext in a particular block, then after 
decryption, the error is limited to the exact bit of the exact 
block of plaintext [15]. Flipping a ciphertext bit flips the 
corresponding plaintext bit. The attack aims to change a bit 
in the decrypted plaintext by flipping a bit in the ciphertext 
thereby changing the decrypted plaintext. 
For example, assume an attacker knows the ciphertext for 
an electronic fund transfer, which contains the ASCII string 
"$1000.00" for the transfer amount. The attacker can alter 
the amount to "$9000.00" by XOR the part of cipher text for 
the string with the result of (“$1000.00" ⊕ "$9000.00”): 
 
          "$1000.00" ⊕ ("$1000.00" ⊕"$9000.00")  
      = "$1000.00" ⊕ "$1000.00" ⊕ "$9000.00"  
      = "$9000.00" 
Note that: 
 "$1000.00" ⊕ "$1000.00" = all zeros 
 All zeros ⊕ "$9000.00" = "$9000.00"  
 
In addition, there is no chaining between blocks in the 
CTR mode. Thus, if Eve (an attacker) modifies any block, 
Bob (a receiver) will never know about that. Moreover, the 
CTR requires synchronization of the initial counter value 
between the encryption party and decryption party. A policy 
to ensure that the next communication's initial counter value 
is unique and correct should be in place and enforced. This 
might require a private communication channel [16].  
XEX based Tweaked-codebook mode with ciphertext 
Stealing (XTS) mode is developed based on the XOR 
Encrypt XOR mode (XEX) [17] with Ciphertext Stealing 
mode (CTS) feature. However, it is slower than the CBC 
mode due to more mathematical operations (such as XOR 
and multiplication) [18]. XTS mode uses XOR function. 
 
Blocks     















Figure 1.  Example for a substitution attack against the ECB mode 
TABLE I. EXAMPLE OF BREAKING THE CBC CHAIN 
CBC Encryption: CBC Decryption: 
If C1 is corrupted to X 
then: 
C0 = Ek (P0 ⊕ IV) 
C1 = Ek (P1 ⊕ C0) 
C2 = Ek (P2 ⊕ C1) 
C3 = Ek (P3 ⊕ C2) 
C4 = Ek (P4 ⊕ C3) 
P0 = Dk (C0) ⊕ IV 
P1 = Dk (C1) ⊕ C0 
P2 = Dk (C2) ⊕ C1 
P3 = Dk (C3) ⊕ C2 
P4 = Dk (C4) ⊕ C3 
P0  = Dk (C0) ⊕ IV 
P1’ =  Dk (X) ⊕ C0     ≠ 
P1 
P2’ =  Dk (C2) ⊕ X   ≠ 
P2 
However: 
P3 = Dk (C3) ⊕ C2 
P4 = Dk (C4) ⊕ C3 
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Before and after each encryption process (like XEX), and 
uses two keys instead of one key [19]. Since there is no built-
in mechanism to detect alterations (an active attack) [4], any 
altered ciphertext (by attacker) will be decrypted to some 
legitimate plaintext.  
Some may argue that the CTR_CBC MAC mode (CCM) 
can provide an integrity check in addition to performing 
encryption [20]. However, the inherently sequential nature of 
the CBC mode, and the need for two passes with AES, can 
make CCM AES a slower scheme [21]. CCM mode requires 
a longer processing time than the CBC mode (CBC is a 
special case of CCM).  
A Galois/Counter mode of operation (GCM) was 
proposed by McGrew and Viega in 2004 [22]. The GCM 
mode has been approved by the NIST of USA as an 
authenticated mode of operation [23]. The GCM mode 
ensures data confidentiality using the CTR mode. It delivers 
guarantee of the authenticity of the confidential data using a 
hash function which is defined over a binary Galois field 
[23]. However, while the CTR mode is a part of the GCM 
mode, therefore it could be vulnerable to the flipping bits 
attack which we mentioned above. In addition, the GCM 
mode is vulnerable to replay attack [23], in other words, 
similar to numerous authentication modes, GCM does not 
naturally stop an attacker from interrupting the message and 
replaying it for authenticated decryption at a later time, for 
example, in an attempt to imitate a party that has access to 
the key. 
The Extended Codebook (XCB) Mode of Operation was 
proposed by McGrew and Fluhrer in 2004 [24].  The XCB 
was the first mode that constructed from the hash CTR hash. 
The XCB used the CTR mode of operation in order to ease 
tackling variable length messages. However, Chakraborty 
and Sarkar reported that the XCB has limitation [25]. While 
the XCB mode adopt the ciphertext block as a key, therefore, 
the key length and the length of the block must be identical 
[25]. Thus, it is impossible to use the XCB mode once the 
length of the key is different from the length of the block, as 
for example in AES with 192bit key and 128bit block. 
Parallel ciphering can improve the speed performance of 
the encryption. Big data usually stored in distributed 
locations, therefore parallel encryption is needed in order to 
encrypt the large number of blocks or chunks of data 
separately, which takes much longer when using sequential 
encryption. 
III. PARALLEL BLOCK CIPHER MODE 
Data encryption is one of the most common practical 
choices for computing developers and database designers [26] 
to protect data. The biggest database management systems 
like Microsoft’s SQL Server and Oracle adopted the CBC 
mode in block cipher algorithms [27], as well as most of 
cryptosystems nowadays adopting the CBC in their block 
cipher. Because of its popularity, we choose the CBC as the 
sequential block cipher mode to compare with Parallel Block 
Cipher (PBC) mode, was briefly presented in 2015 [13]. 
Before we present the comparison, we introduce the PBC 
briefly Below. 
The PBC mode parallelizes the encryption process. It 
converts plaintext blocks to ciphertext blocks without any 
chaining occurring between data or outputs from another 
block. The hash of the file is utilized to generate encryption 
and decryption keys. Multiple blocks can be encrypted in 
one round and each plain text block does not need to wait for 
outputs from a previous block to start or complete the 
encryption process, making parallelization possible. The 
proposed PBC mode makes use of 128 bit key AES and hash 
function [28]. Encryption diagram is shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2.  The PBC encryption diagram. 
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      𝐻(𝑃) 
Step 2. First of all, the plaintext P will be hashed 
to obtain the hash value of the data H(P) in order to 
mix it with the key.𝐻(𝑃)
𝐸𝐾1(𝐻(𝑃)),   𝐴𝐸𝑆128
               𝑊 
𝑃𝑖
𝐸𝐾2(𝑃𝑖),   𝐴𝐸𝑆128
             𝑌𝑖   
In the second step, we encrypt the hash value H(P) 
using K1 = IV ⊕ K (where K is the session key) to 
obtain W. then, encrypt the plaintext Pi using K2 = 
((IV⊕ K) ⊕ H(P)) to yield the ciphertext of the 
data Yi. 
Step 3. 𝑊 +  𝑌𝑖
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
          𝐶𝑖  
Finally, we combine W and Yi to produce 
the complete ciphertext Ci which involves 
the ciphertext of the data and the hash 
value. 




        𝑊 + 𝑌𝑖  
To decrypt the ciphertext Ci using the 
PBC mode firstly we have to extract the 
ciphertext of the hash value W which is 
located in the first block of the ciphertext, 
the rest of the ciphertext is Yi. 
Step 2. 𝑊
𝐷𝐾1 𝑊),   𝐴𝐸𝑆
−1128
               𝐻(𝑃)  
Secondly, we will decrypt the ciphertext 
of the hash value W to retrieve a copy of 
the original hash value H(P). 
Step 3. 𝑌𝑖
𝐷𝐾2 𝑌𝑖),   𝐴𝐸𝑆
−1128
               𝑃𝑖       
Then decrypt using K2 the rest of the 
ciphertext Yi to retrieve Pi which represent 
the original data. 
Step 4. Integrity check, H2(P) = H(P), (optinal) 
Furthermore, the PBC mode facilitates a 
message integrity check (step 4). The PBC 
mode can check the integrity of the 
message by comparing the hash of the 
copy of the original file which derived 
from Ci with H(P). This step is optional, 
because the proposed PBC mode is an 
encryption mode and not an authenticated 
encryption mode.  
Decryption diagram is shown in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3.  The PBC decryption diagram. 
 
IV. IMPLEMENTATION  
Microsoft Visual Studio (MVS) 2010 and Dot Net 
Framework 4.5 were used to implement the CBC mode and 
the PBC mode. Two console applications were developed. 
The first one for the execution of the CBC mode and another 
one for the execution of the PBC mode. We have used 
System.Security.Cryptography package to utilize 
cryptographic services in MVS such as secure encryption 
and decryption of data using AES, as well as calculating 
hash value hash function. 
 





(a) The PBC servers’ box (multiple servers are running) 
 
 
(b) The CBC servers’ box (single server is running) 
Figure 5.  PBC and CBC servers’ boxes. 
To parallelize the PBC mode, a Task Parallel Library 
(TPL) was also used. The TPL is a set of public types and 
Application Programming Interfaces in the 
System.Threading and System.Threading.Tasks packages. 
The TPL aims to simplify the process of adding parallelism 
to applications and efficiently use all the CPUs that are 
available. In our case, the TPL can let multiple cores 
computer to run eight CPUs at the same time to allow the 
program to run in parallel. 
The executions of the sequential the CBC mode and the 
parallel PBC mode have been conducted using thirteen data 
samples with different sizes (100MB, 200MB, 300MB, 
400MB, 500MB, 600MB, 700MB, 800MB, 900MB, 1GB, 
1.1GB, 1.2GB and 1.3GB). 
V. RESULTS AND EVALUATION 
A. Experimental Results 
The PBC mode has been tested and compared with the 
CBC mode in three different scenarios. A single data file was 
used as input for the PBC mode which uses only one process. 
In the second scenario, the data file was manually split into 
data blocks and used as input for the PBC mode using 
multiple processes. Finally, a single data file is used as input 
for the PBC mode using multiple processes. In the last 
scenario, the PBC mode automatically splits the data file, 
processes the blocks, and recombines encrypted blocks to an 
encrypted data file. 
1) Scenario 1  
The PBC mode has been tested using a single process 
and compared with the CBC mode [13] in computers using 
Windows 7 and an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7 2600 CPU. 
CrypTool 2.1 and AES128 algorithm were used. The 
CBC_AES parameters were: action is encryption, key size is 
128 bits, block size is 128 bites, chaining mode is the CBC, 
and padding mode is zeros. The PBC and CBC modes were 
running with a single process and a single input file was not 
split into blocks. The PBC mode was running like the CBC 
mode in a sequential manor. The results in Figure 4 indicate 
that the PBC mode is faster than the CBC mode even when 
both run on a single process. However, the time difference 
between the CBC mode and the PBC mode is quite small, it 
is only 1.61% on average using single process. 
2) Scenario 2 
When a single process is used, parallel processing for the 
data blocks were in fact not tested. So we proceed to test the 
PBC mode with input data being broken manually into 8 sub 
files. Each sub file is fed to a single process. Outputs from all 
eight processes were manually combined to generate the 
encrypted file. The time difference between the CBC mode 
and the PBC mode now increased to 19.61% on average. The 
PBC can save approximately one fifth of the execution time 
as compared to the CBC mode. 
3) Scenario 3 
Nowadays, most of the high performance computers have 
more than one processor (CPU). We can treat those 
computers as multiple computers in a single box. This idea 
was adopted in this test. 
 
 
(a). Single standalone server is running 
 
(b) The execution result 
Figure 6.  Running the CBC mode in virtual machine (CPU usage of the 
server). 
 
(a) Single server running among eight servers 
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(b) The execution result 
Figure 7.  Running the CBC mode using Affinity Mask (CPU usage of the 
server). 
 
 (a) Eight servers running in parallel 
 
(b) The execution result 
Figure 8.  Running the PBC mode on multiple servers (CPU usage of the 
server). 
One computer with Intel(R) Core(TM) i7 2600 CPU (8 
CPUs) and 16GB RAM adopted to perform this test. 
Assumption 1. Assume that this computer has multiple 
processors (can be multiple servers) in a single box 
simulating eight servers, as shown in figs. 5a and 5b. 
Assumption 2. Suppose every server mentioned in this 
paper has 1 CPU and 2 gigabyte RAM. 
Limitation 1. Tests executed using data files with size 
ranging from 100MB to 1.3GB due to computer hardware 
limitation.  
While the CBC cannot run in parallel [29] due to the 
block chaining feature, it will be run on a single server, as 
shown in Figure 5b. We have two options when using only a 
single server for a multiprocessor computer. The first option 
is to use virtual machine (VM) that runs on one server. 
Figure 6a shows the CPU usage when the CBC mode is run 
using of VM which uses one server. Encrypting 1.3GB file 
takes about 99.49 seconds (1:39.49), as shown in Figure 6b. 
The second option is to use CPU Affinity Mask to force 
the multiprocessor computer to use a single CPU and 16GB 
RAM. As a result, encrypting 1.3GB file using the CBC 
mode takes about 92.84 seconds (1:32.84), as shown in 
Figure 7b. Which is very close to the previous result and the 
improvement may be attributed to the larger RAM used. 
The PBC can be run processes in parallel using all the 
servers in the box (eight servers in this test), as shown in 
Figure 8a. The whole duration of hashing, breaking the file 
into parts, encrypting and combining the encrypted parts into 
one encrypted file using the PBC mode takes the average 
41.4 seconds for a 1.3GB data file. The result is shown in 
Figure 8b, which is significantly better than the previous 
results. It shows that the PBC mode is more than twice as 
fast as the CBC mode. 
Note that when we use 8 servers, the expected encryption 
time is around one eighth of that used by the CBC mode 
(approximately 13 s). The actual time used is around 17.42 s. 
With overheads for splitting the data file (14.68 s) and 
joining the cipher blocks (9.30 s), the total time span adds up 
to 41.40 s. 
 

























































Multiple servers’ tests were executed using data files 
from 100MB till 1.3GB, with an increment of 100MB for 
each data file. Execution time was measured in seconds. The 
percentage time saving between the PBC mode and the CBC 
mode is about 60% on average for all data file sizes. In other 
words, the PBC mode takes only 40% of the CBC mode 
execution time to encrypt the same amount of data. The test 
results were shown in Figure 9. 
B. Discusions  
The PBC mode is faster than the standard CBC mode in 
terms of execution time. As mentioned in the experimental 
results section, the proposed mode proves to be superior to 
the original CBC mode in terms of execution time under 
multiple servers’ environment. As shown in Figure 9, the 
PBC can save up to 60% of the CBC mode encryption time.  
Furthermore, the proposed PBC mode provides 
confidentiality. The PBC mode essentially has a similar 
concept of chaining blocks as in the CBC block cipher in 
terms of security performance. The PBC mode chains all the 
blocks together using the hash value of the plaintext. The key 
used to encrypt the plaintext blocks is generated using the 
hash value, therefore the hash value is used in encrypting 
every single block. If one cipher block is corrupted, then the 
corresponding plain text block will also be corrupted. The 
hash of the decrypted plaintext will differ from the original 
hash sent to the receiver. This will provide an integrity check 
on top of the confidentiality provided by encryption. 
Accordingly, the security thoughts of the CBC can be 
applied straight away to those of the PBC mode. Since the 
CBC mode of operation is revealed to be safe against 
numerous attacks such as chosen ciphertext attacks, 
ciphertext only and, known plaintext, we can claim that the 
proposed PBC mode is also safe against these attacks. As 
well as, the key stream of the CBC mode involves two inputs: 
key and IV. While the PBC mode key stream involves key, 
IV, and the hash value of all blocks, which add another 
degree of randomness. 
Moreover, the proposed PBC mode has faster error 
recovery than the CBC mode. As mentioned in table I, in the 
CBC mode one ciphertext block corrupted will affect two 
plaintext blocks as a result. However, in the PBC mode one 
ciphertext block corrupted will affect the corresponding 
block only. As a result, in case of AES, corrupting 16 bytes 
block in the CBC mode affect 32 bytes blocks, and 
corrupting 16 bytes block in the PBC mode affect only 16 
bytes block. 
In relation to the CTR mode which is intended for 
parallelized processes and has been commonly utilized in 
high speed network standards. However, the PBC mode does 
not require counter synchronization.  The unique values of 
IV and the hash deliver better security than the CTR mode. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The new PBC mode considerably increases the speed of 
encryption process. In this mode, each cipher block makes 
use of the characteristics of the entire file (hash value of the 
file) instead of just the previous cipher block during 
encryption as in the CBC to improve the randomness of the 
key stream. This mode offers high levels of security, and 
better speed performance as compared to the standard CBC 
mode. In the future, the PBC mode can be tested in a real 
network and using a cloud environment with larger files. 
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Abstract-- Cloud computing is a model for using computer 
resources and technologies to provide services such as 
storage and applications. Users can access and use the cloud 
computing services without the need to acquire knowledge, 
expertise or even administration of infrastructures that 
support these services. Cloud computing can be a general 
concept which includes software services and other modern 
technological functionality in the information technology 
world. Since cloud computing shares distributed resources 
through the Internet and intranet in the exposed 
environment, security is therefore an important issue. 
Cryptography is one of the common practical choices for 
cloud computing developers. It can offer a high level of 
security. However, cryptanalysis shows some weaknesses in 
block cipher modes, such as parallelization for Cipher 
Block Chaining (CBC) mode. This paper will explore the 
security issues of the standard block cipher modes of 
operation as well as in cloud computing. In addition, a new 
mode of encryption called the parallel encryption mode will 
be presented. In this mode each cipher block makes use of 
the characteristics of the entire file instead of just the 
previous cipher block. Therefore, if any single plaintext 
block is changed, all the cipher blocks will be changed. This 
mode offers high levels of security, integrity and enhances 
the performance of the block cipher in terms of speed as 
compared to standard CBC mode. 
 
Index Terms-- Cloud Computing, Data Security, Modes 
of Encryption and Encryption Schemes. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
First of all, we have to clarify that cloud computing is not a 
new technology but a new form of service. To understand this 
we must put forward a simplified definition of cloud computing 
which states that cloud computing is a model for using 
computing resources (Hardware and Software) via the Internet 
to introduce to us as a service. Users do not have to know or 
master the concept of how this service operates, runs, gets 
connected, and what software is installed on it. There are three 
main types of services offered by the cloud: Software as a 
Service (SaaS); Platform as a Service (PaaS); and Infrastructure 
as a Service (IaaS) [1]. SaaS means using software which is 
already stored in the cloud such as YouTube. PaaS is using the 
cloud as a platform to install applications and operating systems 
in a platform to ensure homogeneity between applications such 
as the Google app Engine. IaaS is using the cloud as 
 
 
infrastructure (Processor, memory, hard drive and limited 
number of users). Users are free to use these components in any 
way such as the Amazon web service. Fig. 1 shows the Cloud 
Computing Service Models with their examples. In addition, 
four deployment models have been identified for cloud 
architecture solutions, namely Private cloud; Community cloud; 
Public cloud and Hybrid cloud [2]. The cloud infrastructure of 
the Private cloud is functioned for a private organization. 
Private cloud can be managed by the same organization 
(organization that owns the cloud) or by external organization. 
The cloud infrastructure of the Community cloud provides 
services to a number of organizations and supports a specific 
community that has shared interests. Community cloud can be 
managed by the same organization (organization that owns the 
cloud) or by a third party. The cloud infrastructure of the Public 
cloud is made accessible to the universal public or an enormous 
organizations group and is managed by an organization offering 
cloud services. The cloud infrastructure of the Hybrid cloud is a 
mixture of two or more clouds (private, community, or public). 
Hybrid cloud is usually used by organizations that use small 
amounts of data or need special applications. 
Cloud computing has many advantages over traditional 
computing such as: easy access to most of the applications we 
need regardless of time or place. Reducing the expense of 
buying new high performance computers and hardware; 
ensuring continuity of service. Cloud computing organizations 
work 24/7. However, there are security concerns. Some people 
have concerns about putting all of their information and files in 
the cloud. If a hacker can launch a successful attack to an 
exposed service, he/she may be able to get all the user 
information. 
 
Fig.1. Cloud computing service models [3]. 
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Also, if the hacker tries to use or re-sell the stolen information, it 
would be a privacy and security catastrophe. To overcome these 
issues, cloud service providers often use secure and reliable 
encryption techniques to secure their systems. 
The two main encryption schemes are Deterministic 
encryption and Probabilistic encryption. For Deterministic 
encryption, encrypting identical plaintext multiple times will 
yield identical ciphertext every time. On the other hand, 
encrypting identical plaintext many times using Probabilistic 
encryption yield different ciphertext every time if the same 
encryption key is used in all cases. These two encryption 
schemes are used by many types of modes of encryption in 
different situations. For example, Electronic Code Book mode 
uses Deterministic encryption while Cipher Block Chaining 
mode uses Probabilistic encryption. This paper presents a new 
cipher block mode for Probabilistic encryption to secure data in 
the cloud. 
II. SECURITY ISSUES 
A. Standard Modes of Encryption 
There are five modes of encryption for block cipher that have 
been approved by the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) [4]: electronic codebook mode (ECB), 
cipher block chaining mode (CBC), cipher feedback mode 
(CFB), output feedback mode (OFB) and counter mode (CTR). 
Each of these five modes has its own shortcomings. Firstly, 
deterministic encryption is the big issue of ECB mode, which 
means if you encrypt the same plaintext blocks more than once 
you will have identical ciphertext blocks, while the key is not 
changed. Subsequently, this will lead to substitution attack 
against ECB mode [5]. Secondly, the encryption process for 
CBC mode cannot be parallelized to make it faster, as there is 
reliance on the previous ciphertext block [6]. The ECB and 
CBC modes use block cipher for encryption, while CFB, OFB 
and CTR use block cipher as a key stream generator. CFB and 
OFB modes have similar issues to CBC mode, in that they 
cannot parallelize their encryption processes to make them 
faster. Therefore, they will struggle in terms of speed, especially 
with big data. In addition, there is a shared problem between 
CFB, OFB and CTR stream modes which called flipping bits. If 
a bit flip error arises in ciphertext in particular block, then after 
decryption, the error is limited to the exact bit of the exact block 
of plaintext [7]. Flipping a ciphertext bit flips the corresponding 
plaintext bit. In addition, in CTR mode, there is no chaining 
between the blocks. Thus, if Eve modifies any block, Bob will 
never know about that. Moreover, the difficulty in the execution 
of CTR is in the deflection of the counter value between the 
encryption party and decryption party, both of them needing a 
policy for counter synchronization to ensure that the next 
communication's initial counter value is unique and correct this 
might require a private communication channel [8]. In 
cryptosystems, the integrity of the message is critical for 
satisfactory security, yet all five standard modes do not provide 
this feature. 
B. Cloud Computing 
Nowadays, cloud computing is used by millions of people 
around the world. Cloud computing gives users the opportunity 
to store data in the cloud for easy access anytime and anywhere. 
However, cloud computing poses many security issues with 
regard to confidentiality and integrity. For data distribution in 
the cloud, both confidentiality and integrity are vital in order to 
avoid data from being vulnerable to unauthorized attacks [9]. In 
terms of confidentiality, in the cloud environment, user’s data is 
controlled by service providers and not by users themselves. 
The potential for data leaks is real, either intentionally or 
accidentally, which is unacceptable [10, 11]. Furthermore, data 
in the cloud is stored in geographically diverse locations; 
therefore confidentiality becomes a big concern [12]. Once 
users use cloud services, they perhaps won’t know precisely 
where their information is stored [13]. In this situation, it is 
better for the cloud service providers to offer high levels of 
encryption techniques to secure the data wherever it is. In 
relation to integrity, confidentiality is not enough to guarantee 
cloud computing security. Users want to ensure that their data 
has not being improperly modified or compromised by a third 
party. Cloud service suppliers should apply methods to 
guarantee data integrity [1]. In addition, as the data is stored in 
diverse locations in a cloud, the access control methods need to 
be completely safe and every user needs to be verified as an 
authentic user [12]. 
III. PROPOSED WORK 
It is well known that there are several ways to protect files in 
the cloud. Data encryption could be the most common practical 
choice for cloud computing developers and database 
designers[13].The biggest database management systems like 
Microsoft’s SQL Server and Oracle use CBC mode in block 
cipher algorithms [14, 15]. However, in CBC mode chaining 
between the blocks necessarily means that one corrupted cipher 
block will result in two corrupted blocks [16]. Furthermore, 
CBC cannot parallelize the encryption process to make it any 
faster. Thus, we propose a parallel encryption mode for 
encrypting files in the cloud. This parallel encryption mode 
parallelizes the encryption process and provides integrity. It is 
encrypting plaintext blocks to produce ciphertext blocks 
without any chaining occurring between plaintext and 
ciphertext. The hash of the file is used to encrypt and decrypt the 
blocks, thus changing one block will affect the whole file. Each 
plaintext block does not need to wait for the previous ciphertext 
block to start the encryption, making parallelization possible. 
The proposed parallel encryption mode has utilized AES128bit 
key and MD5 (HF) together. 
We chose AES128 to match with the output of MD5. MD5 
produces a 128bit message digest [17] and the proposed parallel 
encryption mode uses 16 byte block. The Initial Vector IV 
should be known by both parties (Alice and Bob) but 
unpredictable for a third party (Eve). In particular, the IV should 
be unpredictable and not related to the plaintext.  
 
 
Fig. 2.  Encryption process. 
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              (2) 
                  (3) 
 
Thus, encrypting files using the Parallel Encryption mode 
requires the following steps. Firstly, file X will be hashed using 
MD5 to obtain the hash value H(Xi). Secondly, IV will XORed 
(Exclusive or) with the key (K) and the result will XORed with 
the hash value H(Xi), ((IV⊕ K) ⊕ H(Xi)).The result of these 
two XOR functions will be used as a key input to the AES 
algorithm (shown as ‘E’ in equations 1 and 2) to encrypt the file 
and obtain the ciphertext (Yi) (shown in equation 2). At the 
same time, the hash value H(Xi) will be encrypted using the 
AES algorithm and using IV ⊕K as a key input to obtain an 
encrypted form of the H(Xi) (shown as ‘W’ in the diagram and 
equation 1). Finally, W will be sent together with the rest of 
cipher blocks (Yi) to the destination (shown as ‘Ci’ in the 
diagram and equation 3).The cipher block (W) will be the first 
block of the final ciphertext (Ci) sent, so that the decryption 
process can commence after receiving only two blocks. 
Encryption logic is shown above in Fig. 2. 
Furthermore, the Parallel Encryption mode facilitates a 
message integrity check. The decryption process is actually a 
reverse of the encryption process. We split the first cipher block 
(W) from Ci and decrypt it using AES-1 and the decryption key 
IV ⊕K to obtain the hash value H(Xi). Then decrypt the rest of 
cipher blocks (Yi) using AES-1 (Shown as ‘D’ in equations 4 
and 5) and the decryption key H(Xi) ⊕(IV ⊕K) to obtain a 
copy of the original file X. 
 
 
Fig.3. Decryption process. 
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In relation to integrity, this mode provides integrity without 
the need for a Message Authentication Code (MAC). We can 
check the integrity of the message by comparing the hash of the 
copy of the original file we derived from Ci and H(Xi).This 
extra step (integrity step) is optional. Decryption logic is shown 
above in Fig. 3. 
Some may argue that CTR (Counter mode) plus CBC-MAC 
mode (CCM) can provide an integrity check in addition to 
performing encryption. However, the inherently sequential 
nature of CBC mode, and the need for two passes with AES, can 
make CCM-AES a slower scheme [18]. CCM mode requires a 
longer time than CBC mode (CBC is part of CCM). As a result, 
the Parallel Encryption mode would be better than CCM in 
terms of speed and provides message integrity in addition to 
encryption. 
IV. 3BEXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
The Parallel Encryption mode has been tested in computers 
using Windows 7 and an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2600 CPU. 
CrypTool 2.1 [19] used to compare the results between CBC 
mode and the Parallel Encryption mode using an AES 
algorithm. The results indicate that to encrypt a one gigabyte file 
using 128bits key input, CBC mode took 156889 ms and 
Parallel Encryption mode took 154362 ms. Noticeably, the gap 
between the CBC mode encryption time and Parallel Encryption 
mode encryption time would be increased with  increasing file 
size, as shown in table I: 
Table I: Comparison between Existing CBC mode and 
proposed mode. 
 
The time difference between CBC mode and the Parallel 
Encryption mode to encrypt one gigabyte of data is 2527ms.  
  
Fig .4.  The time difference between the two modes of 
encryption. 
 
Fig. 4 shows the time difference between the two modes of 
encryption for files up to five gigabytes, it is states that the time 
difference between the two modes increases linearly with file 
size. 
V. CONCLUSION 
A new Parallel Encryption mode with faster speed and an 
integrity check was described in this paper. MD5 hash function 
was used to produce the 128bit hash values. The hash value of 
the original file was used as part of the encryption and 
decryption keys generation process. This hash function ensured 
that any change in the plaintext blocks will affect all cipher 
blocks. Furthermore, the CrypTool 2.1 platform for 
cryptography and cryptanalysis was utilized to measure the 
encryption times of both CBC and Parallel Encryption mode. 
Then, we compare the encryption times and the result indicates 
that Parallel Encryption mode is faster than CBC. In addition, 
the file hash value in Parallel Encryption mode can be used as an 
integrity check. To sum up, Parallel Encryption mode provides 
a faster encryption process and integrity check as compared to 
CBC mode. In the future, we will use the proposed mode to 
develop new cloud cryptosystems and infrastructure to secure 
users’ data and information. 
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Cloud computing is a model which provides an easy, cheap, and flexible technological services. However, 
it poses some security problems. One of the most common security problems is the TCP DoS attack. This 
attack threatens any cloud in terms of energy consumption and resources exhaustion. In this paper, we 
propose a method to mitigate the DoS attacks in a cloud by reducing excessive energy consumption via 
limiting the number of packets. Instead of system shutdown, the proposed method ensures the 
availability of service. The proposed method can better manage the incoming packets by dropping 
packets from the most frequent requesting sources. This method shows that it can process 98.4% of the 
accepted packets during an attack. Furthermore, it is proved that dropping the most frequent requesting 
sources will always save more energy than not dropping when under attacks. 
1. Introduction 
The importance of the cloud computing has been significantly increasing within the last decade due to 
the ever increasing services and facilities that cloud can deliver. In addition, cloud computing services 
are in extremely high demand from organizations and individuals as a result of benefits the services can 
offer, such as better computing power, inexpensive operation costs, good performance, and high 
availability. On the other hand, cloud computing projects have some security issues that need to be 
addressed [1]. One of the most concerning issues is the Denial of Service (DoS) attacks [2]. There are 
many types of DoS and distributed DoS attacks. Many of them were mentioned in [3]. One of those types 
is the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) DoS flood attack, which we will discuss in this paper. The TCP 
DoS attacks can flood the victim’s network with extremely large numbers of packets to shut the network 
down and prevent legitimate users from accessing the services, to exhaust the resources and cause 
overheating, and to consume more energy than expected. Historically, in 2013 there was an incident of 
overheating Microsoft’s data center which led to 16 hours’ shutdown in Microsoft’s cloud services, such 
as SkyDrive, Hotmail and Outlook [4]. Therefore, developing an efficient DoS mitigation method that can 
keep the services available 24/7 and reduce the excessive energy consumption is an important research 
topic. In this paper, we propose an energy efficient TCP DoS attack mitigation method that can be 
implemented in the cloud environment. The proposed method is designed to keep the incoming packets 
number under the number of packets the server can handle. Thus, this method can improve the services 
for cloud projects with protecting them against the packets flood, as well as reducing cost and energy 
consumption. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 briefly describes the proposed method. In Section 
3, we evaluate the performance of the proposed method. In Section 4 we sum up this paper with 
conclusions. 
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2. The Proposed Method 
In this section, we discuss cloud architecture as well as the mitigation method. Our cloud includes: (1) 
data storage, a single server point (Server); (2) several other points that represent the legitimate points 
(Client); (3) spurious points (Attacker); and (4) TCP packets (TCPPackets). Assume that the Attacker uses a 
real, not faked or spoofed IP. We also assume that TPackets is the rate of TCPPackets, which Server can handle 
within a time frame Time, and LPackets is the total rate of the legitimate TCPPackets, that the Client points 
send to the server. The following equation is a further assumption that the rate of the legitimate packets 
is at most the half of the handling capacity of the Server to allow for the bursts of requests: 
 
In addition, we assume that together with the legitimate packets, the Attacker is able to send spurious 
to make TCPPackets more than what the Server can handle. We denote the Attacker spurious packets as 
SPackets, such that: 
 
The proposed method aims to keep the sum of LPackets and SPackets smaller than TPackets to ensure the 
availability of a cloud project, reduce energy consumption, and decrease the cost of the cloud 
maintenance: 
 
In case of a normal traffic when no attack is occurred to the cloud, 
 
From equation (2), 𝐿𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠 = 𝑇𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠 / 2, equation (3) is satisfied for the normal traffic scenario. 
On the other hand, in the case of abnormal traffic when the attack is performed on the cloud, the 
proposed method ∏ will drop the TCPPackets of the most frequent requesting IP addresses in order to 
ensure that LPackets + SPackets does not exceed TPackets. Most frequent requesting IP addresses can be filtered 
using any packets filtering method, such as iptables [5]. 
For example, suppose that our server can handle 10 packets per Time, and there are six sources of 
{attacker | Client} initiating a connection with the Server. The number of packets that are sent by the 
sources are as follows: source1=1 packet, source2=2 packets, source3=3 packets, source4=4 packets, 
source5=5 packets, and source6=6 packets. Therefore, the number of packets that are sent from sources 
1 to 6 are about 21 packets, while the server can handle a maximum of 10 packets within Time. In this 
case, ∏ will use a filter to determine which sources are the most frequent requesting IP addresses, and 
then ∏ will drop them. In our example source5 and source6 have 5+6=11 packets, and the rest of the 
packets are 1+2+3+4=10 packets. Intuitively, source5 and source6 that have relatively higher request 
rates are more likely the target of the TCP DoS attacker sources than the other less frequent requesting 
sources. Even though there is a possibility that source5 and source6 could be Client sources, ∏ can keep 
the request rate below TPackets, and the service is still available. Furthermore, using ∏ will save energy 
during a DoS attack as shown in the performance evaluation section below.  
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3. Performance Evaluation 
We tested the proposed method in our lab. The network contained one Server, one Attacker, and eight 
legitimate Clients. 
We established TCP DoS attacks from the Attacker (IP2) point against the Server (IP1) point alongside with 
the legitimate TCP connection requests from Clients (IP3 to P10). According to Tables 1 and 2, the Attacker 
sent 47807 requests and received only 21130 responses, and the Server sent 47893 requests and made 
21219 responses. 
Wireshark Network Analyser 2.0.0 [6] was used to capture the packets traversing the experimental 
network and no missing packets were discovered, as shown in Table I. 99.7% of the traffic with 68997 
packets were using in TCP protocol. In Tables 1 and 2, sources indicate the source of a packet and 
destinations present the destination of a packet. 
 
Table 1. Overall packets statistics 
 
 
Table 2. Sources and destination statistics 
 
Let the probability of an accepted TCPPackets within the time frame of Time be 𝜀1. The number of all the 
incoming packets during Time is denoted as n. The number of TCPPackets which are expected to be sent to 
the Server during Time must not exceed TPackets ∙ Time. Thus, every single TCPPackets has the following 
probability to be accepted by the Server: 
 
In case of normal traffic when no attack is performed against the cloud, all TCPPackets must be accepted 
by the Server. As a result, the Server accept the TCPPackets with the following probability: 
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As a result, this can be expressed as follows: 
 
Thus, we can claim that the proposed method ∏ can process 98% of the accepted packets during an 
attack.  
As mentioned above, that the TCPPackets of the most frequent requesting IP addresses will be dropped in 
order to ensure that LPackets + SPackets won’t exceed TPackets. However, this means that LPackets which 
represent legitimate users packets could be dropped as well, and not only SPackets has the potential to be 
dropped. Therefore, we must justify ∏ in terms of the energy consumption, and investigate whether the 
benefits of ∏  are sufficient enough when it is compared with the loss of LPackets. If  ∏ drops LPackets from 
the traffic, it costs energy of receiving (Renergy) these packets by the Server, denoted by ∏𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡. Whereas, 
if ∏ drops SPackets from the traffic, it saves energy by not processing the packets (Penergy), as well as saving 
the energy Senergy by not sending packets from a Server to Client, denoted by ∏𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡. According to the 
authors of [7, 8], Senergy is more than Renergy. Consequently, we can formulate the relation between Renergy 
and Penergy + Senergy as follows: 
 
where ∏𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 is the net energy saved when ∏ is in action. 
In case of no attacks 𝑛 ≤ 𝑇𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠 . 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒, from (7) the probability of packets acceptance will be 𝜀1 = 1, 
therefore the profit of ∏ will be calculated as follows: 
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On the other hand, in case of attacks 𝑛 > 𝑇𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠 . 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒, from (7) the probability of packets acceptance 
will be 𝜀1 =
𝑇𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠 ∙𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒
𝑛
 , therefore the profit of ∏ will be calculated as follows: 
 
As a result, dropping TCPPackets of the most frequent requesting IP addresses when under attacks will 
always save more energy than not dropping.  
To recap, this paper handles the security problem in cloud computing and proposes a method to mitigate 
TCP DoS attacks by reducing excessive energy consumption via limiting the number of packets. Instead 
of system shutdown, the proposed method ensures the availability of service. 
4. Conclusion 
To sum up, in this paper we presented an energy efficient TCP based DoS attacks’ mitigation method to 
enhance the security of the cloud on top of saving energy. The method maintains the availability of the 
service by controlling the number of the server processed TCP packets to stay below the number of 
packets which the server can handle. This method can reduce the energy consumption in case of a DoS 
attack thereby reducing the chance of shutting down services due to such attacks. 
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